


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
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# SOME SEMITIC RITES OF MOURNING AND RELIGION

STUDIES ON THEIR ORIGIN AND MUTUAL RELATION

BY

A. J. WENSINCK

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Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam

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AMSTERDAM  
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1917



SOME SEMITIC RITES OF  
MOURNING AND RELIGION



## PREFACE

During the last forty years several prominent students of Semitic philology have inquired into the phenomenon of Semitic worship of ancestors and of the dead. It is sufficient to mention STADE's *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*; OORT's *Over dooden-vereering bij de Israëlieten*; GOLDZIHHER's *Culte des ancêtres* and his *Todtenverehrung*; SCHWALLY's *Leben nach dem Tode*.

The present treatise follows a different line. I have been struck by the fact that many rites of mourning occur also as religious rites. It is my purpose in the first place to show this in some cases which so far have escaped attention or have not sufficiently been discussed.

But research cannot stop after having shown the outward identity of these rites. We must try to explain this identity. This is only possible if we are able to discover the original meaning of the ceremonies as mourning and as religious rites. In some cases we shall not be able to do this.

In other cases it will appear that the mourning rite goes back to the same motive as the religious rite. Here mourning and religion may have gone the same way independently of one another.

In a third class it will appear that as mourning rites they have a meaning rational to the primitive mind, whereas they are not understood in religion. Here our conclusion is, that religion has simply borrowed them from mourning. This calls for an explanation, which it is not difficult to give. In the dominion of mourning some rites have become acts in honour of the dead, acts of worship; and as such they have been adopted by religion, the real domain of worship. Mourning and religion have, also in this point, become neighbouring provinces; and this has led to other units passing from one territory to the other.

I must however warn the reader not to think that my con-



clusions are final in my own opinion. On the contrary, I shall consider my purpose attained, if the following pages instigate others to give their attention to these problems which are important enough to be discussed by students of Semitic science. I therefore beg them to take my inquiries for nothing more than what they are: essays in the proper sense of the word.

Neither will the list of rites discussed here prove to be complete. Cases which seemed either doubtful or to be capable of a double or a manifold interpretation, are treated in the last chapter. But other cases which seemed too doubtful have been omitted altogether.

The present treatise had already been written when Professor GOLDZIHHER's article "Die Entblössung des Hauptes" in *Der Islam* VI, p. 301 sqq. appeared.

I am indebted to Mrs. KUENEN—WICKSTEED for her careful revision of my English manuscript and of the proofs.

I have to thank Professors HOUTSMA, KUPER and SNOUCK HURGRONJE for several remarks and corrections.

Leiden, May 1916.

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# THE THRASHING-FLOOR

## I

On the significance of the thrashing-floor in the life of the Syriac peasants of to day, we possess the admirable treatise by J. G. Wetzstein, entitled „Die Syrische Dreschtafel”. Wetzstein states that „vor jedem Dorfe liegt ein grosser baumloser, aber in niedrig gelegenen Gegenden meist gut beraster, also grüner Anger, welcher die Tenne, bēdar, der Ortschaft heisst”. It is not only for its proper purpose that the thrashing-floor is used nowadays, it is also used for marriage and funeral rites. When a Syriac peasant dies, his body is placed on the thrashing-sledge; if there is an open space near his house, the corpse is put there; but generally it is taken to the common thrashing-floor, where it remains under a tent and where several mourning rites take place, some of which are even continued after the burial.

That the use of the thrashing-floor for mourning rites dates from remote antiquity, is proved by the story of the burial of Jacob, whose body is brought from Egypt to the country East of the Jordan, to the thrashing-floor, called “the thrashing-floor of the thorn”, as is told in Gen. 50, 10: “and they came to the thrashing-floor of the thorn, which is beyond Jordan, and there they mourned with a great and very sore lamentation”<sup>1)</sup>. Here is an example of that wonderful continuity of the East, that makes the Present a living illustration of the Past, and the Past an illustration of the Present. Therefore it is not surprising to find traces of the same custom in the literature lying between the Old Testament and that of the present day. In the Baby-

1) ייבאו עד גרן האמר אשר בעבר הירדן ויספרו שם מספר גדול ובכר מאד

Verhand. Kon. Akad. v. Wetensch. Nieuwe Reeks Dl. XVIII N<sup>o</sup>. 1.



lonian Talmud, Mo'ed ḳaṭan 5b "the field of weepers" (יִדְדָּה בִּירֵין) is mentioned, which is explained as "a field on which people perform their farewell ceremonies to the deceased"<sup>1)</sup>. Probably an utterance of Jeremiah points to the same custom. Chap. 7, 29 the prophet says: "Cut off thine hair, and cast it away and take up a lamentation on glades"<sup>2)</sup>. Here also bewailing scenes appear to take place on bare hills, probably the same places that were used as thrashing-floors. In modern Palestine the thrashing-floor often is a smooth rock<sup>3)</sup>.

In the towns the thrashing-floor did of course not hold the same position as in villages. But the old custom has here too preserved its features: the thrashing-floor has been replaced by the square or the marketplace. This may be inferred from several instances. In the Mishna, Mo'ed ḳaṭan III, 8 the actions to be omitted on feast days are described: "It is not allowed to place the bier on the square, in order to prevent the bewailing of the deceased becoming regular (on these days)"<sup>4)</sup>. The custom is also attested for Syria in a canon of Jacob of Edessa, communicated by Bar Hebraeus, Nomocanon, p. 69, paen. sqq.: "In early Christian times, when the faithful were few in number, the services for the dead were held in the churches. But now that they have become numerous, it is not necessary to carry the dead into the church. But often the services are held in the houses or in the squares"<sup>5)</sup>.

A trace of the North-Semitic use of the thrashing-floor or a similar place outside or within the town for mourning ceremonies, seems to have been preserved among the Southern Semites too. Muslim books of tradition mention a service for the dead, held by Moḥammed in Medīna at the place called al-Muṣallā. This space was situated in the Southern part of the market Barr al-Munākha, East of Wādī Buḥān<sup>6)</sup>. When the

1) עדה שמפטרין בה המתים

2) גוי נורד יהשליכי ושא על שפום קנה

3) Canaan in ZDMG, LXX, 175.

4) אין מניחין את המתה ברחוב שלא להרגיל את המכסד

5) בעהז, שבזלח בנ. כחצית ממה שמענוא כבזלח ממה ממה, 5)  
העבדלח בל חתה. מאבזלח זמ שלח לא אלח ולחזלח  
חלחלח. אלח בלח בלח חבזלח וחלח שלחלח ממה  
חלחלח העבדלח

6) Cf. Mohammed en de Joden te Medīna, p. 25.

Negūs of Abessinia died, Moḥammed had this fact proclaimed (نعى); then, says Bukhārī, *Djanā'iz*, bāb 61, "he ranged his followers on the Muṣallā and pronounced four times the takbīr over the Negūs"<sup>1</sup>). This tradition is also communicated by Muslim; it gives his commentator Nawawī the opportunity of discussing the question whether the service for the dead should take place on the Muṣallā or in the mosque<sup>2</sup>): "Abū Ḥanīfa concludes from the tradition "he went to the Muṣallā" that the service for the dead should not be held in the mosque. But our school (that of Shāfi'ī) and most of the others, declare it to be allowed in the mosque"<sup>3</sup>). So the different schools appear to have held different opinions on this point. The custom of carrying the dead to the synagogue or to the church appears to have been well known among Eastern Jews and Christians. In the treatise Berakot of the Jerusalem Talmud it is mentioned several times, e.g. III, 1: "Rabbi Jose was delivering his lecture (in the Synagogue) when a corpse was brought in"<sup>4</sup>). We have already quoted the canon by Jakob of Edessa, proving that Oriental Christianity was also well acquainted with the custom. Burying eminent men even in or before the altar was a Christian custom<sup>5</sup>).

How closely Islām followed the practices of its teachers can be seen not only from the Muslim custom of performing the service for the dead in the mosque, but also from the fact, that the famous jurisconsult Awzā'ī was buried in the Miḥrāb of the mosque at Beirūt<sup>6</sup>). The Miḥrāb corresponds to the altar.

On the other hand opposition against this custom was so violent, that even in the time of al-Malik al-Aṣḥraf it was still a point of discussion, whether corpses were allowed to be introduced into the mosques of Mekka and Medīna<sup>7</sup>). It is possible that this opposition was due to that tendency which

1) صَفَّ بِهِمْ بِأَمَلِي فَتَبَّرَ عَلَيْهِ أَرْبَعًا

2) II, 337, 24 sqq.

3) وَقَدْ يَحْتَجُّ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ فِي أَنْ صَلَاةَ الْجَنَائِزَةِ لَا تَفْعَلُ فِي الْمَسْجِدِ بِقَوْلِهِ خَرَجَ إِلَى الْمَسْجِدِ وَمَذْهَبُنَا وَمَذْهَبُ الْجَمْعِ جَوَازُهَا فِيهِ

4) רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הָיָה יוֹרֵם מִתְּנִי וְעָלָא מִיָּתָא

5) Cf. Bedjan, *Acta Martyrum*, I, 92, 7: Bar Hebraeus, *Chronicon Ecclesiasticum*, III, 475, 4. Lane, p. 527 attests the custom for the modern Egyptian Muslims.

6) Cf. the article al-Awzā'ī in the *Encyclopaedia of Islām*.

7) *Kuṭb al-Dīn*, p. 208 sq. Cf. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, II, 189.

is called by Muslim tradition itself "the tendency to deviate from Judaism and Christendom" (تخلف النبیوت والنصارى). It may also have been connected with anxiety not to defile the mosque.

Those who thought that the Muṣallā was the proper place for the service of the dead, quoted Moḥammed as an example. It seems that tradition concerning this fact was based upon historical reminiscences. This is not the important question however for us. The tradition quoted shows that the Muṣallā was considered as the natural place for the service for the dead. In connection with our instances showing that the Northern Semites had parallel customs, we may probably take it as certain that here are traces of a proto-semitic rite.

I have assumed a consanguinity between the North-Semitic thrashing-floor and the South-Semitic Muṣallā on account of their common place in the mourning rites and on account of the fact that among the Northern Semites thrashing-floor and square occur in mourning rites one beside the other. This parallelism and the conclusion drawn from it are corroborated by evidence from North-Africa of to day, where the Muṣallā is still a thrashing-floor or a similar place. This appears from the description of it given by Doutté: "c'est une aire assez vaste, où se trouve parfois un petit mur avec un mihrab dans lequel prie l'imam, et quelques marches sur lesquelles il monte pour prononcer la Khotba; il en est ainsi dans beaucoup de villes du Maroc" <sup>1)</sup>.

## II

We find the thrashing-floor among the Semites used for marriage and mourning rites. Before discussing its further uses we must ask: how can it be explained that ceremonies bearing such a different character, should be performed in the same place?

It is possible to answer this question in a rationalistic sense: for the two ceremonies some space is required and so the thrashing-floor is naturally chosen for performing them. Probably this rationalism is also that of the present Syriac peasants. A student of the history of religion however has good reason to doubt such explanations, because they do not seem to be exhaustive. He is aware of the fact, that ancient ceremonies of a

1) p. 462

religious nature (and primitive life is of a much more religious nature than ours) have usually a religious meaning also in those details which have lost their significance for the dull-minded generations which have learnt to think rationalistically. For us it is clear that, marriage ceremonies taking place on the thrashing-floor, there must be an intrinsic connection between the significance of marriage and the significance of the thrashing-floor. The same holds good for mourning rites and the thrashing-floor.

Now the connection between marriage ceremonies and the thrashing-floor is elucidated by Hosea IX, 1: "Rejoice not, o Israel, for joy, as other people: for thou hast gone a whoring from thy God, thou hast loved the reward of harlots upon every thrashing-floor"<sup>1</sup>). Here it appears, that the thrashing-floor was the place of ritual prostitution. And now the significance of the thrashing-floor is clear. Prostitution in antiquity occurs as a purely religious rite, as every student of Semitic religion knows. But it may also be a rite performed in order to bring about fertility for the coming harvest, consequently a rite of sympathetic magic. That this rite used to take place on the spot which is a symbol of harvest, is only natural; so the thrashing-floor seems to have been the symbol of the fertile earth.

This explains also the reason why marriages are celebrated on the thrashing-floor. The aim of Semitic marriage consists in the procreation of children in large number: therefore marriage is celebrated on the spot, representative of the earth, the type of fertility.

The conclusions which we have come to give us also the answer to our second question: what is the connection between the thrashing-floor and the dead? We may now put the question thus: What is the connection between the earth and the dead? In the first place we think of the passage in Gen. 3, 19: "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread, till thou return unto the ground: for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return".

The word for dust, used here, is **עפר**. Nöldeke, in his admirable article "Mutter Erde und Verwandtes bei den Semiten"<sup>2</sup>)

1) אל תשמח ישראל אל תגל בעמים כי זנית בעל אלהיך אהבת אתהן על כל גרמות דגן (corrected after LXX)

2) Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, VIII, p. 161 sqq.

has observed that עפר is the denomination of the matter of which the earth consists: man is earth and returns to earth. The same idea is strikingly expressed by Bar Hebraeus in his *Ethikon*. The true mystics, he says, lie down to sleep on the floor, without anything separating them from the earth. For they say to their body: thou art dust, and unto dust thou shalt return<sup>1</sup>). In a monograph "The Ideas of the Western Semites concerning the Navel of the Earth"<sup>2</sup>) I have endeavoured to show, that according to a widely spread Semitic theory the nucleus of the earth is considered as the typical grave. Even in modern poetry the bodies of the dead are compared with seed strewn in the mother earth: "Noch köstlicheren Samen bergen wir trauernd in der Erde Schooss und hoffen dass er aus den Särgen erblühen soll zu schönern Loos" (Schiller's *Lied von der Glocke*).

So the act of placing the deceased on the thrashing-floor is likely to have been a symbolic representation of the intrinsic connection between the dead and the earth. It may be compared to a birth-rite described by A. Dieterich<sup>3</sup>). In Italy it occurs in some places, that a new-born child is laid on the earth: the same rite was and is practised in some parts of Germany. Dieterich has explained this rite as a dedication of the child to the Earth, the mother of mankind.

### III

After having considered the thrashing-floor as the scene of marriage and mourning rites, we have to show its relation to magical and religious rites.

During the reign of Ahab and Joshaphat a remarkable scene took place on the thrashing-floor outside the gate of Samaria. The two kings, being in doubt whether they should undertake a campaign against Aram, wished to consult an oracle. Four hundred prophets were gathered on the thrashing-floor, where the kings, seated on their thrones, watched the grotesque performance of the raging prophets<sup>4</sup>).

This is not the first example of the religious use of the

1) p. 44, I.

2) *Verhandelingen der Kon. Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel XVIII, N<sup>o</sup>. I.*

3) *Mutter Erde*, p. 6 sqq.

4) *2 Kings 22*.

thrashing-floor in Israelite history. When David had numbered the people and this action had been punished by a plague from Yahwe, the prophet Gad was sent to teach David the remedy: "And Gad came that day to David, and said to him, Go up, rear an altar unto Yahwe in the threshing-floor of Arauna the Jebusite". "And David built there an altar unto Yahwe and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings. So Yahwe was intreated for the land, and the plague was stayed from Israel" <sup>1)</sup>).

The place is expressly mentioned by Gad, evidently because it was considered as eminently suitable to bear the altar. It was even considered so suitable for religious purposes that the temple of Solomon was ordered to be built there <sup>2)</sup>). A special interest is attached to the customs practised near Tlemcen in a sanctuary where *Sidī Yaḳūb al-Tifrisī* is worshipped with ancient rites. Continually, says Douffé <sup>3)</sup>, people go to offer, usually hens, to *Sidī Yaḳūb*. The animals are slaughtered by the mukaddem "sur une aire dégarnie d'herbe". There the blood is left to impregnate the earth and the feathers are laid in heaps; every night the djinn's come to take away the feathers and to drink the blood.

The same *Muṣallā* at Medina where the service for the dead was held, was the place used for performing the religious ceremonies immediately after Moḥammed's *Hidjra*. As soon as the mosque had been built, the ṣalāt was held there. But some ceremonies kept their place on the *Muṣallā*, of course because the *Muṣallā* was thought the most suitable ground for them. These ceremonies were: the Ṣalāt al-Istiskā' and the Ṣalāt on the so-called two Feasts (the first of Shawwāl and the tenth of *Dhu 'l-Hidjdja*). Regarding the ceremony of praying for rain, I must remark, that it was also a Jewish custom to perform it in the square of the town. This appears from the Mishna treatise *Ta'anit*: "people carry the teba to the square of the town" <sup>4)</sup>). Here we find again the correspondence between the *Muṣallā* and the square which we have noticed before. The parallelism between the Muslim and the Jewish prayer for rain

1) 2 Sam. 24, 18: יובא גר אל דוד ביום ההוא ויאמר לו עלה הקם ליהיה מזבח בנרן  
ארגנה הובסי  
Verse 25: יבן שב דוד מזבח ליהיה ויעל עליות ישראלים ויעתר יהוה לארץ והעצר  
המנפה בעל ישראל

2) 2 Chron. 3, 1.

3) p. 475.

4) II, 1: מוציאין את התיבה לרחובת של עיר

probably points to old Semitic rites, dating from the times before Judaism and Islām<sup>1)</sup>.

Tradition generally says that Moḥammed performed the prayer for rain on the Muṣallā<sup>2)</sup>. But utterances in favour of the mosque are also heard. Bukhārī<sup>3)</sup> relates that once during the Friday ṣalāt Moḥammed heard people complaining of drought, thereupon he prayed for rain in the mosque. So tradition appears to be divided as to the use of mosque or Muṣallā for the prayer for rain. It is easy to see the reason of this dissension. The Muṣallā was the classical place for the prayer for rain; therefore it was used by the Prophet, according to Kaṣṭallānī, in the year 6 A.H., consequently at a time when the mosque had been built. Moḥammed only continued the pagan rite in its old place, with Muslim additions. If the tradition should not be historical, it would prove, that later generations have done so.

On the other hand it was natural that Muslims, judging the mosque to be the most suitable place for Muslim rites, condemned the pagan place with its pagan reminiscences. It is however to be remarked, that to the present day the prayer for rain is held in the open air. Carsten Niebuhr, *Reize naar Arabië*, I, 384 gives a description of the ceremony in a place in Yemen; he calls the Muṣallā "a place outside the town destined for public prayer".

We find the same dissension regarding the use of Muṣallā or mosque on the two feasts. Of the origin of the feast on the tenth of Dhu 'l-Ḥijjdja we do not know so much as we could wish. Muslim tradition favours the view that Moḥammed in Medina, not being able to celebrate the ḥadjdj, created a substitute for it at Medina, consisting of a public ṣalāt, *khutba* and sacrifice of animals, on the Muṣallā. It is remarkable to see, that these ceremonies did not become obsolete after the conquest of Mekka, but that, on the contrary, up to the present day they enjoy a wide-spread popularity throughout the Muslim world. We may perhaps venture the hypothesis, that it was an ancient custom of pagan Arabia to offer sacrifices at the feast of autumn in several places. This hypothesis appears probable,

1) Cf. Juynboll, *Handbuch*, p. 93.

2) Bukhārī, *Istisḳāʿ*, bāb 4: Muslim II, 301 sq.: Abū Dāʿūd I, 115 sq.: Tirmidhī I, 110; Nasaʿī I, 224.

3) *Istisḳāʿ*, bāb 6.

considering the fact that the feast in the autumn was a proto-semitic festival, by no means limited to Mekka and its environs. Perhaps we may even go further and suppose that from of old the Muṣallā at Medīna was the place where such ceremonies used to be performed. According to tradition, Moḥammed conducted his followers to the Muṣallā (Bokhārī, 'Idain, bāb 6, 15 sq., 18, 21 sq. Muslim II, 296. Abū Dā'ud I, 112 sqq. Nasā'i I, 231. Tirmidhī I, 107). Muslim practice has followed his example; Doutté's description of the North-African Muṣallā, which I have quoted above (p. 4), is given as the description of the Muṣallā for the Feast of Sacrifices. Some doctors of the Law however are of a different opinion; Abū Ishāḳ al-Shīrāzī (Tanbīh, p. 41, 19) says on this point: "the ṣalāt (on the two Feasts) is to be held in the mosque; but when this is not spacious enough, people have to perform their ṣalāt in the open air"<sup>1</sup>). The famous Nawawī, like Abū Ishāḳ a Shāfi'ite, gives full information on the subject of the different opinions within his own Madhhab (II, 296, 14). On Muslim's tradition, cited above: "the Prophet, on the days of Sacrifices and of Breaking the Fast, used to go out and to begin with the ṣalāt" he commentates in this way: "This tradition is an argument for those who think performing the Ṣalāt of the Feast on the Muṣallā preferable to performing it in the mosque. This is the practice of the people in most of the capitals. But as to the people of Mekka, from the beginning of Islām onwards they have performed it in the mosque. Among the adherents of our Madhhab there are two opinions. One declares the open field preferable on account of the tradition in question. According to the other one (and this is favoured by a larger number of adherents) the mosque is to be preferred, save only if it should not be spacious enough. It is said that the inhabitants of Mekka perform the Ṣalāt on these days in the mosque only because it is spacious and that the Prophet went to the Muṣallā only because the mosque was too small. And this proves that the mosque is to be preferred, if it is spacious enough"<sup>2</sup>).

1) وتقام الصلاة في الجامع فمن ضاق به صلوا في الصحراء

عذا دليل من دل باستحاب الخروج لصلاة العيد الى انصلي وانه افضل من فعلينا في المسجد وعلى هذا عمل الناس في معظم الامصار واما اهل مكة فلا يصلوننا الا في المسجد من الزمن الاول ولما حبسنا وجئنا احدينا الصحراء



As this quotation shows, Nawawī reduces the question to a trifling one. But nobody will credit him with a true insight in this matter: that Moḥammed performed these ceremonies on the Muṣallā had nothing to do with a question of space: it happened because they were thought to be in their proper place there.

Perhaps also among the Mālikites a certain suspicion of the Muṣallā is to be observed. Khalīl b. Ishāq, at the end of his paragraph on the two Feasts says: "On these two days supererogatory ṣalāt's before or after the festal ṣalāt are reprehensible if performed on a muṣallā, not if performed in a mosque<sup>1)</sup>. One may further compare Zurḡānī on the Muwaṭṭa', I, 328, 8 sqq. But it is not certain whether the passage is to be interpreted in this sense.

#### IV

So we have found the remarkable fact that the thrashing-floor is the scene of rites of mourning and of religion. We have also found, that the reason for rites of mourning being performed there is quite clear: it is the symbol of the earth, especially of the fertile earth. Our next question must be this: Is there also an intrinsic connection between the thrashing-floor and these religious rites? Or, in other words: between the fertile earth and these rites?

In this case it does not seem so easy to give the answer as in the former one. We have found a great variety of religious rites performed on the thrashing-floor: the performance of the prophets, the building of an altar, the building of the temple, sacrifice of fowls, the prayer for rain, the service on the two Muslim Feasts. We may conclude from this variety with certainty that the thrashing-floor or the Muṣallā is thought the proper place for all sorts of religious rites. It is however to be observed that some of these rites may have been connected intrinsically with the idea of the fertile earth or the

أفضل لهذا الحديث والتدنى وهو الأصح عند أكثره المسجد أفضل إلا أن يضيق  
فلما وإنما صلى أهل مكة في المسجد لسعته ولما خرج النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم إلى المسجد  
لضيق المسجد فدل على أن المسجد أفضل إذا اتسع

1) p. 34. وكذا تنقل صلى قليلاً وبعداً لا مسجد فيهما

earth. In the first place the prayer for rain. In the second place the sacrifices. For we know that the altar itself has certain connections with the earth and has been considered as a symbol of the earth: I may refer here to the monograph on the Navel of the Earth, p. 40. Consequently sacrifice has an essential relation to the earth, at least in some cases. Whether our examples belong to these cases, it seems impossible to decide.

So we may imagine two answers to our question. One would be this: sacrifice was performed on the thrashing-floor or a similar space because of the intrinsic connection between the two. From this case onward the thrashing-floor has extended its dominion over all sorts of religious acts.

The other would be this: it is uncertain whether the sacrifices performed on the thrashing-floor have been the beginning of its connection with religious rites, as in most cases sacrifice does not appear to have been limited to the thrashing-floor. So sacrifice cannot be our starting point in answering the question. We have simply to state that all sorts of religious ceremonies take place on the thrashing-floor. This is to be explained by the fact that this area was of old the scene of mourning rites. Religion has simply appropriated the place of the mourning ceremony as it has done in other cases we shall meet with. It could so borrow, because mourning, religion and magic are closely connected in antiquity.

I should be glad if any reader could produce arguments to decide, which of the two answers is preferable.

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## PROSTRATION AND STANDING

### I

It is surprising, that, as far as I know, prostration as a mourning rite has not sufficiently drawn the attention of scholars, although it occurs in one of the most familiar passages of the Old Testament, viz in the first chapter of the book of Job. When Job hears the tidings of the death of his sons and daughters "he rent his me'il, shaved his head, and fell down upon the ground and performed the prostration"<sup>1)</sup>. The text is as clear as possible: prostration is a mourning rite, like the rending of clothes and the shaving of the head.

Whether prostration as a mourning rite was commonly practised in O. T. times, is uncertain; in other descriptions of mourning rites, it is not present: still, it occurs in some places: Ps. 35 and 38. The author of the former Psalm describes in the usual way of Psalmists the evil inflicted on him by his enemies, but when they were visited by sickness, he mourned over them, vs. 13 sq.: "But as for me, when they were sick, my clothing was sackcloth; I humbled my soul with fasting; and my prayer returned into mine own bosom. As though they had been my friend or brother, did I behave: I prostrated myself in a state of dirtiness as one that mourneth for his mother"<sup>2)</sup>. The text of Ps. 38, 7 is probably corrupt; so we may put it aside.

In the face of this evidence it is impossible to deny the existence of prostration as a mourning rite among the Israelites. Arabic literature is so extensive, that it is difficult to make use of it for this kind of investigation. At any rate it may be said that prostration does not belong to the usually mentioned rites

1) I, 20: ויקם איים ויקרע את מעילו וינו את ראשו ויפיל ארצה וישתחו

2) ואני בחלתי לבושי שק. ענותי בצום נפשי ותפלתו על חוקי חשיב כרע כאח לי  
התהלכתי כאבל אם קדר שחתו

of mourning. I am able to adduce only one instance of it, occurring after the rise of Islām during the reign of the Omayyads. In Balādhori's *Ansāb al-Ashraf*, as edited by Ahlwardt, we read: "When the tidings of the death of (ʿAbd Allāh) ibn al-Zubair reached (the caliph) ʿAbd al-Malik, he prostrated himself, called for a pair of scissors and cut off a part of his own and his little children's forelocks, and also that of Rauḥ ibn Zenbāʿ, saying: thou belongest to us"<sup>1</sup>).

The similarity between the scene at the caliph's court and that described in the book of Job is striking, a new illustration of the continuity of the Semitic East. The cutting of the forelocks is a modification and explanation of the famous "baldness between the eyes" (קרח בין העינים) i.e. "on the forehead" of the Old Testament<sup>2</sup>).

We may state therefore that prostration as a mourning rite is a custom occurring among the Northern and Southern Semites, consequently belonging to proto-semitic customs.

In our first chapter we spoke of the ṣalāt al-djanāʿiz, the service for the dead, which was performed on the Muṣallā. It should be remarked here, that this service, as some of the other services on the Muṣallā, ought not to be called a ṣalāt in the ordinary sense of the word. Ṣalāt, the Aramaic ṣelota, is nothing but the nomen verbale of the Aramaic verb سَلَمَ "to bow", ordinarily used of a trap set for catching birds. So that ṣelota only means "a bowing down, a prostration". Now Bukhārī, *Djanāʿiz* bāb 57, says, that the Prophet called the service for the dead "a ṣalāt, without rukūʿ and prostration, and without formulas, apart from takbīr and taslīm greeting"<sup>3</sup>). Kaṣṭallānī explains the absence of rukūʿ and prostration "lest people ignorant (in religious matters) should take the service as an act of worship of the dead"<sup>4</sup>). Here we obviously

1) p. 74. Ssq.: نَمَا بَلَغَ عَبْدَ اَمَلِكٍ مَقْتَدُ اِبْنِ اَنْزِيْرٍ سَاجِدٌ وَدَعَا بِقَصِّ ذَخْدٍ مِنْ

نَصِيْبَتِهِ وَاخَذَ مِنْ نَوَاصِي صَعَارٍ وَدَدَ وَاخَذَ مِنْ نَصِيْبَةِ رُوْحِ بْنِ زُبَيْرٍ وَقَالَ اَنْتَ مَتَا

2) Professor Snouck Hurgronje reminds me of the fact that a sajdah on the part of a ruler on being informed of the death of his rival is commonly conceived in Islām as an act of gratitude (سَجْدَةُ اِنْشَاكِرٍ; e.g. *Ṭabarī* II, 551). This conception would be of a nature to weaken the strength of my example in the text; it is, however, possible that the sajdah al-shukr is a survival of the old mourning rite, modified by Muslim conceptions.

3) سَمَّاهَا صَلَاةً لَيْسَ فِيْهَا رُكُوعٌ وَلَا سَاجِدَةٌ وَلَا بَتْلَامٌ فِيْهَا وَفِيْهَا تَحْمِيْرٌ وَتَسْلِيْمٌ

4) نَتَلَّا يَنْتَوَعَمُ بَعْضُ الْجَيْلَةِ اَنْهَا عِبَادَةٌ لِّلْمَيِّتِ

have a reminiscence of prostration as a rite performed before the dead.

“That *Ḳaṣṭallānī* is right, is proved by cognate cases in which some of the doctors combate prostration before the dead, disguised by the forms of the religious *ṣalāt*. *Zurḳānī* in his commentary on *Mālik’s Muwaṭṭa’* treats the point in this way: “As for the *ṣalāt* on the tombs, its lawfulness is taught by the majority of the doctors, *Shāfi’ī*, *Aḥmad ibn Wahb*, *Ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥakam*, and *Mālik ibn Anas* according to a tradition which contradicts [the rest of the traditions concerning *Mālik*]; for according to the vulgata concerning *Mālik*, he defends it. Further it is considered as defended by *Abū Ḥanīfa* and *al-Nakha’ī* and others. On their authority it is thought that it is lawful if it takes place after burial; otherwise it is not lawful. Their opponents maintain, that this (viz. the Prophet’s performing the *ṣalāt* on the tomb) was only one of the privileges of the Prophet. This argument is met by *Ibn Ḥabbān* with the reply, that the Prophet’s not reprehending those who performed the *ṣalāt* on the tomb with him, proves that *Moḥammed* has allowed it to others and that consequently this *ṣalāt* is not a privilege of the Prophet. Against this reply it is argued, that what is done in following an other person does not afford an argument for the lawfulness of the act as an original one.

“What proves the act of the Prophet to have been a privilege is a tradition of *Abū Huraira* adduced by *Muslim* and *Ibn Ḥabbān*: “Then the Prophet performed the *ṣalāt* on the tomb; thereupon he said: “these graves are full of darkness for their inhabitants; now *Allāh* illumines them by my *ṣalāt* upon their inhabitants”. And in the tradition of *Zaid ibn Thābit*, *Moḥammed* says: “My *ṣalāt* over him (viz. the dead) is an act of mercy in his behalf and it is not lawful in behalf of others”. *Mālik* says: “Practice is not in accord with the tradition concerning the negress”<sup>1)</sup>. *Abū ‘Omar* remarks: *Mālik* means the practice in *Medina*, and what is said concerning the *ṣalāt* on the tomb as having been practised by some of the companions of the Prophet and the following generation, this is only lore from *Baṣra* and *Kūfa*. And we have not found it related concerning any

1) The woman on whose tomb *Moḥammed* is said to have performed the *ṣalāt*.

man of Medīna of the companions or the following generation, that he performed the ṣalāt on the tomb" <sup>1)</sup>).

Bukhārī's treatment of the case is an illustration of the words of Zurkānī quoted above. Bāb 67 of his chapter *Djanā'iz* bears the title, given by the author himself: "The ṣalāt on the tomb after the burial of the dead". So he allows the ṣalāt on the tomb only when the body has already been buried and he adduces two traditions relating that the prophet had done so. The opposite opinion is expressed in a tradition which is, for instance, to be found in Tirmidhī's work: "Do not sit upon the tombs and do not perform the ṣalāt in their direction" <sup>2)</sup>).

It is to be observed that the service for the dead without prostration is not meant here, but the real ṣalāt with all its ceremonies of standing, obeisance, kneeling and prostration.

It is only natural that this service, a continuation of pagan practices, has met with great suspicion from the Muslim doctors; apparently they have been obliged to let people have their way; but Mālik at least could not refrain from shaking his head and grumbling.

## II

Prostration is however much better known as an act of religious awe practised in the presence of the godhead and the

1) Mowatta' II, 12, 6 sqq.: وَأَمَّا الصَّلَاةُ عَلَى الْقَبْرِ فَقَالَ مَشْرُوعِيْنَهُ الْجَمِيْرُ وَمِنْهُمْ أَشْشَاعِي وَاحِدُ بْنُ وَهْبٍ وَابْنُ عَبْدِ الْحَكَمِ وَمَالِكٌ فِي رِوَايَةٍ شَاذَةٍ وَأَمْشِيْرُ عَنْهُ مِنْهُ وَبِهِ قَالَ أَبُو حَنِيفَةَ وَالنَّخْعِيُّ وَجَمَاعَةٌ وَعَنْهُمْ أَنْ دُفِنَ قَبْلَ الصَّلَاةِ شَرَعَ وَأَلَّا فَلَا وَجَابُوا بِأَنْ ذَلِكَ مِنْ خَصَائِصِهِ وَرَدَّهُ ابْنُ حَبَانَ بِأَنْ تَرَكَ انْكَارَهُ صَلَّى عَلَى مَنْ صَلَّى مَعَهُ عَلَى الْقَبْرِ دَلِيلٌ عَلَى جَوَازِهِ لُغِيْرِهِ وَأَنَّهُ لَيْسَ مِنْ خَصَائِصِهِ وَتَعَقَّبَ ابْنُ الذُّكِيِّ يَقَعُ بِاتِّبَاعِهِ لَا يَنْبَغُ دُنْيَاً لِلْأَمَانَةِ وَالْذُّبِيلُ عَلَى الْخُصُوصِيَّةِ مَا زَادَ مُسْلِمٌ وَابْنُ حَبَانَ فِي حَدِيثٍ أَنَّ هُرَيْرَةَ فَصَّلَى عَلَى الْقَبْرِ ثُمَّ قَالَ أَنْ عُدَّ الْقَبْرُ مَلُوءٌ ظِلْمَةٌ عَلَى أَعْلَى وَأَنَّ اللَّهَ يَنْوَرُهَا لَكُمْ بِصَلَاتِكُمْ عَلَيْهِمْ وَفِي حَدِيثِ زَيْدِ بْنِ ثَابِتٍ فَإِنْ صَلَّاتُ عَلَيْهِ لَمْ رَحْمَةٌ وَهَذَا لَا يَتَحَقَّقُ فِي غَيْرِهِ وَقَالَ مَالِكٌ لَيْسَ الْعَمَلُ عَلَى حَدِيثِ الْأَسْوَدِ قَالَ أَبُو عَمْرٍو يَرِيدُ عَمَلُ الْمَدِيْنَةِ وَمَا حَكَى عَنْ بَعْضِ الصَّحَابَةِ وَاتِّبَاعِيْنَ مِنْ الصَّلَاةِ عَلَى الْقَبْرِ إِنَّمَا فِي أَنْزِلَ بِصَرْفٍ وَكُوفِيَّةٍ وَلَمْ تَجِدْ عَلَى مَدَنِيٍّ مِنْ الصَّحَابَةِ فَمِنْ بَعْدِهِ أَنَّهُ صَلَّى عَلَى الْقَبْرِ أَنْتَهَى

2) I, 195, 4 infra: لَا تَجْلِسُوا عَلَى الْقُبُورِ وَلَا تَصَلُّوا إِلَيْهَا

king. Instead of giving superfluous instances, I will lay stress on the fact that we have here a proof of divine rank being attributed to the king. As is to be expected, it was also practised in the presence of Egyptian kings or their vicegerents<sup>1)</sup>. So we find three or, the godhead and the king being reckoned as one, two classes of beings which were met with prostration: the dead and the godhead.

As regards the dead, I recur to the instances from the Old Testament and Arabic literature given above. The passages in Job and in *Balādhori* mention the prostration on hearing the tidings of a death. It cannot be seen what the significance of the rite in these cases has been: prostration can only have a meaning, if practised in the presence of the being before whom reverence or awe must be shown. So the examples of Job and Abd al-Malik again prove them to have been obsolete rites, no longer practised in their proper place and no longer understood in their real significance.

The Old Testament and Assyrian literature are well acquainted with a slightly different mourning rite, that of lying down or sitting on the ground. It is mentioned e.g. 2 Sam. 13, 31; Hes. 26, 16; Jeremias, *Hölle und Paradies*, p. 10 and is of course cognate with the rite of prostration in its significance.

We must try to discover this significance. The only method which may lead us to this end is that of examining other cases of prostration in Semitic literature, which seem to be characteristic.

That prostration was practised in the presence of the spirit of the dead, is shown by the familiar scene in 1 Sam. 28. Saul has induced the witch to bring up the ghost of the dead Samuel. As soon as Saul is aware that Samuel's ghost is present, he casts himself down upon the ground<sup>2)</sup>.

In 2 Kings 2 is the account of Elisha obtaining his desire, that a double portion of the spirit of the sublated Elijah should fall upon him. When Elisha thus endowed was met by a band of younger prophets who were aware of this fact they prostrated themselves, vs. 15: "And when the sons of the prophets which were to view at Jericho saw him, they said, the spirit of Elijah

1) Erman, *Aegypten I*, 109, 132.

2) 1 Sam. 28, 14: וַיֹּאמֶר לֹה מֶה תֵּאָדָר וְהֵאָמַר אִישׁ וְקָן עָלָה וְהוּא עֲמָה מְעִיל יִדְעֶה  
שְׂאוּל כִּי שָׁמָּה הוּא, וַיִּקַּד אֲפִים אֶרֶצָה וַיִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה

doth rest on Elisha. And they came to meet him, and prostrated themselves before him" <sup>1)</sup>).

An other characteristic case occurs in the story of Bileam, Numbers 22, 31: "Then Yahwe opened the eyes of Bileam, and he saw the angel of Yahwe standing in the way, and his sword drawn in his hand; and Bileam fell down and prostrated himself on his face" <sup>2)</sup>).

Finally in Joshua 5, 13 sq. we have a case which bears a close resemblance to the previous one. "And it came to pass, when Joshua was by Jericho, that he lifted up his eyes and looked, and, behold, there stood a man over against him with his sword drawn in his hand: and Joshua went unto him, and said unto him: Art thou for us or for our adversaries? And he said, Nay; but as captain of the host of Yahwe am I now come. And Joshua fell on his face to the earth and prostrated himself" <sup>3)</sup>).

These examples seem sufficient to show, that prostration takes place in the presence of a spirit. They can have only one motive: that of fear. The spirits on their side do not expect anything but fear from the human beings to whom they appear; for this reason, when appearing with friendly intentions, they sometimes begin their message with the words: "Fear not".

That prostration was really considered by the Semites as a protection against influences, which were thought dangerous, is to be concluded from the well known story of the boy Mu'ā-wiya, communicated by Ibn Ishāḳ in his Biography of the Prophet <sup>4)</sup>. Mu'āwiya was present with his father, Abū Sufyān, when the pagan Mekkans had captured one of the followers of Moḥammed. They bound the man to a tree and began to throw their spears at him. The only revenge of which the poor Muslim was capable was to hurl heavy curses at his enemies. As soon as he began to utter the dangerous words, Abū Sufyān threw the little Mu'āwiya flat on the ground, evidently because

1) ויראהו בני הנביאים אשר בירחי כנגד ויאמרו נחה רוח אליהו על אלישע ויבואו לקראתו וישתחו לו ארצה

2) ויגל יהוה את עיני בלעם וירא את מלאך יהוה נצב בדרך וחרבו שלפה בידו ויקד וישתחו לאפיו

3) והיו בחיות יהושע בירחי וישא עינו וירא יהוה איש עמד לנגדו וחרבו שלופה בידו וילך יהושע אליו ויאמר לו הלנו אתה אם לצרנו ויאמר לא כי אני צר צבא יהוה עתה באתי ויפל יהושע אל פניו ארצה וישתחו

4) p. 641. Cf. Goldziher, Abhandlungen I, 1 sqq.

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he considered this attitude as the only means of escaping the influence of the curses.

All this is very clear and now it is also clear why people prostrate themselves in the presence of the king: the king is a supernatural being, he is the "Son of God". It is also clear why, to the present day, the Semites make use of amulets when appearing before a king. There is a widely disseminated amulet, the text of which is ascribed to Cyprian, the magician of Antioch. The Arabic version preserved in Cod. 51 of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Vatican Library fol. 46a opens thus: "This prayer is an amulet against the devils and a means to secure those who appear before the Sultan his favour"<sup>1)</sup>. And in the Aethiopic text, preserved in Cod. Aeth. N°. 57, fol. 45 sqq., of the Bibliothèque Nationale, it is characterised as "efficacious against kings and protective against Satan and the evil eye"<sup>2)</sup>. Northern Africa of to day supplies Doutté in his *Magic* p. 258 sq. with an example of an amulet serving for the same purpose: "Celui qui écrit le ouïfq du même et le récite et le porte sur lui peut entrer chez les rois, les généraux, les gouverneurs, les cadis: il est toujours accueilli par eux avec faveur, est écouté, reçoit des cadeaux: il serait devant un lion que celui-ci se ferait humble devant lui".

### III

In the foregoing section we have found that originally fear or, when and where the real sense of the ceremony is no longer understood, awe and reverence are the motives for the act of prostrating one's self as a rite of mourning and as a rite of worship.

Now there is an other manner of showing awe and reverence, still known in our Western society: that of rising, the counterpart of prostration. In the Semitic world it occurs in the same cases as prostration: 1<sup>o</sup> as a rite of mourning; 2<sup>o</sup> as a rite of reverence before highly esteemed persons; 3<sup>o</sup> as a rite of worship. It is remarkable to find this close parallelism with prostration: this parallel is of a nature to lead us to assume also a parallelism of motives in all the cases.

1) وَحَزْزَ مِنَ الشَّيَاطِينِ وَغَبُولِ أَمَمِ السُّلْطَانِ

2) ጽጌዕ፡ ሰገገሥት፡ ወስደት፡ ሰሰይጣን፡ ወዓይን፡ እኩይ፡

But in order to be able to draw a conclusion, we must give some particulars concerning these cases. Concerning the second, we have evidences from the remotest Semitic antiquity. Hammurapi when receiving his code from the god Shamash is shown standing before the god in the relief at the top of the copy of his code preserved in the Louvre. The Israelite priest is, in his priestly function, said to stand before Yahwe. Deut. 10, 8: "At that time Yahwe set apart the tribe of the Levites to bear the ark of Yahwe's covenant, to stand before Yahwe's face in order to serve him"<sup>1)</sup> etc. Deut. 18, 7: "And he (the Levitic priest) shall serve in the name of Yahwe, his God, as all his brothers the Levites, who stand there (at Jerusalem) before Yahwe"<sup>2)</sup>.

When the heavenly King presides over the celestial court, his madjlis as the Arabs would say, he sits upon his throne but his court stands, as several instances in the Old Testament show. 1 Kings 22, 19 Mikha ben Yimla describes his vision in this way: "I saw Yahwe sitting on his throne and the whole host of the heavens standing by him, at his right hand and at his left"<sup>3)</sup>. It is the same in the scene described in Job 1, 6 sqq., and II, 1 sqq. The celestial beings (בני אלהים) come to stand before Yahwe (להתיצב על ידו). These descriptions of the heavenly court are of course reproductions of the ritual in the madjlis of the Israelite kings. It was however not only before divine beings that people used to rise, but also before old age. "Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head"<sup>4)</sup>. This is old-semitic lore. Ahiqar says to his son: "My son, if thou seest a man older than thou art, rise before him"<sup>5)</sup>.

These examples may be sufficient as illustrations of our second class. For the third one, it will hardly be necessary to give any. For it is well known that the attitude which, also by the Ancients, is considered typical for Jewish as well as for Christian and Muslim ritual prayer, is that of standing<sup>6)</sup>.

1) בעת חמורא הבדיל יהוה את שבט הלוי לשאת את ארון ברית יהוה לעמד לפני יהוה לשרתו

2) ושרת בשם יהוה אלהיו ככל אחיו הלויים העמדים שם לפני יהוה

3) ראיתי את יהוה יושב על כסא יכל צבא השמיים עמד עליו מימינו ומשמאלו

4) Lev. XIX. 32: מפני שיבה תקום

5) כו, בנ לענא לבוא דמנא דאזי: מסא נא סודאמא, p. 46, n<sup>o</sup>. 61

6) I may refer here to „Mohammed en de Joden te Medina”, p. 105, where to note 3

We come now to the standing attitude as a mourning rite. Here a few words are necessary. In Syria, when the dead body has been placed in the tent on the thrashing-floor, the women form a circle round the tent in order to perform the *ma'id*<sup>1)</sup>. Although Wetzstein does not expressly state that the women sing the odes standing, it follows from his description.

For early Arabia, I may in the first place repeat a few examples given by Goldziher in the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, XVI, 334. He quotes some verses by Ibn ʿKais al-Ruḡaiyāt, ed. Rhodokanakis, p. 190: "Many a widow, who is overcome by weeping, when the eyes of the happy sleep, bewails the men of her father's family and those of her own family, she alone standing"<sup>2)</sup>. And *Kitāb al-Aghānī*: "Bewailing her dead husband standing, was a rite performed by those women who did not wish to remain in the state of widows"<sup>3)</sup>.

This is however not the only trace of the standing attitude in the presence of the dead. Muslim tradition has a good deal to say concerning this rite. Muslim adduces the following tradition on the authority of the Prophet: "When you see the bier, rise before it till it has passed or been placed on the ground"<sup>4)</sup>.

The Muslims, on the strength of this and similar traditions (cf. *Muwatta'*, II, 19), recognise three different cases: 1<sup>o</sup> rising before a bier that passes; 2<sup>o</sup> standing in the cemetery till the bier has been placed upon the ground; 3<sup>o</sup> standing at the tomb till the body has been buried. The opinions of the doctors concerning these points diverge widely: undoubtedly some of them have felt the pagan background of this rite; and on this point they are right.

Concerning the first case, it is remarkable to see how in

may be added: Wright, *Ancient Syriac Documents*, p. 71, 17: Afrahat, ed. Parisot, I. 312, 19; Ephraim, ed. Lamy II. 683, 18; Bar Hebraeus, *Ethicon*, 2 ult.: 11, 4 infra. Cf. further Mittwoch, *Entstehung des isl. Gebets*, p. 16; Brockelmann in *Festschrift—Sachau*, p. 314.

1) Cf. the chapter on the circumambulation.

2) وارملة تعتزينا اندجيب  
اذا نامت الاعين اندعه

تبكى رجال بني عمها  
واخوتها وحده قائمه

3) X, 58. 3 infra: لا تريد ان لا تفعلنا من لا تزوجنا قائمة ما تفعلنا من لا تزوجنا

تتزوج بعد زوجنا

4) II, 340. 5: اذا رأيتم الحنارة تقوموا لها حتى تحلقكم او توضع

some traditions people are anxious to prove that rising before a bier (which is practised to this day in Mekka<sup>1)</sup>), is not an act of worship of the dead, an anxiety which proves that the original, pagan meaning of the rite was of this nature. Zurkānī, *Muwaṭṭa'* II, 19, 14 communicates a tradition according to which the Prophet and his companions rose in the presence of a bier. In line 19 on the authority of venerable doctors this tradition is completed by the words: "We rose before the angels" (فَمِنَّا لَمَلَائِكَةٌ). It is a common Semitic belief that angels accompany a funeral procession. Others are anxious to complete the tradition in this way: "We rose only in honour of Him who takes the souls" (of the living)<sup>2)</sup>. In an other tradition, given by Zurkānī, *Muwaṭṭa'* II, 20, 1 the rite is mentioned as being abrogated because the Jews also used to perform it. "The Prophet used to rise before a bier; once a Jewish doctor passed, who (seeing Moḥammed rise) said: So is the practice (among us). Then Moḥammed said: Sit down, make your rites different from theirs"<sup>3)</sup>.

Nawawī gives the following summary of the question: "Al-Ḳāḍī (ʿIyāḍ) says: the doctors have different opinions in this matter. Mālik, Abū Ḥanīfa and Shāfiʿī declare rising to have been abolished. Aḥmad (b. Ḥanbal), Ishāq and the two Mālikites Ibn Ḥabīb and Ibn al-Māḍjīshūn declare it to be a matter left to individual preference. There is also a disagreement concerning the standing of those who accompany the bier, at the tomb. A great many of the companions and the ancient doctors say: people shall not sit down (at the tomb) before the bier has been set down; for the abrogation only concerns the rising of those before whom the bier passes. This is the opinion of Awzāʿī, Aḥmad (b. Ḥanbal), Ishāq and Moḥammed b. al-Ḥasan.

"There is also a disagreement concerning the rite of standing at the tomb till the body has been buried. Some disapprove of it, others practise it. The latter is said of ʿUthmān, ʿAlī, Ibn ʿOmar and others. Thus far al-Ḳāḍī".

"The general opinion in our (the Shāfiʿite) madhhab is, that

1) Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, II, 190.

2) أَمَّا فَمِنَّا أَعْضَاءُ نَلْذِي يَقْبِضُ النُّفُوسَ

3) دَنْ صَلَّعُمْ يَقُومُ نَلْجَنْدَزُهُ نَمَرَّ بِهِ خَيْرٌ مِنْ أَلْيَبُودِ فَعَلْ هَذَا لِنَفْعَلْ فَعَلْ  
نَجْلِسُوا وَخَلَقُومُ

standing is not recommendable. It is also said that it is abrogated by the tradition of 'Ali<sup>1</sup>). But of the scholars of our party al-Mutawallī has preferred the opinion that it is recommendable and this is the preferable opinion. This being so, the order to perform the rite is meant as a recommendation and the order to sit down as a permission; and in such a case the category of abrogation is not applicable. For abrogation only takes place if efforts to harmonize several traditions have failed, and here they have not failed. But Allāh knows best''<sup>2</sup>).

#### IV

All these examples show, that standing in the presence of the dead was a common Semitic rite, performed during the act of bewailing the dead, on the way to the burying place and during burial. From expressions in Muslim tradition we learn, that it was considered as an act of reverence to the dead. It goes without saying, that this act of reverence, as the rite of prostration, must have risen from fear and awe; reverence is too modern a conception to supply the explanation of the old rite. In the case of prostration we were able to conclude, that people believed to be able to protect themselves against the dangerous influence of spirits and supernatural beings by throwing themselves down. As rising and standing took place before the same class of beings, we are led to the surmise that rising was also considered as a means of evading the dangerous in-

1) The tradition which Nawawī has mentioned before: „The Apostle of God rose, thereupon he sat down“.

2) وللقاضي اختلاف الناس في هذه المسئلة فقال مالك وأبو حنيفة والشافعي 2) الثقيم منسوخ وقل أحمد وإسحاق وابن حبيب وابن المنذر أن النكاح هو مخير قل واختلقوا في قيام من يشيعنا عند انقبر فعال جمعة من الضحابة والسلف لا بقعد حتى توضع قل والنسخ إنما هو في قيام من مرت به وبنيها قل الأوزاعي وأحمد وإسحاق ومحمد بن الحسن قل واختلقوا في الثقيم على انقبر حتى تدفن فدره [فدرهه] قوم وعمل به آخرون روى ذلك عن عثمان وعلي وابن عمر وغيره رآه هذا كلام القاضي والمشتبه في مذعبنا أن الثقيم ليس مستحباً وثنا هو منسوخ حديث على واختار المنول من أصحابنا أنه مستحب وهذا هو المختار فيكون الأمر به للندب والعود بينه للجواز ولا يصح دعوى النسخ في مثل هذا لأن النسخ لا يكون إذا تعذر الجمع بين الأحاديث ولم ينعدر والله أعلم

fluence emanating from the dead, the god and the king. I am not able to prove the truth of this conclusion by an example like that of Abū Sufyān and Mu'āwiya, taken from Semitic literature. I can only quote an utterance from the Laws of Manu, kindly communicated to me by Professor Uhlenbeck: "For the vital airs of a young man mount upwards to leave his body when an elder approaches; but by rising to meet him and saluting, he recovers them"<sup>1)</sup>. If the presence of an older is dangerous to a younger man, the same may certainly be supposed to be the case of a spirit, a god or a king. It is highly probable, that the Semitic conceptions and customs, as we have described them, go back to the same motive as that mentioned in the Laws of Manu, for one thing because this motive is exactly parallel to that of Semitic prostration.

Thus the rites of prostration and standing appear to be founded on fear: it seems probable that in mourning and religion the same motive has caused the same rites. In one case only the religious rites seem to have been borrowed from the domain of mourning: the service for the dead, with its prostration and rising, seems to be a direct continuation of old mourning rites. This surmise explains the attitude Islām has adopted towards the service.

1) II. 120 (p. 52).

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## INVOCATION

### I

Besides the odes sung in honour of the dead, there is a rite of proto-semitic origin in the ceremony of bewailing: calling to the dead by his name. This act is called זָכַר by the Hebrews. This is proved by the following facts. The verbal noun of the root זָכַר, זִכְרָה, is used as a synonym of שֵׁם "name". Prov. 10, 7: "The *seker* of the just is blessed: but the name of the wicked shall rot" <sup>1)</sup>). The parallelism proves that זִכְרָה and שֵׁם are synonyms. This is only possible, if the chief object of the act זָכַר is the name. That this really was the case is seen from the example quoted by Schwally <sup>2)</sup> from 2 Sam. 18, 18: "Now Absalom in his lifetime had taken and reared up for himself a pillar, which is in the king's dale: for he said, I have no son to keep my name in remembrance: and he called the pillar after his own name" <sup>3)</sup>).

This passage shows us two things which are of value for our present research: 1<sup>o</sup> that the Hiph'il הִזְכִּיר, like the Hiph'il in other cases, is a denominative verbal form, meaning: "to use as זִכְרָה". The object of this זִכְרָה is the name. We shall find this confirmed later on: 2<sup>o</sup> that the act of calling to the deceased by his name, was a duty incumbent on his son.

The same holds true for other parts of the Semitic world, as we learn from the Story of Aḥiḳar. When the (false) report of the death of Aḥiḳar had spread, this happened: "The women rent their faces and said: Alas for thee, Aḥiḳar, thou wise secretary, thou fence of the breaches of our country: for like thee there will never be any one to us. Then Sanherib

1) זָכַר צָדִיק לְבִרְכָה וְשֵׁם רָשָׁעִים יִרָקָה

2) ZAW, 1891, p. 178.

3) וְאַבְשֵׁלָם לָקַח וַיַּצֵּב לוֹ בְּחַיֵּי אָת מַצֵּבֶת אֲשֶׁר בַּעֲמֻקַּת הַמֶּלֶךְ כִּי אָמַר אֵין לִי בֶן כְּעַבְדִּי הַזֶּכֶר שְׁמִי וַיִּקְרָא לַמַּצֵּבֶת עַל שְׁמוֹ

Three characteristic mourning rites are mentioned here: The women's tearing their faces and praising the dead; the ritual bewailing of the dead, the **חן חן**; the ritual invocation of the dead. The ritual bewailing is performed by the women, the **חן חן** by the son of the deceased.

[illegible][illegible]

3) ib., p. 73 sq.: כוונתו להבדיל בין המלכות והמלוכה  
 המלכות המלכות המלכות המלכות המלכות  
 המלכות המלכות המלכות המלכות המלכות  
 המלכות המלכות המלכות המלכות המלכות



That the invocation of the deceased by calling his name was also an Arabic mourning rite, is well known; I may refer here to Goldziher's Article in the Wiener Zeitschrift, XVI, p. 313 and to Rhodokanakis in the Sitzungsberichte of the Vienna Academy, vol. 149, p. 58, 60 sqq. For Egypt of the present day the custom is attested by Lane, Manners and Customs, p. 516: "Even before the spirit has departed, or the moment after . . . . . the women of the family raise the cries of lamentation called "welweléh" or "wilwāl", uttering the most piercing shrieks and calling upon the name of the deceased".

Among the Arabs it was also the son on whom this duty was incumbent, as is still to be seen from an expression, which has lost its original meaning. In Ibn Ḥazm's Ṭawḥ al-Ḥamāma it is said of a ruler: "He had no son, nor heir to his kingdom, or anyone who kept alive his *dhikr*" <sup>1)</sup>.

Goldziher has drawn attention to the fact, that the deceased was often invoked by his kunya. This is in harmony with what we have found concerning the duty of the son towards his deceased father.

Now in connection with slaves there are some data which deserve to be mentioned here, as they are of a nature to throw light upon the relation between the invocation and the kunya. Concerning Jewish slaves two facts are expressly stated in Mishna and Talmud: 1<sup>o</sup> that slaves are never called father or mother so and so. Berakot 16b and Jer. Nidda I, 5: "An other one taught: Slaves and handmaids are never called "father so and so" or "mother so and so" <sup>2)</sup>. It should be remarked that this is said in a section treating of funeral rites. 2<sup>o</sup> that on behalf of slaves no mourning rites are performed: "People are not condoled with on the death of slaves" <sup>3)</sup>. And: "our rabbis have taught: people do not form a row at the burial of slaves; they do not recite on their behalf the birkat abelim either" <sup>4)</sup>.

The question arises as to how this matter is regulated in the muslim world. Goldziher has shown that the kunya was

1) *فم يدين له ذكر ولا من يوت ماله ويكسبه ذكره*: 6,20

2) *הני אידך עבדים ושפחות אין קורין איתם אבא פלגני יאמא פלגני*

3) *Beit. II, 6: אין מקבלין תנחומין על העבדים*

4) *הני רבנן עבדים ושפחות אין עומדים עליהם בשורה ואין אומרים עליהם ברכת אבלים*

sometimes estimated as being above the rank of a mawlā<sup>1)</sup>. From this fact it is to be concluded a fortiori, that a slave did not possess a kunya at all. If in Arabic literature, notwithstanding this fact, kunya's of slaves occur, it is necessary to examine these cases. Kosegarten<sup>2)</sup> has given several examples of kunya's conferred upon slaves. But from the fact that they were granted them in connection with peculiar qualities it is to be concluded, that such cases were exceptions to the rule. The same may be presumed concerning Yasār, a convert slave, who is also called Abū Fukaiha: for such convertites are likely to have received their kunya on entering Islām<sup>3)</sup>. In the history of the Zaidites, a certain Abū Miḥdǧām is mentioned, "a slave of the Ya'furides". But perhaps the denomination is used here as an expression of disapproval<sup>4)</sup>.

As regards performing funeral rites on behalf of slaves in muslim society, Professor Snouck Hurgronje tells me, that a distinction is to be made between such slaves as are used for domestic services and so have become to a certain extent members of the muslim familia, and those who are employed as workmen. The former class are treated as Muslims also after their death. But the latter live and die without further notice being taken of them.

So it seems that, generally speaking, Semitic slaves did not possess a kunya, and were allowed of no funeral rites. This is a new proof of the close connection between the kunya and invocation.

## II

We have found invocation as an essential part of the mourning rites. It is also an essential part in religious worship. This is proved by some passages in the Old Testament. The Yahwistic author, relating when and how the worship of Yahwe originated among mankind says: "Enosh was the first to use the name of Yahwe as an invocation"<sup>5)</sup>.

This utterance does not stand alone. It was the current ex-

1) Muhammedanische Studien I. 267

2) Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes I, 297—317

3) Ibn Hisham, p. 26

4) Communication from Dr. C. van Arendonk

5) Gen. 4, 26: וַיִּקְרָא בֶשֶׁם יְהוָה (corrected after LXX)

pression for ritual worship, as is proved by other passages. Ex 20, 24b: "In all places where thou shalt use my name as an invocation I will come unto thee and bless thee" <sup>1)</sup>. Isaiah 26, 13: "O Yahweh, our God, other lords beside thee have had dominion over us: but thy name alone we will use as an invocation" <sup>2)</sup>. And Hosea 2, 19: "For I will take away the names of Baalim out of her mouth, and their names shall no more be used as an invocation" <sup>3)</sup>.

These examples speak for themselves: the essential part of primitive monotheistic and pagan worship is the invocation. It is also here, in religious worship, that **זָכַר** is used as a synonym of **שָׁם**. I will only quote the characteristic place, where the Elohist author relates how the worship of Yahwe was instituted. Ex. 3, 15: "And God said moreover unto Moses, thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, Yahwe the god of your fathers, the god of Abraham, the god of Isaac and the god of Jacob, hath sent me unto you: this is my name for ever and this is my **זָכַר** unto all generations" <sup>4)</sup>.

As in Arabic mourning rites, so we find the **ذِكْر** in Arabic monotheism. We may say that life in Islām is full of *dhikr*: in the ritual prayer which every Muslim should repeat five times every day, a large place is given to several formulas which contain Allāh's name and praise him (cf. Bukhārī, *Ṣalāt*, bāb 155: Muslim II, 129).

During the *ḥaǧǧ* the people cry a special *dhikr* without ceasing: "Labbaika, Allāhumma, labbaika". The books of tradition mention assemblies of people who come together in order to practise *dhikr* (Bukhārī, *Dā'wāt*, Bāb faḍl *dhikr* Allāh; Muslim V, 293 sqq.: bāb faḍl *madjālis al-dhikr*; Abū Dā'ud I, 148).

Among the derwishes in their *ṭarīqa*'s these *dhikr*'s have a peculiar character: here the name Allāh, sometimes without any addition, is repeated in a tempo which is gradually ac-

1) בכל מקום אשר תזכיר את שמי אבא אליך יברכתך (corrected according to the *Peshiṭta*).

2) יהוה אלהינו בעלנו אדנים וילתך לדרך זכור שך (reading לדרך in stead of בך).

3) וזכרת את שמות הבעלים מפיה לא יזכר עד בשמם. Other examples are given by Schwally in ZAW, 1891, p. 178.

4) יאמר עוד אלהים אל משה כה תאמר אל בני ישראל יהוה אלהי אבותכם אלהי אברהם אלהי יצחק ואלהי יעקב שלחני אליכם זה שמי לעולם זה זכרי לדור דר

celerated, to such an extent that the performers at last pass into a trance and foaming at the mouth fall down upon the ground. Descriptions of these scenes are given for instance by Lane in his „Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians”. It seems to me probable that these schools of derwishes go back to the remotest Semitic antiquity, for their typical features are also those of the elder Hebrew prophets as given in 1 Sam. 10 and 19. But it is not here the place to inquire into this subject.

It is especially interesting to find that these performances of dhikr occur in Palestine of to day in connection with the bewailing of the dead. W. M. Thomson in his "The Land and the Book" I, 142 gives a description of such a performance. At the funerals bands of derwishes are hired who do not cease shrieking Allāh, Allāh, Allāh ad infinitum. Probably here is a continuation of the proto-semitic rite of the invocation of the dead, in an islamised form.

It is only natural to find that also in Syriac Christian worship the invocation ܠܠܗܐ has its appointed place. Bar Hebraeus has defined this place circumstantially. In his Book of the Dove he gives a chapter on the fourfold form of asceticism. The first place is taken by prayer ܠܠܗܐ, the second by invocation ܠܠܗܐ. "The invocation of God consists in repeating ten sentences of the hymns of the beatified three children: six of those beginning with: "Blessed art thou" and four beginning with: "Bless ye". The least number of repetitions is three; a moderate number, six; and the complete one, forty, according to time and rite" <sup>1)</sup>).

### III

Thus we have found the rite of invocation in a great many Semitic religions as a mourning rite and as an essential rite of religious worship. We have now to discuss in the first place

1) p. 540, 15 sqq.

Cf. also *Ethikon*, p. 25.

the meaning of the rite. Mentioning the name is in Semitic antiquity the means of summoning the bearer of the name. I may refer here to Goldziher's article in the *Wiener Zeitschrift*, XVI, 314 where the author shows that also in the *Hidjā'* poems the name of the satirized person is repeated, in order to summon and to chastise him with scorn and curses. I may refer further to *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, 1913, p. 266, where more literature is mentioned, especially in connection with the power over a god, given to those who know and mention his name.

That the dead are called back by an invocation is proved by the frequent addition of the formula لَا تَبْعِدْ "be not far away". This is sometimes or always a mere form of propitiation; for sometimes فَذْهَبْ "then go away" is added<sup>1)</sup>.

That the act of זָכַר meant to call back the dead, is made probable by a special use of a derivation from this root. In later Hebrew זָכַרִי means "incantation of the dead". In the Talmud, Sanhedrin, 65b the expression מַעֲלֵה הַמֵּת בְּזִכְרִי occurs "he who brings up the ghost of the dead by invocation"<sup>2)</sup>.

This having been made clear we come to the question of the relation between the rite of invocation in mourning and in worship. I think, this relation follows indubitably from the examples and arguments given above. The name of the deceased was called in order to summon him; and the god was invoked to summon him. Mourning and religion may have practised the rite with the same intention. It is clear, that, this intention being no longer understood, the rite has become in both cases a rite of worship, worship of the dead and worship of the god.

Readers of Schwally's article in *ZAW* and of his book "Das Leben nach dem Tode" (p. 28—31) will be able to realise the difference between his method of research and that which is followed in the present chapter. It seems to me that this difference involves also a different aspect of the relation between mourning and religion on this point.

1) Rhodokanakis, l. c. p. 61.

2) Cf. Levy, *Neu-hebraisches Wörterbuch*, s. v. and Payne Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus*. It is of course nonsense to say that this word has been borrowed from the Greek.

## WATCHING

### I

Among the Semitic peoples burial takes place a few hours after death. If, however, a person dies at such an hour of the day, that it is not possible to bury him on the same day, it is customary to watch by the corpse.

Wetzstein in his monograph mentions this custom among the Syrian peasants of to day. Speaking of the thrashing-sledge on which the corpse is laid, he says (p. 295): "Dieses Lager einschliesslich des Todten heisst die menaṣṣa "das Paradebett", bei welchem während der Nacht abwechselnd einige Nachbarn wachen".

Probably this custom was also practised among the Jews in the Middle Ages and later, though it is not expressly stated by Bodenschatz, *Kirchliche Verfassung der heutigen Juden* IV, 177. He says: "Ein solcher Kläger darf kein Fleisch essen, keinen Wein trinken, sich nicht ordentlich zu einem Tisch setzen, nicht beten, keine Tphillin legen, keine Tzizis küssen, es sey denn, dass ihrer zwey den Todten warteten, in welchem Fall einer nach dem andern abwechseln, von dem Todten weggehen, sein Gebet verrichten und die Tphillin legen darf". Here the custom of remaining by the corpse is attested; it is not expressly said, that it also took place during the night; but it is probable.

For modern Egypt we have the description by Lane<sup>1)</sup>: "If the death took place in the morning, the corpse is buried the same day; but if it happened in the afternoon or at night, the deceased is not buried until the following day. In this case the neddábehs remain all the night, and continue the lamentation with the other women; and a fikee is brought to the house

1) Manners, p. 517.

to recite chapters of the *kurán* during the night, or several fikees are employed to perform a complete *Khatmeh*".

In a verse by al-Khansā' we probably have evidence of the antiquity of this rite among the Semites: "Men weep grievously; and the *djinn* assist those who wake"<sup>1)</sup>.

The custom is however not exclusively Semitic; it is well known in Indonesia too. G. A. Wilken, speaking of some tribes on Halmaheira, says: "So lange nämlich die Leiche noch nicht beerdigt ist, müssen die weiblichen Verwandten die ganze Nacht hindurch unter Begleitung des Tifagong um das Haus tanzen; die Uebrigen bewachen die Leiche"<sup>2)</sup>. A. C. Kruyt mentions the custom among tribes on Borneo<sup>3)</sup>; and Adriani en Kruyt say concerning the Toradja's: „In den nacht, gedurende welken het lijk boven aarde staat, wordt de doode door de vrienden en verwanten, die in het sterfhuis verzameld zijn, bewaakt. Men noemt dit monghariani „oppassen"<sup>4)</sup>.

Professor Snouck Hurgronje has found the custom among the Achehnese<sup>5)</sup> and a great many Indonesian populations: in Europe it is practised by the Irish to this day.

It is not probable that the Semitic race has influenced the tribes on Borneo and Celebes in this point; consequently we may consider the rite of waking in the presence of the corpse as a primitive human rite.

## II

The ceremony of waking is also well known in religious worship. The night of the institution of the feast of the Passover is described thus: "This night was a night of waking for Yahwe, because of his bringing them out from the land of Egypt; this night is a night of waking unto Yahwe for all the children of Israel in their generations"<sup>6)</sup>.

It seems to be clear, that here two explanations of the term

1) *Diwān*, p. 124, 3<sup>d</sup> verse: وَالْجِنُّ تُسْعِدُ مِنْ سَمَرٍ وَالْأَنْسُ تَبْكِي وَيَبْكِي

2) *Verspr. Geschriften* III. 415 sq.

3) *Het Animisme*, p. 329.

4) *Toradja's* II, 92.

5) *Atjehers*, I, 464.

6) *Ex.* 12, 42: לֵיל שְׁמֵרִים הוּא לְיָדֶיהָ לְהוֹצִיאֵם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם הוּא הַלַּיְלָה הַזֶּה לְיָדֶיהָ  
שְׁמֵרִים לְכָל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְדֹרֹתָם

"night of waking, vigils" are given. According to the first it was a night in which Yahwe had to wake because he had to conduct the Israelites, his people, safely out of Egypt. According to the second it was a night in which the Israelites had to wake and will have to wake to all generations. We may neglect here the first one; the second one is of importance; it implies, that here the night of the Passover is instituted as a night of vigils unto Yahwe, for ever. Here waking is an act of worship unto a godhead; we have to keep this feature in mind.

That the night of the Passover has indeed remained a night of vigils to the present time, is well known. But the Old Testament probably contain an other example of a night of vigils. In Isaiah 30, 29 are the words: "You shall have a song, as in the night when a feast is consecrated"<sup>1)</sup>. That also among other peoples festivals were usually celebrated in the night, is proved by the fact, communicated to me by Professor Snouck Hurgronje, that in several Indonesian languages "to watch" is synonymous with "to celebrate a festival".

Later Semitic literature gives copious examples of the rite: in Christendom and Islām ritual services during the night are very common; in Syriac literature waking, *ḥimā*, is often expressly mentioned. As this rite, which took place at a time destined for sleep, bore in itself an ascetic character, it has become a characteristic of ascetics and so we find it often in Syriac biographies of monks and saints. Waking in honour of a divinity occurs, however, not only as a festal or ascetic rite, it is daily practised in the Jerusalem temple: priests and Levites wake every night in the temple<sup>2)</sup>. The Mishna describes these vigils minutely. "At three places in the Sanctuary Priests waked, at twenty one others Levites. The prefect of the holy mountain went round to inspect all the watches, torches being burnt before him. If he found a watcher not standing upon his feet, he said: Peace to thee. If he perceived that the watcher slept, he chastised him; he had the right to burn his clothes. If the others said: what is this crying in the court, it would be the crying of a Levite who was chastised and whose clothes were burnt, because he had slept at his post. Rabbi El'azar

1) חֲשִׁיר יְהוָה לָבֶם כָּלִיל הַחֲקֹדֶשׁ חָג

2) Josephus, Contra Apionem. I, 22: Διατρέβουσι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς νύκτας καὶ τὰς ἡμέρας ἱερεῖς.





## III

Having found the wake practised both in the presence of the dead and as an act of honour to the godhead, we have to ask what its original meaning has been and to try to explain what the relation between mourning and religion has been in this case.

In the first place we have to mention a rite in connection with waking in the presence of the dead, which will seem to us less strange after our quotation from *Mishna*, Middot. Wilken describes and explains it in this way: "dem, der in Schlaf fällt, wird das Gesicht mit Holzkohle geschwärzt, was, wenn wir von der Annahme ausgehen, dass das Schwarzen zum Zwecke der Vermummung geschieht, unseres Erachtens nach wohl darin seinen Grund hat, dass jene Person sich eines Mangels an Ehrfurcht gegen den Verstorbenen schuldig gemacht und daher der Verfolgung durch diesen, woran sie mehr als andere blossgestellt, entzogen werden muss"<sup>1)</sup>. With a slight modification the explanation of the blackening among the Toradja's as given by Adriani en Kruyt is the same as that of Wilken: „Het slapen is hierom verboden, omdat terwijl men slaapt de ziel uit het lichaam treedt en gemakkelijk door de ziel van den overledene meegevoerd kan worden naar de onderwereld. Het zwart maken zal wel de bedoeling hebben om den slapende het voorkomen van een geest (dien men zich zwart denkt) te geven en hem zoo te behoeden voor de macht van den overledene. Sommige Toradja's spreken de meening uit, dat het lijk door de geesten zou worden gestolen, als men ging slapen"<sup>2)</sup>.

The explanations given by Wilken and Adriani en Kruyt may be summarised as follows: 1<sup>o</sup> Waking in the presence of the corpse takes place in order to prevent it being stolen by the ghosts. 2<sup>o</sup> Waking consequently being an act practised on behalf of the dead, its omission, in this case by falling asleep, is revenged by the dead. 3<sup>o</sup> In order to be saved from revenge, those who have fallen asleep are blackened.

It now becomes clear that in religion the original meaning of the rite is not understood, and cannot be understood. For

1) Verspr. Geschriften III, 416

2) Toradja's II, 92

waking in the presence of the god in order to prevent his being stolen, is a conception that has no place in Semitic religions, as far as I am aware. It is clear therefore that religion has borrowed the rite from mourning, in its secondary meaning as an act of honour. The origin of the religious rite still appears in the burning of the clothes of the sleeping priests, a survival, as it seems to me, of the blackening of the watch sleeping in the presence of the dead.

## THE BURNING OF LIGHT

### I

It was a Jewish custom to kindle a light as soon as anyone had died. In the Mishna this custom is mentioned, Berakot VIII, 6: "No beraka is said over the light and the perfumes of gentiles, neither over the light and the perfumes of the dead" <sup>1)</sup>).

Bodenschatz, o. c., IV, 171 attests the custom among the Jews of his time: "Hierauf (as soon as the sick has died) nimmt man den Todten aus dem Bette, legt ihn auf langes Stroh, welches nach der Länge gelegt ist, und deckt ihn mit einem schwarzen Tuch über den Kopf zu, zündet ein Licht an und stellt es zu seinen Häupten".

Probably the ancient Assyrians were acquainted with the same rite: on the monument described by Clermont-Ganneau in *Revue Archéologique* (1879; tome XXXVIII) several funeral scenes are sculptured; near the dead is placed a candle-stick with several arms (p. 344). And that the custom survives till to day is to be seen in Ebers, *Aegypten*, II, 111 where the dead woman is represented lying between two candle-sticks.

How great a uniformity there is in the funeral customs of various peoples is again proved by the description of the death-bed of the Toradja's in Celebes. We have seen that a Syriac peasant is laid on the menassa, the bed of state, i. e. the thrashing-sledge. *Adriani en Kruyt, De Toradja's*, II, 94, describe the bed of state of the Toradja's of Middle-Celebes as follows: Kort nadat iemand is gestorven, maakt men een nette ligplaats voor hem gereed. Een matje wordt gespreid, een hemel wordt daarboven gehangen, een kussen en al de eigendommen van den overledene worden op en bij het matje

אין מברכין לא על הנר ולא על הבשמים של גוים ולא על הנר ולא על הבשמים  
של מחים

gezet, of aan touwen er bij opgehangen. 's Avonds wordt er licht gebrand". We may also recall the use of light in the presence of the dead in contemporary Western Europe. We have now to ask: what was the meaning of this rite?

As in most cases our sources do not give a direct answer: we must try to find it by considering analogous cases. Fortunately these cases are not rare.

Light was kindled on behalf of sick persons among the Jews, as appears from *Pesahim* IV, 4: "it is permitted to kindle light in the synagogues, in the schools, in dark entrances and at the side of sick persons"<sup>1</sup>). This custom has been preserved during the Middle Ages, as appears from *Bodenschatz*, IV 170: "Die jenigen, welche bei denen Kranken stehen, haben ebenfalls ordentliche Gebetbücher, aus welchen sie beständig beten müssen, Lichter in den Händen haltende". Cf. plate XVI.

The same custom is mentioned among the Arabs in a particular case of sickness. From *Rasmussen*, *Additamenta*, it appears that, if anyone had been bitten by a serpent, light was kindled near him<sup>2</sup>).

Sickness was ascribed by the ancient Semites to the workings of evil spirits, serpents especially were considered as being the abode of demons. It is therefore natural to think, that the kindling of light near the sick and the deceased had its ground in the belief that in this way the evil spirits must be driven away.

This explanation is corroborated by arguments from parallel cases. On plate IV opposite p. 60, part IV of *Bodenschatz*' work can be seen that near a Jewish woman in child-birth light was kindled. The same custom exists in our Archipelago and in the Philippines. Here it is explicitly said, that the light or the fire serves to drive away the *puntianak*, the demon whose special aim it is to do harm to women in child-birth<sup>3</sup>). The kindling of fire near a woman in or after child-birth, is also mentioned in the Talmud, *Erubin* 99b: "Samuel said: it is allowed to lay wood (in order to kindle fire) on behalf of a woman in child-birth on the Sabbath"<sup>4</sup>).

1) מדליקים בבתי הכנסת יבתי מדרשות ובמבואות אפלים יעל נבי החולים

2) p. 84

3) Wilken III, 229.

4) אמר שמואל עישין מדרה לדה בשבת

## II

Now the kindling of light in the presence of the deceased, which had the object of driving away the evil spirits, that always haunt the corpse of the deceased, has become a rite in honour of the dead.

Nasā'ī I, 287, 6 *infra*, has this tradition: "On the reprehension of the custom of burning lamps on the tombs. To us was communicated by Ḳutaiba on the authority of 'Abd al-Wārith b. Sa'īd, on the authority of Moḥammed b. Djaḥāda, on the authority of Abū Ṣālih, on the authority of Ibn 'Abbās, that the Apostle of God cursed the women who visit the tombs and those persons who build upon them places of worship and burn lamps there"<sup>1</sup>).

It is interesting to observe that not only in the Semitic world, but also in the Indian Archipelago and in Western and Eastern Europe the original rite has developed into a rite in honour of the dead.

As regards Europe the use of burning candles before the images of Saints is known to everyone.

For the Archipelago I will quote a few instances from Wilken's works. Describing the feast of All Souls on the Ambon-Isles, he says (III, 131): "Jaarlijks wordt er hier een feest gevierd, aroha geheeten, waarbij men gebeden opzegt voor het heil zijner afgestorvenen. Op dien dag maakt men ook de graven schoon, zet er eenige offergaven bij neder en brandt des avonds lichtjes op de kerkhoven". III, 273 Wilken relates how the gathering of edible nests of swallows is accompanied by religious rites in honour of the goddess Ratu Lara-Kidul: "Ook daar (at Karang Bolong) worden feesten gegeven en offers gebracht en voor het pakhuis waarin de nestjes verzameld worden, een paradebed voor Ratu-Lara-Kidul gereed gemaakt, waarbij elken Donderdagavond te harer eere lampen ontstoken, wierook gebrand en spijzen aangericht worden". That the rite originally belongs to the funeral customs is shown here by the bed of state (paradebed).

انتغليظ في اتخاذ السرج على القبور اخبرنا قتيبة قال حدثنا عبد الوارث ١)  
بن سعيد عن محمد بن جهماد عن ابي صالح عن ابن عباس قال نعن رسول  
الله صلعم زائرات القبور واتخذن عليهن المساجد والسرج

## III

Finally the burning of light appears to have become a Semitic form of religious worship.

In the Old Testament we find it in the temple of Shilo, 1 Sam. III, 2: "And it came to pass at that time, when Eli was laid down in his place, and his eyes began to wax dim, that he could not see; and ere the lamp of God went out in the temple of the Lord" . . . .<sup>1)</sup> It is also mentioned as occurring in the Tabernacle and the Jerusalem Temple (Ex. 25, 37; 1 Kings 7, 49 etc.). In later times there is a remarkable peculiarity, mentioned by Josephus, *Contra Apionem* I, 22: *ἐν τῷ ναῷ πάντοτε ἔστιν ἑστὸς ἱερὸς πυρρὴς ἡμετέρας*. "On these there is a light which never is extinguished, day nor night".

If we were justified in believing a communication by Keane, it would appear that the everburning light had also passed into Islām. In the Ka'ba there is, according to him, a lamp which is never extinguished; it is considered as a bad omen if this lamp goes out<sup>2)</sup>. But Professor Snouck Hurgronje warns me, that he never heard of this lamp at Mekka and that, the building of the Ka'ba remaining shut up sometimes during several months, Keane's communication seems to be untrustworthy. In the Christian churches the everburning light is however well known.

It is not only the "eternal light" which bears testimony to the rite of burning light as a rite of religious worship. Before the beginning of the Sabbath the lights especially destined for this day are kindled by the Jews. The rite is exactly regulated in the *Shulḥān 'Arūk*, *Orah Ḥayim* § 261, 263 and a description of the Jewish practice is given by Bodenschatz II, 143 sq. The rite dates however from olden times: it is mentioned in the *Mishna*, *Berakot* VIII, 5; *Shabbāt* II, 1 sqq.

In Christendom and Islām the burning of lamps and candles takes place on many occasions. Some of these, however, have a direct connection with the rite, viz. those feasts which originally are connected with the seasons and are meant as rites

1) vs. 3: וְנֵר אֱלֹהִים טָרִם יָכֵחַ

2) Keane, p. 182.

to produce light. This is the case with the feast of Hanukka, (חג המנוחות) and the Epiphany. These feasts therefore do not belong to our subject.

The line along which the burning of light as a rite has developed seems sufficiently elucidated by the foregoing data and arguments: originally destined to drive away the evil spirits from the deceased, it has become a rite of honour to the deceased, and finally a religious rite in honour of the deity; here of the original meaning nothing seems to have survived. Religion has simply borrowed the rite from mourning. Still it is to be noted, that in some cases the burning of light in the temples may have been destined to drive away the spirits.



## CIRCUMAMBULATION

### I

The ceremony of bewailing the dead has among the modern Syrians different names, some of which point to very remarkable customs. The name نواح, given by Wetzstein, p. 296, is only a variant of the classical نياحة and points to the exclamations, which constitute a considerable part of the bewailing ceremony.

There is an other word, Arabic رَقَصَة, which corresponds to Syriac ܪܩܨܐ and denotes a different feature: the dance which is performed around the dead. Dozy, Supplément, s. v. رقصه, quotes a description of this dance from Roger, *La Terre sainte* (Paris, 1646), p. 265: "Etant toutes assemblées pour faire les cérémonies et lamentations qu'elles appellent Raquase, elles se mettent en une salle, ou en une cour, et quelquefois en un lieu éminent et spacieux hors de la maison et se disposent toutes en rond, comme si elles voulaient danser sans se tenir les mains.

"Après quoi une vieille femme, qui est louée pour ce badinage, se barbouille de noir la face, la poitrine, les mains et les bras avec le noir de leurs poèles et marmites et à son instigation les femmes du défunt, leurs soeurs et leurs filles se noircissent de même, toutes échevelées, n'ayant rien que leurs chemises qui sont ouvertes jusques au nombril. Cette vieille noircie se met au milieu de la danse, et commence à dire toutes les prouesses et actions de remarque du défunt en forme de litanie, et à chacune elle fait une pause pendant que les autres répètent avec un air funeste et lugubre dansant d'un pas égal. Les parentes qui sont barbouillées de noir, se frappent la poitrine et les joues avec les paumes des mains, tant qu'elles ont les joues toutes bouffies et continuent cette cérémonie de danse sans intervalle, jusques à ce qu'on porte le corps au tombeau".

Wetzstein does not mention the name رقصه; but he gives interesting particulars concerning the dance or circumambulation.

In the first place he mentions the dance as it takes place among the Beduins (p. 296): "Sie ist die einfachste und am wenigsten geräuschvolle; denn zu dem Trauertanze, der in den ersten Wochen täglich einige Stunden lang von Jungfrauen um das einsame Grab eines angesehenen, theueren oder jungen Mannes aufgeführt wird, findet sich in der Regel niemand ein". The second description refers to the inhabitants of the towns; it is in accordance with the not infrequent descriptions of the wailing-women (نَحَّامَات) already known in classical Semitic literature. There is, however, one remarkable feature in it: this bewailing scene takes place in the house of the dead, on its impluvium. And here also the dance takes place "bei der man gar nicht selten hinter den scheusslichen, mehr als halbnackten laṭṭāmāt her auch die Männer um das Bassin wanken und sich mit beiden Händen den Bart zerrauen sieht". Here the dance consists in a circumambulation with a halting or swaying gait.

Among the Syriac peasants not much of a circumambulation is left: but the whole ceremony of the women bewailing the dead standing in a circle around the tent in which the menaṣṣa is placed, bears the name of معيد, which word Wetzstein always translates by „Trauertanz“. He himself gives (p. 297, note 1) the following explanation: Das ZW-ma'ād ist nach meinem Gewährsmann das Synonym von Naṭwaṭ (نَطْوَتْ) dem Frequentativ von نَفَّ (نَفَّ) "hüpfend gehen". • Es ist gewiss einerlei mit dem hebr. מָעַד "Wanken", so dass ma'ād ursprünglich nur das Wanken der Klagefrauen um das Zelt und das Taumeln der laṭṭāmāt um das Bassin, resp. das dazu gesungene Lied bedeutet haben wird, und dass sich diese Bedeutung mit der Sache selbst allmählig modifizierte".

Among the Arabs the rite of circumambulation is also known as a mourning rite. I may refer here to the instance given by Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien, I, 246. He describes how on the death of 'Antar's father several mourning rites take place. One of them consists in the prisoners of Khaibar being brought into his presence. Of these he causes the women and the girls to circumambulate the tomb of his father seven times.

It is impossible to deny the parallelism with the rites described by Wetzstein. For the same reason it seems to me that also in the circumambulations which take place at the tombs of

some saints, we can recognise old mourning practices, which coincide in this case with the Muslim practice of the ṭawāf around the Ka'ba. Some of the examples given by Goldziher, *Muh. Studien* I, 315 are perhaps to be considered in this light.

Among the Jews examples of the circumambulation of the dead are not known to me: that the rites occurred among the later Jews, is shown by a plate in the *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, III, p. 432, representing "Sephardic Jews in procession round a coffin". As to the original meaning of the rite of circumambulation, I am not able to make any suggestion.

## II

The common rite appears also in official Semitic religion on some special occasions, chiefly at the spring festival and the autumn festival. In the Arabian world it bears the name of ṭawāf, which does not denote more than a circumambulation, specially that which is made around the Ka'ba.

This fact is generally known; it is particularly remarkable to observe that a trace of the original form of the rite is preserved here to the present day: the ṭawāf is not practised in ordinary walking; like the ma'īd, it has to be performed in a particular manner, which is described in the Lawbooks in this way: "The pilgrim performs the circumambulation around the Ka'ba seven times: the first three times in the manner called رمل, the other four times in the ordinary way called مشى<sup>1)</sup>. Now مشى is nothing but the gait of the ordinary walker. Of رمل the *Lisān* XIII, 314 in the middle, says this: "رمل is said of a man, if he walks hastily and vehemently shakes his shoulders without going so far as to skip"<sup>2)</sup>. It is obvious that this quaint way of running is only a slight modification of the ma'īd which is described as نضوف.

There is a second feature in the ṭawāf, which should be noticed here. In a subsequent chapter the dress in mourning and religion will be treated. Here I will only mention that the ṭawāf is to be performed, with the right shoulder bare. The same Abū Ishāq says on this point: "The pilgrim has to place

1) Abū Ishāq. p. 78, 15.

2) ويقال رمل الرجل .... اذا أسرع في مشيته وهز منكبيه وهو في ذلك لا ينزوي

his *ridā'* so, that his right shoulder is uncovered and the middle of the *ridā'* is under it, the two slips he has to throw on his left shoulder''<sup>1)</sup>).

This is also a mourning rite. We have seen, that the Syrian women are generally half naked when performing the bewailing of the dead. Of the Hebrew women it is mentioned that they uncovered the shoulder or shoulders. Mo'ed Kaṭan III, 7 some mourning rites are enumerated which must be neglected on a feast day; among them: "people do not denude themselves". In the Tosaphot Jom Tob to this place the following commentary is given: "On a feastday. Here the uncovering of the shoulder is meant, so that the arms and the shoulders of the women were made bare''<sup>2)</sup>).

Now the *ṭawāf* took place chiefly at the two feasts, the spring and autumn festivals. The latter even owes its name to the rite, for as Wellhausen rightly remarks (Reste, p. 110) the root *ḥ* is synonymous with *חג*, so familiar in the meaning of "to describe a circle". *ḥ* therefore means nothing but the circumambulation "den heiligen Reigen". This opinion had already been expressed, though in a less positive manner, by Professor Snouck Hurgronje<sup>3)</sup>.

That the name *ḥ* in its special application to the feast in the autumn is proto-semitic, is proved by some of the older places in the O. T., where *חג* also denotes the feast in the autumn. We might therefore expect also to find the circumambulation in the O. T. in connection with the feast of Tabernacles or the "Feast of Harvest". This expectation is, however, not fulfilled. The only place in the O. T. where a circumambulation in the sense of the muslim *ṭawāf* occurs, is, as far as I know, Ps. 26, 6: "I will wash mine hands in innocence; so I will go round thine altar, O Lord"<sup>4)</sup>. It is possible that here the occasion of the autumnal festival is meant; but it is not stated. If on account of this silence it should be concluded that

1) p. 78, 8: وَيَضْبَعُ فَيَجْعَلُ وَسْفَ رِثَاةٍ تَحْتَ عَاتِقِهِ الْيَمِينِ وَيُطْرَحُ شُرْفِيهِ عَلَى عَاتِقِهِ الْأَيْسَرِ

2) חלוצת כתר שורעותיהן וכהפיהן מגולות cf. the numerous examples of this rite given by A. Büchler in ZAW XXI, p. 81 sqq.

3) Het Mekkaansche feest, p. 20.

4) ארחץ בנקיון כפי ואסבבה את מזבחך יהוה

the ancient Hebrews did not know the rite of circumambulation on the feast in the autumn, it would be a mistake: it is mentioned in Mishna and Talmud with all desirable particulars. We have only to note the following description (Sukka IV, 5): "Every day (during the autumn festival) the people circumambulated the altar once, saying: Save now, I beseech thee, O Yahweh: O Yahweh, I beseech thee, send now prosperity (Ps. 118, 25) . . . . But on this day (the Sabbath day of the feast) the people circumambulated the altar seven times"<sup>1</sup>). Here we have even the seven circumambulations as they are usual in the ṭawāf. The rite is therefore to be considered as being proto-semitic. It is highly remarkable that down to modern times the sacrificial day of the autumn festival is considered by the Beduins as the day on which slain offerings are to be made for the dead. Goldziher (Muh. Stud. II, 240) points to Burckhardt's book on the Beduins and Wahabees, in which he relates how on the 10<sup>th</sup> of Dhu 'l-Hidjdja the Beduins slay as many camels as members of their families have died during the last year.

### III

The ṭawāf also takes place at the feast which by the pagan Arabs and also later in Islām was celebrated in the month of Radjab. It is certain that the feast of Dhu 'l-Hidjdja was the autumnal feast; consequently the feast in Radjab was the feast of spring. In this season the Arabs made their pilgrimages to the sanctuaries, where they slew offerings (عتقر) and performed the circumambulation. As regards the times of later Islām it is worth while reading the description Ibn Djubair has given of the multitudes celebrating the ʿumra when he was at Mekka. He justly remarks that the ʿumra in the sacred month of Radjab was considered as a "sister" of the pilgrimage in Dhu 'l-Hidjdja (p. 128 sqq.). It will be observed that the feasts bore a close resemblance to one another in regard to the rites performed: the ṭawāf and the slaying of victims. In most of the sanctuaries they may have been identical. Now it has been observed that the ʿumra in the month of Radjab corresponds to the

בכל יום מקיפין את המזבח פעם אחת. ואומרים אנה ה' הושיענו אנה ה' הצליחנו  
 נא . . ואיתי היום מקיפין את המזבח שבע פעמים

feast of the Passover, as the Ḥadjdj corresponds to the feast of Tabernacles. So we might expect a similarity of rites in the former two feasts, as it exists in the latter two. This expectation is only partly confirmed by the facts we know from the old literature. It is true, a slaying of cattle takes place on the Arabic as well as on the Israelite feast of spring. But the circumambulation, which takes so prominent a place in the Arabic feast, does not occur in the Old Testament and in the later descriptions of the Passover. Fortunately our knowledge of the ancient rites is completed by the Hebrew name of the feast, פֶּסַח. We have of course to disregard the Biblical explanation including the historical foundation of the name. In Genesius-Buhl's Lexicon the real etymology of the word is given, it is the Arabic فسح which means "to sprain".

פֶּסַח is therefore spraining and the manifestation thereof, the halting gait<sup>1)</sup>. In Hebrew itself this meaning of the word is still preserved. I Kings 18, 21: "And Elijah came unto all the people, and said, How long halt ye between two opinions"<sup>2)</sup>? It is also used of Mephibosheth, the crippled son of Jonathan<sup>3)</sup>. It is therefore evident that the proto-semitic feast of spring must also have possessed its circumambulation, as well as the feast in the autumn. This circumambulation was performed in the same way as the circumambulation of the dead. The names only have changed: ma'īd, ṭawāf and pesaḥ are one and the same rite.

Now this limping circumambulation seems to have been widely spread in North Semitic religions. In 1 Kings 18, 26 it is performed by the priests of Ba'al round the altar at the mountain of Karmel<sup>4)</sup>. Perhaps the ζαλμαζωζ (Le Bas et Waddington, N<sup>o</sup> 1855), which is considered by Baethgen (Beitr. z. Semitischen Religionsgeschichte, p. 25) as a transcription of בעל מרקד "the Ba'al of dance" is to be regarded in the same light. And perhaps David's dance "before Yahwe" (2 Sam. 6, 14, 16; 1 Chron. 15, 29) must also be connected with the limping circumambulation.

1) Cf. Schwally, Idioticon. p. 124: Holzinger, commentary on Exodus, ad XII. 13.

2) וינש אליהו אל כל העם ויאמר עד מתי אתם פסחים על שתי הסעפים

3) 2 Sam. 4, 4.

4) יפסחו על המזבח

## IV

As the meaning of the ma'îd is no longer to be detected, we can only set the religious rite beside the rite of mourning, with the remark that both seem to be identical. We cannot explain why religion has adopted or practised it. The same applies to the uncovering of the shoulder as a rite of mourning and a rite of religion. We will now pass to a further mourning rite occurring in connection with the circumambulation: that of mutilation. In the passage, 1 Kings 18, 26, quoted above, the sacred dance is connected with the rite of making incisions: vs. 28: "And they cried aloud, and cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, till the blood gushed out upon them"<sup>1</sup>). It is well known that the making of incisions is a mourning rite; in Deut. 14, 1 it is forbidden to the Israelites.

During the Ḥadjdj different forms of mutilation were practised. One of them is performed to this day, the so-called, *إشعار* "making a mark in the body of the victim". The rite consists in piercing the skin of the hump of those camels which are destined to be slain on the feast, so that the blood appears. Muslim doctors have given a rationalistic explanation of this rite. According to Nawawî in his commentary on Muslim III, 213 it was practised in order to mark such a camel, so that, if it lost its way, it could be brought back. This explanation seems as simple as other rationalistic explanations of ancient religious rites. That the *ish'ār* was not a simple mark on the skin of the animal, such as are common in the Eastern and Western countries, is proved by the definition of the word itself: the blood must appear. So Abū Ḥanifa condemns it as an act of cruelty (*مُتَلَّة*). Surely it is an ancient rite no longer understood in Islām. In connection with other acts of mutilation practised together with the circumambulation, it seems to be meant as such: it has probably the purpose of torturing the victim in behalf of the godhead. Torturing as a rite of mourning is practised in many parts of the world. Wilken (Verspr. Geschr. III 478 sqq.) has given many instances from the Eastern Archipelago. He shows it to have been practised on the feast

<sup>1</sup> ויקרא בקול גדול ויתגדדי במשפחם בהרבות וברמחות עד שפך דם עליהם

for the dead and on religious occasions; and he thinks that it served to free the soul of the victim in order to satisfy the deceased who could completely use the soul if the victim was tortured. In the same way the dead himself was often mutilated in order to free his soul from his body. Lastly I have to recall an instance of mutilation during the circumambulation given by Goldziher<sup>1)</sup>: It is reported that people performed the ṭawāf, being conducted round the Ka'ba, a ring in their nose. It appears that of old the circumambulation was connected with many mourning rites, as the circumambulation itself is a mourning rite. It is not easy to say how it has come about that religion has collected these rites round the circumambulation, for the meaning of most of them is no longer known to us. The acts of mutilation seem to go back to the same motive in both cases: that of propitiating the spirit of the dead or the godhead. But as regards the others the relation seems to be obscure.

1) *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, XXXVII, 318.



## NEGLECT OF THE APPEARANCE

### I

It is a custom and afterwards a duty, prescribed by the law, that those who mourn, especially the widow, have to abstain from the usual care of their appearance. Al-Khansā' describes the Arab women who mourn over the dead, in this way: "Then our women bewail (the dead) with voices, hoarse with weeping, when the professional bewailing women have taken rest, with dishevelled hair and lean faces, without ceasing, when the barking dogs cease barking during the night" <sup>1)</sup>. The widow had to abstain from the use of kuhl and perfumes <sup>2)</sup>. Islām has preserved this custom and given it its legal sanction: to the Muslim widow it is even forebidden to comb her hair <sup>3)</sup>. The present practice at Mekka is described by Snouck Hurgronje: Für die Wittwe ist die Trauerzeit auf 4 Monate und 10 Tage festgesetzt, während deren sie keine neue Ehe eingehen noch vorbereiten, sich nicht besonders schmücken, nur im Nothfalle das Sterbehaus verlassen, sich keinerlei Luxus gestatten darf" <sup>4)</sup>. Lane gives the following description of the widow's mourning rites in Egypt: „In general, the women, while in mourning, leave their hair unbraided, cease to wear some of their ornaments" etc. <sup>5)</sup>.

Cognate customs seem to have been practised by the Israelites. I have already quoted Ps. 35, 14: „as one who mourns over his mother, I prostrate myself in a state of dirtiness". A parallel passage is Ps. 42, 10: "I will say unto God my rock,

1) p. 28, vs. 4:

فَنَسَاؤُنَا يَنْدُبُنِي بَحًّا    بَعْدَ حُدَّةِ السَّوَابِحِ  
شَعْتَنَا سَوَاحِبَ لَا يَنْبِي    إِذَا وَفَى ثِيْلُ الثَّوَابِحِ

2) Bukhārī, Haid. b. 12. Wellhausen. Reste, p. 182. Freytag, Einleitung, p. 223.

3) Juynboll, Handbuch, p. 171.

4) Mekka II, 194.

5) p. 532.

why hast thou forgotten me, why go I in dirtiness under the oppression of the enemy?"<sup>1)</sup> And to the Takoite woman, who has to assume the appearance of mourning over a son, Joab says: "Anoint not thyself with oil"<sup>2)</sup>. Neglecting the use of oil as a custom practised during the time of mourning, appears also in the papyri found at Elephantine. When the Jewish temple had been destroyed by the Egyptians, the members of the Jewish community mourned over this loss. They describe their state in the first papyrus: "until the present day we are clad in saḳ's, we are fasting and abstaining from our wives, we anoint not our selves with oil and wine we drink not"<sup>3)</sup>. In later times the abstinence from the bath is also mentioned. In the Talmud, Ta'anit 13b, the mourning rites on this point are described: "According to the Halakha mourners are not allowed to wash their body with hot or cold water, during all the seven days (after the death)"<sup>4)</sup>.

These customs are not distinctive of the Semitic peoples, they appear to be practised also in other parts of the world. In support I will only quote a passage from Wilken's works: "Auf Leti, Moa and Lakor tragen die Frauen zum Zeichen der Trauer nur einen kurzen Sarong, während sie ihr Haar nicht kämmen dürfen. Auch auf Babar ist den Frauen nach einem Todesfalle das Waschen und Kämmen ihres Haares nicht erlaubt. Von der Insel Kisar oder Makisar wird uns erzählt, dass die Trauer darin besteht, dass man allen Schmuck ablegt, das Kämmen des Haares unterlässt, und alte, zerlumpte Kleider von dunkler Farbe anzieht"<sup>5)</sup>.

## II

This total neglect of the usual care for the body, which runs parallel to other customs of abstinence during the time of mourning, has of course its good reason: the deceased is bereaved of all that makes life desirable; so the mourners ab-

1) אמרתי לאל סלעי למה שכחתני למה קדר אלך בלחץ אויב

2) 2 Sam. 14, 2: אל תסוכי שמן

3) ed. Sachau, I, 20 sq.: בארמלה זילן וצימין נשיא זילן בארמלה  
ועד יומא אנתנה שקקן לבשין וצימין נשיא זילן בארמלה  
עבדין משח לא משחין וחמר לא שתין

4) והלבתא אבל אסיר לרחוץ כל גופו בין בתמין בין בצונין כל שבועה

5) III, 419.

stain from these things in order to be protected against the acts of jealousy on the part of the deceased's spirit; in other words: they imitate the dead and take the appearance of being dead. I am glad to find that this view is held by one of the most competent men in this domain, Dr. N. Adriani, who in a paper read in the Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen "De schoone slaapster in het bosch en een gelijkkluidend verhaal in Midden-Celebes" (printed in Verslagen en Mededeelingen, 5<sup>e</sup> Reeks, Deel II) has given examples of the Toradja custom of imitating the dead in order to free the living from the evil influence of the dead. I will lay stress upon the opinion, that here lies the root of a large part of those rites, which, under the influence of a dualistic religion, have developed into a whole system of ascetic practices; of course in later times these practices, having become a substantial part of religion, have no longer anything to do in the mind of those who practise them with their original meaning. Their origin has been forgotten; it is our task to inquire into it.

### III

We shall first have to consider the old rite of neglecting the appearance in the case of war, which is, in the early Semitic conception, a matter of religion.

Among the pagan Arabs, he who is going to take revenge for spilt blood and he who is going to participate in a feud must neglect his toilet . . . "Die Rache oder die Blutfehde gilt immer als heilige Pflicht und bringt es von selbst mit sich, dass der, dem sie obliegt, sich nicht kämmen und waschen, keinen Wein trinken, kein Weib berühren darf, bis er das gelobte Blut vergossen hat oder selber gefallen ist; dann ist das Gelübde gelöst" (Wellhausen, *Reste* <sup>2</sup>, p. 122).

In the same way Samson, whose life is given to the holy war, has the duty laid upon him to let his hair grow. There are other duties of abstinence incumbent upon the warrior, which probably have also their origin in the mourning rites. But as it is uncertain whether these rites are also founded upon the motive of imitating the dead, I will not adduce them.

It is in the domain of religion that we find innumerable examples of a neglect of the appearance. In the first place we have to mention here that state which Muslims call *ihrām*

"the holy state", the rites of which undoubtedly go back to the times of heathendom. To the present day the muḥrim has to abstain from bathing and combing his hair and from all other care for his toilet. Like the mourning women the pilgrims are شَعْتٌ "with dishevelled hair" and at the end of the holy days they are in a state of utter dirtiness, so that the permission to resume the ordinary way of life is welcomed most heartily.

In North Africa of to-day we find the neglect of the appearance, together with other mourning rites, on the occasion of the January feast, Ennair. During this feast the Muslims do not bathe, they do not change their clothes, they do not cut their nails nor their hair<sup>1)</sup>.

In Judaism, we find the rite among the sect of the Essenes as a permanent state. This is very remarkable, particularly because the Essenes try to live continually in a state of Levitical purity. It is in accordance with the last tendency that they take a bath daily, but for the rest the old mourning rite appears undoubtedly in the description of Josephus<sup>2)</sup>. In the first place there is the remarkable fact, that they never use oil: *καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιχρίματα χρῶνται τὸ ἔλαιον, καὶ οὐδὲ οὐδὲ τῆς ἄκρας, ἀνέχεται τὸ σῶμα· τὸ γὰρ ἀνέχουσιν ἐν καλῇ τῆδεσσι.* "They hold touching oil as a stain; and if anyone of them has been inadvertently soiled with it, he cleans his body; for they reckon being not anointed as something beautiful". In the second place they never take new clothes without necessity: *οὐδὲ ἐκδοῦναι οὐδὲ ἐνδοῦναι ὁμιλοῦσιν πρὶν ἢ διαρραγεῖναι τὸ πρότερον περιεσπασμένον ἢ διαπερκεῖσθαι τὸ γέννη.* "They do not change their clothes or their sandals before they are completely ragged or worn out by length of time". It is only natural to find that these rites appear also among the orthodox Jews on those religious feasts which have the character of mourning days. On the day of atonement bathing and the use of perfumes were prohibited<sup>3)</sup>. The same is told of that lengthy period of religious mourning which culminates in the 9<sup>th</sup> of Ab<sup>4)</sup>.

In Oriental Christendom, which was excessively ascetic, these

1) Doutré, p. 551.

2) Bell. Jud. II, 8, 3 s<sup>1</sup>.

3) Jer. Berakot III, 4.

4) Cf. Houtsma, Over de isr. Vastendagen (Verslagen en Mededeelingen Kon. Akad. van Wetenschappen, IV<sup>e</sup> reeks, 2<sup>e</sup> deel).





## THE SACRED DRESS

In order to explain the sacred dress as it is worn by the priest, the man who performs his duties of worship, the ascetic, the derwish, even the god himself, we shall have to apply the method which has proved to be efficient in the previous cases: we have to examine first what the dress of the dead and that of the mourners was. Concerning the dress of the dead we have very full information.

### I

It may be surprising, at the first glance, that the descriptions of the dress of the dead by two such competent authorities as Goldziher and Juynboll are mutually contradictory. According to Goldziher<sup>1)</sup> the dress of the dead Muslim is "als aus zwei Stücken bestehend bezeichnet". In support of this opinion he quotes an Arabic verse to the effect that all what a man has from this world are رِدَائِي تَلَوِي فِيهَا وَحَنُوطٌ "two ridā's in which thou art enveloped, and the ingredients used for embalming thy corpse", And concerning Thābit b. Ḳais b. Šammās Goldziher quotes the tradition that he "embalmed himself and put on two white garments in order to be shrouded therein". For other traditions on this subject references are given.

Juynboll on the other hand, speaking of the shrouding of the dead, says that the shrouds have to be odd in number<sup>2)</sup>.

It will therefore be necessary to examine how this dissension originates. We find information on this point in the books of law and the books of tradition, chapter *Djanā'iz*. Nawawī ad Muslim II, 329, paen. sqq. connects his information in his usual instructive manner with a tradition: "The Apostle of

1) Bemerkungen zur arabischen Trauerpoesie (WZKM, XVI, 338).

2) Handbuch, p. 170.

God was shrouded in three, white, Saḥūlic, garments among them was neither a ḡamīṣ nor a turban”<sup>1)</sup>. In this quotation Saḥūlic clothes are explained as meaning white, clean cotton garments. According to others the name refers to a town in Yemen. After some sentences explaining upon whom the duty of paying the cost of shrouding is incumbent he continues: „For a man three shrouds are recommended. This is our method and the method of most of the doctors. But one shroud (at least) is imperative as has been said above. For a woman five shrouds are recommended. It is also permitted to shroud a man in five garments; but it is preferable not to exceed the number of three. Exceeding the number of five, is exceeding the just limit in the case of a man as well as in that of a woman. The word “white” (shrouds) proves the recommendability of shrouding the dead in white; and on this point there is uniformity of opinion. In the sound tradition it is said: “In white garments; shroud therein your dead”. Coloured clothes are reprehended and equally clothes of finery”<sup>2)</sup>. Further Nawawī maintains, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfa, that ḡamīṣ and turban are not to be recommended in the attire of the dead.

The Shāfi‘ite opinion is supported by many traditions in Muslim and the other books of tradition. Muslim does not adduce any tradition where two shrouds are mentioned; nay, he even opposes this custom in a tradition which does not leave any doubt as to its polemic tendency: “Ā‘isha said: The Apostle of God was wrapped in a Yemenite ḡulla, which belonged to ‘Abd Allāh b. Abī Bekr. Afterwards it was taken from him and he was shrouded in three Saḥūlic garments from Yemen, among which there was neither turban nor ḡamīṣ: then

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كفن رسول الله صلعم في ثلاث أثواب بيض سحوية نيس فيينا تبيض ولا عمامة 1)  
 السنة في الثفن ثلاثة أثواب للرجل وهو مذهبن ومذهب الجماهير وأنواجب 2)  
 ثوب واحد كما سبق والمستحب في المرأة خمسة أثواب ويجوز أن يلفن الرجل  
 في خمسة نكن المستحب أن لا يتجاوز الثلاثة وأما الزيادة على خمسة فاسراف  
 في حق الرجل وامرأة فونب بيض دنيل لاستحباب الثفنين في الأبيض وهو مجمع  
 عليه وفي الحديث انصحيح في اثنياب الببيض ولفنوا فيينا موتام وبكره انصبغات  
 وحوها من ثياب الزينة (الزينة read)



‘Abd Allāh took the ḥulla to preserve it, saying: I will be shrouded in it. But afterwards he said: The Apostle of God has not been shrouded in it, should I be shrouded in it? Then he made its price a ṣadaqa”<sup>1</sup>). Nawawī (Muslim) II, 330. 4 infra commentates the word ḥulla in this way: “Lexicographers say: a ḥulla is nothing but two cloths, izār and ridā”.

Polemics against the use of two garments for shrouding the dead could scarcely speak less disguisedly in tradition than is done here. This utterance thus confirms the existence of the custom of shrouding the dead in two pieces of cloth. Later we shall adduce other evidence for this fact.

There are several other features in Nawawī’s exposé deserving discussion.

In the first place it is to be observed that the odd number of shrouds (one, three, five) is only one example out of many testifying Muslim preference for the uneven numbers. The dead are to be washed an odd number of times (Bukhārī, *Djanā’iz*, bābs 8 and 9). The living also (cf. *Der Islam*, V, 76). The hāir of deceased women is to be divided into three parts (فرون: Bukhārī, *Djanā’iz*, 14 and 16; Muslim, II, 327, 9. Similar is the practice in modern Egypt. Lane, p. 60). Apparently polemics against the custom of two shrouds originate in this preference for odd numbers. This preference seems therefore to have been unknown, at least in this case, among the older Muslims and the pagan Arabs. In the case of the number of ritual ablutions this preference has probably been influenced by Jewish practice (cf. *Der Islam* V, p. 76 sq.): the same may be the case here.

In the second place it is to be observed, that a greater number than five shrouds is disapproved of: it is called excessive. Abū Dā’ud quotes a tradition with the same tendency: a great number of shrouds is called مغالا “exceeding the limit”<sup>2</sup>). Like most traditions these have also their origin in contemporary tendencies. A few words have to be said on this subject. Apparently there was in the Semitic world a tendency to make

1) Muslim II, 330 sq.: عَنْ عَائِشَةَ قُلْتُ أَدْرَجَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فِي حُلَّةٍ يَنْبِئُ كُنْتُ نَعْبُدُ اللَّهَ بِهَا أَيْ بَكْرٍ ثُمَّ فَرَعَتْ عَنْهُ وَكَفَّنَتْ فِي ثَلَاثَةِ أَتْرَابٍ سَحُولٍ بِدِيَةِ نَيْسَ فَيُنَا عِمَامَةً وَلَا تَمِيسَ فَرَفَعَ عَبْدُ اللَّهِ الْحُلَّةَ فَعَالَ أَنْفُسَ فَيَبِثَ ثُمَّ قَالَ لَمْ يَنْفُسَ فَيُنَا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَأَكْفَنَ فَيُنَا فَتَصَدَّقَ بِنَا



2) II, 41. 8 sqq.

funerals pompous. We are informed concerning this chiefly by its rigid opponents. We find them already in early Syriac literature. Ephraim Syrus does not only condemn the bewailing of the dead and the dance, but also the large number of shrouds: "for the living put on only one cloth; should then the dead be a wardrobe?"<sup>1)</sup> Bar Hebraeus considers it appropriate to repeat in his *Nomocanon* a canon by Jacob of Edessa, to the same effect: "The Faithful shall not shroud their dead in precious garments. For they are a ruin for the living and the dead do not profit by them"<sup>2)</sup>. We shall find exactly the same argument in Muslim tradition. But we have to consider first a Jewish tradition to the same effect: "Before, the burial of the dead was a burden more heavy for his kindred than his death, so that it even happened that his kindred left him and fled. This continued until Rabban Gamliel took the charge of levity on himself: he ordered himself to be buried in linen garments. This example was followed by the people"<sup>3)</sup>.

This same tendency, founded on the same motive as is given by Jacob of Edessa, is found in Islām. It appeared already in the tradition of Abu Dā'ud adduced above. Its motive is put into the mouth of Abū Bekr in a tradition communicated by Mālik. When Abū Bekr was on his deathbed he asked his daughter 'Ā'isha in how many garments the Apostle of God had been shrouded. She answered: in three, white, Saḥūlic clothes. Then the sick man pointed to the cloth he had on and said: This cloth has been made dirty by red earth or saffran, wash it and take it as my shroud together with two other pieces of cloth. When 'Ā'isha protested, saying that it was worn out, her father answered: The living need a new cloth more than the dead; it only serves for the matter<sup>4)</sup>.

We thus find in Muslim tradition on the one hand the tendency to shroud the dead in an odd number of clothes; on the other hand disapproval of any luxury in the shrouds. This

1) *Carmina Nisibena*, p. 37, 5.

2) p. 70:   


3) Mo'ed kaṭan 27b: בראשונה היתה הוצאת המת קשה לקרוביו יותר מכיתתו עד שהיו קרוביו מניחין אותו ובורחין עד שבא רבן נמליאל ונהג קלות ראש בעצמו ויצא בכלי פשתן ונהג העם אחרית לצאת בכלי פשתן

4) *Muwatta'*, 6, 6 infra: 

disapproval is expressed in a sentence which is borrowed from Christian examples; it is also found in Jewish literature.

The odd number is still to be detected in the Jewish shrouding as it is described by Bodenschatz IV, 171. According to him the deceased Jew is shrouded in a shirt and a cowl. The head of the men is enveloped in his *ṭallit* (the white cover of the head during prayer), that of women in a different cloth. He also mentions white stockings; of course this is a mere Western addition, so that the number of three pieces of clothing seems to have been the usual one.

I have quoted from Goldziher some instances of the practice of using two shrouds. As the matter is of some importance for our inquiry, I will add some further ones.

It is particularly interesting to see that the example of Abū Bakr has also (and probably previously) been adduced by those who think two garments the number to be used for shrouding. When Abū Bekr felt death near, he ordered two of the pieces of clothing he had worn to be washed and to be taken as his shrouds. When ʿĀʾisha advised him to buy a set of shrouds he answered: "within a short time it becomes the prey of matter"<sup>1</sup>). The same tradition is in a modified form adduced by Suyūṭī in his commentary on *Nasāʾī* I, 268, 18. In these traditions there is only the tendency to oppose luxury in shrouding. It is easy to see that the tradition quoted above from Mālik, p. 6: Abū Bekr's questioning ʿĀʾisha on the number of the shrouds of Moḥammed and her answer, three, is a modification of the old form given by Ibn Hishām and Suyūṭī. The tendency to adduce the Prophet's example is evidently a new shoot on an old branch. Suyūṭī l. c., l. 20 sqq. further quotes a tradition in which it is said that Ḥudhaifa, when he felt death near, ordered two white cloths to be bought for shrouds<sup>2</sup>), excesses in shrouding being superfluous as better or worse clothes await the dead.

At the present day the Egyptians are shrouded in "a piece or two of cotton"<sup>3</sup>).

1) Ibn Hishām, 240, 7 sqq: بلغد أن أب بكر الصديق لما حضر أمر بثوبين نبيسين يغسلان فيكفن فيهما فقالت له عائشة قد أعذك الله يا أبة عني فاشتر كفن فضل إنما ع سلعة حتى يصير إلى القبر

عن حذيفة أنه قال عند موته اشتروا لي ثوبين أبيضين<sup>2</sup>

3) Lane, p. 518.

We thus have the two sets of traditions side by side. To the question which is the older one the answer must be: that of two shrouds. For 1<sup>o</sup> the preference for odd numbers is influenced by Jewish tradition in other cases and therefore probably also here. 2<sup>o</sup> if three shrouds had been the original number founded on the preference for odd numbers, it cannot be explained why some people should have tried to replace it by two. 3<sup>o</sup> Muslim practice prefers two shrouds, notwithstanding the consensus of the doctors and the books of tradition. This can only be explained by the fact that practice often continues the old habits without regard to the law. 4<sup>o</sup> the common Semitic dress consisted of two pieces of cloth, so it is only natural that the dead were also dressed in this way.

Wellhausen has several times laid stress on the last mentioned fact. It should, however, be remembered that two pieces of clothing are commonly considered in historical times by the Semites themselves as a full dress. Within the house, or while doing heavy work, a man takes off his mantle, so that he has on one piece of cloth only. This circumstance is also reflected in the laws and customs of shrouding. Muslim tradition gives examples of one shroud only being used; and the law declares one shroud imperative, as we have seen above. We shall see later on that the same variations occur in religious dress; and that there also two pieces of clothing is the usual number.

These two shrouds are said, in the traditions which are quoted above, to have been white, if any colour is mentioned. Utterances of the Prophet are also adduced prescribing white garments: "On the authority of Ibn 'Abbās: the Apostle of God said: put on white clothes for they are the best; and shroud therein your deceased" <sup>1)</sup>. It will not be necessary to say more of Muslim custom on this very important point, as there is, as far as I know, no difference of opinion in this matter.

Among the Jews too the white shrouds seem to have been prevalent. In Bodenschatz's description (IV, 171) only white clothes are mentioned. There is, however, one tradition which has to be brought forward. It occurs in the Babylonian Talmud, Sabbath 114a: Rabbi Jannai said to his sons: "My sons,

1) Tirmidhi I, 185, 22: عن ابن عباس قل قل رسول الله صلعم ائبسوا من ثيابكم عن ابيات فاننا من خير ثيابكم وكفنوا فينا موتاكم Cf. also Abū Dā'ud I, 268, 2,

do not bury me in white garments, nor in black ones. Not in white ones, for if I am not found just, I shall appear (among the damned) as a bridegroom among mourners. Not in black ones, for if I am found just, I shall appear (among the blessed) as a mourner among bridegrooms" <sup>1</sup>).

Here is an allusion to the custom of using black shrouds. This is, however, the only evidence I am able to give. We may consequently say, that it was the prevalent Semitic custom to use white shrouds: black ones seem to have occurred seldom. The custom of using white shrouds is, however, not especially Semitic. Wilken (III, 116, 118) quotes instances from the Straits Settlements and Sumatra (Bataks). As a rule the Greeks were shrouded in white garments (cf. Mau in Pauly-Wissowa's Encyclopaedia, s.v. Bestattung, vol. III, col. 334); this holds also true for contemporary Europe.

Muslim tradition further contains some extremely valuable allusions to the form of the shrouds. We have already quoted a tradition containing a condemnation of using a shirt (قميص) and turban (عامة). This tradition seems to have been widely spread and to have been directed against innovations consisting in putting on the dead a shirt and a turban. It is interesting to see, how a Mālikite distorts the plain sense of the words in order to extract from them a meaning to the contrary. For the Mālikite school allows the use of shirt and turban. "On the authority of 'Ā'isha: the Apostle of God was shrouded in three white, Saḥūlic clothes; among them was neither shirt nor turban". Zurkānī: "This means: shirt and turban are not included in the three garments, they are to be reckoned over and above this number. Taken in this sense the tradition does not contradict Mālik's and Abū Ḥanīfa's opinion that shirt and turban are recommendable". Zurkānī is, however, honest enough to add: "it is, however, possible that the words mean: there were no clothes beyond this number. On this Shāfi'i's and the others' denial of the recommendability is founded. But it is allowed. The Ḥambalites think that the use of shirt and turban is disapproved of and condemned in the tradition" <sup>2</sup>).

1) ואמר רבי יצחק לבנו בני אל תקברוני לא בבליים לבנים ולא בבליים שחורים לבנים שמא לא אכזה יאמרו כחתן בין אבליים שחורים שמא אכזה ואזהה כאכל בין חתנים לבנים  
2) Muwatta' II, 6, 9 sqq.: (ليس فينا قميص ولا عامة) معدودان من جملة  
الثلاثة بل زائدان علينا فلا يخالف قول مالك وإني حنيقة بأسبغائهما ويحتمل

While shirt and turban are disapproved of by a large part of the Muslim scholars, tradition on the other hand has not forgotten to state what is the preferable form for shrouds.

We have already quoted Abū Dā'ud's tradition on the authority of the Prophet: "the best shroud is a ḥulla" and Nawawī's explanation according to which a ḥulla consists of izār and ridā'. In a tradition of Ibn Sa'd it is said that Moḥammed was buried in izār, ridā' and a lifāfa. A lifāfa is not a garment in the usual sense of the word: it is only a tie, or a cloth wrapped around the body or any parts of it. So izār and ridā' are also here the shrouds in the proper sense of the word.

This fact is confirmed and elucidated by other traditions, viz. those which prescribe that any one who dies in the state of a pilgrim, shall be buried in the garments he is wearing. Now the iḥrām the pilgrim wears consists of an uncoloured izār and ridā': funeral dress and religious dress are therefore identical. Muslim III, 159 sqq. gives a good many of these traditions, the common type of which is as follows: "On the authority of Ibn 'Abbās: a man who was muḥrim had fallen from his camel so that his neck was broken and he died. The Apostle of God said: Wash him with water and perfume of lotus, and shroud him in his two garments without covering his face and his head; for he will rise again crying: Labbaika Allāhumma, Labbaika" <sup>1)</sup>. With slight modifications this tradition occurs, apart from the places indicated in Muslim, in Buḫḫārī, *Djanā'iz*, bāb 22; Nasā'i I, 269, 15. The modifications are chiefly three: instead of "in his two garments" occurs "in two garments". But according to Ḳāḍī 'Iyāḍ, quoted by Nawawī III, 159, 9 *infra*, the first is the prevalent reading. The second modification is the condemnation of perfumes instead of the order to use lotus water; and the third consists in the reading ملتبيا instead of ملتبيا.

ان معناه لم يكن مع الثلاثة شيء غيرها وهو قول الشافعي والجمهور بعدم استحبابها  
وانما هو جائز وقيل للتعاطف بالدراسة والنفي في الحديث

عن ابن عباس ان رجلا أوقفته راحلته وهو محرم فمات فقال: 1) p. 160, II sqq.: رسول الله صلعم اغسلوه بماء وسدر وكفنوه في ثوبيه ولا تخمروا وجبه ولا رأسه  
فنه يبعث يوم القيامة ملتبيا

نَبْد means "to glue the hair", a custom of the pagan muḥrim's as the Lisān s. v. tells us. Consequently the tradition and its variants only mean to say that a muḥrim is already wearing his shrouds.

As I have said, the clothing of a muḥrim consists of izār and ridā'. It is worth observing that, as in the case of the shrouds, here also the shirt and the turban are expressly forbidden, a confirmation of our identification of funeral dress and religious dress. "On the authority of Ibn 'Omar it is said that a man asked the Apostle of God what the muḥrim should put on. The Apostle of God answered: Do not put on a shirt, nor a turban, nor trousers, nor a burnus, nor shoes. Only if any one does not find a pair of sandals he may put on shoes; but he has to cut them off to beneath the ankles; it is also forbidden to you to put on a cloth touched by saffran or *Wars*'<sup>1</sup>).

These polemics against the shirt and the turban in both cases give us the right to conclude that in the early ages of Islām these clothes were beginning to intrude themselves into the domain of mourning and religion and that they were prohibited because they were an innovation. For these garments have in themselves nothing which could scandalize the muslim doctors. This conclusion will be confirmed by a consideration of the form of these clothes.

As regards the قميص it is rightly translated by "shirt". It is (compare Dozy's Dictionnaire détaillé des vêtements s. v.) a shirt reaching half way down the calf of the leg, covering the shoulders and provided with long or short sleeves. It corresponds to the Hebrew כְּתָנִית. This sort of garment is the usual dress of the Israelites in historical times and of the Arabs in an equal stage of civilisation, that of settled people. So it is comparatively young und consequently it has no place among the garments worn during mourning and in religious state. As soon as it tries to obtain its place in this sacred domain, it is repressed at least by the majority of the Muslim doctors. We

1) Muslim III, 131. 7 sqq.: عَنْ ابْنِ عُمَرَ أَنَّ رَجُلًا سَأَلَ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ مَا يَلْبَسُ تَحْرِمُ مِنَ الثِّيَابِ فَقَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ لَا تَلْبَسُوا الْقَمِيصَ وَلَا تَعْبِئُوا وَلَا تَسْرُوبِلَاتٍ وَلَا تَبْرَانِسَ وَلَا الْخُفَّاءَ إِلَّا أَحَدٌ لَا يَجِدُ أَنْعَلَيْنِ فَلْيَلْبَسِ الْخَفَيْنِ وَلْيَقْطَعْهُمُ أَسْفَلَ مِنَ الْكَعْبَيْنِ وَلَا تَلْبَسُوا مِنَ الثِّيَابِ شَيْعًا مَسَّهُ الزَّغْفَرَانُ وَلَا النُّورَسُ

may thus conclude that *izār* and *ridā'*, being the religious dress, belong to a period preceding that of the Arabs as a people which has settled down to a large extent. This conclusion is again confirmed by historical tradition. In the biography of Moḥammed and in the books of tradition his *izār* or *mī'zar* is repeatedly mentioned. That it was the common Beduin garment may be seen from the verses by Beduin poets quoted in the *Lisān* s. v.

The forms of *izār* and *ridā'* are familiar to us, because to the present day they are worn by the pilgrims. It may suffice to quote two modern descriptions: "Statt mit den gewöhnlichen Kleidern muss er (the pilgrim) seinen Körper mit zwei ungenähten, neuen oder doch reinen und wo möglich weissen Tüchern bedecken, von denen das eine (der sogen. *Ridā'*) um die Schultern, das andre (der *Izār*) um die Lenden gehängt wird"<sup>1)</sup>. And Burton II, 133 sq.: "One of these sheets, technically termed the "*Rida*", is thrown over the back, and, exposing the arm and shoulder, is knotted at the right side in the style "*Wishah*". The "*Izār*" is wrapped round the loins from waist to knee, and, knotted or tucked in at the middle, supports itself". The *izār* is nothing but a cloth covering the middle of the body, of course without sleeves; indeed the sort of dress appropriate to Beduins. This dress is made complete by covering the upper part of the body with the *ridā'*. We have indeed found the single garment and the full dress occurring among the forms of funeral clothing.

Turning to the Israelites we find the same condition. We do not know much of their Beduin period; but their Beduin garments are also preserved as their religious dress. The word *izār* is linguistically speaking of exactly the same formation as אָזָר; for the *ṣērē* of the Hebrew word has been artificially prolonged. אָזָר is that which is girded on the body. In historical times the אָזָר has been somewhat enlarged and has taken the form of the Arab إزار; it is now called אֶפֶד. That the אֶפֶד is the enlarged form of the אָזָר is proved by two things: 1<sup>o</sup> by the expression הָגֵר אֶפֶד בָּר (1 Sam. 2, 18; 2 Sam. 6, 14) "girded with the linen ephod." The ephod consequently had no sleeves and did not cover the shoulders: it had to be

1) Juynboll, *Handbuch*, p. 145



girded with a belt. 2" by the fact that a person, wearing only the **אֵפֹד**, is called nude (2 Sam. 6, 20).

This fact has already been recognised by modern inquirers such as Baentsch, Holzinger, Benzinger<sup>1)</sup>. That the ephod was no longer the usual dress in the historical period of the Israelites, is proved by its being worn only by priests.

Further we know with certainty what the full dress of the priest consisted of and it is probable that we have here the counterpart of the *ridā'*. Young Samuel, acolyte in Shilo, is girded with the linen ephod. Every year his mother brings him a little **מֵיֵל**. The *me'īl* was apparently that which completed the priestly dress and it may be assumed, like the ephod, to have been a particular piece of clothing. This is confirmed by other facts: it is only mentioned as being worn by priestly and royal persons. It is probably owing to this fact that modern inquirers incline to consider the *me'īl* as a garment of luxury: a prince must wear luxurious clothes. To a certain extent this is true, but it is never said that the king wears a *me'īl* as a dress of state; and moreover it is out of the question that a rigorous man of the old stamp like Samuel should be depicted as wearing a luxurious dress. That the feature of 1 Sam. 2, 19 is not an unhistorical description appears in 1 Sam. 28, 14 where the dead Samuel is also described as wearing the *me'īl*. It was the religious dress *par excellence*. Princes are also sacred persons: therefore they wear the *me'īl*; not because of their indulging in luxurious habits. It thus seems that the modern conception of the *me'īl* is wrong. It belongs to the primeval ephod and may be expected to have been as antique as this. That it was used, like the *ridā'*, as a wrapper, is proved by its character: it is only a completion of the ephod, worn out of doors, not during the official service of the priest. It is also proved by the verb which is used in connection with the *me'īl*, viz. **עָטָה** "to envelop": whereas **לָבַשׁ**, the ordinary verb meaning "to clothe", is not associated with the *me'īl*.

The apparently false view of modern inquirers is explained by their being misled by the descriptions of the priestly dress

1) It would take too long to give a critical examination of the many opinions concerning the ephod, which have been expressed by a host of scholars. It seems to me better to take as a starting point the opinion, which is the prevalent one at the present time.

in later times, especially those which are given in the very detailed prescripts for the Tabernacle. In these chapters (Ex. 28, 29, 39) a priestly dress is described which may be compared with Josephus' descriptions in Hellenistic times, but wholly different from what we know to have been the ancient dress.

We may sum up our arguments by saying that it is probable, if not certain, that the ancient holy dress of the Israelites and the holy dress of the Arabs consisted of two, sometimes of one, pieces of cloth of white colour and that this dress is the same as the dress of the deceased. This dress may be called proto-semitic.

There are, however, some classes of persons which are buried not in white shrouds, but in the dress in which they have died. Among the Muslims the *shahīd*, he who is fallen on the field of battle, is treated in this way. Bukhārī in his *Kitāb al-Djanā'iz* gives some traditions dealing with this matter. They of course mention particular cases only; but, as is the way of tradition, they are taken as examples for Muslim practice. In these traditions there may be historical truth: they relate how the Muslims fallen at Uhud were treated, a matter of which remembrance may very well have survived.

Bāb 73, first tradition: "On the authority of Djabir ibn 'Abd Allāh: The Prophet united every two men of those who were killed near Uhud in one cloth. Then he said: Which of the two had mastered the greater part of the *Ḳor'ān*? Then, when that man had been named, he had him put in the tomb first, saying: I am the witness of these on the day of resurrection. Then he ordered them to be buried with traces of blood on them without being washed, nor was the *ṣalāt* performed over them"<sup>1</sup>). Cf. bāb 75.

This tradition might give the impression that the dead were divested of their clothes and each two of them laid together in one shroud. That this was not the case is expressly said by al-Muzhirī as quoted by Kaṣṭallānī (II, 497, 23); according

عن جابر بن عبد الله قال كان النبي يجمع بين الرجلين من قتلى احد  
في ثوب واحد ثم يقول ايكم اكثر اخذا للفران فاذا انشبر له الى احدنا قدمه في  
الاحد وقال انا شبيد على هؤلاء يوم القيامة وامر بدفنتهم في دماهم ولم يغسلوا ولم  
يصل عليهم

to him their bloody clothes were left upon them and then they were wrapped together with others in one shroud. This is of course right, though the tradition does not say it literally. This opinion is moreover corroborated by an other tradition quoted by Kaṣṭallānī II, 500, 2 according to which the Prophet said: "Do not wash them, for every wound or scar or trace of blood will smell like musc on the day of resurrection"<sup>1</sup>). It is exactly the traces of blood, also those on the clothes, that have to be preserved.

It will be observed that we have here three exceptional features: the burying of the killed in their bloody clothes; the omission of the usual ablution; the omission of the usual service for the dead. They are also enumerated by Mālik in his *Muwaṭṭa'* II, 319.

It is interesting to see, that Jewish custom runs parallel to that of the Arab Semites. But with the former there are some other categories of persons which are not shrouded in the usual way, but left with the clothes they wore when dying. Bodenschatz IV, 171 enumerates: 1<sup>o</sup> those who are slain. He mentions expressly the bloody clothes, as in the case of the Muslims. 2<sup>o</sup> women who have died in being delivered of a child. 3<sup>o</sup> brides. The meaning of the Muslim and Jewish custom will be discussed further on, when the exceptional character of the shrouding of the dead is dealt with. This however must be preceded by a short resumé of the data gained so far.

We have seen that in historical times the Arabic death clothes consisted of two white garments, an antique dress identical with that of the muḥrim.

This dress of the muḥrim appeared to be identical with that of the ancient priestly dress of the Hebrews.

Of the Israelite shrouds we know with certainty only the customs of post-christian times: then they are generally white, seldom black.

As regards the numbers of two garments in the Arabic dress of the dead and in the Arabic and Israelite religious dress, it corresponds only to the custom, in vogue at certain periods of the Semitic peoples, of wearing two pieces of cloth. In later periods this number has grown in the daily dress.

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١ لا تغسلوهم فان كل جرح او كلم او دم يفوح مسكاً يوم القيامة

The only thing left to be discussed is therefore the colour of the shrouds: their being white, black by exception.

At the outset it has to be observed, that this is not the only case in which funeral clothes are only distinguished by their colour. Every one will think immediately of our own mourning clothes which are generally black, for women partly white. This was also the custom of the Semites. I shall give only a few examples. The mourning women among the Arabs used to be clad in black clothes. Lisān I, 455 s. v. سلب contains this passage: "Concerning Asmā' the daughter of 'Umair it is related that she said, when Dja'far had died: the Apostle of God commanded me: put on (تسلبى) three mourning garments, then do what you like. تسلبى means: put on black mourning clothes; these are called سلاب which means a black cloth with which the mourning woman covers her head" <sup>1</sup>). And on the same page: "Silāb and Sulub are the black clothes the women put on during the bewailing scene" <sup>2</sup>). We may further compare the data given by Goldziher in WZKM, XVI, 322, note 4 and in his Muhammedanische Studien I, 259, note 6.

It is to be remarked that among the Arabs white occurs also as the colour of mourning. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka II, 194: "Weisse Kleider gelten während dieser Zeit als die besten, jedoch sind auch grüne und schwarze gebräuchlich".

The Syrians of to day still wear black, as appears from Wetzstein's description, p. 296, where he tells that the bewailing women wear "das lange schwarze, ziegenhärige Trauerhemde". Wetzstein gives a note here, which is worth mentioning. According to him this black shirt is of the same colour as the biblical שֶׁק. This is a priori probable; Wetzstein supports his opinion by referring to Apoc. 6, 12: *μύλας ὡς σάκκους γκριζέουσας*. What he says further of the ihrām, need not be discussed here; we have already said enough on the shape of the ihrām.

The שֶׁק is so universally known to have been the mourning

عن أسماء بنت عمير أنها قالت لما أصيب جعفر أمرني رسول الله صلعم فقال ١) تسلبى ثلاثة ثم اصنعي بعد ما شئت تسلبى أى البسى ثياب الحداد أسود وفي السلاب وهو ثوب أسود تغطي به لحد رأسها

٢) والسلب والسلب ثياب سود تلبسها النساء في المنأمر

cloth of the Hebrews, that I need not give any examples here. But a further remark should be made. Benzinger has rightly considered the  $\overline{\text{ר}}^{\text{ע}}$  as the antique piece of cloth which served to cover the middle of the body and was girded round the hips. He is also right in comparing it with ephod and izār. But he is wrong in saying that all these clothes are simply the clothes of ancient times, which have survived in exceptional cases. It would be against all analogy, if the Hebrews had not possessed a peculiar dress for peculiar circumstances. The form and the number of these peculiar clothes were not exceptional, no doubt: what was exceptional, was their colour: white or black, the colours of death and mourning. Ephod, izār and saḵ therefore appear to have been of the same form; but the former two were white, at any rate not coloured, the latter was black.

Now what had induced primitive peoples to prefer these colours has been made clear by ethnologists such as Frazer and Wilken. After giving a great many examples of white and black mourning garments (III, 60, note: *ib.*, p. 416—422), which confirm his opinion that mourning garments are intended to differ from the usual ones, Wilken says (p. 416): *Aber mehr noch als durch das Farben des Körpers oder des Gesichtes, wird man bestrebt gewesen sein, sich den Abgestorbenen gegenüber durch eine gänzlich veränderte Kleidung unkenntlich zu machen. Dies muss dann auch die Anleitung für das Tragen einer Trauerkleidung gegeben haben, wie das bei einer Menge von zivilisierten und wilden Völkern angetroffen wird. Diese Trauerkleider waren ursprünglich allein eben so viele Vermummungen, mittels deren man den Geistern zu entwischen trachtete*”.

Now we have found that among the Semites it was the mourner and also the dead who were clad in white or black. Why the mourners assumed this disguise is at once clear: they had to fear the ghost of the deceased. But wherefore were the dead themselves disguised? Had they to fear ghosts and had they therefore to be disguised?

This question must be answered in the affirmative: the deceased was indeed the object of the enmity of ghosts. We have already met with an example of this enmity, that has given rise to the custom of watching the dead; if this were neglected, the dead would be stolen by the ghosts.

There is an other example, well known in the Semitic world.

According to Muslim theology the departed is tormented in his grave by two ghosts (here of course angels) Munkar and Nakir. In North-Africa of to-day there even exist magic formulas to be used beside the dead in order to facilitate the interrogation by these ghosts. Now Munkar and Nakir are not a Muslim invention: the Jews knew of angels who awaited the dead after their departure from life. Test. of Asher, VI, 4 sq.: "For the latter end of men does show their righteousness (or unrighteousness), when they meet the angels of the Lord and of Satan. For when the soul departs troubled, it is tormented by the evil spirit which it also served in lusts and evil works". The later Jews speak of the **חבט הקבר** "beating of the grave". Bodenschatz III, 95 sq., quotes very picturesque descriptions. Cf. further Jewish Encyclopaedia I, 593.

It is likewise said that the ancient Persians were tormented by a demon when they had departed from life (Windischmann, *Zoroastrische Studien*, p. 110). Analogous conceptions exist among primitive peoples. Wilken (III, 55) quotes an example of the Benuas of Malacca: "The souls of the wicked are to be devoured by spectres, who approach the graves for that purpose on the seventh day after interment, on which day fires are kindled to drive the evil spirits away". A vivid description of the fate of the Toradja soul after death is given by Adriani en Kruyt, *De Bare'e-sprekende Toradja's* II, 111 sq.: „Een eindweegs verder komt zij (the soul on its way to Hades) bij eene smidse, waarin geesten bezig zijn met smeden. Hun hoofdman heet Langkoda. Deze geest is mank en kan niet loopen; aan de zielen van mannen die voorbij komen, vraagt hij hoeveel koppen zij hebben gesneld, aan de vrouwen, hoeveel vrijers zij er op na hebben gehouden . . . . . kan eene ziel hem niet antwoorden, dan hamert Langkoda haar op de knieën, zoodat zij niet kan loopen. Dit zelfde lot ondergaat de ziel van een ongetrouwden man of een ongetrouwde vrouw".

So the conception of the soul after death being tormented by ghosts may be called a common conception. White garments being a common means of misleading the ghosts, may consequently be considered as a talisman with which the dead are provided by the living on their departure to the grave and Hades.

This conclusion is supported by what we have found concerning special garments of the dead. The dress of the bride

is eminently suited to drive away the ghosts, for it is usually provided with talismans; but its special character alone would be sufficient.

The same may be said of the bloody clothes of the slain and women who died during childbirth. Blood is one of the mightiest talismans in the popular mind all the world over. The bloody garments are reckoned as being a better protection for the dead against the ghosts than the usual shrouds. So it is only natural that the Muslims do not wash the slain: the blood must remain. And prayers have not to be recited over the slain; they have a protection mightier than prayer.

The high value attached to shrouds, as it has been explained in our discussion, is elucidated by the Jewish conception, that to be buried without shrouds, was a punishment. *Megilla* 32a: "Rabbi Pharnak said in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: everyone who touches an uncovered scroll of the Law, will be buried uncovered"<sup>1</sup>).

White garments are also used in other conditions which are thought to be dangerous on account of the ghosts. It is well known that a bridegroom is the object of the jealousy of the demons: so the bridegroom wears white clothes (cf. the above quotation from *Sabbat* 114a). Menstruation is also considered as affected by demoniacal powers: so women wear white clothes during the days following menstruation (*Sabbat* 13b, beginning).

Apart from white or bloody garments there are a good many customs which seems to be intended to protect the dead against ghosts: the use of perfumes in several cases: in the water with which the dead are washed, in the shrouds themselves, on the way to the tomb; covering the dead with salt as the Jews did (*Sabbat* 151b), reciting sacred texts on the way to the burial place, "damit die Teufel von den Todten weichen mögen" (*Bodenschatz*, IV, 173): closing all entrances of the body with plugs of cotton in order to prevent the spirits from entering.

## II

We have to inquire more closely into the religious dress in order to be able to answer the question whether there is any

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אמר ר' יוחנן כל האוחז ספר תורה ערום נקבר ערום 1)

relation between the funeral and the religious dress, and if so, to account for such a relation.

A part of this investigation has already been made in the previous section of this chapter, where it appeared that the muḥrim, who is going to celebrate the feast of spring or of autumn, is dressed in the same way as the dead: in izār and ridā'. We have further found that these two feasts and their original rites date from proto-semitic times; so it is probable that the dress worn on these occasions dates also from proto-semitic times; but as far as I know, we are not able to prove this conjecture.

We will, however, first turn our attention to the dress ascribed to the gods of the Semites and see whether it is connected with the dress of the dead. Of course our information will not be very full, because the religion of the Hebrews has not preserved many anthropomorphic features, and, as regards the Arabs, the reports concerning their pagan times are, generally speaking, of an incidental nature. Moreover the statues and images of Semitic gods which have been brought to light by excavations (apart from Babylonia) are very few. But there are some descriptions available. Krehl in his *Religion der vorislamischen Araber*, has published some texts concerning the ancient deities. In the section concerning the god Wadd the following description of his statue occurs (p. 87): it was the statue of a man of the highest stature, enveloped in two ḥulla's: one in the form of an izār, the other in the form of a ridā' <sup>1)</sup>.

This valuable description shows us that the dress of the gods consisted of an izār and a ridā', exactly like that of the dead and the muḥrim. The colour is not mentioned here, but in connection with the foregoing and the following facts, there can be no doubt that it was white, when the clothes were real.

This fact is paralleled by the information, small as it is, which we have concerning the Israelites. We have seen that the funeral dress and the sacred dress were of the same form, that of the Arabic izār, in the first case called שָׂק, in the second case אֶפֶד. Now this word אֶפֶד has in some places of the Old Testament the meaning of image (Judges 8, 26 sq.).

كُنْتُ أَنْظُرَ إِلَيْهِ دُونَ تَمَثُّلِ رَجُلٍ كَأَعْظَمِ مَا يَكُونُ مِنْ أَتْرَجَالٍ قَدْ دَبَرَ عَلَيْهِ أَيْ ١)  
نُفْسٌ عَلَيْهِ حُلَّتَانِ مَتَزَّرٌ (متأزّر with Krehl) حِلَّةً وَمَتَزَّرٌ بِأُخْرَى



This has led to the correct supposition that the image of the god was clad with an ephod, so that the god and his priest wore the same garment, a garment, we may add, which is the old Semitic garment of the dead. It consisted of one piece which was obligatory and a second to make the dress full.

The religion of the pagan Arabs did not know priests in the usual sense of the word; and probably the same may be said of the proto-semites. Comparing כֹּהֵן with كَاهِن one cannot maintain that the meaning "priest" is older than that of "sooth-sayer". And still in old-hebrew religion the functions which in later times are distinctive of the priest, are performed by the pater familias. But with regard to their dress, in pagan Arabia the same relation exists between the god and those who perform the sacred rites as among the old Israelites. It is not always stated that they were white, but it is probable. Goldziher has adduced some instances of the two pieces of clothing worn by worshippers. It has already been said that at certain periods in the development of the Semitic peoples two cloths were the usual dress; this number was augmented in later times; but in religion the number of two remained, as we shall see.

One of Goldziher's instances (WZKM, XVI, 138 note 8) is taken from Yāḩūt's Geographical Dictionary II, 108, 7 sqq. "A man of the tribe of Kinda had lost some camels which had gone astray. Then he journeyed towards the god Djalsad, slew a camel and asked for two pieces of clothing from the clothes of the guardians of the sanctuary and hired them; then he put the two garments on. This was a custom of the pagan Arabs" <sup>1)</sup>).

Probably the reason why the man took two garments from the guardians, was the necessity of wearing white clothes, which the guardians wore in attending the god. Other examples of the two garments worn by ascetics may be found in Goldziher's article. Nöldeke in ZDMG XLVIII, p. 45 sqq. quotes an other instance. When the poet Abu 'l-Atāhiya was converted "he put on a woollen kisā' and a woollen darrā'a" <sup>2)</sup>). Here the

أَتَى رَجُلٌ مِنْ كِنْدَةَ أَبَلَا فَأَقْبَلَ إِلَى الْجَلْسَدِ فَذَكَرَ جَزُورًا وَسَمِعَ نَوْبِينَ مِنْ  
بَيْتِ السَّدَنَةِ وَأَتَرَاهَا فَلَبِسَهَا وَذَلِكَ دُونَ بَعْضِهِمْ

نَبَسَ أَبُو الْعَدْنِيَّةِ لِسَاءَ صُوفٍ وَدِرَاعَةَ صُوفٍ 2) Aghani III, 100. 16.

two white garments are certainly the token of a religious state. And the woollen garments have always been the distinguishing dress of Christian and Muslim ascetics, who are called in Arabic after them *ṣūfī's*. Of Moḥammed's companion 'Abd Allāh b. Mas'ūd it is said that he used perfumes and that he wore white clothes, two characteristics which recall the funeral rites<sup>1)</sup>. And of the first Muslims it is said that they used to wear wool on Friday (Abū Dā'ud I, 37, 6 *infra*). Gabriel, in the well known traditions which describe his interrogating Moḥammed, wears white garments<sup>2)</sup>. Among the Mandaeans white was the favourite colour<sup>3)</sup>.

Further we find some remarkable instances of the religious use of white clothes among the Jews.

We have already seen that the Essenes, who were famous for their piety, used to wear their clothes till they had become rags, and to neglect their appearance. It is said by Josephus that these rags were originally white<sup>4)</sup>.

On the day of atonement modern Jews are clad in white; it is even expressly said that on this day they put on the same dress that they will wear when they are dead<sup>5)</sup>.

In the third place it should be remembered that the *ṭallit*, the cloth with which the Jews cover their head when performing prayer and studying the Tora, is of a white colour. This same *ṭallit* is bound round the head of the corpse and around the head of the mourners by the dead<sup>6)</sup>.

We have seen that the usual mourning dress of the Israelites in historical times was the *שָׂק*. The *שָׂק* was also used by persons who had devoted themselves to religion. Isaiah is ordered to take off the *saḳ* that he wears on his loins<sup>7)</sup>.

In Oriental Christianity two pieces of clothing have also remained the religious dress; the original form is even recognisable. Of Ephraim Syrus it is said that he wore a *kusita* and was clad in rags<sup>8)</sup>. The *kusita* is a sort of cowl, covering head and shoulders; the cloth, covering the body, is the second

1) Cf. the article in the Encyclopaedia of Islām.

2) Muslim, I, 77 and 79.

3) Johannesbuch, II, 100, 20 sqq.: 131, 7 and note 4: 132, 14: 218, 3.

4) Bell. Jud. II, 8.

5) Bodenschatz II, 217. The comparison between the religious dress and the shrouds is also made by Hudjwiri, Kashf, translation by R. A. Nicholson, p. 55, 6 *infra*.

6) Bodenschatz IV, 171.

7) Is. 20, 2: *לֵךְ וְפָתַחַת הַשָּׂק מֵעַל מַתְנֶיךָ*

8) Bedjan, Acta III. 644 ult.: *שָׂק בַּשְּׂמֵטָה הָלַכְתִּי וְהַסָּבָא*



form, it is on account of the fact that the deities themselves were represented as wearing the dress in question; the dead and the gods have a certain resemblance to one another. This resemblance goes even so far that they sometimes bear the same name (אלהים, 1 Sam. 28, 13). The dead were consulted in difficulties just as was the case with the deities (1 Sam. 28). Is it therefore not natural, that people dressed their gods in the dress of their deceased? In this manner the dress of the deceased may have become the dress that was considered as being naturally the religious one; and thus the worshippers may have adopted it themselves.

I am however far from thinking, that this answer must be considered as the final solution of the question. It is possible that worshippers have assumed the white dress in some cases, in order to mislead the spirits; it is also possible that in some cases there has been a tendency to mark the persons wearing a special dress, as being in a sacred state or as bearing a sacred character. Still the fact, that in nearly all cases the religious dress is identical with the mourning dress, makes it natural to prefer the supposition of a direct transition from one domain to the other.

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## WEEPING <sup>1)</sup>

It is of course not necessary to open this chapter, like the previous ones, with instances concerning weeping as an act of mourning. This phenomenon is so well known all the world over, that instances would be superfluous.

It will only be useful to show here, that weeping for the dead among the Semites as well as among other peoples bears a character which distinguishes it from a simple expression of sorrow. Semitic weeping for the dead is a distinct rite, consisting in elevating the voice and crying aloud, sometimes in uttering the *zagharit*. Lane has given a remarkable instance of the significance attached by modern Egyptians to this rite <sup>1)</sup>. But as it is not our purpose to describe mourning rites as such, we may turn at once to the rite of weeping in Semitic religions. It will be hardly necessary to state that it occurs as an utterance of sorrow on those feasts which celebrate the memory of a dead god or on the days of repentance. Much more interesting are other cases in which it occurs <sup>2)</sup>.

It is natural to begin our inquiry with that Semitic religion which has developed ascetic practices to a higher degree than other Semitic religions; for it is in the first place in ascetic circles that weeping has been practised. When the legendary Hilaria, the daughter of the Emperor Zeno, is assuming monastic habits, while she is still in the palace of her father "she

1) Rewritten from the article „Über das Weinen in den monotheistischen Religionen Vorderasiens" in *Festschrift-Sachau*, p. 26 sqq. and supplemented by dates kindly communicated to me by Professor Goldziher and C. van Arendonk and by quotations from the article by J. L. Palache in *ZDMG*, LXX, 251 sqq.

2) p. 523 sq.

3) I am sorry to see, that Dr. Joseph Weiss, in a review in *Der Islam*. VII. p. 123 sqq., infers from my article that I consider the ritual side of the phenomenon as the only one existing. I am well aware of the fact, that a variety of psychological motives lie at the bottom of it. But I wish to draw attention in the first place to the phenomenon as such, especially in its connection with the domain of mourning, which, as far as I know, has never been done before.



"definite prayers at fixed times, vigils, weeping, fasting, manual labour, abiding abroad"<sup>1)</sup> etc. This obligatory character of weeping and its significance is explained by Bar Hebraeus in a different place of the same book: "The reciting of Psalms by the monks has to take place with weeping. The cause of weeping is the humbleness of heart and the burning of the soul with love towards God. Once a solitary man dreamt, that he was reciting Psalms before David the son of Isai, who said to him: I wonder, that you have learned to recite Psalms, without having learnt to weep. But weeping without understanding cannot be"<sup>2)</sup>. These quotations may speak for themselves. Lastly it is to be observed that tears have become the object of subtle discriminations, as is the case in the passage from the "Good Conduct", which bears the title: "On the various kinds of weeping during prayer":

1. Neglect not your prayers, nor your fasting, nor your alms and fulfil your duties, that your prayers may be heard.

2. This is the sign, that your prayer has ascended towards heaven: if tears will flow from your eyes and their sweetness sweetens your heart.

3. Sweeter than all kinds of sweetness are tears arising from joy; sometimes there arises sorrow from them caused by the remembrance of sins.

4. Other tears are agreeable when their motive is gratefulness for plentiful signs of Grace, surpassing merits.

5. Know that in tears arising from sorrow or from grief, or in those that are shed over the deceased, there is no reward, because they belong only to nature.

6. Tears arising from joy are sweet and refreshing, those which arise from sorrow are bitter and salt"<sup>3)</sup>.

1) p. 537, paen.: גְּלִיּוֹתֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ מִיָּדָה כִּבְּדָה  
וְהַיְּהוּדִים חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ

2) p. 544, 8 sqq.: וְהַיְּהוּדִים חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ  
וְהַיְּהוּדִים חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ  
וְהַיְּהוּדִים חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ  
וְהַיְּהוּדִים חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ  
וְהַיְּהוּדִים חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ  
וְהַיְּהוּדִים חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ חֲתוּמֵינוּ

3) Ms. Add. 2018, University of Cambridge, fol. 9<sup>b</sup>—10<sup>a</sup>

In the second stanza it appears that weeping is considered as a charisma showing that prayers have been heard. We shall find this feature also in Muslim and in Jewish literature. Before turning to the former we have however to draw attention to the most important of the numerous passages in the ascetic and mystic writer Isaac of Ninive, treating of weeping and its significance. We may divide them for the sake of convenience into two classes: 1<sup>o</sup> those utterances which only mention weeping as a rite along with other religious and ascetic rites; 2<sup>o</sup> those in which weeping is conceived as a charisma, a token of a certain spiritual state and in which its religious significance is described.

Ad I. Isaac recommends weeping strongly: "Elevate thy voice unto God with heavy weeping and ask humbleness. Fill thy mouth with thy tears and bestrew thy head with dust, without rising from the earth"<sup>1)</sup>. Further: „Purify, o my brother, the beauty of thy chastity with tears, fasting and sitting by thy self alone"<sup>2)</sup>. "With tears we have to wake at the gate of Christ"<sup>3)</sup>.

Here weeping is a rite like fasting, besmearing the head with dust, sitting on the earth and prayer. It is in accordance with these precepts when Isaac describes the true solitary as weeping during night and day<sup>4)</sup>. There even exists a type of solitary "which is wholly occupied by the shedding of tears, so as to neglect the canonical duties, without desiring anything besides, because the shedding of tears seems to them more profitable than all other things"<sup>5)</sup>.

Ad II. In a long discourse between pupil and master, the former asks: "Which are the true tokens and the near signs, as soon as in the soul of man hidden fruits of his works are

1) p. 412, ult. sqq. כַּחֲסֵה זִכְרָה כִּי־נָשָׂא מַלְךְ לֵאלֹהֵי כְּסֵה  
מִמֶּנִּי. מִלֵּךְ אֶפְסָה מִן הַחֲתִיף הַלֵּל זִי־נָשָׂא כַּחֲסֵה. מִן  
כִּי־נָשָׂא לֵךְ אֶפְסָה

2) p. 221, II sqq. זִכְרֹנָה אֶפְסָה, נִפְסָה וְכֵן הַחֲסֵה הַחֲסֵה  
מִמֶּנִּי לֵאלֹהֵי אֶפְסָה

3) p. 337, 7. כִּי־נָשָׂא לֵאלֹהֵי אֶפְסָה

4) p. 120, 5 infra. כֵּן אֶפְסָה לֵאלֹהֵי

5) p. 98, 3: אֶפְסָה הַחֲסֵה הַחֲסֵה, מִלֵּךְ אֶפְסָה מִן הַחֲסֵה  
כֵּן אֶפְסָה מִן הַחֲסֵה: אֶפְסָה לֵאלֹהֵי אֶפְסָה







But, though the value of tears be very high, they do not belong to the highest spiritual degree. "And when thou hast entered this place of pacification of thought, then continual tears are taken from thee and thou reachest the stage of measure and moderation"<sup>1)</sup>. This is said still more explicitly in an other place, where Isaac speaks of the pure prayer, which is exalted above usual prayer, being a sort of extatic union with God. "From the purity of prayer onwards, when the spirit has crossed this border, it has furthermore neither prayer, nor motions, nor tears, nor dominion, nor freedom, nor persuasion, nor desire, nor longing after anything of that which is expected in this world or in the world to come"<sup>2)</sup>.

In the Ḳor'ān there is a remarkable instance of the rite of weeping during the reading of sacred scriptures. Sūra 17, 10 sqq.: "Say: Believe in it (viz the Ḳor'ān) or believe not in it; those who have been provided with knowledge before its (revelation), if it is recited before them, fall down on their beards prostrating themselves and saying: glory to our Lord, verily his promise is being fulfilled. And they fall down on their beards weeping"<sup>3)</sup>. This utterance is not very clear; but there are at

وَقَالَ لَهُمْ إِنَّمَا اتَّخَذْتُمْ لَهَا مَثَلًا ۚ لَوْ كُنْتُمْ إِذْ يَنْزِيلُهَا فِيهَا كَارِهُينَ  
فَلَا تَسْمَعُ لَهَا شَيْئًا وَتَسْتَكْبِرُونَ وَلَكِن لَّعَلَّكُمْ تَعْلَمُونَ ۚ

وَقَالَ لَهُمْ إِنَّمَا اتَّخَذْتُمْ لَهَا مَثَلًا ۚ لَوْ كُنْتُمْ إِذْ يَنْزِيلُهَا فِيهَا كَارِهُينَ  
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قُلْ آمَنُوا بِهِ أَوْ لَا تُؤْمِنُوا إِنَّ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْعِلْمَ مِنْ قَبْلِهِ إِذَا يُتْلَىٰ عَلَيْهِمْ  
يَخْرُجُونَ لِلْآذَانِ سَاجِدًا يَقُولُونَ سُبْحَانَ رَبِّنَا إِنْ كُنَّ وَعْدَ رَبِّنَا نَفَعُولًا وَيَخْرُجُونَ  
لِلْآذَانِ يَكُونُ

least two remarkable features in it: it shows the custom of the people of the book (here probably the Christians) to prostrate themselves and to weep on hearing sacred scriptures recited. And further it shows the combination of prostration and weeping, two rites which are mourning rites. — Then this rite of weeping on hearing scriptures recited, is often connected in literature with Abū Bakr: “On the authority of ‘Ā’isha, the mother of the Faithful, it is told, that the Apostle of God, during his last illness, said: Let Abū Bakr perform ṣalāt with the people. ‘Ā’isha said: I objected: If Abū Bakr takes your place, people will not understand him on account of his weeping”<sup>1)</sup>. This weeping of Abū Bakr is said to have possessed such an emotional power, that he caused others also to weep and so spread Islām at Mekka<sup>2)</sup>. Such traditions may contain some proof of Abū Bakr’s devout character: primarily it appears from them, that here also weeping is a religious rite and to some extent, a charisma conferred upon the highly venerable first Caliph. By the words in the Ḳor’ān it is shown that the earliest Islām was acquainted with the rite. This brings us to consider a group of persons in early Islām which are known in tradition as “the weepers” (al-bakkā’ūn). Historical data concerning them are scarce and, as it seems to me, not very trustworthy. It is said, in explanation of Sūra 9, 93, that when Moḥammed was preparing his enterprise which ended at Tabūk in the year 9 A.H., seven men, whose names are mentioned, being too poor to provide themselves with the means necessary for accompanying such an expedition, entreated Moḥammed to look for an opportunity of giving them a place in the expedition. When he declared this impossible, the seven are reported to have turned away weeping. This tradition is apparently nothing but an anecdote invented to explain an historical phenomenon. In later Islām there was a class of persons called bakkā’ūn. Dhahabī in his Ṭabaḳāt al Ḥuffāz mentions a certain Hishām b. Ḥassān, a man renowned for his piety, who is said to have died in 148 A.H. He performed

1) Bukhārī, Adhān, bāb 46, trad. 2: عن عائشة أم المؤمنين أنها قالت أن رسول الله صلعم قال في مرضه مروا أبا بكر يصلي بالناس قالت عائشة قلت أن أبا بكر إذا قام في مقامك لم يسمع الناس من البكاء

2) Ibn Hishām, p. 246.

the ḥaḍīdj not once, but perpetually and exercised himself in continuous fasting. This man is called one of the bakka'ūn. Dhahabī does not give any explanation of the historical significance of the term. But it seems that this generation of weepers in the second century of Islām is the spiritual posterity of the bakka'ūn<sup>1)</sup> in Moḥammed's time: so that the latter would also have to be considered as a class of men who were given to ascetic practices, in the first place to that of weeping. This would be a new proof of our thesis, that weeping has been a religious rite in the Semitic East. The discussion of the "weepers" is rendered still more uncertain than it is in itself, by the fact, that side by side with the well known root بَكَى to weep, there is a root بَكَأَ, which is applied to sheep that do not give plenty of milk. Metonymously this root is applied to taciturnity and so "bakka'" may also mean "silent". Now taciturnity also belongs to ascetic practices, not only in Christendom but also in Islām. There is a tradition of Moḥammed, running: "we, the order of prophets, are silent"<sup>2)</sup>. But it seems better to derive بَكَى from the root "to weep". This has also been done by the Muslims themselves in the case of the bakka'ūn in the year 9 A. H. One of the persons who practised weeping among their religious performances, is Yaḥyā al-Hādī († 298, one of the leaders of the Zaidites). One of his maulā's relates this of him: "I used to follow him with a lantern most nights, when people take their beds, to a little room in the mansion where he used to retire. When he had entered it, he sent me away and I went. One night it occurred to me to shut myself up and to pass the night at the door of the mosque in order to see what he did. So I saw how he passed the whole night performing rak'a's and sajdā's and I heard the falling of his tears and the sobs in his throat"<sup>3)</sup>. And in the *Sīrat*

1) I, 147, 10 sqq. هشام بن حسان .... كن من البكاكين وكن عشم بن حسان من العبدلين الخ

2) *Djāhīz*, Bayān, II, 165. 8 infra: انا معشر الانبياء بكاء فقال داس البكاؤ انقلته وأصل ذلك من ثلبن فقد جعل صفة الانبياء قلّة الحلام

3) *Ifāda*, fol. 42a: كنت اتبعه حين يخذ الناس فرشهم في أكثر الليل بالصبح  
الى بيت صغير في ثدار دن ياتى اليه اذا دخله صرفى فنصرف فيباجر ليلة بعلبى

Yahyā this passage occurs: "As often as we made halt in any abode, Yahyā b. al-Ḥusain retired for some time from us. Then he would sob over Islām and over the erring and misled community, as a woman will sob over the loss of children"<sup>1)</sup>.

But, in Islām, weeping is not only a particular expression of religious feelings of a few individuals: it also occurs during the ḥadjj as a common rite. When the pilgrims for the first time cast their eyes upon the sacred city they sob. That this sobbing assumes the character of the weeping for the dead appears from v. Maltzan's description: "Die meisten weinten. Viele schluchzten und seufzten in lauten, gellenden Tönen"<sup>2)</sup>. Here is a survival of the old clamorous mourning rite; as the Lisān expresses it: "weeping loudly" (البكاء بالصوت). The same rite is performed when the pilgrims perform the ṭawāf: many of them cling weeping to the curtain of the Ka'ba<sup>3)</sup>. The real domain of the rite is, however, the plain of 'Arafāt on the 9<sup>th</sup> of Dhu 'l-Ḥidjja during the wuḳūf, the religious standing, the cardinal ceremony of the ḥadjj according to Muslim opinion. I must remark that neither in the canonical books of tradition nor in the common books of law have I found any sign of acquaintance with the rite during this ceremony. In the 12<sup>th</sup> century A. D. it appears however to have been a common practice, as may be seen from the description of Ibn Djubair. "When on the Friday mentioned the ṣalāt's of noon and afternoon had been united, people performed the wuḳūf, humbly and weeping, beseeching Allāh to bestow his mercy upon them; the Takbīr sounded and sobbing prayers arose; never a day of more frequent weeping had been seen . . . . . In this state people remained while the sun burned their faces, till its disc sunk"<sup>4)</sup>. The same rite is described by modern European

ان احتبس وأبيت على باب المسجد أنظر ما يمنع قل فسير عليه السلام الليل اجمع  
ركوعاً وسجوداً وكنت اسمع وقع دموعه صلح ونشيجاً في حلقه

ما كن ننزل منزلاً إلا خرج يحيى بن  
الحسين حتى ينترح منا ساعة ثم يبكي ينتحب كما تنتحب امرأة اشكلا على  
الاسلام وعلى الأمة الضالة والضالة

2) I, 370.

3) Burton, II, 186, 197.

4) فلما جمع بين الضيق والعصر يوم الجمعة المذكور وقف الناس خشعين باديين

ḥadjjī's. It is customary, that during the wuḳūf the ḳāḍī of Mekka reads a sort of sermon, in Arabic, from the platform on the sacred mountain; but very few of the surrounding Muslims really hear or understand his words, so that it would be impossible that this sermon had any power over the multitude. Nevertheless, according to von Maltzan „je mehr die Predigt vorrückte desto stärker wurde das Schluchzen, Seufzen, Gestöhne und Weinen" <sup>1)</sup>). It is clear that weeping, sobbing and sighing have become a fixed rite during the wuḳūf. Burckhardt, in his description of the same ceremony adds a feature, which is of importance for our inquiry: "During this sermon, which lasted almost three hours, the kadhy was seen constantly to wipe his eyes with a handkerchief: for the law enjoins the khatyb or preacher to be moved with feeling and compunction; and adds that, whenever tears appear on his face, it is a sign that the Almighty enligtens him and is ready to listen to his prayers . . . . Some of them (viz. the pilgrims) mostly foreigners, were crying loudly and weeping, beating their breasts, and denouncing themselves to be great sinners before the Lord; others (but by far the smaller number) stood in silent reflexion and adoration with tears in their eyes" <sup>2)</sup>). Here it appears that the rite is considered in modern Islām exactly as it is considered in Semitic Christianity, at first as a sign of religious emotion, then as a token that prayers have been heard. It is clear that here we have not two examples of analogous development of the rite, but that there has been direct influence of one religion on the other. But we shall discuss this point after hearing the evidence of Jewish literature showing the position of Jewish religion.

We must however remark before, that Muslim mysticism, like that of the Syrians, gives an important place to weeping. Ghazālī in his *Ihyā'* has this passage on the subject: "On account of this it is not forbidden to the warner who has a good voice to quote from the pulpit in his melodies verses which arouse sorrow and make hearts weak; neither is it forbidden

والى الله عز وجل فى الرحمة متضرعين والتدبير قد علا وضجيج الناس ببدء قد  
ارتفع فما رأى يوم أكثر مدامع . . . . فما زال الناس على تلك الحنة والشمس  
تلفح وجوعهم الى أن سقط قمرنا

1) II, 34 sq.

2) II, 52.





There is, however, no more material to be derived from the Old Testament as evidence for the purely religious rite of weeping. Neither does the Talmud contain much direct evidence. But it is, at any rate, worth while considering the instances given by J. L. Palache<sup>1</sup>).

Berakot 32b: "Since the sanctuary was laid waste, the gates of prayer were closed: nevertheless the gates of weeping were not closed"<sup>2</sup>). The passage is certainly noteworthy; but it will be observed that weeping is here connected with an event which has always formed the cause of mourning in Judaism. Sanhedrin 104b: "The voice of anyone who is weeping during the night is heard. Another explanation (of Canticles 1, 2): If anyone weeps during the night, stars and planets will weep with him"<sup>3</sup>). Here a high value is attached to weeping in the night: possibly there is evidence here of ascetic practices: waking and weeping are also connected in Semitic Christendom. But Canticles 1, 2 speak only of mourning and it is not necessary that religious practices are meant here. Rosh Hashana 18a: "It is beautiful for mankind to cry before Judgment and after Judgment"<sup>4</sup>). Here crying is again associated with a circumstance that in Christendom, Islām and Judaism has been the object of much terror; so that this place is not very characteristic.

Palache also points to Rosh Hashana 34a, where the sound of the trumpets is considered as a symbolic representation of weeping. This material from the Talmud does not enable us to determine the place weeping occupied in the ascetic practices of Judaism: they are far from proving that weeping as a religious rite had its fixed place there. They only show that weeping, especially in connection with days of mourning, is esteemed and considered as the token of an earnest religious state of mind. It is interesting to see, that in later literature weeping has obtained its place, among the rites of conversion. Maimonides says in his chapter on conversion: "It belongs to the ways of conversion that the convert cries constantly before God with weeping and supplication"<sup>5</sup>). I may refer the reader

1) p. 253.

2) מיום שחרב בית המקדש ננעלו שערי תפלה ואף על פי כן שערי דמעה לא ננעלו

3) כל הבוכה בלילה קולו נשמע דבר אחר כל הבוכה בלילה בוכים ימולות בוכים עמי

4) ר' יצחק אמר יפה צעקה לאדם בין קודם גזר דין בין לאחר גזר דין

5) מדרכי התשובה להיות השב ציעק תמיד לפני השם בבכי ובתחנונים

for further examples of the connection between conversion and weeping to the article by Palache. It may be taken for certain that according to Jewish theology weeping was a rite assumed to be the usual companion of conversion. There is however in later Jewish literature a class of books that contains many examples of religious weeping, viz. that class which has originated in ascetic circles or has arisen from ascetic tendencies. Of Palache's many examples I will quote two only, and these two because they are identical with utterances in Christendom or Islām. In the *תעורת שלמה* (Offenbach 1718), 2a this passage occurs: "How good and how pleasant it is when the ḥazzān is able to recite prayer with tears on the solemn days and on the day of fasting and in a time of distress. And if he is not able to weep, he has at least to assume a voice of weeping"<sup>1</sup>). There is a well known tradition of Moḥammed, to this effect: "and if you are not able to weep, then assume the appearance of doing so"<sup>2</sup>). It is clear that on one of the two sides, or on both, there must be dependency. The other example is taken from Zohar: "If anyone prays and weeps before he is able to utter words, his prayer will be heard, in eternity it will not return idly, it will overcome judgment"<sup>3</sup>). The utterance is identical with what we have found in Christian and Muslim literature. We have now to answer the question: what is the relation between all these phenomena in Christianity, Islām and Judaism? It has already been said above that mourning rites like weeping and wailing have penetrated into official religion through asceticism. We have shown this above in the case of weeping in Semitic Christianity. The progress of the rite has been highly facilitated here because Syriac Christendom as a whole is ascetically coloured in a higher degree than Islām or Judaism.

The instances of the rite occurring in the Talmud are rather weak and do not prove the existence of weeping as a generally recognised religious rite. Even later Jewish literature only knows it in connection with conversion. So it seems that early Islām

1) מה טוב ומה נעים אם יוכל החזן להתפלל בדמעות בימים הנוראים וביום התענית יבעת צרה ואם אי אפשר לו לבכות לכל הפחות יעשה קול הבוכים

2) *Lisān*, v. v. *وَأَنْ تَجِدُوا الْبَيْتَ قَتَبَاوَا*: بكي

3) מאן דמתפלל ובוכה עד שלא יוכל לדבר האי תפלה אחי שלמה ולעולם אינה חוזרת ריקם והא מקרעת גזר דינו של אדם

and later Islāmic practice have been influenced by Semitic Christianity in this respect. Whether this holds also true for later Judaism seems to be doubtful. But I am inclined to consider this the best explanation of the characteristic sayings Palache has quoted. Such books as the *Zohar* take their material where they are able to get it. I am even inclined to think that ascetic circles in Judaism have borrowed from Christian corresponding circles, just as Muslim *ṣūfī*'s have imitated Christian monks and perhaps others. So it seems to me, that the place of weeping in older Judaism has not been as large as the place it occupied in Christianity and Islām.

## II

We have further to inquire into the attitude of each of the three religions towards weeping for the dead. In the first place we have to remark, that monotheism, whose aim it is to conduct the thoughts of mankind away from this world towards the world of religion and things to come, cannot approve of utterances of immoderate grief, which leaves no room for the consolations of faith. And so we find in the three religions warnings against immoderate bewailing of the dead. For instances I refer to *Festschrift-Sachau*, p. 31 sqq. and the literature given there. Still it must be added, that the absence of any token of sorrow, is not approved of by Islām either. This is shown by a tradition remarkable also from another point of view: "U'sāma b. Zaid said: One day we were with the Apostle of God, when one of his daughters sent a man to call him and to communicate to him, that one of her little boys or one of her sons was in the agony of death. Moḥammed said to the messenger: Return and say to her: to God belongeth what he taketh and to him belongeth what he giveth<sup>1</sup>). Everything with him has its fixed time; order her to be patient and resigned. Then the messenger went and returned, saying: She conjures you to come. Then the Prophet, and with him Sa'd b. 'Ubāda, Mu'ādh b. Djabal and myself, went. Then he took up the sick boy, while his breath panted at if it were in an old sack and his eyes shed tears. Then Sa'd said to him: What is this, O Apostle of God? He answered: This is a sign of compassion,

1) Cf. *Job* 1, 21.

that Allāh has laid in the hearts of his servants. For he only showeth compassion towards those of his servants, who are compassionate" <sup>1)</sup>). This is also the opinion of Judaism: moderate signs of grief are allowed. Weeping as a mourning rite, is to be considered independently. As to popular practice, we may state at once, that the old-semitic rites have remained to the present day, without taking heed of the warnings of official religion. As regards Semitic Christendom, it has condemned these mourning rites. Ephraim Syrus already forbids bewailing of the dead and dancing <sup>2)</sup>). The sixty first of his *Carmina Nisibena* is nothing but a severe condemnation of bewailing the dead, put into the mouth of personified death. The concluding verses are very important for our inquiry: "Instead of shedding useless tears on the graves, it is better to shed them during prayer in the churches, for these tears benefit the dead and the living. But do not weep in a way that augments sorrow for the dead and the living" <sup>3)</sup>). The importance of this utterance of Ephraim does not lie in its forbidding weeping for the dead, but in its showing that religious weeping as a rite has been borrowed from the rites of mourning, and, what should also be noted, that the religious rite disavows its parent, the mourning rite. So it seems that the church has tried to become absolute mistress of the mourning rite. Practice was however too strong

1) Muslim, *Djānā'iz*, trad. 12: كنت عند النبي صلعم وارسلت اليه احدى بناته تدعوه وتخبره ان صبيبا ليا او ابنا لها في الموت فقال للرسل ارجع اليها فاخبرها ان لله ما اخذ وله ما اعطى وكل شيء عنده باجل مستي فمرها فلتصبر ولتحتسب فعاد الرسول فقال انها قد اقسمت لناآتينها قال فقام اندي صلعم وقام معه سعد بن عبادة ومعاذ بن جبل وانطلقت معهم فرفع اليه الصدى ونفسه تقعقع كذا في شنة ففاضت عيناه فقال له سعد ما هذا يا رسول الله قال هذه رحمة جعلها الله في قلوب عباده وانما يرحم الله من عباده اترجماء

2) *Carmina Nisibena* 37, 6: **ܠܗ ܕܡܕܝܢܐ ܕܡܡܡ ܡܕܝܢܐ** . **ܡܡܡܐ ܕܡܡܡܐ ܕܡܡܡܐ ܕܡܡܡܐ** . "The deceased shall not be buried with signs of desolation, in the pagan way, with garments, bewailing and dance".

3) p. 120, 16 sqq.: **ܡܠܟ ܕܡܡܝܢ ܕܠܗ ܡܡܝܢ ܕܠܗ ܡܡܝܢ ܕܠܗ ܡܡܝܢ** . **ܡܡܝܢ ܡܡܝܢ ܡܡܝܢ ܡܡܝܢ ܡܡܝܢ** . **ܡܡܝܢ ܡܡܝܢ ܡܡܝܢ ܡܡܝܢ ܡܡܝܢ** .



weeping has lost its place in mourning rites and has obtained a new place in religion. Islām seems to have followed the example of Christendom in both cases. Judaism, though abolishing some mourning rites, has probably understood that a total prohibition would be practically useless. At the same time we observe that in older Judaism, weeping not being transferred from its original place, has not obtained a prominent place in religion.

## VARIOUS RITES AND INSTITUTIONS

The rites we have discussed in the foregoing pages are not by any means the only ones which mourning and religion have in common. I have dealt with them at some length because it seemed to me, that, though I am deeply convinced of the tentative character of my discussions and arrangement of facts, they were at least of a nature to give us an insight into the relation between the rites of mourning and the rites of religion. The rites and institutions which follow seem to me too uncertain, either as to their original meaning or their religious significance, to be ranged on the same level with the previous ones. Yet they should be mentioned, also because I hope that investigators will give some attention to them and be so kind as to assist me with their knowledge and suggestions.

### I

Shaving of the head, or the forehead (קרחת בין העינים) combined with letting the hair grow on other parts of the head, are well known mourning rites. Goldziher has given many examples of the Arabs shaving their heads in mourning; as regards the Hebrews every book on Hebrew Antiquities mentions their different ways of doing the hair.

It is also well known that religion has always been rather particular about headdress and rites of shaving: to the present day the muḥrim shaves his head after having accomplished the ḥadj; tonsure was a ceremony exercised on Syrian monks only after a certain time of novitiate; the Jew who had been banished from religious community shaved his head when reentering it. These examples could be multiplied; it is clear that they have not the same meaning; they have sprung from different motives; we need not go into this. It must however be observed that the shaving of the head of the mourner, that

of the muḥrim and that of the Naziræan, have been explained as a sacrifice of the hair to the dead or the god. As far as I know, this conception has met with no valid opposition. And so we may state that in these cases the religious rite springs from the same motive as the mourning rite. This statement does not however give the light we desire: it only brings us into the domain of sacrifice and it gives us the question to answer: what is the meaning of sacrifice in mourning and religion? It is well known that different answers have been given to this question. It seems to me that the answer cannot be a general one: sacrifice is a rite which has sprung from several motives and has been performed with various ceremonies. Wilken in his treatise "Ueber das Haaropfer und einige andere Trauergebräuche bei den Völkern Indonesiens" (Verspr. Geschr. III, 399—550) has developed the theory that the shaving of the head for the dead is a substitute for human sacrifice for the dead, and that sacrifices for the dead as well as other gifts are rites designed to conciliate the spirit of the dead. Robertson Smith in his *Religion of the Semites* considers sacrifice as a means of attaining communion with the gods by partaking of a common meal. Wilken has criticised Robertson Smith's theory in his article „Eene nieuwe theorie over den oorsprong der offers" (IV, 157—195). It is easily seen, that other solutions of the question are also possible, so that the occurring of shaving of the hair as a sacrifice for the dead and for the gods could only be discussed in connection with a lengthy inquiry into the nature of sacrifice, such as it is not my purpose to give here. It remains, in my opinion, probable that we should find, that shaving of the hair is in both cases a means of conciliating in one case the spirit, in the other the gods. But at this we must leave the question.

## II

I fear that the same must be our conclusion after having considered another rite, viz. that of placing elevated stones, **מִצְבֵּה**, **أَنْصَاب**, on the graves and on the sacred territories or at the side of the altars. The elevated stones in religious worship are sufficiently known, so that instances would be superfluous; as regards the stones on the graves of the Arabs I may refer to Goldziher's *Muh. Studien* I, 231 sqq. In the Old



Testament they are also familiar. What the meaning of these stones in religion is, can not be said in a few words. Many explanations have been given, one as probable or as little probable as the other. The same may be said of the stones on graves. Dalman (*Petra* II, 56) has thought of channels enabling the spirits to ascend and to take the sacrifices offered to them at the tomb. But I do not see that this explanation is conclusive. So we must again leave the question in a state of non liquet.

### III

We have already found instances of a partial nakedness as a rite of mourning: Wetzstein calls the *laṭṭāmāt* "mehr als halb nackt". Uncovering the shoulder appeared to be a Jewish mourning rite: in the Old Testament (*Micah* I, 8) total or partial nakedness is enumerated among other mourning rites. Wellhausen, *Reste Arabischen Heidentums*, p. 295, 177, has given instances of the same custom among the Arabs. It seems uncertain, what the custom meant: it may have been conceived as a disguise, or as a token of neglect of the appearance, or perhaps, it had a different purpose<sup>1</sup>). In religion nakedness is also well known, it is chiefly connected with the circumambulation: we have already seen, that the right shoulder has to be bare during the *ṭawāf*. But it is reported that in pagan times the *ṭawāf* was also performed in a state of complete nudity (*Snouck Hurgronje*, *Mekkaansche Feest*, p. 111, sqq.; *Wellhausen Reste*, p. 110). It is possible that the religious rite is connected with the nudity of mourners; but it can also be explained by itself (see *Wellhausen*, l. c.; *Doutté*, *Magie et Religion*, p. 579).

### IV

Another rite, occurring in both domains which has not yet been explained sufficiently, is the taking off of shoes. For the Israelites the existence of this rite is proved by *Ez.* 24, 17, for the present-day Syriac peasants by Wetzstein, who describes the women proceeding from the house of the dead to the

1) Cf. Buchler's article in *ZAW.* XXI, quoted above.

thrashing floor as going barefooted. A sufficient explanation of the custom has not yet been given. In religion it is also well known: on the hill of the Jerusalem temple, according to Mishna, Berakot, IX, 5<sup>1</sup>) it was forbidden to walk with shoes. The priests perform their services barefooted. Moses and Joshua, in the presence of higher beings, have to take their shoes off. The muḥrim is allowed to wear sandals only. We can scarcely do more than place these facts on record, their real relation is as yet unexplained.

## V

Genesis 50, 1 it is said that "Joseph bent over the face of his (deceased) father, wept over him and kissed him"<sup>2</sup>). In the Book of Jubilees (XXIII, 10 sq.), the dying Abraham says to Jacob: "And do thou, my son, draw near and kiss me. And he drew near and kissed him". And vs. 26: "And the two lay together on one bed and Jacob slept in the bosom of Abraham, his father, and he kissed him seven times". The custom may be called proto-semitic. When 'Othmān b. Maẓ'ūn, Moḥammed's pious companion, had died, the Prophet kissed him<sup>3</sup>). When Moḥammed himself had died and lay on his deathbed, Abū Bakr approached unto him, "uncovered his face, then bent over him, kissed him and wept"<sup>4</sup>). Abraham and Moḥammed are treated in the same way by their successors. The rite is not only proto-semitic, it is known the world over. Wilken (III, 7) tells us that on the island of Nias, people are believed to possess three souls. The first, called noso, is taken from the wind and at death returns to the wind. „Alleen de noso's van hoofden maken hierop een uitzondering. Deze blijven voortduren, daar de oudste zoon en opvolger zijns vaders noso in zich opneemt, hetgeen hij feitelijk doet door zijn mond op dien van den stervende te brengen en zoo diens laatsten ademtocht op te vangen".

The same custom is attested by Frazer, Kingship, pp. 265, 293 for other parts of the world. It is not possible to deny the

1) ולא יכנס לחר הבית במקלו ובמנעלו

2) ייפל יוסף על פני אביו ויבך עליו וישק לו

3) Abū Dā'ūd II, 42, 1.

4) Bukhārī, Djanā'iz, bāb 3, trad. I: فكشف عن وجهه ثم اكب عليه فقبا له ثم بكى

connection of the Semitic instances with this widely diffused custom. But from the Semitic instances it appears also that the meaning of the rite is no longer understood here. It is true, that in three of the four adduced instances it is the successor who kisses his predecessor, but the latter has already died when he is kissed.

Like the dead, the images of the gods are kissed (1 Kings 19, 18). Jahwe says to Eliyah: "And I will leave in Israel seven thousand, all being knees which have not bowed before the Baal and mouths that have not kissed him"<sup>1</sup>). The same is done with the black stone in the Ka'ba: if the crowds are too numerous to give every one the opportunity, it is touched with the hand or with a stick. The parallelism, striking though it be, does not give us the assurance that the religious rite has been taken over from the mourning rites. For it is possible that the image of the god, and the black stone, are kissed and touched because they are believed to transmit their godly fluid to those who kiss or touch it, totally apart from any thought of the rite of mourning.

## VI

In the case of fasting there are stronger parallels between the rite as it is performed after a case of death and in religion. What induces me to range it with the doubtful cases, is the plurality of motives lying at the bottom of it. I may assume the rite of fasting in the Semitic world after a case of death to be sufficiently known. The same may be assumed concerning religious fasting. But as regards the last class of cases, we have to distinguish several kinds according to their motives. Fasting before eating the flesh of sacrifices, fasting before attending a session of the court of justice, fasting as a preparation for meeting an angel, as it is practised by apocalyptics, fasting joined with ascetic practices, these are many classes based upon as many motives. But of fasting after a death also it may be said that it was possibly based upon more than one motive: in this connection we should remember the tendency, well known to us, of abstaining from the benefits of life in

והשארתיו בישראל שבעה אלפים כל הברבים אשר לא ברעו לבשל וכל חמה אשר  
לא נשק לו

order to propitiate the spirit of the dead, jealous of its former pleasures. One may also recall the fear of eating anything which may be infected by the spirit of the dead, so that it is only safe to obtain food from elsewhere, as was and is a Semitic custom. At best we may call it probable, that ascetic fasting has a connection with that fasting which is practised in order to appropriate the spirit of the dead: such a connection would have many parallels, as we have seen above. This would be one of the many instances in which religion is seen to have borrowed its rites from the domain of mourning.







THE VAIÇEŚIKA-SYSTEM,  
described with the help of the oldest texts,

BY

Dr. B. FADDEGON.

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Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam.

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AMSTERDAM,  
JOHANNES MULLER.  
1918.





# BOOK I.

## INTRODUCTION.

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE STUDY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY IN EUROPE.

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*Impression made in Europe by Indian philosophy,<sup>1)</sup> — Necessity of appreciation and comparison in historical study.*

Although Indian Philosophy has roused much superficial interest in Europe and a few of its terms have even become familiar to western Theosophists, yet not till after the lapse of a full century were more serious attempts made by European scholars for the explanation of its technicalities. If we confine ourselves to the Brahmanic schools, we find that during the nineteenth century only the more attractive, (but therefore not necessarily more important) systems, the Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, were studied with a certain fulness of detail. A few monographies and some concise chapters in the handbooks were all that appeared on the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. The internal development of the six systems, their mutual influence, their relations towards the philosophy of the heterodox sects, Buddhists, Jainas, Āiavas, these questions gave rise only to a few scattered preliminary notes. The knowledge of details was too restricted for the making of a synthesis. A history of Indian Philosophy as PAUL DRUSSEX has given to us, is indeed a work of great value, the result of years of devoted study, but it is not and cannot be expected to be a history in the strict sense of the word.

And even now, after the more satisfactory publications of the last years, our knowledge of the contents of the systems is still imperfect and we find it a difficult and almost impossible task to pronounce a judgment on them. The theories, or more correctly the fancies, laid down in Sāṃkhya and Vedānta on the human soul and its

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<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book IV section I, where the full titles of all books, referred to, are given.

fate, on the world and its meaning, may fascinate and appeal to our imagination — the scholasticism, that endless craving for accurate definitions, which in spite of their ever increasing subtlety will never satisfy, and that neglect of investigation of the objects themselves as we find it in the '*nayya*' Nyāya, may frighten and bewilder us — the casuistry of the Purva-Mīmāṃsā, which puts together a priestly performance for any desired result whatever and obliges the European reader to cram his memory with a load of monotonous and often meaningless details of ritual, may scarcely seem to be worth studying; yet we cannot consider such sympathies and antipathies a well-founded appreciation of Indian thought. Moreover not only is more knowledge desirable, but also judgment, based on several European standpoints of philosophy, in order to be just in our appreciation. For the present we have to unravel the thoughts of the Sūtras and Bhāṣyas patiently, even when they *prima facie* seem to be unfertile.

And perhaps such a patient study will at last be rewarded. Even now we may mention the interesting theory of the syllogism, found in the Nyāya, which will rise more in our estimation, when we compare it with the results of logical investigation, arrived at in Europe during the last century, namely with the theories of H. LOIZE and CHR. SIGWART; we may mention the discussions, given by the Purva-Mīmāṃsā on grammar and psychology of language<sup>1</sup>, ideas which penetrate much more deeply into the subject than the speculation of Plato's.

And specially concerning our system, the verdict pronounced by MAX MÜLLER in his *Six Darsanas* is certainly a great injustice to the many merits which the Vaiśeṣika system undoubtedly possesses, provided that we look at it in the true light. The passage which I mean occurs in p. 474 of that book and runs as follows:

"While in the systems, hitherto considered particularly in the Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Yoga, there runs a strong religious and even poetical vein, we now come to two systems, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which are very dry and unimaginative, and much more like what we mean by scholastic systems of philosophy, business-like expositions of what can be known, either of the world which surrounds us or of the world within, that is, of our faculties or powers of perceiving, conceiving or reasoning on one side, and the objects which they present to us, on the other".

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the fragments in the Nyāya-kandali, bearing on this topic and translated here in book III.

The expression 'businesslike exposition' here seems rather out of place: certainly 'no religious' or 'poetical vein' runs through Nyāya and Vaiçṣika: but this statement does not condemn these systems as science. If as such we try to fix their value justly, we shall come across many interesting ideas, interesting because of the insight they give either in the development of human thought or in the mental capabilities of the Indian race.

I have chosen these remarks on the importance of Indian philosophy, not so much because they would form a fit exordium, but principally because I believe appreciation to require the historian's attention just as much as description and narrative. Certainly many an historian is inclined to take the descriptive and narrative part of his work as his most prominent mental occupation, which principally, or even exclusively, makes his study what he wishes it to be: a science. Narrative and description, he will reason, can only be objective: appreciation, dependent as it is on the author's feelings, thus on his individual character and experience of life, will for ever remain a subjective factor: appreciation will be, like taste, a topic not to be discussed. I do not deny this antithesis: but I should only like to state that historiography without this subjective factor, would miss its main aim. Besides subjectivity does not mean capricious and reckless freedom. Just as the historian ought to be correct in his statements, so should he strive for justice in his appreciations. And in order to do this, he is bound to analyse his judgments, to justify them before his reader, to reflect on the canons which he applies.

Now there is a question connected with the present publication which may be formulated thus: are we allowed to compare Indian philosophy with Occidental thought, or ought we to keep them apart as much as possible. Or to put the question in a more general form: must we believe in one ultimate truth as the final aim of scientific research, or must we interpret the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge in such a way that every era and every nation has its truth, that Occidental and Oriental philosophies will remain for ever incommensurable quantities?

Before giving my own convictions, I should like to insert here a quotation from an article of MAX MÜLLER's, a passage which, I may say, has become famous among Sanskritists, since it has been quoted with great approval both by GARBE in his book *Die Sāṅkhya Philosophie*, and by SUALI in his comprehensive account of recent Vaiçṣika philosophy. This passage then runs as follows:

„Indische Dinge *haben so viel von Vergleichung zu leiden*, dass es nothwendig ist, ihre characterische Eigenthümlichkeit so viel als möglich hervorzuheben. Wir lernen durchaus nicht die Individualität des indischen Volkes erkennen, wenn wir seine Sprache, sein Denken und Forschen nur immer als Analogon oder als Complement der griechischen und römischen Welt betrachten“.

Before examining this thought of MAX MÜLLER's more closely, I must express my astonishment at the fact that SEALI even as late as the year 1913, has considered it fit to use these words of MAX MÜLLER's. For which of the Sanskritists of the last years can be accused of considering Indian thought as a mere complement to Greek-Roman philosophy? JOHN DAVIES in his exposition of the *Sāukhyā-Kārikā* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition 1894) gives two notes on „the connection of the Sāṅkhya system with the philosophy of SPINOZA“ and the „connection of the system of KAPILA with that of SCHOPENHAUER and VON HARTMANN“; MRS. RHYSDAVIDS delights in comparing Buddhist psychology with modern psychology and the philosophy of HUME; DR. STCHERBATSKOI explains the works of the Buddhist logicians with the aid of KANT's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*; WALLISER has given as introduction to his studies on Buddhist philosophy an essay on „*Das Problem des Ich*“ (1903) in which he professes himself to be a moderate follower of VON HARTMANN's. Indeed the fault, condemned by MAX MÜLLER, is certainly not one of recent years; and SEALI's repetition of his words is, I am afraid, rather thoughtless.

Now, I do not intend to be an advocate of MAX MÜLLER's contemporaries nor of the scholars, just mentioned. But what I principally wish to maintain, is that the maxim, expressed in the first words of the passage quoted, when literally accepted, cannot be upheld.

For what reason is there for not comparing Eastern and Western thought? Certainly we must be careful in our interpretations of Indian terms, be conscious of the differences existing between terms, apparently equivalent; we must avoid substituting European arguments for Indian lines of thoughts. But why should we not compare? Methinks, comparison is the only means for avoiding these mistakes, for finding out what is characteristic and expressing our descriptions clearly. It is the only way to arrive at appreciations of worth. JACOBI in his exposition of Indian Logic, avoids passing judgment on this branch of Oriental thought by reason of its deviations from Aristotelian logic. For him they remain two incommensurable quantities. This is a conception of the

relativity of human thought which I cannot accept. We are not only allowed, nay, we are even obliged to compare Indian and Aristotelian logic. But by that, Indian thought is not condemned. For modern research has taught us the deficiencies of the traditional, so-called Aristotelian logic and so has given us the means of appreciating Indian scholarship more justly.

Comparison, indeed, not made sporadically, for a single thought, for a single author, but comparison of the whole development of Western and Oriental thought, would be the most important means for insight and estimation.

I do not boast of carrying out this program in the following pages, but neither can I submit to a maxim which is oppugnant to the most principal exigencies of historical study.

#### Notice.

In the following chapters of this introduction I first describe the Vajesika texts, then the Nyāyasūtra, and finally the other Brahmanic and Buddhistic systems of philosophy. Whereas a knowledge of the Nyāya Sūtra is of help for the understanding of the Vajesika Sūtra and Bhāṣya, the systems, collected in chapter IV, are of greater importance for the interpretation of the Nyāyakandali. This chapter therefore can be left out in the first reading; the sections VII—X in book IV are connected with it.

Within a short time I shall publish a separate translation of the Vajesika Sūtra with a concise epitome of the system.



## CHAPTER II.

### DESCRIPTION OF THE VAİÇEŚIKA TEXTS.

#### SECTION I.

#### CHRONOLOGY OF THE VAİÇEŚIKA AUTHORS.

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##### § 1. *Introduction.*

*The date of the final redaction of the Vaîçeśika Sūtra.*

Of the three authors whom we have principally to do with, namely KAṆĀDA, PRAÇASTAPĀDA and ĀRĪDHARA, it is only the last-mentioned whose date we know by direct information. For in the colophon of his Nyāya-kandalī it is said: „The Nyāya-kandalī was written in the year 913 of the Śāka-era [i. e. 991 A. D.]”.

As for Kaṇāda, he may be undoubtedly be considered as a mythological person. I hope to prove by an analysis which will be given in the following section, that the Vaîçeśika-sūtra was not the work of one man, but of some generations of thinkers. Thus two questions arise with reference to its chronology: 1. when did the final redaction take place, 2. what can be said about the chronology of the different thoughts in the system.

The first question is rather difficult to answer. For even at the time when the redaction on the whole was settled, fresh insertions were added. So I consider it probable that V. S. II, 2, 22<sup>1)</sup> is even of later date than VARSĪYANA'S explanation of the Nyāya-sūtra and as for some other sūtras in the Vaîçeśika-sūtra we may doubt whether they existed in the time of Praçastapāda, the oldest commentator as far as we know. Yet on comparing the two sūtras of the Vaîçeśika and the Nyāya, we get a strong impression

1) See here book II chapter II section 2 § 3 B.

that the literary form of the *Vaṇeṣika Darṇana* indicates its chronological precedence. The fixed scheme of treating any question by first stating the difficulty *saṃcayā*, then formulating the *prima facie* view or thesis held by an opponent *purvapakṣa* &c., has become the main form of exposition in the *Nyāya-Darṇana*, but in the *Vaṇeṣika-Sūtra* we scarcely find one example of this (cf. however the discussion on *ṇabala* in book II ālm. 2). Thus with the exception of a few subsidiary passages the final redaction of the *Vaṇeṣika-Sūtra* may be put at an earlier date than that of the *Nyāya-Darṇana*.

We may mention here two facts bearing on the date of the final redactions: the oldest *Nyāya*-commentator, *Vātsyāyana*, quotes a few *sūtras* from the *Vaṇeṣika-Darṇana* (namely V. S. III. 1, 16 in the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* on N. S. II. 2, 24 i. e. Vizian. Ed. p. 113; and V. S. IV; 1, 6 in the same work on N. S. III. 1, 33 Viz. Ed. p. 143 and on N. S. III. 1, 67 p. 155); and *Praṇastapāda*, who takes the same place in his school, develops thoughts which are directly or indirectly taken from the *Nyāya-sūtra* (for instance the synonyms of *buddhi* in *Praṇ. Bhāṣya* book III chapter 2 § 13 Viz. Ed. p. 171, cf. N. S. I. 1, 15; further the whole discussion of 'inference for another' *Praṇ. Bhāṣya* book III chapter 2 § 34 p. 231 &c.).

Then I should like to refer to the two historically reported facts which *SUALI* speaks of in his *Introduzione*: 1. that the term *Vaṇeṣika* is not yet mentioned under the names of philosophical systems in *Kaṇṇiṇa's Arthaśāstra*, i. e. in a work written about 300 b. C.; 2. that on the other hand notions, found in the *Nyāya* system, and the six categories of the *Vaṇeṣika* are met with in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, written by the physician of King *Kaṇiṣka* (according to *SUALI* ± 100 A. D.).

## § 2. *The history of the thoughts expounded in the Vaṇeṣika Sūtra.*

As for the history of thought we may notice for the present the following: the discovering of the six categories (substance, quality, action, generality, peculiarity and inherence or combination) — of which the three first are the most important — is closely connected with grammatical study. That grammar, a form of research which with mathematics has been the first to arrive at a scientific standard, should have a great influence on philosophical thought, can be expected. For study of language is essentially a form of psychology, in which self-reflection is still guided by the observation of the audible utterances of man. History of European philosophy has

shown amply the importance of this influence. A fact which proves a similar development of thought in India, may be mentioned here. One of the terms by which Buddhism indicates the ever-changing condition of things, is, *kaccadrāpa*; and now we find the participle *kaccat* used in the Aitareya Brahmana as technical term for, present tense. *Kaccadrāpa*, therefore, characterises all things as having only a *present* or actual *form* of existence.

If we consider the discovering of the six — or originally three — categories as the birth of the Vaiśeṣika system, then it follows that this philosophy owes its origin to a purely theoretical attitude of mind and not to that craze for liberation which dominates nearly all forms of Indian thought. Therefore it is not the wish to discriminate soul from that which is not soul, ego from non-ego, as conceived by later scholiasts, but it is the theoretical desire for a correct classification and system of definition which has been the starting-point of the Vaiśeṣika system.

Of the six so called *padārthas* the three first: substance, quality and action: movement were the most original. *Sāmānya* generality; at first did not mean the same as *jāti* genus, but was synonymous with *sādharanya*, i.e. the accordance which one finds existing between substances, qualities and actions, or between two substances mutually &c.; *vaiśeṣa* difference or peculiarity, did not originally mean species, but the totality of properties which are typical for one category when compared with another. The sixth category *samarāṇya* is of still later origin; this term is rather difficult to translate, since it signifies both the relation between the whole and its parts and that between the things and its qualities, besides other meanings which were gradually added. When Pandit NANDA LAL SINHA for instance translates *samarāṇya* by combination, then he has evidently kept in view the first meaning; whereas its second meaning should be translated by inherence. A term which combines both meanings does not exist, as far as I know, in European philosophical terminology. In the Vaiśeṣika system it very probably owes its origin to the theory of reasoning.

From this general division of six categories there followed a trial to find subdivisions for each of them and specially for the three first. So nine substances were distinguished. The first five were earth, water, fire, wind and physical space (the medium through which sound is transmitted). In this naive physics not the theory of atoms was the original part, but the distinction of the elements (which distinction was obtained by referring them to our organs of perception and by considering their typical movements). The Vaiśeṣika

system was in the first place a system of distinctions, but not an atom-theory.

The atoms are discussed in the Darśana itself in rather obscure terms. What might have been the origin of the atom-theory, is not clear. WINDELBAND in his History of European Philosophy (*Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2 Aufl., 1900, p. 34) explains the atomism of Lencippus as a synthesis of the Eleatic and Heraclitic principles. The atoms, residing in empty space, were themselves exempt of change, this existence of theirs formed the Eleatic principle; but the distances between them varied continually, these variable relations of theirs represented the Heraclitic dogma. Since Brahmanic speculation had at an early date taken hold of this Eleatic conception and Buddhistic theory arrived at the Heraclitic principle in the works of NĀGĀRJUNA<sup>1</sup>, one might be inclined to take the Vaiçeśika atomism as a similar compromise. Yet we must notice an important difference between the development of Indian and Greek thought. The Vaiçeśikas namely have never tried to explain the qualitative changes of compound things as results of the quantative changes (in distances and velocity of movement) in the atoms and the reaction of the human psychical organism: their atoms are not absolutely hard corpuscula, but are mathematical points, thus indefinitely small (*anuv*), — a notion, I may add, which was worked out by later scholasts in a very unsatisfactory manner. Therefore the Vaiçeśika atomism could never have afforded such great service to physical science as Greek atomism has done by its allowing the scientist to express all physical facts in mathematical formulae. Yet the fact that the Vaiçeśika discusses the eternal and transient forms of the elements, that it considers psychical life as being a fluxus of momentary states in an everlasting, substantial soul, that it thus combines the Eleatic and Heraclitic standpoint, may be an indication of its being of more recent date than Nāgārjuna. I am, therefore, inclined to agree with the conclusions, formed by JACOBI and SUALI:

that both the final redactions of the Vaiçeśika and Nyāya Sūtras are later than the foundation of the Mādhyamika school, (cf. N. S. IV, 2, 26—37, which is a polemics against Nāgārjuna's Ćūnyavāda,

that the Vaiçeśika Sūtra chronologically precedes the Nyāya Sūtra.

<sup>1</sup> H. JACOBI (J.A.O.S. anno 1911 p. 1) compares Nagarjuna with Zeno. As far as their method is concerned, this is right. But Zeno believes in an Absolute Being and Nagarjuna in an Absolute Void. In other words in Nagarjuna's conception the world becomes an irrational chaos. Thus whereas Nagarjuna approaches Zeno in method, he stands on a super-Heraclitic standpoint in conviction.

The psychological views of the Vaiçeśika system are on the whole much more interesting than its physical notions. When we compare its psychology with the Sāṃkhya, we may notice a great progress. The fact that mental phenomena do not themselves occupy place though psychical life, according to experience, is bound to the existence of a body, had led in the Upaniṣad-time to the still inaccurate formulae: soul is infinitely great, or infinitely small. The Vaiçeśika used both expressions, it attributed infinite greatness to soul, infinite smallness to the internal organ. The *ātman*, soul, was the same principle which was called *puruṣa* by the Sāṃkhyins, however in many respects differently comprehended.

The Sāṃkhyins, following the example of the old Upaniṣad-thinkers, had hypostatised the different functions which can be distinguished in psychical life. This was not yet done discriminately, but only with the help of the crude terms which popular language offered to them. So in the Sāṃkhya system we meet with a kind of psychical body, consisting of *ahaṃkāra*, *manas*, *buddhi* and ten *indriyāṇi*.

In two main points the Vaiçeśika deviated from the Sāṃkhya: 1. they distinguished more clearly the different psychical functions, and 2ly they taught them to be qualities (or qualitative changes) of soul. In both points the Vaiçeśikas agree with the Naiyāyikas.

This more accurate distinction is perhaps due to the same, theoretical attitude of mind which we have noticed before in the Vaiçeśika system.

The second dogma, mentioned, may be called a partial return to more popular conceptions, by which soul was conceived to be a kind of body and all psychical phenomena qualities or actions of this psychical body. According to the Vaiçeśika system these phenomena belong to soul infinitely great (or as we should express: to soul in itself exempt of spacial relations). This synthesis of the philosophical conception of soul as infinitely great and the popular notion of the soul as passing through successive states, certainly upsets the ideas of the Sāṃkhya on liberation. This could on the basis of Vaiçeśika psychology only be explained as a *cessation* of psychical qualities: whereas according to Sāṃkhya-ideas soul was really *freed* (*mukta*), from bondage, was severed from psychical and material bodies. But the more theoretical attitude, characteristic for the Vaiçeśika system, made this loss of no importance.

The origin of the Vaiçeśika psychology can still clearly be traced in one of its details. So, as ARTHALVE (in his edition of the *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 149) note on section XVIII) has noticed, this

system<sup>1</sup>) has given an explanation of sleep, by simply transferring to the internal organ, that which popular and Upaniᅒad-conception had attributed to soul itself, the entering into the heart through the arteries.

Finally we may state that the psychological notions of the Vaīᅒeᅒikas, judging from their logical simplicity, are of more recent origin than those laid down in the Upaniᅒads and adopted by Sāᅒkhya and Vedānta.

Whereas the *terminus a quo* is found by the relation between the Vaīᅒeᅒika and Nyāya-Sūtras, on the one hand, and Nāgārjuna on the other, the *terminus ad quem* is determined by the circumstance that VĀᅒTSYĀYANA (or PAKᅒᅒILA ŚVĀMIN), the oldest commentator on the Nyāya-darᅒana, was polemised against by DIGNĀGA (BODAS, J.R.A.S., Bombay Br., vol. XIX p. 332, SATHĒ CANDRA VIDYĀBHÜᅒᅒAᅒA, History of Indian logic, Mediaeval School p. 56 n. 1).

So then if we for the sake of convenience use the names of Kaᅒāᅒa and Gotama for the final redactors of the Vaīᅒeᅒika and Nyāya Sūtras, we get this order: Nāgārjuna, Kaᅒāᅒa, Gotama, Vāᅒtsyāyana, Dignāga.<sup>2</sup>)

### § 3. *The date of Praᅒastapāᅒa.*

I wish to bestow here only a few words on the problem of PRAᅒASTAPĀᅒA's date. Our accurate knowledge of it is for the present of no decisive importance, since we know the relative chronology of our main sources (Vaīᅒ. Sūtra, Praᅒastapāᅒa-bhāᅒᅒya, Nyāya-kandali). In the first place Bodas has proved that Praᅒastapāᅒa must have preceded ĀᅒᅒᅒKARĀ ĀᅒᅒᅒYA, the great Vedānta teacher. Then JACOBI and later on STALI have upheld the idea that Praᅒastapāᅒa lived before UDDYOTAKARA (BHARADVĀJA), the author of the Nyāya-vāᅒrttika. (STALI, *Introduzione*, p. 31). Further DE STCHERBATSKOI (Vol. V of Le Muséon N.S. anno 1904, p. 129 &c.) and STALI have discussed the relative chronology between Praᅒastapāᅒa and DIGNĀGA. According to De Stcherbatskoï, Praᅒastapāᅒa has borrowed in an unfair way, many of his ideas from Dignāga. I cannot yet discuss this problem here<sup>3</sup>), because of its technicalities, so for the present I must merely mention that I have not been convinced

<sup>1</sup> V. S. V., 2, 16.

<sup>2</sup> On the date of Nāgārjuna and Dignāga, see JACOBI, J.A.O.S. XXXI p. 22 note, p. 6 note 3.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. here book II chapter V section 1 § 3 and 4.

by his argumentation and that I completely agree with Sualì's conclusion (*Introduzione*, p. 424). „Ma ad ogni modo bisognerebbe ammettere — poichè tali analogie sono spesso notevolissime, e le divergenze sovente secondarie — che i due autori siano separati da un intervallo assai breve: pochi decenni — per non dire pochi anni soltanto.”

§ 4. *Vaiṣeṣika authors between Praçastapāda and Gaṅgeṣa.*

A great evolution of thought in which also Vaiṣeṣika thinkers have taken part, separates PRAÇASTAPĀDA from KAYADA, and CRĪDHARA from Praçastapāda.

So the second line of Praçastapāda's opening verse: „*padārthadharmaṣaṃgrahaḥ pravakṣyate mahodhajaḥ*” is commented upon by Crīdhara (Ny. Kand. p. 3) as follows.

„*Padārthadharmaṃnām saṃkṣepenābhīdhāyako granthaḥ prakṣyate mahācakṣyate', iti granthakartuḥ pratijñā. Granthasya ceyam prakṣatā, yad anyatra granthe vistarenetas tato 'bhīhitānām dhakatra tācatām eva padārthadharmaṃnām granthe saṃkṣepena kathanam'*.”

The whole gloss is evidently a forced interpretation of the prefix *pra* in *pravakṣyate*, where *pra* is supposed to express 'excellence' and excellence again 'shortness'. Yet Crīdhara's opinion that the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya is in many ways a compendium of thoughts, previously worked out broadly, seems very probable.

Between Praçastapāda and Crīdhara there are a few authors whose works are still preserved. For more details I must however refer to SCALI'S *Introduzione*, which work helps us to put together the following chronological table:

Vācaspati-miśra . . . . .	844 A.D. (SCALI p. 58)
Bhāsarvajña . . . . .	900 A.D. (p. 59)
Udayana . . . . .	984 A.D. (p. 61)
Crīdhara . . . . .	991 A.D.
Çivāditya . . . . .	(p. 64)
Gaṅgeṣa . . . . .	1175 A.D. (p. 66)

§ 5. *The syncretic Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika.*

I should like to insert here a few words on ÇIVĀDITYA, though he properly does not belong to the authors to whom I shall refer. He is the author of the *Saptapadārth*, which book by its short and easy exposition offers a fit introduction into Vaiṣeṣika philosophy.

This treatise is often called the first example of syncretic Nyāya-

Vaiçeśika philosophy (BODAS, J. R. A. S., Bombay Br., vol. XXIX, p. 315). This characterisation, though correct, might lead to misconceptions. During their whole history, Nyāya and Vaiçeśika — and we may add the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, as far as its philosophical parts are concerned — have had very great positive influences upon each other. It is true that the schools disagreed about such details as e.g. the influence of fire on earthly substance, that the Nyāya has never been interested in the subtle questions, raised by Praçastapāda concerning the momentary stages: in the process of conjunction, in the psychical process which leads to the notion: 'two' &c. — questions which fully deserve the sarcasm of the proverb, quoted in the Sarva-darçana-saṃgraha, — that one school accepted nominally more or less *pramāṇas* than another; but in spite of a few such details we may still uphold the idea that the Nyāya and Vaiçeśika have always been cognate systems having a positive influence upon each other.

The expression syncretic Nyāya-Vaiçeśika philosophy therefore either refers to a more intensified influence, for example the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇas* is inserted in a work which follows for the rest the Vaiçeśika system; or it refers to the form of composition, for instance the general plan of a work is based on the sixteen topics of the Nyāya, but the second heading *pramāṇa* contains an exposition of the Vaiçeśika. An example of the first kind is offered by Çivāditya's Saptapadārthī, of the second by KEÇAVA-MIÇRA's Tarka-bhāṣā, a work, posterior to GAṄGEŚA's renowned Tattvacintāmaṇi.

#### § 6. Çaṃkara Miçra and his Upaskāra.

The commentary on the Vaiçeśika Sūtra, written by ÇAṂKARA MIÇRA and called the Upaskāra is of more recent date. The writer was a pupil of RAGHUDEVYA's, who was himself a pupil of MATHURANĀTHA's who again was a pupil of RATHUNĀTHA's. This last-mentioned author wrote the Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti 1520 A D. So Çaṃkara Miçra must have lived about 1600.<sup>1)</sup> His Upaskāra closely follows the Vaiçeśika Sūtra. It is published together with the fundamental text in the Bibliotheca Indica (1861) and translated by NANDA LAL SINHA. Both these publications will often be quoted in the following pages. For although Çaṃkara Miçra's work is a work of mere compilation and of no scientific or philosophical value, yet we cannot leave it aside and shall specially need it for those *sūtras* which were not referred to by PRAÇASTAPĀDA.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. SCALF, Introduzione, p. 81.



## SECTION 2.

## ANALYSIS OF THE VAİṢEṢIKA SŪTRA.

§ 1. *The Vaiṣeṣika System a doctrine of categories.*

NOTE. References are made to the Bibliotheca Indica edition. For the translation I have made freely use of NANDA LAL SIMHA'S translation.

The Vaiṣeṣika system is in the first place a doctrine of categories. This is clearly pronounced at the beginning by one of Kānāda's sūtras. V.S. I, 1, 4 runs: „The supreme good [results] from the knowledge, produced by a particular *dharma*, of the essence of the categories, substance, quality, action, generality, peculiarity and inherence, by means of their resemblances and differences". The name Vaiṣeṣika does not refer to the „ultimate qualities of atoms", but denotes the system as a doctrine of characterisation.<sup>1</sup>

The list of V.S. I, 1, 4 has been accepted by Praçastapāda (Viz. ed. p. 6). In the Sarva-darçana-saṃgraha we find the following passage in which an opponent and a defendent discuss the number of categories (transl. by COWELL and GORRIE, 2nd edition p. 117 : „If you ask, why do you say that there are only six categories, since non-existence is also one? we answer, Because we wish to speak of the six as positive categories, i.e. as being the objects or concepts which do not involve a negative idea." In a similar way other recent Vaiṣeṣika works sum up seven categories and *abhāva* here is coordinate with the others.

The passage treating of non-existence in the Vaiṣeṣika Sūtra forms a part of the discussions on external perception (V.S. IX, 1, 1-10) and similarly in the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya *abhāva* does not occur in the list of categories, but is dealt with under the heading *aiṅgikāya-jatam*, because Praçastapāda considers *abhāva*, i.e. [the proof for] the non-existence [of a thing], as really a form of *anumāna*. This treatment of *abhāva* in connection with the trustworthy sources of knowledge (*pramāṇāni*) is also met with in the Purva-mīmāṃsā and in the Buddhist Nyāya-bindu. On the other hand that *abhāva* should be reckoned a seventh category is explicitly stated by CRIDHARA in his Nyāya-kandali.

<sup>1</sup> This thesis will be proved here later on. Cf. MAX MÜLLER, Six Darçanas p. 580.

The first three of the categories are subdivided in the following sūtras: V.S. I, 1, 5 : Earth, water, fire, air (or wind), physical space [i.e. space considered as the medium through which sound is transmitted], time, (mathematical) space [i.e. space, considered in relation to the notion of direction], self [or soul] and mind are the only substances. — V.S. I, 1, 6 Qualities are colour, taste, smell and touch, numbers, measures, separateness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, understandings, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and volitions. — V.S. I, 7 : Throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contraction, expansion and going are actions.

PRAÇASTAPĀDA, after having summed up the seventeen qualities mentioned above, continues: these are the explicitly stated (*kaṭhoktāḥ*) seventeen [qualities]: by the word *ca* seven are [implicitly] added: weight, fluidity, adhesion, *saṃskāra* [the property of persevering in, or returning to a former state], the unseen [quality of the soul, namely merit and demerit] and sound [or word conceived as a quality of physical space]. So then there are all together twenty four qualities. We find a similar interpretation in the Śarvadarśana-saṃgraha and the Ūpaskāra: the seven qualities, however, which Praçastapāda has added, though acknowledged by KANĀDA, are not considered by him to be quite coequal with the others. Therefore in my opinion the interpretation of *ca* in V.S. I, 1, 6 which became current in the Vaiçeṣika school, does not necessarily express the thought intended by Kanāda. Before being able to prove this, we have to analyse the composition of his sūtra.

## § 2. *Detailed analysis of the Vaiçeṣika Sūtra* <sup>1)</sup>.

The original Vaiçeṣika Darśana shows the same irregularity of economy as is usually found in the scientific works of the Hindus. This is partly owing to egressions which can be accounted for: partly perhaps old ‘*creptis*’ have crept into the ‘*mola*’. If we confine ourselves to the main points, we may make the following statements:

1. The first book deals with the main *categories* in general outlines. That is to say: the first āhnikā mentions the similarity and dissimilarity of the three first categories (substance, quality and action), principally by examining these notions with reference to causality. The second āhnikā treats of generality and peculiarity, and of being in general. It is, however, a striking point that *samarāga* (inherence) is left out here.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book IV section II.

2. The second book and the third contain the discussion on the *substances*, moreover the first lesson of the third book gives a preliminary treatment of inference (*anumāna*) as an introduction to the theory of soul (*ātman*). Though physical space is first treated in its proper place according to the enunciation (*abhyāsa*), namely between wind and time, yet it is taken up again at the end of book II, with a full discussion on sound and a polemic against the Mīmāṃsakas.

3. The first lesson of the fourth book treats of the *first group of the qualities*, colour, taste, smell and touch. The atoms and the conditions of perception are discussed in connection with it. Only the last sūtras of this lesson mention provisionally the qualities of the second group: numbers, extensions, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority.

4. The second lesson of the fourth book gives information about the different kinds of bodies and could be taken as an introduction to the fifth book which treats of *actions* movements. The first lesson sums up their several causes, i. a.: weight and physical inertia (a kind of *saṃśkṛta*). The second lesson deals with the movements of the elements and of the internal organ *manas*: fluidity (*dravata*) is mentioned here in connection with water. Darkness is introduced here, because a moving shade might suggest the idea that darkness is a substance. Movement is denied of (mathematical) space, time and physical space.

5. *Merit and demerit* (together forming the unseen quality of soul) are the contents of the sixth book. Pleasure, [pain], desire '*rāga* = *icchā*', [aversion], and activity '*pravṛtti*', forming together with the implied quality 'inactivity' '*avivṛtti*' the immediate utterance of volition '*prayatna*' — thus *five of the six psychological qualities, mentioned in V.S. I, 1, 6* and in Nyāya Sūtra I, 1, 10 — are mentioned shortly in the interesting passage V.S. VI, 2, 10—13. Now it might be, that since, according to general Indian ideas merit and demerit are results of bodily and mental actions (*carakasya karmāṇi* & *manasaḥ karmāṇi*), some closer connection exists between the books V, VI and the second lesson of the fourth. I must, however, avow that neither the redaction of the sūtras, nor any note of a commentator confirms this conjecture.

6. The discussion on the *qualities* is resumed in the seventh book.<sup>1)</sup> After bestowing a few sūtras on the previously explained

<sup>1)</sup> According to the latest redaction of the Sūtra this discussion is here begun for the first time, cf. here book II chapter V section 1 § 3 B.

qualities: colour, taste, smell and touch, and stating where they are eternal and where non-eternal, the author takes up the treatment of extension, and specially minuteness (*agutva*) and all-pervasiveness (*cibhūta*). The eternality and non-eternality of this quality is considered as well. The second lesson deals with number, conjunction and disjunction, farness and nearness. The three last sūtras explain by way of digression the notion of *inherence* (*samavāya*), so that again the order of the enunciation is transgressed. But as *samavāya* bears upon material as well as psychological matters — there is *samavāya* between a pot and its red colour, and there is *samavāya* between the soul and its feeling of joy — so this might have been a reason why *samavāya* has been placed after those qualities, such as number, which similarly refer to both spheres of existence.

7. The eighth book gives a theory of perception. The first lesson of the ninth book, after bestowing its ten first sūtras on non-existence (*abhāva*), continues the discussion on perception. The second lesson takes up inference (*anumāna*), (without adding however anything of importance to that which has been said in III, 2) and the other forms of *bodhi* (*intellection*). So we see that these two last books treat of one *quality*: intellection. The first lesson of the tenth book distinguishes this last quality from the other psychological qualities, specially pain and pleasure, whilst the second lesson, by transgressing the enunciation, gives definitions of the three kinds of causes.

### § 3. Conclusion to be drawn from this analysis.

1. We may conclude that the arrangement of KĀṢYĀPA'S Sūtra is principally based on the enunciation of the nine substances and of the seventeen qualities (I, 1, 5 & 6). The qualities are divided into three groups: those of the first and the third group characterise the physical elements and soul respectively, those of the second are common to every kind of substance. The order of the enunciation is broken in the second lesson of the fourth book and in books V and VI. These treat of *a.* the different kinds of bodies, *b.* the actions and the qualities, fluidity, weight, *samskāra* (here: physical inertia and elasticity), which are all three causally related to the actions (movements), *c.* the quality 'unseen' (i. e. not directly experienced, but only inferrible) of soul, [merit and demerit], which is mentioned in connection with action (V, 1, 6 and V, 2, 13) and which moreover has received an independent treatment in book VI; *d.* the typically psychological qualities, mentioned in

1. 1, 6 with the exception of intellection. We may notice here that the qualities mentioned under the letters *b* and *c*, form most of those, explained by Praṇastapāda as meant by the particle *ca* in V. S. I, 1, 6: the quality *śabda* is mentioned by way of egression in V. S. II, 1, 2 and sound is discussed in a polemical egression at the end of book II.

2. Though the categories—generality, peculiarity and inference, are of great importance for the system, yet they have not had the slightest influence on the composition of the book.

3. The seven qualities, added by Praṇastapāda, have not the same significance as the original seventeen, summed up by Kaṇāda himself. For colour, taste, smell and touch are used for defining the elements, whilst weight, fluidity, adhesion, (physical) *saṃskāra*, are only mentioned on occasion of action (movement), and intellections, pleasure, pain, wish, aversion and volition are psychological states which are directly experienced, whilst the existence of the 'unseen' quality and psychological *saṃskāra* (latency of impressions) can only be proved by inference. And though we should expect *śabda* 'sound or word' to be mentioned in V. S. I, 1, 6, yet notwithstanding this one exception I am inclined to believe that Kaṇāda meant to express his thought completely in this sūtra. Later on, commentators discovered the inconsistency of this sūtra and the rest of the Darśana; and so they found an easy remedy in a forced interpretation of the particle *ca* and the omission of this *ca* in the preceding and the following sūtra.

4. The composition of the whole work is very irregular. For instance the discussion on actions and on merit and demerit is hidden in the middle of the book, whereas its natural place would have been at the end. And this is even more strange, since the three first sūtras and the last two of the whole work mention 'merit' as its most principal subject-matter. For the explanation of this fact the following supposition suggests itself to me. The discussion on the actions (movements) was inserted between the sensual and the relational qualities, because movement (which does not belong to soul) was considered to be cognate to the first kind of qualities; and further the mentioning of the 'unseen' quality as a cause of movements in V. S. V, 1, 15 and V, 2, 13, or perhaps the ambiguity of the term *karma* which according to technical application meant 'movement' and according to popular use had the wider significance of action, led to the insertion of the discussion on *dharma* immediately after the treatment of the *karmāni*.

5. The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra was not the work of one man, but has

gradually grown during several generations of teachers. It is, therefore, a rather difficult task to settle the relative chronology between this sūtra and those of other schools. For though, for instance, the Vajesika Sūtra is in thought and style evidently older than the Nyāya Sūtra, yet we may come across passages, more recent than the latter work (cf. my explanation of V. S. II. 2, 22 in the chapter on sound). And though the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya owing to the technique of its method and the complicateness of its theories gives the impression of having been composed much later than the Vajesika Sūtra, yet I am inclined to think that some of those passages which are seemingly an egression or insertion in the Darçana and at the same time are not referred to by Praçastapāda, did not yet exist in this commentator's time. On the other hand the fact that the recensions, given in the Bibliotheca Indica and Berhampore editions, differ so widely from each other <sup>1)</sup>, may perhaps indicate that the teachers always had a certain freedom of quoting the sūtras in such order and completeness as they thought most fit for educational purposes.

### SECTION 3.

#### DESCRIPTION OF THE PRAÇASTAPĀDA-BRĀṢYA.

##### § 1. *The Bhāṣya, to be divided into 'books', 'chapters' and 'paragraphs'.*

In the table of contents which the Indian editor of the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya has given, we only find a division of the work into *prakaraṇas*. In order however to get a fuller insight into the composition of the Bhāṣya it seems necessary to arrange these *prakaraṇas* (books) into chapters and paragraphs, and moreover to give the contents of each paragraph more extensively than DIVYEDIN has done. For this reason I have composed the tables of the fourth book, section III and IV, of the present publication.

Here I should like to analyse the Bhāṣya in a more descriptive form. Looking at the table of contents (table of section III mentioned) we notice that Praçastapāda's work has got a much more regular composition than we could discover in the sūtra. And

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here the appendix p. 34.

whereas in the Darśana the three first categories, substance, quality and action form the groundwork, we may divide the Bhāṣya into seven books, of which the first treats of the categories in general, the six others of each of the categories in detail, so that not only substance, quality and action, but also generality, particularity and inherence have received a special treatment.

§ 2. *Enunciation, characterisation and detailed description the three forms of exposition, used by Praçastapāda.*

Further we may state that

in the first two chapters of book I, an *Enunciation* of the categories and of the subdivisions of the categories is given — only chapter 2 § 13 and 14 do not contain subdivisions which do not exist, but definitions of *antya cipeṣaḥ* and *sāmuccāyaḥ*,

in the third chapter of book I a *Characterisation* of the categories,

in the first chapter of book II a *Characterisation* of the nine substances, in the second chapter a *Detailed Description* of each of them,

in the first chapter of book III a *Characterisation* of the 24 qualities, in the second chapter a *Detailed Description* of each of them,

in § 1—6 of book IV a *Characterisation* of action in general and of the five kinds of action: in the following paragraphs a discussion on action with reference to its causes and with reference to the kinds of moving substances,

in the books V—VII a discussion on generality, difference and inherence.

Thus we see that as far as possible three forms of exposition are chosen: enunciation, characterisation and detailed description. This conclusion leads us again to two other questions: 1. is DIVYDIX, the Indian editor of the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya right, when he calls the subject of the first chapters of book II and III *sādharmya-raiharmya-nirūpaṇa*? 2. what is the relation between these three forms of exposition (enunciation, characterisation and detailed description) and the three methods of the Vaiṣeṣika system as distinguished by CRIDHARA, namely: enunciation (*uddeṣa*), definition (*lakṣaṇa*), and examination (*parīkṣā*)?

The answer to the first question is to be found in Praç. Bhāṣya book II chapter 2 § 15 (p. 26) and book III chapter 1 § 1 (p. 27). These paragraphs are as follows:

„*Evaṃ saccitra sādharmyam viparyayāt vaidharmyam ca rūpam iti dravyāsaṃkāraḥ*”.

„*Thodānām ekailaṣo vaidharmyam ucyate*”.

The first of these two paragraphs is partly ambiguously expressed and partly vitiated by tradition. For, what does *viparyayād* mean? Ārīdhara paraphrases it by *‘itaracyārītte’* i. e. ‘in consequence of exclusion’, then it must be accepted as an attributive adjunct to *vaidharmyam*. Though the expression *viparyayād vaidharmyam* is tautological, yet so often are instances of tautology met with in Indian philosophical authors, that this can scarcely be called an objection. On the other hand one might be inclined to accept another meaning for *viparyayād*, for instance: ‘otherwise [i. e. in such cases where *sādharmya* cannot be stated]’. As an error of tradition we must consider the words: *dravyāsamkaraḥ*, which have been added by a copist (cf. the reading, quoted Viz. Ed. p. 26 note). So then we get the following rendering:

„Thus everywhere [*sarvatra* = *sarvasmin patārthe*] we ought to state the concordance, and the difference resulting from mutual exclusion”.

„Here now [in the following chapter] the peculiarity of each [of the substances] will be separately described”.

Thus we see that Drivedin is right in calling the chapters in question *sādharmya-vaidharmya-āropaṇa* and at the same time we arrive at the conclusion that *sādharmya-vaidharmya* together corresponds to the term ‘characterisation’ used in the exposition given above, and that *vaidharmya* alone is equivalent to ‘detailed description’.

The answer to the second question can be found with the help of a quotation from the Nyāya-kandalī p. 26 l. 17 in which the use of *parīkṣā* is described. „*Yatrābhīhite lakṣaṇe pravādāntaracyāpekṣāt tattvanīcayo na bhavati, tatra parapakṣacyūṭāsārtham parīkṣāvidhir vīhikriyate*”, i. e. „Where no certainty about the truth of a definition given, arises in consequence of [the existence of] another opinion [about the matter], there we require the process of examination in order to refute the opponent’s view”.

The giving here of prominence to definition and discussion on definition, answers more to the composition of GAṄGEA’S *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* and other recent Vaiśeṣika works than to the construction of the *Prācāstapāda-bhāṣya*. In other words, Ārīdhara with the threefold method of *uddeśa*, *lakṣaṇa*, *parīkṣā* really describes the school-practice of his own days, but not the proceedings of *Prācāstapāda* himself.



### § 3. *Appreciation of Praçastapāda's work.*

The regularity of composition, just proved to be characteristic for PRAÇASTAPĀDA'S work when taken as a whole, is likewise met with in its separate parts. So we find e.g. the detailed description of the four elements (earth, water, fire and wind) to be based on the following scheme:

- A. Enumeration of the qualities, belonging to the element.
- B. Its division into two kinds: the atomical and the developed form.
- C. Subdivision of the developed form: 1. body, 2. sensory, 3. object (in the case of wind, a fourth rubric is formed by *prāṇa*, vital air).

It is true that the order of the 24 qualities in the Bhāṣya (see here book IV section III) is not quite logical. First we find *a* four physical qualities (colour, taste, smell, touch), then *b*, seven mathematical qualities (or relations, number, dimension, conjunction, disjunction, farness, nearness, besides *prthaktvā*), then *c*, six psychical qualities (intellection, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition), then *d*, three physical qualities relating to movement (weight, fluidity, adhesion), then *e*, a quality, in nature partly physical and partly psychical (*samśkṛta*, i. e. 1. inertia and elasticity, 2. psychical latency or retention); then *f*, two psychical qualities having, however, a great influence in the physical world (merit and demerit), finally *g*, one physical quality (sound). A much more regular arrangement would have been got at, by discussing sound (*g*) immediately after the other physical qualities and by postponing the discussion on the psychical qualities (*c*) till that on physical qualities (*d* and partly *e*) was ended. It is clear that Praçastapāda has submitted here to the authority of Kaṇāda's sūtra (I, 1, 6), subservience betrayed by all Vaiçeṣikas up to the present day.

Whereas the methodical order, met with in Praçastapāda's Bhāṣya, deserves praise, on the other hand we must blame the scholastic formalism of some of its definitions and characterisations, the sophistry found in some of its dialogues.

Scholastic formalism is found in such tautological definitions as book II chapter 1 § 1 (pag. 20) „*prthivyadīnām narānām api dravyatrayagatī*”, i. e. participation in substance-ness is common to all nine [substances:] earth &c.”; (book II chapter 2 § 10 p. 69) „*ātmatrābhīsambandhād ātmā*”.

The „characterisations”, found in chapter 3 of book I, and in the first chapters of book II and III, are reprinted here (in book IV section IV tables A--C), in tabellie form. We may call this

method of characterisation, which has remained typical for the Vajesika system during its whole historical development, an insignificant form of dialectics, a form of science in which there was no room for any ingenious thought or combination, and still less any necessity for a direct observation of nature.

Subtlety and capriciousness of argumentation, combined with love for eristic dispute, are found in the long paragraphs, such as deal with the mathematical qualities. Several instances will be afterwards met with.

Although therefore the Bhāṣya is superior to the Sūtra in regard to methodical arrangement and (as we shall see in the next section) in regard to fullness of material, still at the same time, we must acknowledge a beginning of those habits of mind which make the Tattvacintāmaṇi and its commentaries and supercommentaries a torment for the European reader.

In spite of my mixed appreciation of Praçastapāda's merits, I must however protest against the accusation of plagiarism, brought in by DE STCHERBATSKOI; later on<sup>1)</sup> I hope to prove him to be innocent of this.

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#### SECTION 4.

### COMPARISON BETWEEN VAJESIKA SŪTRA AND PRAÇASTAPĀDA-BHĀṢYA<sup>2)</sup>.

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#### § 1. *List of subjects discussed in the Sūtra and omitted in the Bhāṣya.*

Since the subject-matter of the Sūtra has been completely rearranged by PRAÇASTAPĀDA in his Bhāṣya in order to obtain a more methodical order, one feels in studying these books the continual need of a concordance. This need has been supplied with reference to the Bhāṣya by Pandit DVIVĒDIN, the Indian editor of this text, and I have thought it practical (also for polemical purposes) to give the *same* table *in opposite arrangement*, thus in compliance with the Sūtra (see book IV section V). He who uses these two tables, will soon find that they fall short in giving too much: Dvivedin, namely, is often inclined to see a parallelism and thus an historical connection

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<sup>1)</sup> Book II chapter V section 4 § 3 and 4.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. here book IV section V.

between two passages which with a more critical examination would have to be kept separate. We shall afterwards find many examples of this.

If we try to give a concordance of Dargana and Bhāṣya only in main lines, then we may state that:

Bhāṣya book I (categories) corresponds with V. S. I, 1.

Bh. II (substances) with V. S. II, III, IV 2 plus the portions about atoms and sense-organs in IV 1 and VIII 2:

Bh. III (qualities) with V. S. IV 1 and VI—X 1:

Bh. IV (actions) with V. S. V:

Bh. V & VI (generality and particularity) with V. S. I, 2:

Bh. VII (inherence) with V. S. VII, 2, 26—28.

The subjects which are discussed in the Sūtra, but are left out in the Bhāṣya, are the following:

1. V.S. II, 1, 15—19. The assertion that air — since its existence as a separate category is neither proved by visual perception nor inference — is known as such by revelation; God considered as the creator of human language (according to the *Mīmāṃsākas*, language is eternal, thus not created).

2. V.S. II, 1, 20—23. Polemics against the *Sāṃkhya*s on the existence of physical space, as proved by the movements of objects<sup>1</sup>.

3. V.S. II, 2, 22—24 and 33—37. Polemical portions of the passage on sound, directed against the *Mīmāṃsākas*.

4. V.S. III, 2, 6—18. The existence of soul which should not be considered as identical with the body, proved by internal perception and revelation. Only a few of these sūtras seem to have been known to PRAÇASTARĀḌA; moreover, the whole thought, which is perhaps borrowed from the *Nyāya* (see ATHALAYE, notes on the Tarkasamgraha p. 114), is in contradiction with another passus in the Dargana.

5. V.S. III, 2, 19 and 21. Refutation of the *Vedānta*-thesis that soul is one; i. e. that the individual soul is really identical with Brahman. On the other hand the positive argument in III, 2, 20 for the plurality of souls is literally quoted in Bhāṣya p. 70 l. 14).

6. V.S. IV, 2, 2 and 3. Refutation of the doctrines that the human body consists of five or three elements (partly against the popular opinion, partly against the *Vedāntins*)<sup>2</sup>.

7. V.S. V, 1, 6; 11—13; V, 2, 5; 9—11; 19, 20; 25; 26.

— — — — —

<sup>1</sup> This reference is based on an information by ÇAMKARA MĪCRA. I doubt, however, its correctness and think the passage to have been a polemics against a Buddhistic thesis (cf. ÇAMKARA AÇARYA, *Vedānta-Bhāṣya*, on Balarayana Sūtra II, 2, 24, edition Bibl. Ind. p. 558).

<sup>2</sup> See G. R. J. Sankhya-Philosophie<sup>2</sup> p. 335.

Loose remarks with reference to action. They give the impression of being insertions.

8. V.S. VI, 1, 9—16. *Pravṛtti*, *parasvādāna* and *tyāga* in connection with *dharma*.

9. V.S. VII, 2, 14—20. Polemics on the relation between word and meaning against the *Mīmāṃsakas*. In as far as this passage is inserted, in a forced way, after the category 'conjunction', one is inclined to consider it as an insertion.

10. V.S. VIII, 1, 10 & 11. Two sūtras which are explained by CAṆKARA MIṬRA (in his *Upaskāra*) in such a way that we may take them as directed against the Buddhistic *Vijñānavādin*s.

11. V.S. VIII, 2, 1 and 2. Two sūtras, explained by Caṇkara Miṭra as referring to perception 'of a double specialised nature' or: the perception of 'the being specialised in the specialised' (see NANDA LAL SINHA's translation p. 283).

12. V.S. IX, 1, 1—10. The whole passage on non-existence (*abhāva* or *asat*) is nowhere extensively explained: but only once, and occasionally, alluded to (Bhāṣya, p. 234, l. 7).<sup>1)</sup>

§ 2. *The asatkūrya-vāda, mentioned in the Sūtra and only alluded to in the Bhāṣya.*

For most of these cases we have the choice between two suppositions: either these sūtras did not yet exist in PRAÇASTAPĀDA's time, or he left them out, because he did not want to enter upon any polemics against other schools. The (nearly complete) omission of the passage V.S. IX, 1, 1—10 deserves more fully our attention. If we may believe the more recent commentator CAṆKARA MIṬRA, the division of non-existence into four kinds and the perception of this non-existence is explained here. But Praçastapāda only mentions *abhāva* as one of the forms of inference (Book III Ch. 2 § 32, p. 225); so here the choice remains open between the suppositions that Praçastapāda has left these sūtras unmentioned, because he did not know them, or because he did not agree with their teachings. And as concerns the *asatkūrya-vāda*, the theory that a product does not exist before its production, it is only accidentally mentioned in the Bhāṣya, (book III Ch. 2 § 35, p. 234 l. 7) where it is considered a settled tenet of the Vaiçeṣika-system. With respect to the Sūtra we are not quite sure that the passage treating of this theory, is authentic;<sup>2)</sup> and even if authentic, we cannot be

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book IV section VI table F, a.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf., however, here chapter IV section 2 § 1.

sure about its meaning. The redaction, namely, of these sūtras is very enigmatic and we have no means of controlling the interpretations, given by Ćaṅkara Miṇra.

According to W. HANDT this *asatkārya-vāda* which mounts to the idea that a product (f. i. a jar) is not identical with the material used (the clay), would prove the historical dependance of the Vaīṣeṣika system on Buddhism. For he thinks this theory to be inconsistent with the Vaīṣeṣika doctrine of the eternality of atoms and hence he concludes that it must necessarily be a remnant of the Buddhistic dogma of universal momentariness. I cannot consider this argumentation to be very convincing. The quarrel between Sāṃkhyins and Vaīṣeṣikas concerning the previous existence or non-existence of the effect (product) strikes me as being a question of words. We may affirm as well as deny that the jar is identical with the clay, it only depends upon the meaning attached to the words. Clay and jar are identical as far as their atoms are concerned: but they are not so with regard to their own qualities. It will be shown later on<sup>1)</sup> that the preferring of the second formulation and the acceptance of the *asatkārya-vāda* was quite a logical result of the Vaīṣeṣika table of categories. For the present it suffices us to state that the *asatkārya-vāda* of the Vaīṣeṣika system does not help us in settling questions of relative chronology, as W. Handt has supposed.

§ 3. *Sūtras, quoted by Praṇastapāda and Ćrīdhara, but not extant in the present redaction of the Sūtra.*

We have now to consider the opposite case, a sūtra which does not exist anymore in the present redaction of the Darṇana, but is quoted by Praṇastapāda. In the beginning of the paragraph on *sāmyoga* (Bhāṣya book III ch. 2 § 10 p. 139) we read: „*sāmyogah . . . dravyagunakarṇa-betoh. Dravyārambhe nirapekṣas, tathā bhavatī sāpekṣebhya nirapekṣebhya; ca*’-iti vacanāt; *gunakarṇārambhe tu sāpekṣah, „sāmyuktasamarāgād agner vaīṣeṣikam” iti vacanāt*”.

It is a general rule in the Bhāṣya to end all sūtras which it quotes with the formula: *iti vacanāt*. Now the second quotation can be identified with V. S. X, 2, 7. But the first quotation is found nowhere in the Darṇana. Further we must notice that this passage is rather difficult and can only be rendered by aid of ĆRĪDHARA’S gloss, but even then we must accept so many artificialities of interpretation that no occidental reader can be satisfied.

<sup>1)</sup> Book II chapter I section 1 § 7.

Before, however, using Āridhara's comment, it is worth while noticing that the whole passage becomes much clearer by leaving out the first quotation (from *tathā* up to *iti vacanāt*). Then we may render it thus: „Conjunction . . . is a cause of substances, qualities and actions. It is an independent [cause] in the production of substances; a dependent [cause] in the production of qualities and actions; according to the sūtra: the quality typical for fire [is a dependent cause of the qualities, produced by it in earth &c. in as far as it takes place] by inherence in the conjunct”.

As we shall see later on (in the chapter on Metaphysics) <sup>1)</sup>, the original Vaiṣeṣika system only accepted two forms of relation: conjunction and inherence. And every form of causality is more or less directly based on them. If for instance a perception is the cause of a wish, then this is due to the fact that both inhere in the same soul. If the threads (the material) is called the cause of the cloth (the product), then this is so, because the cloth inheres in the threads. If a magnet is the cause of the movement of the needle, then this is a consequence of the omnipresence of the human soul and of its conjunction with the magnet as well as with the needle. When a cause only depends on one of these relations, then this conjunction (or respectively this inherence) is an independent cause (*nirapekṣo hetuḥ*), but when conjunction requires the aid of inherence or vice versa, then it is only a dependent cause (*sāpekṣo hetuḥ*).

Thus in the Bhāṣya passage, given above, conjunction is an independent cause of a substance, for the only relation required is the conjunction between the parts. But when the clay which was soft and black, becomes hard and red, or when the water moves upwards in the form of steam, then the conjunction with the fire is only a dependent cause of this new colour or movement, for the conjunction between fire and earth or water, and the inherence of the produced quality or movement in the earth or water, are working together.

The explanation, given here, is based on the supposition that the first quotation originally was not read in the Bhāṣya. Let us now see, how the complete passage has been interpreted by Āridhara. His gloss, occurring on page 112 l. 12 &c. runs as follows:

„The Sūtrakāra, after having taught: ‘the notion: the cloth *will be*, arises because of threads which are put together in behalf of a

<sup>1)</sup> Book II chapter 1 section 3 § 5 and § 7.

cloth', continues: '*tathā bhavatīti sāpekṣebhṃ nirapekṣebhṃ cetī*'. The meaning of this is as follows: in the same way as the notion 'the cloth *will be*' results from '[threads\_ which are put together, so there arises the notion of present time (*cartamāna-pratyaya*)' [which can be expressed in the words: 'the cloth\_ *is* i. e. is getting into existence\_'] in consequence of dependent and independent '[threads\_... When some threads are conjoined and others are not [yet\_ conjoined, then by these the notion will arise, the cloth *is* i. e. is getting into existence\_]. Thus is the meaning. Since in this sūtra the word 'independent' is used with reference to conjoined threads which are mentioned as '[one of the\_ causes of the notion of present time, therefore conjunction is understood as independent in the production of substances...'

Two points in this gloss specially deserve our notice: 1. Crīdhara does not allude to one sūtra, but even to two which do not at present occur in the Darṣana. The first of them runs: '*pañcārtham apakriyāmāṇebhṃ tantubhṃ bhaviṣyati pañcā iti pratyayo jāyate*'. 2. Crīdhara has not explained the words *sāpekṣa* and *nirapekṣa* in the same way as I have done, although I maintain that my interpretation is in accordance with the use of the words in the Sūtra I. 1. 16 & 17; see here the section on causality.

Now there is one fact which perhaps may solve our difficulties. Whilst the sūtra '*saṃyuktasamavayād agner vaijeyikam*' forms sūtra X. 2, 7 of the Darṣana, we find in X. 2, 5 conjunction mentioned as a cause of a cloth. So then I should like to give the following explanation. Crīdhara used the Darṣana together with an old commentary in which the sūtras X. 2, 5—7 were explained with reference to time, namely to the notions: 'it will be' and 'it is'. Some of the phrases in that comment were considered by Crīdhara as part of the old *mūla*. He inserted one of these supposed sūtras in the Bhāṣya-text and the other he used himself in his gloss.

In concluding we may state that very probably Praśastapāda has had no knowledge of a more extensive redaction of the Darṣana than the one which we find in the modern editions.

#### § 4. *Topics discussed in the Bhāṣya, but not yet in the Sūtra.*

In the precedent section (p. 27) I have mentioned that the Bhāṣya contains more material than found in the Sūtra. The most important theories to be adduced as examples are the following:

1. A description of the creation and destruction of the world (Bhāṣya II. 2 § 6 p. 48).

2. A full description of the influence which fire has on the qualities of the other elements (III, 2 § 6 p. 106); the distinguishing of stages in this process is characteristic for Praçastapāda's system.

3. A theory of number: number is supposed to be created only momentarily in the surrounding world by a subjective process in the human soul. This influence and the subjective process itself are analysed by Praçastapāda into momentary stages (III, 2 § 7 p. 111).

4. Similar theories of farness and nearness (III, 2 § 12 p. 164).

5. Distinguishing of stages in the processes of conjunction and disjunction (III, 2 § 10 and § 11, p. 139 and 151).

6. A theory of 'inference for another' (III, 2 § 34—42 p. 200). On the whole the examination of intellection is much extended.

7. Distinguishing of stages in the process of movement (IV, § 10 p. 300).

Most of these extensions refer to the theory of *ksaṇas* (time-atoms, durations of time which are supposed to be indivisible). Here undoubtedly we have to do with a renewed influence of Buddhism.<sup>1</sup> The addition of a description of the world-creation and world-destruction can be explained by the wish to complement the system after the example of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta.

With reference to the treatment of causality and the characterisation of the categories &c., Sūtra and Bhāṣya show remarkable differences. In the Sūtra we find an intentional discussion on causality (X, 2) and the general categories are carefully compared with each other, principally in regard to causality (I, 1, 9—31, I, 2, 1—2). In the Bhāṣya, on the other hand, the notion of causality, though fully analysed, is discussed only occasionally (specially in the characterisation of the qualities, book III chapter 1, and of action, book IV § 1); and the characterisation of the main categories (book I chapter 3, see here book IV section IV table A) is very abrupt.

<sup>1</sup> JACOBI, J. A. O. S. XXXI p. 28 & WASSILIEW *Buddhismus* p. 277 (305).

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## SECTION 5.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE  
VAĪṢEṢIKA-SŪTRA.

The Vaīṣeṣika Sūtra is often difficult to explain. The causes of these difficulties are the following

1. We have not always sufficient guarantee for the authenticity of the verbal tradition of the text, this mistrust increases in those cases where a sūtra is not referred to by Praçastapāda. In one recension of our text (see the following appendix) the tradition has been apparently based on mechanical memorising and subject to great alterations; the commentator then does not shrink from the most forced interpretations.

2. The expression of the sūtra is sometimes intentionally difficult. (see e.g. V.S. IX. 1, 1—5).

3. We do not possess a sufficiently reliable tradition on the interpretation of the sūtra. ĆAṂKARA ĀCĀRYA, the great Vedānta teacher, has already mentioned in his Ćārṇaka Bhāṣya, three interpretations of one sūtra of our Darṣana (namely of V.S. IV. 1. 5 in Ćar. Bh. on Ved. Sūtra II. 2, 15 Bibl. Ind. Ed. p. 535).

At all events it would be quite ridiculous, looking from a more critical standpoint to adopt the conception prevalent in India, namely to consider the present sūtra-redactions to be the original work of an ancient *muni* and the comments of such a recent commentator as ĆAṂKARA MIṬRA to be a safe guide for its interpretation.

4. Whilst a grammatical *sūtra* can be explained by a comparison with the described language itself, a philosophical textbook with its subjective and personal contents does not allow such auxiliary.

## APPENDIX.

*The Bhāradvājārṇhi-Bhāṣya.*

VINODHYEVARIPRASĀDA DIVYEDIN, the Indian editor of the Nyāya-kandali relates in his preface (p. 12 n. 2) how he met with a *saṁnyāsin* in Benares, possessing a time-worn manuscript, the first

line of which began: „*Vaiṣeṣikasūtravṛttiḥ Bhāradvājyā*”<sup>1)</sup> and consequently he identifies this book with the Vṛtti, often mentioned by Gaṅkara Miśra in his Upaskāra. Moreover, the same editor has published in a note of the same preface the number of sūtras which the Kaṇāda Darṣana possesses in each of its adhyāyas according to the Bibliotheca Indica edition and according to the *Gaṅgādhara-kaviratna-kavirāja-kṛta-bhāradvājyavṛtibhāṣyapostakam*”.

BHĪMACĀRYA JHALAKĪKAR in the second edition of his Nyāyakōṣa (upodghāta 3 no. 17) ascribes the *Bhāradvājyavṛtti* directly to Gaṅgādhara-kaviratna-kavirāja, without making any special distinction between Vṛtti and Bhāṣya.

JAGADĪCA CHANDRA CHATTERJI, author of „Hindu Realism”, mentions in his list of authorities and sources under no. 9 the following. „A comm. on [the Kaṇāda Darṣana] with what is said to be the Bhāradvājyavṛtti (one of the old and now lost commentaries on the Sūtras), by Gaṅgādhara Kaviratna-Kavirāja. It is impossible to distinguish in this work the Bhāradvājyavṛtti (if there is any of it in this work) from what is actually written by Gaṅgādhara himself. Its reading of the Sūtras and their arrangement are widely different from the other commentaries mentioned above. Publ. Berhampore (Murshidabad) Shak. 1700. The copy I have used is in the India Office Library (I. B. L. 13). London.”

Having read this information of Chatterji's I felt it my duty to study this copy. The results so far obtained can be summarised in the following points:

1. As CHATTERJI remarks, we cannot „distinguish in this work the Bhāradvājyavṛtti from what is actually written by Gaṅgādhara himself.” In other words the Bhāṣya gives the impression of being a direct commentary on the Sūtra the words of which it quotes and paraphrases; but not of a supercommentary, for in this case we should have expected a double series of quotations. Neither is the relation between Bhāradvāja and Gaṅgādhara clear from the colophons at the end of the different āhnikas. Merely for the sake of uniformity I shall henceforward quote the book as the Bhāradvājyavṛtti-bhāṣya and the author as Gaṅgādhara.

2. The numbers of sutras in the different adhyāyas, as they are given by DIVEDIN from his „*vṛtti-bhāṣya-postaka*” do not agree with those of the Berhampore edition.

3. The Vṛtti, quoted by GAṆKARA MIŚRA in his Upaskāra and the Bhāradvājyavṛtti-bhāṣya are historically independent of each other.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. GAṆGĀNATHA JHA, Indian Thought IV p. 263 = Nyāya-Lectures p. 15.

4. GAṄGĀDHARA has aimed in his Bhāṣya at an eclectic standpoint for which he has used mainly Sāṃkhya-Yoga ideas. The results of this eclecticism are mongrel and monstrous and repel the European reader.

5. The composition of the Darṣana which is already difficult in the vulgate recension, becomes quite confused in Gaṅgadhara's Bhāṣya. In consequence of the deviations in the arrangement, the same sūtra has often a totally different import in the two redactions. On the whole the recension, given in the Berhampore edition, is of little authenticity and trustworthiness.

6. Since no references to Gaṅgādhara are found in older or more recent Vaiśeṣika works, the fixation of his date is of little importance for the history of this system itself.

To each of these points I should like to add now a few annotations:

NOTE to 1. — The colophon of the first āhnika runs: *iti prathamāhnikasya bhāradvājavyṛttiḥ*. Similarly we find nothing but the titles *Bhāradvājavyṛtti* or *Ṛtti* at the end of all other āhnikas. On the other hand the colophon of the whole book runs: *iti bhāradvājavyṛttau gr̥gāṅgādharaṇyākṛtāṃ bhāṣyaṃ samāptam*.

NOTE to 2. — The numbers of the sūtras which occur in the different adhyāyas according to the principal recensions, are the following:

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	Total
A. In the Bhāradvājavyṛtti-bhāṣya, according to DIVYEDIN.....	50	64	37	24	43	30	49	17	28	15 =	357
B. In this Bhāṣya, according to Berhampore edition.....	40	62	22	47	27	22	27	12	28	15 =	302
C. In the edition of the Bibliotheca Indica.....	48	68	40	24	41	32	53	17	28	16 =	370

The fact that DIVYEDIN mentions 357 sūtras as occurring in the Bhāradvājavyṛtti-bhāṣya shows that the Berhampore edition is not very reliable. This is affirmed by the circumstance that a sūtra, referred to by Gaṅgādhara in his comment on I, 1, 26 p. 23 does not occur in the Darṣana itself according to the same edition.

We cannot attach much importance to the numbers of the sūtras in the different āhnikas, since DIVYEDIN tells us that his manuscript was too old to fix the order of the pages. The extreme disorder (I may add, in which the Sūtras occur in the recension of the Berhampore edition, suggests almost the idea that a similar mechanical disturbance has been here at work.

NOTE to 3. — DVIDEDIN states the identity of the Bhāradvājavṛtti and the Vṛtti, referred to by Çamkara Mīra in the following words (vijñāpana p. 12 note 2): *Īrāṇasyām ekasya saṃyōjāsino nikale tālapattreṣu maithilākṣarair likhitaṃ, jirnatāt samantāc chinnaṃ, bhāradvājavṛttipustakaṃ cartate; tatra pattān-kānām api chinnaatāt kim kena pattreṇa saṃyōjyam ity api kartum acakyaṃ; prārambhapattreṣya prathamapeṣṭhe „vaiçeśikasūtravṛttir bhāradvājyā” iti lekha darçanāt, „yato bhgyadaganihçregyasasiddhiḥ sa dharma” iti sūtracyākyāne Çamkaramīrāir nirupitaṣya „vṛttikṛtas tv” ity ālilekhaṣya darçanāt, saiveyam vṛttir iti nirṇītaṃ”.*

I cannot make out from Dvivedin's exposition, how according to his ideas the Bhāradvājavṛtti and the Gaṅgādharma-kṛta-bhāradvājavṛtti-bhāṣya are related to each other. If they are identical or even connected with each other, then his argumentation is decidedly wrong, and if not so, then inconclusive.

The quotation, given in the Upaskāra, namely runs (p. 6 Bibl. Ind.) *„vṛttikṛtas tv. abhyodayaḥ sukhaṃ, nihçregyasam ekakūṭina-sakalūṭma-çiçesagunādhcamśah”*. On the other hand we do not find the slightest allusion to the *çiçesagunāḥ* (typical qualities) in the Bhāradvājavṛtti-bhāṣya. We only read here the gloss: *„Ubhaya-loka-gubhaṃ abhyodayaḥ. Niçeṣū nirvṛttir nihçregyasam”*. Similarly other references to the Vṛttikāra, occurring in the Upaskāra, cannot be identified with passages of the Bhāradvājavṛtti-bhāṣya.

NOTE to 4. — That not the Vaiçeśika, but the Sāṃkhya-Yoga is the highest system, is explicitly mentioned by the author of the Bhāradvājavṛtti-bhāṣya in his comments on I, 1, 3. The commentary takes here quite the form of a polemics: *„Na . . . eṣām saṃmāna-sādharṃyacaidharṃyābhgyām tattvajñānān nihçregyasam . . . . . So hy uttamaḥ purnsaḥ . . . . na pratyakṣaḥ . . . . . nānameyacca . . . . , nopameyacca . . . . , na pratarkyaçca . . . . , nopadeçyaçca . . . . , gamyas tu sāṅkhyayogena”*. I. e. : 'The summum bonum [does] not [result] from true knowledge [which arises] from [the understanding of] the resemblances and differences of these six categories. . . . Because this Highest Soul [which Chāndogya Upaniṣad VIII, 3, 4 mentions] cannot be approached by perception, nor by inference, nor by analogy, nor by *pratarka*, nor by *upadeça* (or *āptavacana*, verbal authority), but only by Sāṃkhya-Yoga.' After this the author explains how the discrimination of the six categories can only lead to true knowledge in the wordly sense of the word (*laukika-tattvajñāna*), but Sāṃkhya is true knowledge in the deeper sense of the word and is only to be obtained by the aid of mental concentration. (*„yogasamādhije paramārthike sāṅkhye tattvajñāne jāte, laukikatat-*

*teajñānam apaiti*”. Then the commentator continues: *ity evam paramārthikatatteajñāne jāte lankakatatteākhyā-mithyājñānāpāyād doṣa apayanti rāga-dveṣa-mohāh. Doṣāpāye pravṛttir vāñmanaharir-rāmhaṇ vāpaiti. Pravṛttypāye pūnahpūnarjanamaheta-karmāpāye bhṛgadaya-nihyreṇasa-sūdanadharmāc apagatah. Tadapāye janmahijā-bhācād vicidharubhikhapravartanahetajanmaiva duḥkham apaiti. nihyreṇasaṃ cādhiḡavehana āsmāc charirāt samutthāya param jyotiḥ upasam-padya scena rūpeṇabhinīspadyate, attamah parvāsaḥ to bhavati iti nirvāṇam ity ucyate*”.

The influence of Sāṃkhya-Yōga, noticeable in the Bhāradvā-jayvṛttibhāṣya, is seen very clearly in the comments on the sūtras I, 1, 1 & 5: here we find mentioned the three guṇas of the Sāṃkhya, the *acyakta*, the *pradhāna*, the *puruṣa*, the *ahamkāra* &c.

Yet the Sāṃkhya, followed by our author, does not seem to be identical with the system, described by GARBE and OLTRAMARE. It is rather a synthesis of Vedānta and Sāṃkhya-Yōga, as already found in the Bhagavadgītā or in the more recent Ćivaite systems. For instance the sūtra, stating the unity of all souls (Bibl. Ind. Ed. III, 2, 19) is taken by ĆAMKARA MIĆRA as a pūrvapakṣa-thesis (i. e. as a thesis which belongs to an antagonistic system and should be refuted), ignored by PRAĆASTAPADA, but accepted by the Bhāradvājayvṛttibhāṣya-kāra as a siddhānta-thesis.

NOTE to 5. — In order to compare the two recensions of the Darṣana given by the Bibliotheca Indica edition and the Berhampore edition I have made up the plan of the recension, given in the Berhampore edition: this may be summarised in the following way:

- a. Categories in general (book I);
- b. The five first substances with their qualities, belonging to the first group. — The four last substances (book II, III and IV āhn. 1);
- c. The organic bodies (a part of book IV āhn. 2);
- d. Some of the qualities of the second group: conjunction, disjunction, farness and nearness (rest of book IV āhn. 2);
- e. Inherence (one of the last sūtras of the same āhnika);
- f. *Dharma* and the concatenation of the psychological states (book V āhn. 1);
- g. Some of the qualities of the second group: oneness and individuality (the two first sūtras of book V āhn. 2);
- h. The movements of water &c. and the internal organ, (a part of the same āhnika);
- i. The perception of the qualities, forming the first group (same āhn. 3).

*j.* Movement in general; movements of earth and water (same āhn.);

*k.* Dharma (book VI);

*l.* Qualities belonging to the first group (the first five sūtras of book VII āhn. 1):

*m.* Qualities belonging to the second group, with the exception of conjunction and disjunction (rest of the same āhnika of book VII):

*n.* Qualities of the third group.

So we see that the discussions: on the qualities of the first group (letter *i* and *l*), on the qualities of the second group (*d*, *g* and *m*), on *dharmā* (*f* and *k*), on movement (*h* and *j*) are given in scattered fragments. Moreover the two pieces which deal with movement, are placed in wrong order. Finally we may notice that the two recensions correspond most completely in the two first and the three last books. On the whole the arrangement is much, much simpler in the Upaskāra- than in the Bhāradvājavṛtti-recension. We can indeed attribute no authenticity to the latter recension.

Finally I should like to mention the following facts:

the deviations are often small in comparison with the words, but important as far as the meaning is concerned: f. i. omission or addition of a negative particle or alpha privans,

it often happened that sūtras which were connected in meaning, got separated, while on the other hand, those which treated different subjects still remained close together,

the books at the beginning and at the end have remained better preserved than those in the middle,

sūtra III, 2, 10 Bibl. Ind. Ed. „*gadi dṛṣṭam anarakṣam . . .*” has become „*gaddṛṣṭam annam . . .*”, an absurd reading which can only be the consequence of mechanical, hasty memorising.

NOTE to 6. — The following facts are of importance for fixing the date of the Bhāradvājavṛtti-bhāṣya and at the same time show the untrustworthiness of the Sutra-text contained in it:

Vaiç. Sūtra (Berh. ed.) I, 2, 3 is (almost) identical with Praç. Bhāṣya book I chapter 2 § 6. It contains a definition of *samavāya*. As the original definition of *samavāya* occurs elsewhere (Vaiç. Sūtra Bibl. Ind. ed. VII, 2, 26 = Berh. ed. IV, 2, 20) the so-called sūtra of the Berhampore edition is very probably copied from the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya.

Vaiç. Sūtra (Berh. ed.) VI, 2, 5 resembles closely the beginning of ÇAMKARA MIÇRA's comments on VI, 2, 4. Further this fourth sūtra itself did not, very likely, exist in Praçastapāda's time; at least this author mentions nowhere the term *bhāva* in the meaning

required in the compound *bhāradvāja* (see e. g. Praç. bhāṣya book III chapter 2 § 55 and 56; Viz. edition p. 272 and 280).

Vaiç. Sātra (Berh. ed.) X, 2, 6 is a wrong reading of the sātra which occurs in the Bibl. Ind. edition as X, 2, 6 together with a wrong reading of Çamkara Miçra's comment on it.

Thus it is even probable that the Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya is of more recent date than Çamkara Miçra's Upaskāra.

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## CHAPTER III.

### ANALYSIS OF THE NYĀYA SŪTRA. RELATION BETWEEN THE NYĀYA AND VAIÇEŚIKA.

#### § 1. *Introductory remark.*

I have limited my study of the Nyāya to the Sūtra and VĪCĀNĀTHA'S Vṛtti. For though the latter work is of recent origin, yet it is much more concise than the older commentaries, Nyāya-bhāṣya &c. Moreover, the translations of fragments of the Vṛtti by BALLANTYNE has provided us with an easy introduction. As the study of the Nyāya is only subsidiary to my main study, namely that of the Vaiçeśika in its oldest form, I think I am fully justified in my limitation of study. Besides, the shortcomings which will probably result from using this recent source, can afterwards be easily corrected, when the translation, undertaken by GAṆGĀNĀTHA JIĀ in the periodical Indian Thought, is completed.

The same remark which I have had to make in reference to Kaṇāda's Sūtras, must be repeated here. In the present case too we cannot quite rely on the correctness of the tradition. This is clearly proved by the fact: that Nyāya-bhāṣya and Vṛtti often differ in the reading and number of the sūtras. Often enough VĪCĀNĀTHA himself informs us that we have no means for deciding whether a formula is to be considered as an original sūtra or as a clause, taken from the Bhāṣya. The subject has been investigated by WINDISCH, to whom I refer for further information.

But even where both the Vṛtti- and Nyāyabhāṣya-editions agree in the reading of a sūtra, the possibility of a fault is not excluded. An example of this is afforded by sūtra I, 1, 24, which has been translated by Ballantyne as follows:

„What thing having set before one, one proceeds to act — *that* [thing] is the motive [of the action].”

Now it is clear from the context that this cannot have been

the meaning of the word *prajojana*, intended by the author in his list of *padārthas* (topics). The term precedent is *saṃvaya*, those which follow *dṛṣṭānta* and *siddhānta*: all these terms do not apply to action, but to argumentation. In starting a dispute, we must have a doubt in reference to a certain point: the discussion must have a certain interest or importance for us *prajojana*: in trying to solve the doubt we first examine the data of perception and then try to bring forward inferential proofs for the thesis upheld &c. This meaning of *prajojana* as „interest, importance of a discussion“ often occurs in philosophical authors of different times. Owing to a slip of the memory a wrong definition of *prajojana*, belonging to the investigation of action, has crept in here and caused the original sūtra to be forgotten.

As a preparation for the following short analysis of the Nyāya-Sūtra, I have composed a table of contents with the help of Viśvanātha's Vṛtti and the edition of 1828. This table is given here, in book IV section VI.

Besides this table of contents we have another means for analysing the Nyāya-darśana in some of its first sūtras. They run as follows:

1, 1, 1. *Pramāṇa-prameya-saṃvaya-prajojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhānta-vagava-tarka-nirvaya-vāda-jalpa-vitāṇḍā-hetvābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigraha-sthānāṃ tattejñānān nibhreyasūdhigamah.*

1, 1, 2. *Duhkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāṇe tatlanantarāpāṇād apavargah.*

1, 1, 3. *Pratyakṣānupamānāpabhūtāḥ pramāṇāni.*

1, 1, 9. *Āma-carire'ndriyā'rttha-bodhi-mānah-pravṛtti-doṣa-pretyabhāva-phala-duḥkhā-paravṛtāḥ tu prameyam.*

We may describe the subject-matter of these sūtras as: the sixteen topics of the Nyāya-darśana; the order of the steps towards beatitude; the four sources of trustworthy knowledge; the list of *prameyas*.

§ 2. *Comments on N. S. I. 1, 1, the topics of the five adhyāyas.*

In regard to the sixteen topics (sūtra I, 1, 1) we may state that the first: „*pramāṇa*“ forms the subject-matter of a separate book, scil. book II; that the second: „*prameya*“ has been discussed in two complete books: no. III & IV. On the other hand the topics 3—9 are only treated of in the first lesson of book I itself; the author does not return to it anymore. The topics 10—16 form the subject-matter of the second lesson of the first book: but the very last book (no V) dwells extensively on the last items, *jāti* & *nigraha-sthāna*.

§ 3. *Comments on N. S. I. 1, 2 and I. 1. 1, 9; the topics of the fourth adhigāya, the concatenation of psychological states.*

In regard to sūtra I. 1, 2 it is very remarkable that it reminds us of the last six „*prameyas*” of sūtra I. 1, 9 and consequently of book IV, which treats of these six *prameyas* with the addition of *tattvajñāna*. In order to make the comparison easier, I have put the two series in the form of two columns, inverting however the order of the terms, mentioned in sūtra I. 1, 2:

Sūtra I. 1, 2.	1. apavargah	Sūtra I. 1, 9.	1. pravṛttili
	2. mithyājñānam		2. doṣāḥ
	3. doṣāḥ		3. pretyabhāvaḥ
	4. pravṛttili		4. phalaṃ
	5. jama		5. duḥkham
	6. duḥkham		6. apavargah
			7. tattvajñānam.

It is clear that both series are to be divided into two groups; one group which describes *samsāra*, another group which describes liberation. In both series it is taught that liberation is obtained by right knowledge, or (which means the same thing) by the destruction of wrong knowledge. The two other groups correspond with each other in only mentioning *duḥkha*, (but in fact implying *sukha* as well), in mentioning *doṣāḥ* (but leaving out the contrary of it). As *phala* is identical with *duḥkha* and *sukha*, the omission of *phala* in the first series can scarcely be called a deviation. There is, however, a difference of more importance: in the first series *doṣāḥ* is mentioned before *pravṛtti*, in the second between *pravṛtti* and *pretyabhāva*. Now in sūtra I. 1, 5 *doṣāḥ* are defined (in BALLANTYNE'S translation) as follows:

„Faults (or failings) have the characteristic that they cause activity”.

This definition, then, is in accordance with our first series. Ergo, there is a greater probability that the order of this series is the original one. But how should we translate this word *doṣāḥ*? Ballantyne gives as English equivalent: *fault* or *ailing*. It is not quite clear, how faults particularly should be called causes of activity: *doṣāḥ*, therefore (I am inclined to surmise), did not mean *adharma* (and implicitly *adharma*); but it is a Pāli word, meaning *droṣa* (and by implication: *icchā*, desire or love). In other words the description of the *samsāra*, as given in I. 1, 2, is badly translated

from a Prākṛt dialect into Sanskrit. Afterwards the equivalence of *doṣa* to *dveṣa* was not felt anymore. *Doṣa* was put in the plural and considered more or less as a synonym of *adharma* with the inclusion of *dharma* and placed after *prācīti*.

§ 4. *Comments on N. S. I, 1, 3 and the topics of the second adhyāya;  
the discussion on pramāṇa.*

We have already noticed in our discussion of sūtra I, 1, 1, that the *pramāṇas*, which are divided into four kinds by sūtra I, 1, 3, are treated of in book II. If we look more closely at the table of contents of this book, it will strike us, that really the first lesson contains the discussion of the whole topic and that the second lesson is evidently a later addition: besides the long discussions bestowed here upon the meaning of word, clearly show the influence of exegetic interests, in other words of doctrines and investigations as we find embodied in the Pārvamīmāṃsā.

§ 5. *Comments on I, 1, 9, and the topics of the third adhyāya.*

The six first *pramāṇas* summed up by Sūtra I, 1, 9, form the groundwork for book III. We might call this book an explanation of „special science“, of psychology and physics. Psychology is the doctrine of *ātman*, sūtra III, 1, 1—27; III, 2, 1—58 & *manas* III, 2, 59—62; physics is divided into the discussions of body, sense-organs and objects. This threefold division is the same as the one, accepted by the Vaiśeṣika-system (see here book IV section III, table of contents of Praṣastapāda-bhāṣya Bk. II Ch. 2 § 2—5). In the second lesson of book III the author of the Nyāya-Sūtra reverts again to psychology, in as far as he treats fully of knowledge as a quality of soul.

§ 6. *Results arrived at.*

We may summarise the results, arrived at in the foregoing pages as follows: the Nyāya-Sūtra is made up of different pieces which were first conceived as distinct compositions. The fifth book with its insignificant and scholastic explanations of *jāti* & *nirgrahasthāna* is certainly a recent addition and when we omit it, we gain a suitable ending for the whole book: an explanation of the attainment of liberation.

The first four books have each their own special subject. These topics are respectively.

1.  $\alpha$  rules for scientific dispute, grouped round the notions: doubt, importance (of research), data of perception, data of inference, the members of the syllogistic inference, confutation (*reductio ad absurdum*), the ascertainment of the results (I, 1, 23—49). —  
 2. principal procedures which practically occur in debate, and specially the tricks of eristic dispute (I, 2).

3. a theory of the four sources of trustworthy knowledge in general II, 1; the fourth source: verbal authority, in detail II, 2.

4. the doctrine of *ātman* and the discussion of the three forms of physical nature: body, sense-organ and material thing (III, 1); discussion of intellect (III, 2).

5. the description of *saṃsāra* & liberation (IV, 1 & 2).

It cannot be denied that this arrangement is natural and logical: first elementary rules of debate are given, then a scientific discussion on the sources of knowledge, then a treatment of science itself, principally psychology, and lastly an application of this psychological science to ethical problems: the means of the attainment of liberation.

On the other hand jarring contradictions remain: liberation is really not so much the result of the knowledge of the sixteen *padārthas*, mentioned in I, 1, 1, as the outcome of the knowledge of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, which latter category contains the theoretical notions: *ātman* &c. and the practical notions *doṣa*, *prapñcī* &c. Another salient contradiction is the twofold formulation of *saṃsāra* and liberation in I, 1, 2 and I, 1, 9 (or book IV).

The books differ greatly in style and exposition. The first book principally consists of definitions and short explanations; the second book introduces a form of exposition which reminds us strongly of the Mīmāṃsā-works: first a doubt is formulated, then there is a short dialogue between a defendent of the *siddhānta* (the thesis supposed to be proved by the system) and an opponent, so carried on that the defendent has always the last word. The third and fourth books show the same form of exposition, but at the same time indulge more and more in long polemical egressions.

Although there is more coherence in the composition of the Nyāya-Sūtra than in that of the Vaiṣeṣika-Sūtra, still the facts, mentioned, allow us to draw the conclusion: that the Sūtratext of the Nyāya has similarly been, not the work of one author, but of a school.

§ 7. *Nyāya and Vaiṣeṣika compared.*

As we have seen in the foregoing chapter there is more agreement than difference in the dogmata of the Vaiṣeṣika and the Nyāya. So both systems deny the hypostasis of *buddhi* and declare it to be a quality of *ātman*: both accept the division of the physical world into object (*artha*), sense-organ (*indriya*) and body (*garha*), both sum up the same psychical qualities. Yet notwithstanding this concordance in thought the two systems form a strong contrast in their mental attitude. The classification of the categories, the distinction of the five elements, the theory of causality, the characterisation of the categories and their subdivisions, all these topics show a theoretically interested mind. The Nyāya-system, however, in its main features, agrees with the mental disposition, generally found in India: it principally aims at an exposition of the means enabling man to attain the summum bonum (so specially Nyāya Sūtra book III and IV): compared with which practical (or ethical) problem the two other questions, which are the forms of scientific dispute (book I) and which is the value of verbal authority (book II), are only secondary.

Whereas the Vaiṣeṣika characterises the physical elements, soul, &c. in order to arrive at a satisfactory classification and system of definitions, the original Nyāya distinguishes soul from body and sense-organs for the purport of explaining the road to liberation.

But the Nyāya does not only differ from the Vaiṣeṣika in its main interest, but also in the two following subsidiary questions. For whereas the Vaiṣeṣika Sūtra, by showing greater interest in the objects, has treated *anumāna* principally with reference to the indicative mark or probans — this theory forms the *svārthan anumānam* of syncretic Vaiṣeṣika-Nyāya; — the original Nyāya has given a theory of the propositions, used in argumentation — the *parārthan anumānam* of the syncretic system. And whereas in the Vaiṣeṣika Darśana, only a few sūtras, of later origin, are bestowed on the relation between word and meaning, a whole āhnikā in the Nyāya-sūtra is devoted to this question. This āhnikā (II, 2) declares verbal authority to be a separate *pramāṇa*, and words to be not eternal, but transient, and it finally examines whether words bear on individual things or on genera. The same question is raised in the Parva-mīmāṃsā, though answered differently. Still we are allowed to connect both systems in this respect and to consider them as the outcome of the same sacerdotal interest.

Already BARTHÉLÉMY DE ST.-HILAIRE in his *Mémoire* has charac-

terised the logic of the Nyāya as a theory of dispute. Besides Buddhistic sources have taught us the importance of debates in India, and already the Upaniṣads have vividly described the animosity exhibited at such occasions. The want of a manual for debate was therefore soon felt.

The influence of love for dispute on scientific thought is well known from the history of Greek philosophy. Originally scientific thought was here predominantly directed on the examination of nature. This, so called Ionic philosophy made, however, room for interest in psychical, moral and social questions at the time of the sophists. By these thinkers philosophy was brought unto the homes and hearths of man. As WINDLBBAND suggests, the cause of this change were the political evolutions of Greece, where the old tyrannies had been forced aside by democracies, by constitutions in which mob and demagogues had the greatest influence. He who strove for success in a political career, needed training in the art of oratory. The scientific means, necessary for the perfecting of this art, were offered by the sophists, who thus were the founders of moral science, of logic, grammar and rhetoric, of psychology and ethics. Sacerdotal ambition and jealousy have accomplished in India, what free civil life has done in Greece. And in the same way as the sophists have founded the study of syntax and logic, so have the priests of India, the singers and reciters of the old Vedic hymns and interpreters of sacred lore, laid down the principles of phonetics, grammar and exegesis.

## APPENDIX I.

### *The theories of the ten acayas & the factors necessary for the understanding of a sentence.*

I shall now turn to two questions of less importance: the theory of the ten *acayas* and the notions *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *samanidhi* which are discussed by syncretic Vaiçṣika-Nyāya in the chapter on verbal authority.

In N. S. I. 1, 32 five members of an inference are mentioned: 1. *pratijñā* (promise, i. e. thesis to be proved), 2. *hetau* (reason), 3. *udāharana* (example — originally positive example — on which the 'reason' is founded), 4. *upanaya* (application of the general rule to the special case, mentioned in the promise), 5. *nigamana* (conclusion). In the gloss to this sūtra the Bhāṣya mentions that



some Naiyāyikas insert five other *arāhātās* before them: *jijñāsa*, *samāyoga*, *śakyaṃvāpiti*, *pragajñāna*, *śaśāsa* i. e. 1. the wish to know, 2. doubt, 3. the insight that the proof is possible, 4. the interest in the examination, 5. the removal of the doubt. It is worth noticing: that two of these five members are already found in N. S. I. 1, 1—*samāyoga* and *pragajñāna*<sup>1</sup>, that it is the rule in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā works to state first the existence of a difficulty before entering upon the discussion and that all Indian philosophical authors are accustomed to explain the aim *pragajñāna* of their book immediately at the beginning. In short the members, added by some Naiyāyikas, show the correctness of BARNHARTMAN DE ST.-HILAIRE'S view that the Nyāya may be called in some respects a manual of debate.

What has struck me in the theory of verbal authority is, that the factors necessary for the understanding of a sentence, are treated in all syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, but left unmentioned in the Nyāya-sūtra. As I shall prove in the next chapter that these notions have been first used by the Mīmāṃsakas, I consider this as a proof for the historical connection which existed between Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya and the philosophical part of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā.

## APPENDIX II.

### *The polemical passage N. S. IV, 2, 4—37.*

Finally I should like to add a few observations on a polemical passage directed against the Buddhists, namely N. S. IV, 2, 4-37.

According to VIJAYANĀTHA PAŚCĀYANA, Gotama has attacked here the Vijnāna-vādins. If this were true, then the Nyāya-sūtra „must be later than the fifth century A.D.” JACOBI, J.A.O.S., XXXI p. 2

In order to decide whether this traditional interpretation is right, JACOBI has examined N. S. IV second āhnikā together with its oldest commentaries. Of this āhnikā and VAISYAYANA'S Bhāṣya he gives the following analysis:

[A. — IV, 2, 1—17]. „First comes the problem of the whole and its parts. The adherents of Nyāya and Vaiśe-

<sup>1</sup> Originally the series of I. 1, 1 may have begun with *samāyoga*, the topics *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇya* were added when book II (*pramāṇa*), books III & IV (*pramāṇya*) and book I (theory of dispute) were put together into one Darśana.

śika: maintain that the whole is something different (*arthāntara*) from the parts in which it 'inheres', an opinion which is strongly combated by other philosophers. Connected with this problem is the atomic theory which is discussed in 14 ff.

[B. — IV, 2, 18 — 25]. „After sūtra 17 Vātsyāyana introduces an opponent, 'a denier of perception, who thinks that everything is non-existent'. There can be no doubt that an adherent of the Ājīvika-vāda is meant. He attacks the atomic theory.... and is refuted thus: 'as your arguments would lead us to admit a *regressus in infinitum* (by acknowledging unlimited divisibility) and as a *regressus in infinitum* is inconsistent with sound reason, your objection is not valid'.

[C. — IV, 2, 26 — 37]

[a. 26. Pūrvapakṣa] „Vātsyāyana... continues: '[An opponent objects]: what you say with regard to notions, that their objects are really existing things, [that cannot be proved]. These notions are intrinsically erroneous....' The argument of this opponent .... runs thus: 'if we analyse things we do not [arrive at] perceiving their true nature (or essence: this not-perceiving is just as, when we take away the single threads (of a cloth), we do not perceive an existing thing [that is called] the cloth.

[b. 27 — 30 Siddhānta] „Sūtras 27 and 28 contain the counter-argument, and sūtra 29 adds to them the following. 'and because by right perception we come to know things'... Sūtra 30 gives a proof for this view... Vātsyāyana explains. „If there is proof, *pramāṇa*, [in favour of the proposition] that nothing exists, [the proposition that] nothing exists, sublates the [existence of] proof as well. And if there is no proof for it, how can it be established that nothing exists?...'

[JACOBI adds: „Here it is quite clear that the opponent whom VĀTSYĀYANA refutes is a *śūnyavādin* just as in sūtra 17. For there is no indication that Vātsyāyana in the mean time has changed front, and that the opponent in sūtra 26 is not a Ājīvika-vādin, but a Vijnānavādin. The latter contends that external things do not exist, while Vātsyāyana (on 27) makes his opponent uphold *sarvabhāvānām yāthārtamānupalabdhiḥ*. Moreover, this opponent maintains that notions about things are erroneous, and this is primarily the view of the Ājīvika-vāda. The fundamental principle of the Vijnānavāda is that ideas

only *pramāṇa* are really existent, and not that they are erroneous ideas”.

[c. 31—32. Pārvaṇakṣa]. „Like the erroneous belief in the objects seen in a dream, is this belief in the means of true knowledge and the things known through them, erroneous”. „Or like magic, *fata morgana* and mirage”.

[JACOBI remarks: „As this argument serves to demonstrate that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are an illusion, it is evident that the opponent is a Cānyavāda”.

[d. 33. Siddhānta]. „The next sūtra 33 answers this objection, in pointing out that he has established nothing, as he has given no reason for declaring :1 that the belief in *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is like that in objects seen in a dream and not like the perception of objects in the waking state. 2 that in a dream non-existing things are perceived.”

„This argument of the sūtra is supplemented in the Bhāṣya by another formulated in what looks like a *cāṭṭika*: it comes to this: If you say that things seen in a dream do not exist because they are no more seen in the waking state, you must admit that those seen in the waking state do exist: for the force of an argument is seen in the contrary case, viz. that things exist because they are seen.”

JACOBI'S conclusion: „To sum up: our investigation has proved that neither the Sūtra nor the Bhāṣya refer to the Vijñānavāda, and that the whole discussion is perfectly intelligible if we consider it as meant to refute the Cānyavāda”.

I left out in these quotations those passages where JACOBI shows that and Vācaspatiṃśra (p. 11) and Uddyotakara (p. 12) have mis-interpreted the sūtras discussed.

As to the term *caṇyavāda*, used by JACOBI, we must notice that it is applied in a wider sense by MAHĀYĀNA ACĀRYA. In the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha namely *sarva-caṇyavāda* refers to the Mādhyamikas and *bāhya-caṇyavāda* to the Vijñānavādins, so that the term *caṇyavāda* embraces both sects.

For the rest I want to express my complete agreement with JACOBI'S argumentation and my admiration for the clear way in which he has explained the historical relation between the (Sarva-)cānyavāda and the Vijñānavāda on the first pages of his article.

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## CHAPTER IV. SOURCES OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE OTHER SCHOOLS.

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### SECTION I.

#### THE PŪVA-MĪMAṂSĀ.

##### § 1. *Introductory remarks.*

PAUL DEUSSEN in his *Geschichte der Philosophie* I, III, anno 1908, p. 391, mentions principally THIBAUT's edition of the *Arthasaṃgraha* (1882) as an introduction to the study of the Mīmāṃsā. Indeed, this text and in no less a degree, the introduction and the translation of the editor, are a great help for the beginner. But on the other hand it gives an insight only into the technical-methodical side of this dāṛṣana. Philosophical questions are not entered upon at all in this treatise, and yet some of the Mīmāṃsaka works are very interesting for our purport, specially as the philosophical parts of the Mīmāṃsā are closely cognate to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Even a great number of the ślokaś, quoted in CRIDHARA'S *Nyāya-kandali* are taken from KUMARILA'S *Śloka-vārttika*. A thorough knowledge of the Mīmāṃsā-system will, no doubt, give many a solution to present difficulties in the more recent Vaiśeṣika writings.

Fortunately in the translations and studies of Pandit GAN-  
GAXATHA JHA we now possess very able preparatory work. His complete translation of the *Śloka-vārttika* (1907) is accompanied by a very full table of contents and a handy alphabetical index. Moreover, in the *Indian Thought* (volume II) he has given a systematical account of the Mīmāṃsā according to both the Bhāṭṭa- and Prabhākara-schools, so that the most toilsome part of the study has been done and full attention can be given to the philological research concerning the composition of the most important texts and the internal history of the school. Here I myself have to

abstain from this task and shall merely give a few notes which may be useful with regard to my own main subject.

The Mīmāṃsā-Darṣana is divided into twelve books. Their contents are summed up by Mādhyava Ācārya in his Sarva-darṣana-saṅgraha and in his Nyāya-mālā-vistara (cf. moreover Paul Deussen l. l., p. 391). Most of the books are divided into four pādas, excepted the third, sixth and tenth book which contain eight pādas.

ÇABARA-SVĀMIN wrote a commentary on the Mīmāṃsā-darṣana: this is published in the Bibliotheca Indica: a translation of it has been begun by GAṄGANĀTHA JHĀ in the first volume of Indian Thought, but has been left discontinued.

KUMĀRILA-BHAṬṬA again wrote a gloss on Çabarasvāmin's work. This explanation of Kumārila's is divided into three parts: 1. the Ālokavārttika containing a commentary on the first pāda of the first book of the Darṣana: 2. the Tantravārttika explaining the rest of the first book and all of the second and third: 3. the Tūptikā which contains only brief notes upon the remaining adhyāyas.

### § 2. *Kumārila-Bhaṭṭa's Tūptikā & Tantravārttika.*

The Tūptikā has only value for ritualistic research. The same holds good for the greater part of the Tantra-vārttika: yet a few adhikaraṇas in it have a wider importance: f. i.:

the speculation on *grammar* (gloss on Mīm.-Darṣ. I, 3 adhikaraṇa 9, text p. 190 sūtra 15 &c. = translation p. 259 sūtra 24 &c.);

on the *meaning of words* in Vedic and ordinary parlance, on the *denotation of a word* consisting in class or form (gloss on Mīm.-Darṣ. I, 3 adhikaraṇa 10, text p. 242 sūtra 26 &c. = p. 323 sūtra 30 &c. of the translation);

on *apūrva* as the result of a sacrifice (gloss on Mīm.-Darṣ. II, 1 adhikaraṇa 2, text p. 359 sūtra 5 &c. = translation p. 496 sūtra 5 &c.);

on *exegetical principles*: the principle of syntactical connection, the principle of syntactical split, the principle of elliptical extension (gloss on Mīm.-Darṣ. II, 1, adhikaraṇa 16—19, text p. 423 sūtra 46 &c. = translation p. 582 sūtra 16 &c.)

### § 3. *The composition of the Āloka-vārttika. The polemical passage in the comments on M.S. I, 1, 4 & 5.*

In order to explain the composition of the Ālokavārttika, we have first to pay some attention to the Mīmāṃsā-Darṣana book I, pāda 1, of which it is the commentary. This pāda consists of 32

sūtras: their distribution over the different adhikaraṇas in the *Chokavārttika* (Gāṅgānātha Jhā's translation) is as follows:

adhik.	sūtra	title of the adhikaraṇa in GANGA- SĀTHA JHĀ's translation . . . . .	page ibidem
1	1	Subject of the treatise . . . . .	1
2	2	Definition of <i>dharma</i> . . . . .	21
3	3	Definition of the subject-matter . .	67
4	4	Sense-perception not the means of knowing <i>dharma</i> . . . . .	68
5	5	Authoritativeness of injunction . .	113
6	6—23	On the eternality of words . . . . .	109
7	24—26	On sentence . . . . .	186
8	27—32	The Veda not the work of an author .	553—555

Thus the first five sūtras have been each considered as a separate adhikaraṇa by ĀBĀRA-SVĀMIN and KUMĀRILA, and the comments by the last mentioned author, take up 408 pages in Gāṅgānātha Jhā's translation, whereas the remaining adhikaraṇas are treated of in 117 pages. So we see that Ābāra-svāmin and Kumāṇila-Bhāṭṭa have principally used their comments on the first five sūtras for the introducing of new ideas into the system. As we shall see, these additions principally concern philosophical questions. I should, therefore, like to consider here these first five adhikaraṇas a little more in detail.

A mere glance at the table of contents which Gāṅgānātha Jhā has given of these five adhikaraṇas, is sufficient to show what little order there is in the whole composition. And indeed we cannot expect anything else in scientific works, composed in the way, adopted by Indian scholiasts. Instead of finding a direct expression for their thoughts they preferred to press their theories into the form of glosses on ancient works of renown and authenticity. A suitable place could not be found for every new thought, and so egressions after egressions, and even egressions within egressions were the consequence. Now this form of composition is attractive in fable literature, but in scientific exposition it only leads to hopeless confusion.

Under the heading 'Definition of dharma' (Sūtra 2) we find discussions of the following kinds: Refutation of the theory of the extraneous character of authoritativeness; The falsity of a conception explained; Inference and sense-perception not applicable to objects in the future; The Buddhistic scriptures are false, because composed by humane beings; Utilitarian theory of virtue not tenable, nor the 'conscience' theory &c.

Under the heading: „Sense-perception not the means of knowing *dharma*” sūtra 1: we meet with a series of discussions on the *pramāṇas*, each of these discussions leading to a great number of digressions, I. i.:

(A) sense-perception (why sense-perception is not applicable to *dharma*).

B) inference preceded by sense-perception, not applicable to *dharma*, analogy or *upamāna* and apparent inconsistency or *arthāpatti* inference is based upon sense-perception: abstract or vague perception, how made concrete; *samavāya*; the number of senses (only five):

(C) cognition of objects independent of verbal expression imposition of the form of the word on the object is impossible, the relationship between words and objects is eternal, the factors of memory and perception explained.

The greatest number of egressions, however, is inserted after sūtra 5: authoritativeness of injunction. The comments of this sūtra are divided into 18 sections, in reference to which we may make the following observations: only section 1 comments on sūtra 5, but already section 2 contains the beginning of a new comment on sūtra 1<sup>1</sup>). The remaining sections can be divided into four groups:

A). Refutation of two Buddhistic doctrines: the *Nirvāṇa-vāda* 3 and the *Cārya-vāda* 4: since the following group B is parallel with the middle of the comments on sūtra 1, we must look upon this discussion of Buddhism and this defence of philosophical realism as a demonstration of the trustworthiness of perception, thus as parallel with the beginning of those comments on sūtra 4.

B). A theory of the *pramāṇas* (with the exception of *pratyakṣa*): inference (5), words (6), analogy (7), *arthāpatti* (8), negation (9). This group of sections runs parallel with the middle of the comments on sūtra 4: namely with its discussions on inference, analogy and *arthāpatti*.

C). A series of sections, the first of which bears the same title as the last, and the second as the last but one, whilst those in the middle discuss questions which have to do with words and the *genera* expressed by words. As the Buddhists according to their saying: *sarvaśca svalakṣyaṭvā* or *sarvāṇi pṛthak*, deny the reality of the *genera*, therefore a great portion of these sections too is directed against this sect, namely against the *apoha*-theory. The titles of these sections are as follows: 10 on *vibhakti*; 11 on *sambhavadhātukṣepa*; 12 on

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Appendix II of this chapter, p. 63.



*sphoṭa*, 13 on *ākṣa*; 14 on *apoha*; 15 *śābhaadhāḥśeṣa-parāṇibhāṣa*; 17 *citrāḥśeṣapāṇibhāṣa*. This group of sections may be compared with the end of the comment on sūtra 1.

D' *Itarāṇibhāṣa*. In this part, formed by one section, we find e. g. the following topics: the 'series' of ideas as held by the Bauddhas not tenable; it is not possible for mere 'ideas' to transfer themselves into another body at rebirth: motion is not the only form of action against the Vaiśeṣikas; the Vaiśeṣika arguments for the existence of soul put forward; these arguments refuted by the Bauddhas; the knower cannot be a mere idea; the soul is self-luminous.

Now I should like to consider first the third group C' of these sections more fully.

The sections 10 and 17, both dealing with the *citrā*-sacrifice, are related to each other in such a way that the first contains the *pārcapākṣa* and the second the *uttarapākṣa*.

The sections 11 and 16 both deal on *śābhaadhāḥśeṣa*, i. e. they refute the denial of a fixed relation between word and meaning. These sections are not related as *pārcapākṣa* and *uttarapākṣa* to each other, for section 11 contains both *pākṣas* together. The reason for again bringing forward the same topic is given on p. 349 (translation kārikā 10: „Thereby it must be admitted that the [treatment of 'relation' leaving been interrupted by a consideration of the nature of the denotation of words [in the chapters on *sphoṭa* &c.] it is again brought forward with a view to the consideration of the question of its eternality or non-eternality." From this eternality the author is led on to discuss several other questions: f. i.: the world could have had no beginning in time: no personal creator of the world possible: the bondage of souls not due to any actions lying latent in themselves, knowledge cannot be the cause of deliverance: the nature of deliverance: the existence of a Creator is as untenable as that of an Omniscient Person: process of comprehending the meaning of a word.

The middle sections of this third group all contain subjects cognate with the question: what is the relation between word and meaning; they are, as has been already noticed, directed against the Buddhistic theory of *apoha* and the correlate denial of generality *ākṣa*, here used in the sense of *jāti* or *sāmānya*. The discussion of the general meaning of the „word“ naturally leads on the author to explain the origin and meaning of collective nouns as „*śābha*“. In two directions this explanation is carried out, first by discussing the question in how far an *individual*, belonging to a certain class, f. i. a cow, is *characterised by its parts* the wood

by its trees, then by comparing the relation between a *species* and the *individuals* to the relation between a *collection* (wood) and its *members* (trees).

As to the second group B<sup>2</sup> of these sections we may notice that the list of *pramāṇas* is increased by the addition of 'negation' *abhāva*, not mentioned by Kumāṛila in his comments under sūtra 4: further that *cahda* is not only treated in group C, but already in B, namely in section 6 where the question is raised: is *cahda* a separate *pramāṇa* or is it [as the Vaīceśikas maintain] only a kind of inference? On the other hand in the sections, belonging to group C the relation between word and meaning is examined in detail.

As to the first portion A<sup>1</sup>, dealing with the *nirālamhana-vāda* and the *gūṇa-vāda*, I shall return to them in Appendix II of this section.

#### § 1. *The historical relation between Vaīceśika & Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.*

As mentioned before, the works of KUMĀRILA are of great importance for the interpretation of the Nyāya-kandali, partly because ĆRĪDHARA argues against Kumāṛila himself, partly because he uses the same arguments as this Mīmāṃsā-teacher, when pole-mising against Buddhism. But the knowledge of the Ćloka- and Tantra-vārttika avails little, when we confine ourselves to the explanation of the Vaīceśika Sūtra and Bhāṣya. Here the standpoint is naive realism. It had not yet occurred to KAXĀDA and PRAĀS-TAPĀDA to prove the existence of the outer world as Kumāṛila and Ćrīdhara have done. They still took the existence of the outer world as a fact not needing any deliberation. Neither was the existence of soul a question of difficulty for them. It is clear that Buddhism had not yet then reached that philosophical depth which made it a dangerous opponent for faithful Brāhmanas like Kumāṛila and Ćrīdhara.

But the influence of Vaīceśika-Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā on each other has been much more intense than may be thought from the just given sketch of Kumāṛila's work. This is evident to any one who consults the meritorious description which GAṄGĀNĀTHA JIĀ has given of *The Prābhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, with the help of abundant material. This study originally appeared in the periodical Indian Thought and was separately published at Allahabad 1911. It contains three chapters. The first gives historical information about KUMĀRILA and PRĀBHĀKARA.

The second chapter of this study, called Psychology and Metaphysics, gives 1. a discussion on cognition in general, on the five

*śāntatīkā* perception, inference, verbal cognition, analogy and presumption, then 2, discusses soul, internal organ and their relation to body and sense-organs, 3, describes liberation and retutes the proofs given for God's existence; 4, discusses the categories and their subdivisions. So we see that here all the topics, found in the Vaiśeṣika system, are discussed. 1. logic (cf. here book II chapter VI), 2. psychology (II ch. V) and a part of physics (II ch. III), 3. ethics and theology (II ch. VII), 4. metaphysics (II ch. II) and physics together with mathematical notions (II ch. IV). And he who compares the contents of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya with Gaṅgānātha Jhā's description of the Mīmāṃsā, will be struck by the many details with respect to which the philosophical part of the Mīmāṃsā answers — either positively or negatively — to the two systems mentioned. One example, taken without preference, may illustrate this.

At p. 88 of Gaṅgānātha Jhā's book we come across the following passage: „The *padārthas*, according to Prabhākara, are: 1. *dravya* or substance, 2. *guṇa* or quality, 3. *karma* or action, 4. *sāmānyā* or generality, 5. *paratantratā* subsistence or inherence, 6. *śakti* or force, 7. *sādhya* or similarity and 8. *sankhyā* or number.” [NOTE: The source of this information is a ‘comparatively recent work’ sc. the *Sarvasiddhāntarahasya*].

Five of these *padārthas* form part of the category-table of the Vaiśeṣikas: substance, quality, action, generality and inherence — called in the one system *sāmānyā*, in the other *paratantratā*. The reason why ‘difference’ is not accepted in the Prabhākara-table is given in the following remark (ibidem p. 89): „The *viesā* of the logician cannot be a category, because the differentiation among eternal things like the *ākāśa* and the various kinds of atoms — for the purport of which the logician posits the *viesā* — can always be done on the basis of the ordinary qualities of such things.” As for the notions ‘*śakti*’ and ‘*sādhya*’ we may compare the Vaiśeṣika treatise, written by CĪVABHĪYA, called the *Saptapadārthā*, where paragraphs 54-60 polemise against the acceptance of the following notions as categories, substances and independent qualities, *sādhya*, *śakti*, *andhakāra* — *madhakatā* (cf. *paratra* & *aparatra* in the V. S.), *laghata* (cf. *gravata* in the V. S.) and *jīvitata*. Judging from European standpoint we must consider the lacking of *śakti* in the official category-list as a mistake, partly to be explained by the rôle which *akṣita* the unseen quality of human soul takes in the physical world, so that the attributing of *śakti* to physical objects becomes useless; and partly by the circumstance that causality, though amply discussed in the Vaiśeṣika-

Darśana, is not explicitly mentioned in any *adhyāya*. The appearing of *sādhya* in the Prābhākara system is, in my opinion, connected with the acceptance of analogy (*anumāna*) as a separate trustworthy source of knowledge. Whereas inference is based on *samarāṅga* (one form of which is the relation between individual, or *vyaṅki*, and species, or *sāmānya*), analogy, when accepted as a separate *pramāṇa*, must necessarily suggest the idea of a separate category: *sādhya*. The mentioning of 'number' as a category is wrong: see Gaṅgānātha Jhā p. 89. At any rate the passage quoted is a clear example of the great coherence between Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika.

The third chapter of Gaṅgānātha Jhā's Study gives an 'analytical account' of the technical part of the Mīmāṃsā; each of the twelve *adhyāyas* of the Cāstra corresponds here with a section in the author's exposition, except *adhyāya* VII and VIII which are combined in one section. The *Arthasaṅgraha*, mentioned by me page 51, has borrowed its subject-matter principally from *adhyāya* III: pada 2 & 3, cf. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, l. l. p. 187; and *adhyāya* V: cf. *ibidem* p. 203 of the Mīmāṃsācāstra. Only exegetical questions, relating to the performing of rites, are discussed here.

## APPENDIX I.

*The terms ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā, saṃnidhi & tālparya.*

Finally I wish to return to a thesis, touched upon in the foregoing chapter. I have alluded there (p. 50) to my belief in the Mīmāṃsā origin of the terms *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi* (to which is added sometimes, *tālparya*). When I first met with those terms in the textbooks of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, I considered them to be the outcome of a direct observation of language and I appreciated here the neat way in which the most important provinces of this study are delineated. The understanding, namely, of a spoken sentence is dependent on the following conditions: 1. phonetical connection of words (this is expressed, though not widely enough, by the term *saṃnidhi*, vicinity of words), 2. syntactical connection (*ākāṅkṣā*), 3. logical connection (*yogyatā*), 4. the grasping of ideas, implied, but not expressed by the speaker (*tālparya*). Further study, however, showed me that this interpretation of this formula — though methinks right as appreciation —

does not accurately show its historical origin. In this respect we have to consider the facts: 1. the formulation, mentioned, does not yet occur in the older Nvāya and Vaiśeṣika writings; 2. in the theory of exegesis, explicitly given in older Mīmāṃsā, we neither meet with this formula, but with the three rules, called by *GAṆGĀSTHĀ JHĀ* The Prābhākara School p. 116 : „the principles of syntactical connection, syntactical split and elliptical extension”. The first two of these rules, as is clear from their redaction, concern the interpunction of texts, whereas the third rule refers to syntactical contraction. The terms *āhāṅghyā*, *saṃvādhā* and *gaṇṇatā*, however, are found together in one passage of the *Ulokavārttika*, which deserves to be quoted for this reason:

[Translation p. 531 n°. 247 : „Now we proceed to explain how, for the purpose of the ascertainment of the validity of ‘verbal testimony’ — we obtain a comprehension of the previously-unperceived meaning of the sentence, from the meaning of the words ‘composing the sentence’.”

Ibidem p. 533 n°. 260 : „Similarly, standing-in-need-of-the-manner [of its fulfilment] (*atpanna-kathābhāva*), the *bhāvanā* refers only to the process (*apāya*). And the process too, standing-in-need (*āhāṅghyā*) of something to be fulfilled, is restricted [related to the particular *bhāvanā*], through capability (*gaṇṇatā*) and proximity (*saṃvādhā*), on the ground of the impossibility of any other explanation [of the character of the process and the *bhāvanā*, and the relation between these]. And the process is such as may be obtained from the same sentence [as in which the *bhāvanā* appears] or from other sentences.”

The term *bhāvanā* — derived from the causative of *bhū*, signifying ‘to cause to be’ and ‘to conceive to be’ — is explained in the *Arthasaṃgraha* as having a double meaning: 1. *śābdi bhāvanā* i.e. „the peculiar activity of some productive agent which tends to make a person act” and 2. *ārthi bhāvanā* i.e. „the peculiar energy [of some person] which refers to some action which energy is engendered by the desire of some object”.

Since the Veda, according to the Mīmāṃsā, has an eternal existence, the ‘productive agent’ which brings man to the idea of performing sacrifices, is not the wish of any God whom he obeys, but this ‘productive agent’ is the Veda itself, to which thus a kind of magical influence is attributed.

The aim of the *śābdi bhāvanā* is to rouse man towards an *ārthi bhāvanā*: the means by which the *śābdi bhāvanā* brings this about, is the knowledge which the hearer of Sacred Lore possesses con-

cerning the meaning of the optatives &c. in it; the special form in which this influence takes place, are the eulogies found in these sacred texts.

The aim of the *ārtho bhāvanā* is the obtainment of heaven and other desirables: the means are the sacrifices: the modes of procedure are the *prayāgas* and other ritual details.

When we now try to combine this information with the passage of the *Ālokavārttika*, it occurs to me as likely, that here no *ārtho* and *ābhi bhāvanā* are distinguished. There is only one *bhāvanā* which notion resembles most the *ārtho bhāvanā* of the *Arthasaṅgraha*, but is, at the same time used when the interpretation of texts is concerned. 'The energy of the person engendered by the desire of some objects' is in need (*ākrāntasā*) of a means, namely of a peculiar action *prayoga* or *pāya*. What action is meant, is shown by proximity (*samnidhi*) — which term either may refer to the circumstance of aim, desired, and means, required, being mentioned together, or to the presence of [the implements of] the action required — and by fitness *prayogātva*. At all events this is certain, *samnidhi* does not mean 'phonetical continuation' as is explained in syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, but has only a vague meaning of nearness either of words or in practical performance. No doubt this vague meaning has preceded the technical specialisation in which the term occurs in syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

So then this detail again is a corroborative argument for the close coherence in the development of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

## APPENDIX II.

*The Vṛtti-passage, quoted by Ābarasvamin in his comments  
on Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra, I, 1, 5.*

H. JACOBI has published in the XXXI annual (1911) of the Journal of the American Oriental Society a highly interesting article on the oldest texts of the darśanas with reference to their chronological relation towards Buddhism.

In this article Jacobi has inter alia examined the long comments by KUMĀRILA on M.S. I, 1, 5. A few quotations from this study may be inserted here.

p. 15: ĀBARASVAMIN, the Bhāṣyakāra of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, after having commented on M.S. I, 1, 5 transcribes a long passage

from the unknown Vitti, which begins in the edition of the Bibliotheca Indica on p. 7-17 from below and ends on p. 18-16. . . . The whole passage is without doubt by the Vrttikāra, it gives an explanation of Sūtras 3—5, and is introduced by Cāṇakyaśāhin at the end of his comment on sūtra 5.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore a matter of no little surprise to find that KUMĀRILA DOES, in the Clokavarttika on sūtra 5, assign only the first part of this passage<sup>2</sup> to the Vrttikāra.”

[On page 15 & 16 Jacobi gives an explanation of the origin of this mistake.]

p. 17 [Jacobi's conjecture] about the author of the Vitti. RĀMĀNUJA quotes a Vitti on the Brahma-Sūtra by BODHAYANA and refers to him as the Vrttikāra. Now I think it probable that Bodhāyana wrote the Vitti not only on the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā, but also on the Purva-Mīmāṃsā.”

[On page 17 and 18 Jacobi gives different reasons for this conjecture. On page 18 and 19 we find the translation of two passages from this Vitti, reprinted here in book IV section VII A.]

[On page 21 Jacobi gives several reasons for his believing that the two passages, translated by him, belong together and are meant as one refutation of only Mādhyamika opinions and not yet of Vijñānavāda-doctrines, thus disagreeing with Kumārila-bhāṭṭa in the interpretation of the so called second passage. Of Jacobi's arguments I shall only repeat here the second.]

p. 21 „The technical terms peculiar to the Vijñānavāda<sup>3</sup> e.g. *cijāṇat*, *ālāquecijāṇat*, *pracetthirijāṇat*, *vāsanā* are absent from our passage, and instead of them only such words as *pratyaya*, *buddhi* and *jāṇat* (which are common to all Indian philosophers) are used.”

[See here the section on Buddhism § 6, p. 91.]

## SECTION 2.

### THE VEDĀNTA.

#### § 1. *The Gaudapādīyā Kārikā.*

My studies of the Vedānta have been mainly limited to CAṆKARA'S comments on BĀḌARĀYANA'S Vedānta Sūtra. Before, however, entering

<sup>1</sup> Cf. here p. 57 &c.

<sup>2</sup> Namely section A' in the anal. just cited above p. 57.

<sup>3</sup> Some of these terms were afterwards accepted by the Sāṃkhya-dhms, see here p. 75, n°. 3.

upon the results of this study, I want to dwell shortly upon the Gauḍapāḍīyā Kārikā.

The fourth pāda of this Upaniṣad is called the *Alāta-cūḍa*, a title which is translated by MANILAL N. DTVEDIN as 'quenching the fire-brand'. The explanation of this title is afforded by śloka 47 which runs in the translation quoted: "As motion makes a fire-brand appear straight, crooked, &c., so motion makes thought appear as perceiver, perceived, and the like".

This śloka is commented by Ćaṃkara thus: "... What are the perceiver, and perceived? They are only the motion of that which is all thought: only a motion, appearing as such, through *avidyā*. For immovable thought never moves, and thought has already been described as unborn and immovable."

So we see that here the optical illusion of the continuative line which is brought about when a flame is quickly moved round, is used as a simile to show the illusionary character of all consciousness. And this illusionary character does not bear — as in the Buddhistic *Vijñāna-cūḍa* — only on the existence of external objects, but equally on reflective consciousness. The distinction of perceiver, act of perceiving and the perceived object, of thinker and thought, of several thinkers, of 'I' and 'YOU' — all these distinctions are illusionary, false and worthless. The Vedānta of the Gauḍapāḍīyā Kārikā and of Ćaṃkara are indeed more closely connected with NĀGĀRJUNA'S Mādhyamika school than with the *Vijñāna-cūḍa*. The fact that the Mādhyamikas were detested by the Advaita-vedāntins can only illustrate the blindness of sectarianism, but cannot mislead an objective historian with reference to the real historical connection of facts. Mādhyamikas and Advaita-vedāntins agree in methods, in as far as they both accept the *prāsāṅgika* argumentation or research of antinomies in human thought, but whereas the Mādhyamikas conclude that the world and all existence is nothing but a meaningless chaos of momentary sensations; the Vedāntins think that these antinomies show the exclusive existence of Absolute Being. So then there is a complete agreement between Eleatic philosophy and Advaita-Vedānta; whilst Eleatic philosophy agrees with the Mādhyamika teachings only in method.

The *prāsāṅgika* method is applied in the chapter *Alāta-cūḍa* to three subjects: the notion 'becoming, getting into existence', the notion of causality and the notion of perception, for perception supposes causal relation which has been proved to be full of self-contradictions.

The antinomies, connected with the notion 'becoming' are expressed in śloka 3 thus (Dvivedin's translation):



„Some philosophers postulate evolution or being, others are proud in their conviction of non-being, thus disputing each the conclusion of the other.”

Čankara comments upon the *śloka* as follows: „... some philosophers, that is to say, not all, but the Sāṃkhya's alone ... There are others, the Vaiśeṣika's and Nyāyika's, who, proud of their intelligence, hold that things are produced or nothing.”

In *sūtra* 4 it is then said: „That which is, cannot not be, as that which is not, cannot also be” — thus disputing they drift to the *abhihita* and [unintentionally] imply that *etābhi* absolute non-evolution is the truth’.

If Čankara's interpretation is right and the date of the Gauḍapādīyā Kārikā as placed by WALTERS, *loc. cit.* *Vedānta* p. 19) is in the middle of the sixth century or earlier, then at that time the *asatkārya-vāda* would already have formed a part of the Vaiśeṣika system.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to the history of the *asatkārya-vāda*, I should like to make the following surmise: the Mādhyamika's originally discovered the antinomy in the notion ‘becoming’. Now antinomies have always been a *crux* for human thought, and in the same way as HEGELIAN dialectics was ignored and despised during the latter part of the nineteenth century in Europe, so were NAGĀRJUNA'S *prasaṅgika* argumentations by the schools following him. Each chose that side of an antinomy which pleased him best.

Even the Buddhistic Vijnāna-vādin's are not excepted. They repeated the arguments of Nāgārjuna's, but changed them so that they nominally referred only to the external world: and so they were guilty of logical inconsistency, in not applying these antinomies to psychical phenomena.

## § 2. *The refutation of Vaiśeṣika doctrines in Baddharāṣaṇa's Vedānta-Sūtra & Čankara's Acārya's Bhāṣya*

We may distinguish two groups of passages in ČANKARA'S comments on the Vedānta-Sūtra, which are of importance for the history of the Vaiśeṣika system: those which polemize against the Vaiśeṣika system itself and those which refer to Buddhism and are parallel to passages in ČANDRAXA'S Nyāya-kandali. The passages, belonging to the first class, are the following:

- |         |                           |          |
|---------|---------------------------|----------|
| Ved. S. | THIBAUT'S<br>translation. | Subject: |
|---------|---------------------------|----------|
- II. 1. 12, vol. I p. 317. Refutation of the theory that atoms are the cause of the world: "...other doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by either Manu or Vyāsa or other authorities [i. e. which do not belong to the *Saṃhitā*], are to be considered as 'explained' i. e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the *pradhāna* doctrine [the Sāṃkhya system]..."
- II. 2.       vol. I p. 351.   [Analysis is given separately].  
11—17.
- II. 2. 37, vol. I p. 435. Refutation of the theory, given by the Vaiśeṣikas and others, that the 'Lord' is the operative cause of the world. [Cf. here the chapter on Theology.]
- II. 3. 18, vol. II p. 33. Discussion on the doubt "whether, as the followers of Kāṣṇḍa think, the soul is in-itself non-intelligent<sup>1)</sup>, so that its intelligence is merely adventitious; or if, as the Sāṃkhyins think, eternal intelligence constitutes its nature". [Cf. here the chapter on Psychology].
- II. 3. 50 vol. II p. 69. Refutation of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of  
and 51 &c.               the plurality of souls and the conjunction  
                              between the souls and the internal organs.  
                              Refutation of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of  
                              *anṛta* as a quality of the many souls.

Of these five passages only the second is of importance and may be analysed more fully.

Analysis of Ved. Sutra II. 2. 11—17 and comments:

*A.* Congeniality of cause and effect. Objection raised by the atomists against the upholders of Brahman. This reason shown to be fallacious on the ground of the system of the Vaiśeṣikas themselves. (Sutra 11).

*a.* Formulation of the objection: "...the qualities which inhere in the substance constituting the cause originate qualities of the same kind in the substance constituting the effect.... Hence, if

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. Nyayakandali p. 97, l. 18 &c.

the intelligent Brahman is assumed as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence inherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the case . . ." (transl. p. 381).

b. Description of how the world is created out of atoms (p. 382).

c. Conclusion drawn by the Vedāntin from this description: "Just as from spheroidal atoms binary compounds are produced, which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are big and long, but not anything spheroidal . . . so this non-intelligent world may spring from the intelligent Brahman".

d. Reply by the Vaiśṣṭikas (transl. p. 383).

e. Rejoinder by the Vedāntin: "... the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as the causes from which they spring is too wide . . . Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities . . ." (p. 383—386).

B. The unseen principle *adṛśṭa* and the atoms. Impossibility of creation and world-destruction, from the standpoint of the Vaiśṣṭika sūtra 12.

a. Exposition of how the world is created out of atoms by the influence of *adṛśṭa* (p. 386).

b. Refutation of this doctrine, following suppositions are made: endeavour or impact is the cause of the movement of the atoms at the time of creation; or *adṛśṭa* residing in the atoms; or *adṛśṭa* residing in the souls --- all three suppositions give rise to absurd consequences.

c. Conjunction of atoms is impossible. [Cf. a similar refutation as Caṅkara's, used by the Yogicāras, *Meghāṇa* V, 8. II p. 179.]

C. *Samavāya* and conjunction of the atoms. The notion of inherence, applied to the supposed relation between atom and binary compound, leads to a regressus ad infinitum. (sūtra 13.)

a. Exposition of the objection (p. 389).

b. Self-defence by the Vaiśṣṭika: *samavāya* is eternal and therefore cannot give rise to an infinite regress (p. 389).

c. Dispute continued (p. 390).

D. The movement of atoms proved to be impossible by a *prāsaṅgika* argumentation (sūtra 14.)

"Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither; there being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives is possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be permanent so that no *pralaya* could take place. If they were essen-

tially non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take place...." (transl. p. 390).

NOTE: the argumentation is a beautiful instance for the close relation which exists between Vedānta and Mādhyamika Buddhism.

*L.* The colour of the atoms. "And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse [of the Vaiśeṣika tenet] would take place...." (sutra 15.... "from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and other qualities there would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause, they are gross and non-permanent". p. 391.

*F.* The different number of qualities which are supposed to inhere in the atoms of earth, water &c. form an objection against the Vaiśeṣika system. ....If we assume that some kinds of atoms (e. g. earthly atoms) have more numerous qualities [than e. g. the atoms of water], it follows that their solid size [मातृत्व] will be increased thereby [i. e. the atoms of earth will be larger than those of water], and that implies their being atoms no longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations concerning effected material bodies. [We may notice here that Čaṅkara's observations have not been very accurate.] ...If, on the other hand, we assume... that there is no difference in the number of the qualities, we must either suppose that they have all one quality only... or else we must suppose all atoms to have all the four qualities...." (Comment on sutra 16, transl. p. 394).

*G.* [The atomic theory] is not accepted [by any authoritative person] (sutra 17).

[Cf. H. JACOB — Sitzungsber. der K. Preuss. Akademie 1911 p. 732 &c. — who characterises Vedānta-Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika respectively as: *Ṛiti*, *Smṛti* and *Čāstra*].

*H.* Egression in the comments on sutra 17 (transl. p. 394).

In the comments on sutra 17 Čaṅkara gives a long polemics independent of Bādarāyana's Sūtras. We may distinguish the following points:

*a.* Polemics against the assumption of six categories. "The Vaiśeṣikas assume six categories, which constitute the subject-matter of their system.... These six categories they maintain to be absolutely different from each other, and to have different characteristics.... Side by side with this assumption they make another which contradicts the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of depending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate. ... The substance is in each case

cognised by means of the quality: the latter therefore has itself in the substance. The same reasoning applies to action, generality, particularity and inherence" (transl. p. 394).

b. Polemics against the notion of *apatasiddhi* — i.e. „the relation of one not being able to exist without the other". We may paraphrase Coplan's argumentation as follows: we may distinguish three respects in which *apatasiddhi* could be thought of: *anāyāsa* (as a spatial), as a temporal or an essential relation, *apathapleghatā*, *apathābhāva*, *apathāśchāntatā*.

α. Suppose *anāyāsa* to mean 'the fact of one thing only existing when in the same place as the other thing'. Then we should arrive at the following consequences: according to the Vaiśeṣika system, the cloth inheres *śāśānā* in the threads, [but the cloth is not said to inhere in the cloth itself] i.e.: the cloth originated by the threads, occupies the place of the threads, but not the place of the cloth: — further the qualities of the cloth, whiteness &c. must be considered to occupy the same place as the cloth, but not the same place as the threads: — further from V.8. I, 1. 10 we must conclude that the cloth, inhering in the threads, occupies the place of the threads, and that the qualities of the cloth occupy the place of the qualities of the threads. We may put these conclusions in the following tabellaric form:

	place occupied	place not occupied:
1. cloth	threads	cloth
2. qualities of cloth	cloth	threads
3. cloth	threads	
4. qualities of cloth	qualities of threads.	

Now the fourth conclusion 'the qualities of the cloth occupy the same place as the qualities of the threads' [which qualities in their turn occupy the same place as the threads], [leading to the consequence, 'the qualities of the cloth occupy the same place as the threads'], is contradicted by the second conclusion 'the qualities of the cloth do not occupy the same place as the threads'. So we have proved *ad absurdum* that the definition of *apatasiddhi* as *apathapleghatā* cannot be upheld.

β. Suppose *anāyāsa* to mean 'the fact of one thing only existing provided that the other thing exists during the same time', then one horn of the cow is to be considered to inhere in the other horn of the cow.

γ. And, if finally, you explain it to mean 'non-separation in character', it is impossible to make any further distinction between the substance and the quality, because quality is then conceived as

being identical with substance, [whereas the Vaiṣeṣika wants to uphold their difference, see here under letter a].

c. Polemics against the distinction which the Vaiṣeṣikas make between conjunction *samyoga*, and inherence *samavāya*, transl. p. 396.

d. Polemics against the distinction made between conjunction or inherence and the two things thus connected cf. here letter a transl. p. 397.

e. Conjunction between the atoms, the soul and the internal organ cannot take place, because they have no parts.

f. Polemics against the assumption of *samplēṣa* between the simple atoms and the binary compound. *Samplēṣa* is that kind of intimate connection which exists, for instance, between wood and varnish'. THIBAUT, translation p. 399. [NOTE. Cf. this discussion with the first passage, quoted from WASSILJEV'S Buddhismus, under letter b].

I do not remember to have met with the term *samplēṣa* in Vaiṣeṣika writings. *Upalēṣa* is found Nyāyakandālī p. 325 l. 19.

g. Polemics against the theory of *ācariṭācraṇyabhāva*. [According to the Vaiṣeṣika] „the *samavāya* relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which abides and that which forms the abode — which relation actually exists between the effected substance and the causal substance — is not possible”. [According to the Vedāntin] „that would involve the vice of mutual dependence *itaretarācraṇatva*.” See further transl. p. 399. Moreover „the Vedāntins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding”.

h. Polemics against the notion of atom. „Moreover, as the atoms are limited [not of infinite extension], they must in reality consist of as many parts as we acknowledge regions of space, whether those be six or eight or ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent”.

It is interesting to compare this passage with the information, given by Wassiljew (from DSHAW-JANG-DSCHABPA's work about the Buddhist Sautrāntikas and Vāibhāṣikas.

WASSILJEV p. 279. „Die Grāvaka's nahmen überhaupt Monaden an, welche keine Theile haben, nach der Meinung des Lehrers Saṅgha-rakṣita? bleiben diese Monade nicht eine an der andern kleben, sondern einen Zwischenraum zwischen sich lassend, umringen sie einander wechselseitig, um einen Körper zu bilden. . .

überhaupt nehmen alle buddhistischen Systeme gleichmassig an, dass es keine kleinere Form als diese giebt und sie weder gespalten noch getheilt werden kann: sie weichen von einander nur darin ab, ob eine Monade aus Theilen besteht oder nicht — und wenn dabei auch im ersten Fall gesagt wird, dass die Monade aus acht Elementen gebildet sei, d. h. acht Serten habe, so sagt doch niemand dass sie eine Verkettung sei”.

Wassiljew p. 308. „Im Beweis der „Atome“ sagen die Yogacārva's, dass, wenn man wie die Sarvāntik's die Monade als eine Verbindung von sechs Serten betrachtet, dies bei all dem bedeutet, dass sie aus Theilen besteht: wenn man aber alle sechs als etwas eingesehen nimmt wie die Vāibhāṣik's, dann muss man auch einen Kugel als eine Monade betrachten, folglich &c.”.

„Refutation of the Vaiśeṣika theory „that things can be decomposed only by the separation of their parts.” „Just as the hardness of ghee, gold and the like, is destroyed in consequence of these substances being rendered liquid by their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the while, so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their passing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause”.

When we now look back on the analysis given, we may state the following points:

1. The author of Bādārāyaṇa Sūtra II. 2. 11—17 is only interested in the Vaiśeṣika system in so far as it gives (see Praj. Bhāṣya book II ch. 2 § 6, p. 48) by means of its atomism a theory of the creation and the destruction of the world. This criticism concerning the treatment of a subject surpassing human research and science, was no difficult task, and since the remarks of the critic are of little importance, we may pass them by.

2. The polemics, given by Cakrasūtra under sūtra 17, are much more interesting. Still his discussions on the six categories *a*, *d* and on the notion of inference *a*, *d* & *g* must be considered to be a failure. Every use of language, every daily experience, every expression of a scientific thought, supposes such distinctions as thing, quality, action. And the discerning such a relation as that between a thing and its qualities, does much credit to the Vaiśeṣikas and may be termed an admirable result of abstraction. Therefore although dialectics has a right to show the antinomies to which all our fundamental notions give rise, it is unjust to deny the great merits of a system which first succeeded in distinguishing and defining every one of these notions. And even though

we must admit the thesis that a thing is nothing apart from its qualities, still we are obliged to legitimate this distinction and to continue making use of it. I consider it a great shortcoming in Indian thought that it has always indulged too much in dialectics and sophistry, but striven too little for that, called by European scholars, 'scientific explanation', a form of science requiring patient observing and ingenious combination of experience. I think it a pity that the right tendencies of the original Vaiśeṣika after all resembled 'a river dried up in the sands'.

3. The polemics, directed by Čamkara in *b* against the notion *ayutasiddhi* is interesting as a typical example of subtle dialectics. Yet I cannot agree with Čamkara Deśvara's argumentation. *Ayutasiddhi* signifies the logical necessity which exists between correlative notions such as quality, aggregate and class on the one side, and thing, parts and individual on the other. And thus *ayutasiddhi* possesses a fundamental importance in the structure of human intellect (see here book II chapter I section 3 § 6 and 7).

4. The polemical remarks, made by Čamkara (under letter *b*) about the notion of atom are interesting for the history of philosophy. It seems to follow from the sentence, quoted, that Čamkara makes no distinction between the atomism of the Vaiśeṣikas and that of the Hīnayāna Buddhists. That a close historical relation has existed between these systems is also proved by the fact that and the Vaiśeṣikas — to begin with PRAÇASTAPĀDA — and the Sautrāntikas divide time into *kṣaṇas* moments, i.e. undivisible durations of time, (see here the section on Buddhism, p. 86 § 4). We may surmise that the *kṣaṇikavāda* was a theory laid down first by the Sautrāntikas, and atomism by the Vaiśeṣikas, and that then these two theories were accepted by both schools. For the rest the speculations, given, on the atoms or monads, are rather naive. They show an insufficient insight in the properties of space. That space has 'three dimensions', but that the number of its 'directions' — taking any point as its centrum — is infinitely great, was not understood by them. They talk of an atom having six or eight or ten parts, six or eight or ten sides (thus identifying part and side) according as they distinguish four cardinal points plus zenith and nadir, or eight cardinal points (i.e. or eight cardinal points plus zenith and nadir. It is worth noticing here that, whereas Kaṇāda and Praçastapāda mention ten directions *dśas*, CRIDHARA in discussing the existence of atoms, distinguishes six parts or sides of the atoms.

We learn from the first of the two passages, quoted (under letter *b*) from Wassiljew, that SAṆGHARAKṢITA taught that an inter-



space exists between the atoms. I do not remember to have found such an explicit statement of the porosity of matter in any of the Vaiśeṣika writings.

5. The refutation of atomism, given by Candakara (under letter c), can be expressed in a more modern and occidental form thus: matter need not necessarily consist of atoms, i. e. physical bodies which are indivisible, and never changing in form or volume; but may consist of corpusecula which, according to circumstance, change their form, their volume or both, with this one restriction that a change in volume is accompanied by a change in the degree or intensity of their internal quality (called force &c.), in other words, matter may consist of material corpusecula to be defined as the mathematical product of two factors, viz. spatial extension and internal intensity.

As we shall see later (Book II chapter 3) the influence of fire noticed in the melting of glue and gold, has given rise to long dissertations on the part of the Vaiśeṣikas.

## APPENDIX

### *The refutation of Buddhist doctrine in Vedānta-Sūtra and Bhāṣya.*

A lengthy polemic against Buddhist philosophy is found in the passage Vedānta Sūtra II, 2, 18—32. In Book IV section VII B, I have given its analysis to which I should like to add here the following annotations:

1. The passage consists of two portions II, 2, 18—27 and 28—32. The first part is directed against the Sārvāstivādins; the second is explained by CAṆAKARA as a polemic against the Vijñānavādins; but H. JACOBI has decidedly proved that BĀDHARAYANA himself attacked by it the Mādhyamika; his contemporaries JACOBI, namely, has discovered that the *Vedānta*-passage, quoted by CAṆAKARA-SVAMI under *Mīm. Sūtra* I, 1, 5<sup>1</sup>, contains in its beginning a refutation of Mādhyamika doctrines. Further that the author of this *Vedānta* very probably commented upon the *Upaniṣad-Mīmamsā* as well, and finally that in accordance with this, the *Vedānta*-passage referred to, although preserved in a Pāṇinimānasa commentary, is really an old explanation of Vedānta Sūtra II, 2, 28—32.

<sup>1</sup> See below I, IV, 1 and 34, 1—3.

2. The first part of the polemics, directed against the Sārvāstivādins, may be divided into two parts:

sūtras 18 & 19: a refutation of the *Abhaya-siddhānta* theory, i. e. the theory stating the physical bodies to have originated at the time of creation from material elements, *Abhaya*, and psychical life similar to have risen from psychical content, *siddhānta*;

sūtras 20-27: a refutation of the *śūnyatā-pravṛtta*, i. e. the theory that everything — of material and psychical nature — undergoes momentary destruction.

3. From Chankavācya's comments on sūtra 19 we learn that the notion *Abhaya-jñāna*, i. e. a state of consciousness in which one feels oneself perceiving, willing, etc., thus *not* quite the same as 'self-consciousness', i. e. the identity of the self of this moment with the self of a past moment', a notion, first formulated by the Vyāṁśavādins was also accepted by the Sārvāstivādins. This agrees with the account given by Mātanga-vācya of the Sautrāntika school.

4. With reference to passage II, 2, 28-31, as originally understood, we may notice that the question, referred to in sūtra 30, namely, whether ideas are directly perceived or not, has also drawn the attention of Brahmanic philosophy. The Vaiśeṣikas believe an idea, and in general a psychical state, to be directly perceived by the internal organ, whereas the Mīmāṃsakas affirm the presence of cognition to be only found out by inference (see GANGANATHA JHA, The Prābhākara school p. 26 = Indian Thought II p. 116).

5. Further we may notice that the objection, raised by the Vedāntin against the Buddhist conception of self-knowledge — or more accurately expressed against the theory that one intellection is known by another intellection — is based on the general Buddhist theory of momentary destruction. So there is parallelism between the argumentation of sūtra 26, showing the contradiction of the notion of causality with the *śūnyatā-pravṛtta*, and the argumentation of sūtra 31, showing the contradiction between the Buddhist theory of perception and the same dogma of universal *śūnyatā*.

6. The difficulties, noticed by GANANATHA in the explanation of psychical facts, on accepting the momentary existence, were also felt by the Vaiśeṣikas, who have accepted the last mentioned dogma to a certain extent from the Sautrāntikas. Thus the complicated theories were originated as we find in the Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, book III chapter 2 § 7, edition p. 111 (see here book II chapter IV).

7. When comparing the original meaning of Ved. Sūtra II. 2. 28—32 with that assigned to it by Ānṅkara, we may observe: *a.* sūtra 28 has got a narrower application by Ānṅkara, but the proof, given in sūtra 29, has remained the same: *b.* sūtra 30 has quite changed its meaning, being originally a refutation of the perceptibility of ideas and becoming by later interpretation a refutation of the *aberrant-idea* as the exclusive cause of the complete series of psychical life, the premiss, brought forward in sūtra 31, has remained the same, viz. the theory of universal momentariness: its application, however, has been changed.

8. By comparing the polemics in Nyāya Sūtra IV. 2. 1—31 with that in Vedānta Sūtra II. 2. 12—27 we may notice: *a.* the Nyāya accepts the atomism, also forming part of the Sautrāntika and Vaiśeṣika philosophies, but Bādarāyana and Ānṅkara agree here respectively with the Mādhyamikas and Vijñānavādins, both rejecting atomism. Cf. on the agreement in this respect between Mādhyamikas and Vijñānavādins the exposition of Jacobi's, J.A.O.S. vol. XXXI p. 11: *b.* on the other hand the Nyāya and Vedānta Sūtras agree in their rejection of Mādhyamika doctrine expounding that all perceptions have epistemologically the same value as dreams and illusions.

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### SECTION 3.

### SĀṆKHYA & YOGA.

#### § 1 *The chronology of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga.*

For studying the Sāṅkhya and Yoga I have principally used GARBE's book 'Die Sāṅkhya Philosophie' 2nd edition. A list of passages occurring in this book, of value for the study of the Vaiśeṣika texts, are collected by me in book IV section VII table C. I should like to insert here the following annotations to Garbe's book:

1. JACOBI has proved that PATAṆJALI, the author of the Yoga Sūtra cannot be the same as the grammarian of that name. [The adoption of originally heterodox doctrines [viz. 'the atomic theory which originally belonged to the Vaiśeṣikas' and 'the doctrine that time consists of *kyanas*' by Patañjali the philosophical author] therefore unmistakably points to a relatively modern time, and

thus it serves to confirm the result at which we arrived by examining the allusions to Buddhist doctrines contained in Y. S.; namely, that the Yoga Sūtra must be later than the 5th century A. D. It is probably not far removed in time from ĪCĀRA KṚṢṢA, the remodeler of Sāṃkhya" (J. A. O. S. vol XXXI p. 29 & Garbe p. 148).

2. SAHJĀ CANDRA VIDYĀBHŪṢANA (Med. School p. 53) mentions a legend about a controversy between the Buddhist DIGNĀGA and Īcāra Kṛṣṇa (Cf. TARANĀTHA'S Geschichte des Buddhismus, von SCHEINER p. 132, where the name Kṛṣṇa is read). Since Īcāra Kṛṣṇa must have lived before 559 A. D. (M. MÜLLER, India, what can it teach us? p. 361), Vidyābhūṣana's conjecture about the identity of Īcāra Kṛṣṇa, the legendary opponent of Dignāga and Īcāra Kṛṣṇa, the author of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, seems very probable, although the Sāṃkhya-kārikā and the works of Dignāga, as far as we know, treat of quite different subjects (Cf. Garbe p. 78, on VASUBANDHA as a contemporary of Īcāra Kṛṣṇa).

4. The teachers-list, given in MĀDHAVA'S Candakara-vijaya (WEBER'S Literaturgeschichte, 2te Ausgabe, p. 260 note 255 is too unreliable to allow us to draw conclusions about the date of Vyāsa, the author of the Yoga Bhāṣya, or Gauḍapāda, the author of the Bhāṣya on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. So much is certain that Gauḍapāda, the Sāṃkhya-author, cannot have written the Vedāntic Gauḍapādīyā Kārikā (cf. however Garbe p. 44 n. 2 & p. 57).

5. As is settled now by STALL (Introduzione p. 58 cf. Garbe p. 88 VĀCASPATI-MIŚRA lived in the first half of the ninth century, thus before CRIDHARA'S time. A more thorough knowledge of this versatile author would undoubtedly give us a deeper insight into the history of Indian philosophy and the mutual relation of the schools.

§ 2. *Īcāra Kṛṣṇa and Patañjali, quoted in the Nyāyakandali.*

On the historical relation between Vaiśeṣika and Yoga see JACOBI (J.A.O.S. vol. XXXI p. 28). We learn from this article that the systematical Yoga has been the lending party, the Vaiśeṣika the borrowing one.

In CRIDHARA'S Nyāya-kandali the Yogasūtra and the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya are quoted a few times in short passages (p. 58 l. 3; p. 171 l. 21; p. 172 l. 1; pag. 278 l. 8—10; p. 279 l. 2)<sup>1)</sup>. In the same book ĪCĀRA KṚṢṢA'S Sāṃkhya Kārikā is referred to four times, on p. 143 Kārikā IX, on p. 279 Kārikā LXIV & LXV.

<sup>1)</sup> See moreover here book II chapter VI section 1 § 5 for an interesting parallel between Yogasūtra and Praçastapādabhāṣya.

on p. 284 Kārika LXVII. In the three last of these quotations, referring to *śāstra*, Crīdhara intends to show the community's opinion of divergent systems in regard to the difficulty and possibility of liberation.

§ 3. *Passages in Sāṅkhya Kārikā and Nyāya-kandali, the Tattva-saṁgraha*.

I should like to add the following annotations to the list of passages collected in Book IV, section VII table C.

1. Most of the statements made by GARBE, refer to works later in date than Crīdhara's Nyāya-kandali, to wit, to the Sāṅkhya Sūtra, ANIRUDDHA'S and VĪRĪSABHĀṢINĪ'S commentaries. Exceptions are: no. 17 on the *śāstra āgama*, no. 24 about the *anāgā vīcāra*, no. 26 about the existence of the Lord, no. 28 about the soul and its problematic qualities, no. 33 about the theory of *anumāna*—this concerns a reference to VĪRĪSABHĀṢINĪ'S Tattva-kaumudī.

2. Garbe's conception of no. 3, the maxim of logical simplicity, no. 4—9, as typical for the Sāṅkhya system, when compared with the other daśaśāstras, seems a priori improbable and is contradicted by the facts. The *anupapādā* or *anupapādasamprāya* is often referred to in the Nyāya-kandali (e. g. p. 81 l. 19; p. 87 l. 16; p. 12 l. 6; p. 30 l. 16) and so is the *anavasthā*, *anavasthāna* or *anavasthiti* (Ny. kandali p. 97 l. 4; p. 12 l. 8; cf. moreover UDAYANA'S Kūrāpūvāli, Benares edition p. 33 l. 7. Cf. SCALF Introduzione p. 116—117).

3. The questions, formulated in no. 10—15 are points, much discussed by Vaiśeṣikas. No. 10 is meant as a refutation of *abhāva* as a seventh category, an opinion held by Crīdhara and the writers of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika—no. 12 is opposed to the Vaiśeṣika view of the eternality of the *śūnātmas* and the transiency of the individual things; no. 13 is opposed to the *dharma-dharma-bheda*, defended by Crīdhara (Ny. kandali p. 11; p. 101, p. 111; no. 14 seems to be directed against a similar thesis of the Mīmāṃsakas, for in the official Vaiśeṣika system the notion *śakti* is not acknowledged (see Ny. kandali p. 114); concerning no. 15 see Ny. kandali p. 90 l. 28 *ac*.

4. The *sādhāgareṇa* of the Sāṅkhya no. 17 is attacked by Crīdhara in the Nyāya-kandali (p. 113). This cegression occurs in a commentary on a paragraph in Praṣastapāda's Bhāṣya, dealing with *śūnātmas*, a clear proof, that the question had not yet roused Praṣastapāda's interest. Crīdhara quotes here Sāṅkhya Kārikā IX and comments upon it.

## SECTION I.

## BUDDHISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. *Introductory Remarks.*

With regard to philosophical speculation we may divide the history of Buddhism into two periods—the pre-Kauṣṭhīkean and the post-Kauṣṭhīkean. A few quotations from KERN'S *Manual of Buddhism* I should like to insert here:

p. 121: „The reign of the Indo-Scythian king Kauṣka . . . marks in more than one respect an epoch in the history of India. This conqueror of Cāka or Turuṣka race . . . extended his sway over a wide tract of country comprising Kabul, Gāndhāra, Sindh, N. W. India, Kashmir and part of Madhyadeśa. The N. Buddhists . . . have a tradition that the mighty monarch was at first no adherent of their creed: they ascribe his conversion to the instrumentality of the reverend Sudarśana . . . We have no single indication of the probable date of his conversion, but we shall hardly go far amiss if we assume as the approximate date of the Council held under his patronage A. D. 100.

p. 122: „The most significant trait of the Third Council is that it closed a period of old quarrels between the sects, it did not prevent the rise of new aspirations. Mahāyānism, which in an incipient state was already existing, ere-long boldly raised its head. Buddhist authors explain this fact in a semi-historical way by relating that the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika system, was born at the time of the Third Council, and became the greatest promoter of Mahāyānism . . . Considering that the Rājatarāṅginī represents Nāgārjuna as having flourished immediately after the Turuṣka kings, we may hold that Nāgārjuna lived about the middle or in the latter half of the second century”.

The Buddhist philosophy of the post-Kauṣṭhīkean period is characterised by its more developed, technical methods. Four schools arose in these times, two of them being the continuation of the eighteen sects of the pre-Kauṣṭhīkean period. An acquaintance with these four younger systems is indispensable for the understanding of the polemics inserted in Brahmanic philosophical works, specially for the explanation of several passages in Cāridhara's Nyāya-kandālī.

Though prae-Kauṣhika Buddhism is less important for our aim, yet a few points of its speculation may be indicated here, as they still will prove of some help for our research. For this sketch I have principally used Kern's Manual and the two studies, written by OLFRAMARE and DE LA VALLÉE-POISSON on the Theory of the Twelve Causes.

## § 2. *Prae-Kauṣhika Buddhism.*

The creed of the oldest Buddhism contains principally:

1. the Four Noble Truths, *Āryasatyāna*;
2. the Theory of the Twelve Causes, *Pratitya-samutpāda*;
3. the doctrine of the *S'valāhas*;
4. the doctrine of *Kāraṇa* (i. e. the *adhyāta* or unseen quality of the Vajesika-system).

The last-mentioned article of creed is common to all Indian religious thought; and so are the contents of the Four Noble Truths, their preaching of pain, with which every form and phase of existence is imbued; yet the formulation in a fourfold clause which imitates medical science, is typically Buddhistic. The quintessence of ancient Buddhism, we may say, are the Four Noble Truths, compared with which all other dogmas are secondary.

And whereas the Four Noble Truths form one ingenious thought, which does not bear or need any alteration, the Theory of the Twelve Causes is only a later formed conglomeration. Before proving this, I shall, for convenience, write down the series in their authentic order, adding to each member the English translation of Kern's.

1. *avidyā* ignorance
2. *saṃskāras* impressions
3. *viññāna* clear consciousness
4. *nāmarūpa* name-and-form
5. *saḍāyatana* the six organs of sense
6. *sparśa* contact of the senses with exterior objects
7. *vedanā* feeling
8. *tṛṣṇā* desire
9. *upādāna* clinging, effort
10. *bhava* becoming, beginning of existence
11. *jāti* birth, existence
12. *jarāmaraṇa, cakapavidecāmadahā, ba-laurmanyo-papāśāḥ*,  
old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain,  
grief, despondency.

The first point to be noticed in reference to this twelvefold series, is that it has been evidently composed from two older, independent parts — a. 1- 7, b. 8- 12. The necessity of this division is proved by the prominent significance which *tṣaṅ* 'desire' has logically in the series, secondly by the circumstance that only the members 8 to 12 form a series which can be explained as a causal chain without difficulties, thirdly by the fact that most of the seven first members occur also in the theory of *skandhas*.

But there are not only a priori reasons for the division of the twelvefold chain into two series, but also historical material has been collected by DE LA VALLÉE-POUSSIN in support of this thesis.

Théorie des Douze Causes p. 1. „La définition de la deuxième Noble Vérité (Sermon de Bénarès fournit le cadre et explique le but du *Pratītya-samutpāda* à savoir: dérivation de la souffrance, explication des causes de la renaissance. L'origination (*saṃvṛtāyā*) de la souffrance, c'est la soif = désir, qui conduit à la renaissance (*puṇarbhāva*): ré-existence', qui est accompagnée de plaisir et d'attachement (*saṃdī-rāga*), qui se complait ça et là: elle est triple, concupiscence, désir d'existence, désir de non-existence". — Et "ré-existence" est synonyme de souffrance (première Noble Vérité). „La naissance est souffrance: la vieillesse est souffrance, la maladie est souffrance, la mort est souffrance. . . . le corps et l'âme, la vie physique et la vie morale (= *skandhas*) sont souffrance".

„C'est-à-dire, pour dégager une „chaîne de causalité": la soif (*tṣaṅ*), désir sensuel ou intellectuel, accompagnée du plaisir (*saṃdī*) qu'elle trouve dans son objet, et de l'attachement (*rāga*), produit la renaissance (*puṇarbhāva*): c'est-à-dire la souffrance (*dukkha*): naissance, vieillesse, mort: tous les incidents de la vie et la vie elle-même sont souffrance."

Théorie de Douze Causes p. 35 „Renaissance (*janma*) et souffrance (*dukkha*) procèdent de l'acte (*kamma*): elles en sont le fruit (*phala*) le „ripening" (*cipāka*): à son tour, l'acte procède de la passion, „infection" (*klesa*): telles sont les données logiques du problème. Le *pratītya-samutpāda*, qui se donne comme une description analytique de la production des phénomènes douloureux. . . doit par conséquent exposer trois phases, ou chemins, ou ornières. . . à savoir *klesa*, „infection", *kamma*, „acte", *cipāka* ou *dukkha* ou *janma*, fruit, c'est-à-dire souffrance, c'est-à-dire naissance". (De la Vallée Poussin refers in a note i.a. to Visuddhimagga, XVII, summary in J.P.T.S., 1891, p. 141)

Before now further explaining the Twelvefold Chain we must observe that it has no cosmic significance (as PAUL DUSSEN has



accepted, but only bears upon the suffering of the individual being (cf. OLIVAMARI, p. 27). From this ensues, that the causal chain of Buddhism cannot be compared to the twenty-five principles of the Sāṃkhya, as was proposed by JACOBI.

But, on the contrary, if we want to find a parallel in Brahmanic philosophy, then the list of *pramāṇas* of the Nyāya-system will, certainly, be the nearest of all. We have already noticed that this list likewise consists of two groups, of which the first only enumerates the most important subject-matter of Explanatory Science — Physics and specially Psychology — whilst the second explains the causal series of *saṃsāra*. We have further stated that *loka* originally had the meaning of *dveṣa*, and occupied the first place in the series, so that the order of the links was originally

- |                  |    |             |
|------------------|----|-------------|
| 1. dveṣa & rāga) | or | 1. dveṣa    |
| 2. pravṛtti      |    | 2. pravṛtti |
| 3. pretyabhāva   |    | 3. janman   |
| 4. phala         |    | 4. duḥkha   |
| 5. duḥkha        |    |             |

It cannot, I think, be denied that there is a striking resemblance between this series and the one, quoted by De la Vallée Poussin from the Visuddhimagga, and which may be written in inverted

1. kleśa = moha, avidyā & tīṣṇā.
2. karma (i.e. action, and not *karman* in the sense of adhiṣṭa).
3. phala (or vipāka).
4. janman.
5. duḥkha.

So we see that in both places in Visuddhimagga XVII & Nyāyadārcana I, 1. 2) *saṃsāra* is described as consisting of five links, with this difference that the Visuddhimagga places *phala* before *janman*. Further no serious objections can be raised against the identification of the five last links of the authentic Pratītya-samutpāda with the fivefold chain of saṃsāra which we have attained in the above described way. In other words *tesāṃ* is equivalent to *dveṣa & rāga*; *upādhāna* to *karma* activity, *bhava* to *phala*, *jāti* to *janman*, and *jara-maraṇa* to *duḥkha*. We may notice moreover that the explanation of *bhava* as *phala* (i. e. *adhiṣṭa*), is one given by Buddhist scholiasts.

Only a few words may be added here in reference to the seven first links, they are exactly, like the five first *pramāṇas* of the Nyāya-system in origin the headings of primitive science: *nāmanarūpa* originally meant the external world, characterised as it is by exterior appearance and name (for to primitive thought name is a real quality

of the things: the *sadṛgyatana* are the *indriyāṇi* (organs of sense) of the Nyāya; *cijñāna* is the mind-stuff, the *ἄντρον* as it was conceived by the Greeks. Afterwards *nāmarūpa* was taken in another sense, *rūpa* was called the external world and *nāma* became a collective for all psychical facts. As to the first term *avidyā*, it must not be taken in a cosmical, later Vedānta sense, but it simply means, as previously indicated, the ignorance about the real character of human life, its essential miserableness and its foundation on desire. *Avidyā*, therefore, is the same idea as the *mithyā-jñāna*, which appears Nyāya-darśana I. 1. 2 as a hindrance to *aparigraha*. When *avidyā* or *mithyā-jñāna* makes place for *tattvajñāna* i. e. true insight, then desire vanishes and with it all its consequences (*prapatti*, or *upādāna* &c.). Yet there is one great difference between Buddhism and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: for, whereas these Brahmanic systems consider *īśhā*, *mithyā-jñāna* &c. as qualities of the eternal *ātman*, Buddhism denies totally the existence of soul, a denial which received afterwards a dialectical foundation, when the old *anityatva-vāda* the dogma of transiency of everything had developed into the *kṣaṇabhaṭṭa-vāda* the dogma of momentary destruction of everything existent.

Whereas in the Nyāya-system the ten *pramāṇas* were left a loose enumeration, the series of Buddhism — originally two series: that of the *skandhas*, i. e. elements of existence and consequently topics of scientific discussion, and that of chainlike *saṃskāra* — was recast into one causal chain. The most logical attempt, which is seemingly old (cf. De la Vallée Poussin p. 36 note 3) and which afterwards dominates in scholasticism, is the one which divides the twelvefold chain into three portions:

a. 1. *avidyā* (with the inclusion of the other *kleśas*: *trṣṇā* and *dveṣa*), 2. *saṃskāra* (i. e. *karman* or *adṛṣṭa*). This group represents anterior life.

b. 3. *cijñāna*, 4. *nāmarūpa* (now: the human being), 5. *sadṛgyatana*, 6. *spṛṣṭa*, 7. *vedanā*: these are the results of the former life in this life; 8. *trṣṇā*, 9. *upādāna*, 10. *bhava*: these represent the causes in this life of a following life. Together then the notions 3–10 constitute the present life. *Bhava* here means *karman* and is synonym with *saṃskāra* in the first group (See De La Vallée Poussin).

c. 11 & 12 *jāti* & *jarāmaraṇa* &c., these form the future life.

The facts that the scission before *trṣṇā* is more or less neglected and that two different terms *saṃskāra* and *bhava* are used for the same notion, show clearly that this twelvefold chain has never

been one immediate thought, as was the case with the four Noble Truths. The *pratyakṣa-sametya* has been the outcome of continued scholasticism, and as such lacks every potential of scientific value.

§ 3. *The chapter on Buddhism in the Śāstra-samgrahaṇa.*

The chapter on Buddhism in MĀDHAVA ĀCĀRYA'S *Śāstra-samgrahaṇa* may be considered to be the best introduction for the Sanskritist into the technicalities of the four post-Kaniskean schools. For in spite of this work having been written some centuries after the disappearance of Buddhism from India and with the help of indirect sources, yet its richness of information, its limited size and the very admirable and richly annotated translation by DE LA VALLÉE POISSIN, place it among the most important sources of information concerning Buddhism.

In the following analysis (cf. here book IV section VII D and criticism I shall refer to the translation mentioned Muséon, Nouvelle Série II p. 52—73, p. 171—207, III p. 40—54, 391—401 and the edition in the Ānandācārya series, Poona respectively abbreviated as M. II, M. III; and P.).

Before commencing my analysis I should like to remind the reader of the plan of composition which Mādhava Ācārya has followed in his *Samgrahaṇa*. He describes here sixteen systems of which the Cāmpkāra-Vedānta is the last. The order, chosen, depends on the philosophical value, assigned to each of the systems. Therefore nine heterodox systems are described first and then the seven orthodox Darśanas; besides the six, commonly called so, we find here a Pāṇini-Darśana. „Mādhava — says COWILL — uses this peculiar term because the grammarians adopted and fully developed the idea of the Paryavānāśa school that sound is eternal. He therefore treats of *śphoṭa* here and not in his Jainini chapter”. The determination of their philosophical value clearly shows the narrow-mindedness of the author and the influence of sectarian jealousy and prejudice. So we find for instance placed second and fourth the Bauddha System and the Rāmāṇja-Vedānta, but ninth the mercurial system teaching the effecting of an artificial ecstasy with the help of drogues.

Further Mādhava aims at showing how all the heterodox sects refute each other. Thus the Bauddha chapter begins with a polemic against the materialists Cārvākas who deny inference to be one of the trustworthy sources of knowledge, whereas the next chapter on the Jains begins with a long passage against the doctrine of complete momentariness, upheld by the Bauddhas.

In the polemics against the Cārvākas, with reference to *anuvāsa*, Mādhyava uses two quotations from DHARMAKĪRTI M. II 57; M. III 392; P. 5 & M. II 61, M. III 393; P. 7, one of the most known Buddhist authors on logic. Further De la Vallée Poussin mentions a few parallels between this introduction and the Nyāyabindu and the Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā see his notes n<sup>o</sup>. 8 and 10. Thus we may conclude the introduction to the Buddhist chapter to have been borrowed either directly or indirectly from the Buddhist logicians.

The exposition of Buddhism itself begins thus. (M. II 61; P. 7). Les bouddhistes ont résider la suprême utilité de l'homme dans une quadruple méditation (*catvārcidhā bhūcānā*). Connus sous les noms de Mādhyamikas, de Yogācāras, de Sautrāntikas et de Vaibhāṣikas, les bouddhistes soutiennent respectivement les doctrines du vide complet (*sarva-śūnyatā*), du vide externe (*bhūya-śūnyatā*), de l'aperception indirecte des choses extérieures (*bhūyārthānameyatā*) et de leur aperception immédiate (*bhūyārthā-pratyakṣatā*).

After a sentence on the diversity of teaching (la diversité de l'enseignement) comes another passage which I should like to quote:

„Tout est momentané, momentané; douleur, douleur, individuel, individuel, vide, vide". C'est cette quadruple méditation (*bhūcānā-catuṣṭaya*) qui a été enseignée [par le Maître].

We must notice that Mādhyava uses, in the passages quoted, the term *bhūcānā* in different meanings: in the first passage with reference to the main dogmas of the four sects: in the second to the four main points distinguished by himself in the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra doctrines (see here book IV section VII table D).

This second *bhūcānā-catuṣṭaya*<sup>1</sup> reminds us of a passage in WASSILIEW'S Buddhismus, where the 'Hauptpunkte der Hīnayāna-Lehren' are described (p. 108):

„Endlich beschäftigt vorzugsweise nicht nur die alten Cārvāka's, sondern auch alle übrigen buddhistischen Schulen, indem die Entscheidung derselben einen Ausgangspunkt für ihre philosophischen Anschauungen bildet, eine viel abstractere, wahrscheinlich später als alle übrigen hervorgetretene Frage, nämlich: ob die Existenz der Materie anzunehmen sei? Diese Frage ist unzweifelhaft eine Entwicklung des buddhistischen Begriffs von der *Qual* und der *Concretheit* aller Gegenstände, welche *nichts Dauerndes* repräsentiren und, indem sie temporär existiren, Umwandlungen unterworfen sind, weshalb der Geist auch *bei nichts halt machen kann*."

<sup>1</sup> Cf. moreover Ny. Sutra IV, 1 and here book IV section VI.

This second formula, then, which really belonged both to the Hinayāna and the Mahāvāna schools, was used by Mādhyava as groundwork for his exposition of the Mahāvāna schools. This innovation of his, however, led to incompleteness in the description and might give the impression that the authentic and revered dogmas of the Four Noble Truths and the Pratītya-samutpāda were only adopted by the Hinayāna. It is almost superfluous to contradict this.

If we examine e. g. NYĀYARAJA'S Mādhyamika Śāstra<sup>1</sup>, then we can clearly distinguish three groups of chapters: *A.* cap. III—A discussion on the *śatadharma* &c.; *B.* cap. IV—XII description of *śāśvata-rāga* cap. VI, *apadāna* cap. IX, *śāśvata* specially cap. XI, *duḥkha* cap. XII; *C.* cap. XXII—XXVI discussion on the most revered dogmas of the Buddhistic church, the nature of the Buddha, the Four Noble Truths, the Nirvāṇa and the Pratītya-samutpāda (or *deśadāśāya*). This arrangement gives us quite another insight into the Mādhyamika school and proves the insufficiency of Mādhyava's exposition.

#### § 1. Mādhyava's exposition of the Mādhyamika school.

In the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha the Mādhyamika school is described under the four headings: *kṣāṇabhāṅga*, *duḥkha*, *śāśvata-rāga*, *caṇḍatā*. The discussion on the *kṣāṇabhāṅga* contains two points, *a.* the *kṣāṇikavāda* itself (M. II 62—71, P. 7—10), *b.* the refutation of *sāmānya* and the two other Vaiśeṣika notions: *viśeṣa* and *sāmānya* (M. II 71—73 P. 10—11).

A passage parallel to *a* is found in the Nyāya-kandali p. 73 &c., where the eternality of soul is upheld: passages parallel to *b* ibidem p. 12 l. 17 and p. 317—320, where the Vaiśeṣika notion of *sāmānya* is discussed.

I should like to lay stress on the fact that in passage *a* and its parallel in the Nyāya-kandali, *kṣāṇa* does not simply mean: 'moment, indivisible duration', but 'momentary, individual contents of consciousness', as example of such a *kṣāṇa* the 'sensation "blue"' is often mentioned in the Nyāya-kandali (cf. M. II 172 note 50).

We may surmise that the *kṣāṇavāda* which taught the momentary existence of everything, took its origin in the Sautrāntika

<sup>1</sup> See W. L. G. 's translation.

school (see DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, *Opinions* p. 178 &c. ), that it was accepted by Praçastapāda with slight alterations (see JACON, J.A.O.S., anno 1911 p. 29 ), but that it was totally changed in character by the Mādhyamikas. For them the original *ḥṣaṇḍika-cāda* was not radical enough. For if we suppose that time exists, that it goes on in a succession of temporal atoms, then there would be a fixed arrangement of all the things in the world during such a temporal atom. The acute dialectics of the Mādhyamikas would, however, discover many antinomies in the notion of such a momentarily fixed relation between all things. Not temporal atoms, therefore, but a chaos of momentary sensations was the ultimate result arrived at by this mania of negation. So with them the formula '*sarvaṃ ḥṣaṇḍam*' became really identical with the formula '*sarvaṃ śalabhsaṇḍam*'. And in accordance with this the denial of genus and the *apoharāḍa* were discussed by MĀDHAVA together with the *ḥṣaṇḍabhāṇḍa*, though both dogmas could just as well have been considered as appendices to the *śalabhsaṇḍa-cāda*.

With reference to passage *b* — which contains this denial of genus and the *apoharāḍa*, i.e. a defense of an extreme nominalism upholding genus to be neither *in re* nor *in conceptu* — we may notice that this refutation of *śūnātāṇa* has taken in Mādhyava's account, the form of a polemic against the Vaiṣeṣikas, in as far as *vīṣa* and *samavāya* are also brought in. Yet I do not believe the Buddhist *apoharāḍa* to have been first laid down as a reply to the Vaiṣeṣika theory. For not the Vaiṣeṣikas, but the Pārva-mīmāṃsakas and — through their influence — the Brahmanic Naiyāyikas were the great antagonists of the Buddhists (see here p. 16 § 4). A reason for thinking that there has been an active interchange of thoughts for centuries between Buddhists and Brahmanic theologicians, is the frequent occurrence of the problematic eternality or transiency of sound in the passages of the Buddhist logical works<sup>1</sup>, dealing with the theory of inference. For the belief in the eternality of sound was a question of vital importance for the Pārva-mīmāṃsakas. And it was their grammatical and exegetical studies which led them to raise the question whether words refer to individuals or to classes. Their answer to this question was attacked by the Buddhists, and vice versa KUMĀRĪYA'S *Cloka-vārttika* refutes the *apoharāḍa* in connection with the '*śalabhsaṇḍa-cāda*'

<sup>1</sup> See VIDYASARASVAHYA'S *Madhyakal School* passim.

The passages on the notions *daḥḥa* (M. II. 171) and *scalakṣaṇatva* (M. II. 171) are very short.

In the passage on *caṇaḥata*, as conceived by the Mādhyamikas, we may distinguish four points:

a. M. II. 172. Proof for the thesis that the object and the qualities of the object and the relation between object and qualities, and further the act of perceiving and the agent of perceiving do not exist. This thesis is proved by the examples of the dream and the *albhāsa* (e. g. the taking the shell for silver).

[NOTE. The same argumentation, attributed here by MādHYA VAJESHIKA to the Mādhyamikas, has already been met with in the discussion of the Nyāya-Sūtra, the Būdarāyana-Sūtra and BOBHAYANA'S Vṛtti on the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra. Further we have seen that KUMARILA in the Cloka-vārttika and CAṆKARA Ācārya in the Vedānta-Bhāṣya refute a rather similar argumentation, used by the Yogācāras for proving the non-existence of external things only. It is interesting to see here that MādHYA VAJESHIKA has accepted the formula in its oldest form and application].

b. M. II. 173. The fourfold formula, *saccaṃ anābhayaṃ, saccaṃ daḥḥam, saccaṃ scalakṣaṇam, saccaṃ caṇaḥataṃ*, gives the order in which the *sacca-cāṇaḥata* is to be proved.

c. M. II. 174. Proof for the thesis: „La nature des choses *totale*, c'est le vide, dépourvu des quatre alternatives, être, non-être, être et non-être, ni être ni non-être.”

[NOTE. Though in this often quoted formula four alternatives are successively denied and the third alternative is obtained by a combination of the two first, yet we must not think exclusively *this* form to be used by the Mādhyamikas. So for instance we find in Nāgārjuna's Cāstra (WALLISER, die mittlere Lehre nach der tibetischen Version p. 11) the following instance:

„Das Tun ist nicht mit Bedingungen behaftet, nicht mit Bedingungen behafteteres Tun existiert nicht,  
„Nicht mit Tun behaftete Bedingungen existieren nicht,  
existieren sie denn mit Tun behaftet?”

Here are successively denied: the existence of an action dependent on conditions, the existence of an action independent of conditions, the existence of conditions exempt from action, the existence of conditions accompanied by action. Here the third proposition is obtained by the conversion of the first. Neither is the number of the propositions necessarily limited to four, it may vary according to the case. So e. g. a proposition containing two terms may be put

in nine different forms owing to the proposition successively being put in a negative, a double negative and a combined negative-positive form with reference to either of the terms cf. Nāgārjuna's *Cāstra* chapter VIII.

*d.* M. 175. The *apartharāṇatva* is only allowed at the standpoint of relative truth.

### § 5. *Mādhava's exposition of the Yogācāra school.*

MADHAVĀ ĀCĀRYA begins his exposition of the Yogācāra school by saying (M. II. 177): „Ils adhèrent à la quadruple méditation enseignée par le maître et à la vacuité des [phénomènes] externes, mais ils, . . . se demandent: dans quel sens la vacuité des [phénomènes] internes a-t-elle été admise [par Bhagavat]?” Thus the Yogācāra accepts the formula *sarvāṃ bhāṇakāṃ, sarvāṃ duḥkhaṃ, sarvāṃ śvalakṣaṇāṃ, sarvāṃ cāṇanāṃ*, but the last member of this formula is restricted to external phenomena, whereas the existence of psychical phenomena is acknowledged. Concerning this last point Mādhava Ācārya is here very short, he only mentions the *śaśaṃcetanā* ‘self-consciousness’ accepted by the Yogācāra and quotes from DHARMAKĪRTI a verse in which this self-consciousness — the being aware of one’s self as perceiving — is upheld:

„*apratyaksopalaṃbhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasaṅgaḥ*”.

i.e. „Si l’aperception n’est pas évidente, elle ne peut pas rendre visibles les choses extérieures”.

Then leaving this topic<sup>1</sup> Mādhava Ācārya gives three argumentations by which the Yogācāra proved the non-existence of external objects. These three argumentations are the following:

*b.* The external object can neither be produced, nor non-produced. (M. II. p. 178).

*c.* „Direz-vous: ‘C’est quand elle est passée que la chose devient objet de la connaissance; — parce qu’elle engendre la connaissance?’ — C’est parler comme un enfant car 1. cette explication est contredite par le fait que nous avons conscience de l’actualité [de l’objet de la connaissance], et 2. elle entraîne la perceptibilité des sens et [des autres facteurs de la connaissance].”

*d.* External things can neither be atoms (undivisible bodies) nor aggregates (divisible bodies) (M. II. p. 178-179).

After having thus proved indirectly that external things do not

<sup>1</sup> Indicated in the table referred to in book IV, section VII, sub D. — by the letter *a*.



exist and that psychical states and the so called external things are really one, Mādhava mentions

*e.* a direct proof M. II p. 180—185; P. 13) for the oneness (*abheda*) of object *grāhya* and subject *grāhaka*.

The argumentations, here summed up *b—e*, give rise to the following observations

argumentation *b* is borrowed from the Mādhyamikas by the Yogācāras; it points out the supposed difficulties of the notion '*vyatti*', but does not derive this antinomy from the externality of the objects discussed; so we have here to do with a capricious restriction in the application of the argument.

argumentation *c* is again borrowed from the Mādhyamikas, it originally consisted of three members which show the impossibility of perception in the case of precedence, simultaneity or subsequence of the object with reference to its perception (cf. Nyāya-sūtra II. 1. 18 &c. and JACOBI, J.A.O.S. vol. XXXI p. 13);

argumentation *d* again originally belonged to the Mādhyamika school and was accepted without any change by the Yogācāras. We have met with this argumentation in the Nyāya-sūtra IV, 2. 4 and the Vedānta-sūtra II. 2. 12 &c.). It occurs in the Nyāya-kandali on p. 41 &c., namely in the comments on a paragraph, discussing fire *tejas*.

Passage *e* may be compared i. a. with Ācārya's interpretation of Ved. Sūtra II. 2. 28—32, Kumārila-Bhaṭṭa's comment on M. S. I. 1. 5 section 2 &c., and finally with a long discussion in CRIDHARA'S Nyāyakandali p. 122 ff. In the last mentioned case (we may notice) this insertion, discussing 'twoness' i. e. 'the separate existence of external things and psychical perception' is placed under Praṣastapāda's paragraph on 'twoness, threeness &c. and number in general'. CRIDHARA was obliged to make use of this forced insertion, since Praṣastapāda nowhere refers to this epistemological question.

The argument *e* deserves still more of our attention. It really consists of two parts, the second of which can be found in the first paragraphs of the account given by Mādhava of the Sautrāntika school M. II p. 185—193. These paragraphs namely have the form of a dialogue between a Vijnāna-vādin and a Sautrāntika.

The first part of the argument can be expressed in its Yogācāra-form thus: the duality, supposed to exist between an object and our precept of it, has epistemologically the same value — i. e. untrustworthiness — as the quality which man, during dream or hallucination, imagines to exist between his mental fancy and its

object. This part is an adaptation of a Mādhyamika argumentation for the *vyākṛānta* of everything (see M. II 172—173).

The second part (cf. here book IV section VII, A and ibidem B sub II) had originally this form: 'it is not true that the form of the object moulds the mindstuff and gives it a similar form, so that man may conclude, on the ground of the existence of this internal shape that an object of a corresponding form exists externally, but the object with its form and the percept with its form are identical'. In other words: the second part of the argument *e* was originally a refutation of the 'imposition theory', teaching the external objects imposing their form on the mind-stuff (*vyākṛānta*) of the soul — a theory we may notice, closely resembling the idea which an ordinary man, one not trained in philosophical thought, possesses concerning the process of perception. According to this naive conception consciousness is a kind of looking-glass in which the external objects are reflected or a waxen table in which the impressions coming from outside, are stamped.

The refutation of this imposition-theory was perhaps already put forward by the Mādhyamikas; but they only intended to show the unsufficiency of human intellect.

The argumentation became, however, the basis of the whole Yogācāra philosophy: the identity of object and percept was then more fully explained by the aid of its theory of *ālaya-* and *pravṛtti-vijñāna*. Before entering upon this dogma (§ 7 n°. 1) I should like to insert here a paragraph on the different theories of general psychology and psychology of perception which have been current in Buddhistic philosophy.

#### § 6. *Psychological and epistemological theories current in Buddhistic systems.*

In this paragraph I shall give a short exposition of some psychological and epistemological ideas which have been accepted in Buddhistic systems, either for a shorter or longer time with more or less adherence, but the traces of which will be often found in the Brahmanic texts such as the Nyāya-kandali dealing with Buddhism.

1. Soul no permanent entity. Soul as a permanent entity does not exist. The series of states of consciousness forms the only psychical reality. We may distinguish in them two classes: 1. 'the reflections referring to the Ego' or those states of consciousness in which the individual feels himself to be the perceiver of the objects, to be the thinker of his thoughts &c. 2. all other reflections and

all perceptions i.e. those states of consciousness in which the individual becomes aware of his own moods, desires &c., or of external objects.

The first class is called that of the *ālaya-vijñāna*, a term translated by SALVAIN LEVY as 'sensation du tréfond': this notion reminds us of the *ahamkāra* of Brahmanic philosophy.

In the system of the Vijñānavādins the series of *vijñānas* is determined by *cāraṇa*<sup>1</sup> M. II p. 192, in that of the Sautrāntikas by the causal influence which the really existing, external objects exercise on the soul.

References. Candrakāśī-Ācārya's interpretation of Ved. Sūtra II. 2. 31, Mādhyama's *saṃva-dāraṇa-samgraha*, Mus. II p. 191—193.

2. Perception not preceded by a physical process which is transmitted through a medium. In other words, neither do the sense-organs travel through space and grasp *pṛthak* the objects, nor do the objects themselves send out their influence, e.g. in the form of soundwaves: but the objects remaining separated from the body of the perceiver, exercise a direct influence on the internal organ of the perceiver. Thus each most ordinary perception may be called a process of telepathy.

References. Ānandabhaṅgī's Nyāya-kandali p. 23 and the Nyāya-kōṣa s.v. *prāpya-pratīṣṭhā-kāritva*.

3. Existence of *cijñāna* as mindstuff *चित्तम्*. There exists a kind of mindstuff which is similar to the other elements, earth, water &c. The object causes — either through a physical medium or through a process described under n<sup>o</sup>. 2—a change of form in this mindstuff.

References. We see traces of this naive conception in 1. the *vijñāna* being called a *dhātu* just as *pṛthivī*, *āpas* &c. see KERN, Manual of Buddhism p. 55 note 3. 2 the imposition theory as upheld by the Sautrāntikas, see Mādhyama's account.

4. For one moment can the object of our consciousness be only one. We shall meet this idea again in the Prajñāpāda-bhāṣya, for the whole theory of the origination of number<sup>1</sup>, is the result of it. The general idea, however, has been still more restricted by some of the Buddhists: then it may be formulated thus: for one moment only one sensation can occur in our consciousness. This is the radical *śaṅkṣānupātā-vāda* (theory of of concreteness) as conceived by the Mādhyamikas. It is in flagrant contradiction with the teachings of our internal perception.

<sup>1</sup> See here book IV chapter III. (para 1 § 1—5)

NOTE. This idea of such a limitation that only one percept or concept or sensation may enter mind for one moment, is far spread, not only in India, but also in Europe. We find it for instance in the beginning of KANT'S *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. This does not take away the fact of its being totally wrong. In one moment a whole thought, nay even a complection of thoughts, for instance the contents of a book, may be in our consciousness, although more felt than clearly perceived. The mutual connection of thoughts, and that of concepts, in consciousness does not resemble a river in which the drops of water are bordering each other in space and pass the same spot in temporal succession. For although in psychical matters the factor of time is prominent, yet the relation between the psychical contents cannot be described as a mere temporal relation. A whole thought is often the contents of our consciousness, and remains so for some time, whilst meanwhile the notions, contained in it, are placed one after the other, in the centrum of our attention. The erroneous idea of one percept only existing one moment, is the consequence of a complete lack of insight in the importance which the 'subliminal' has in conscious life.<sup>1)</sup>

References. See the appendix to the chapter on the Vedānta n°. 6 p. 75 and the passage on *sphoṭa* in the Nyāyakandali 268, 24, translated here in book III.

5. The explanation of variegated colour. A question, often discussed by Buddhists, by the Vaiśeṣika philosopher CĀRĪDHARA<sup>2)</sup> and by all writers of syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is the following: how is the perception of variegated colour caused? Though many of their argumentations may by their subtleness irritate the European reader, yet their laying down of this problem, is highly to be praised.

NOTE. In order to show its importance I shall choose here a similar example, taken from modern European physiological psychology: When we put our hand in water — of the same temperature as the surrounding atmosphere — we receive the impression of wetness. Now man possesses in his skin only two kinds of nerves, nerves sensitive for temperature and those for pressure. Although therefore wetness seems to be a simple sensation, it is really a com-

1) These two shortcomings of Indian psychology -- its insufficient understanding of the „stream of thought“ and its ignorance about the existence of the subliminal -- also led to the complicated *sphoṭa*-theory of language.

2) Nyāya-kandali p. 30

pound of a feeling of cold and a complex of feelings of incessantly varying pressure, owing to the great movableness of the liquid. Thus a seemingly simple sensation is based on a very complicated form of nerve-excitement. In a similar way a speech-sound which is the compound of feelings of touch in the tongue-surface, feelings of tension in the muscles and feelings of audition, gives us the impression of being only a simple unity, whereas really each of the three compounds mentioned, is again a very complicated system of subliminal sensations.

In WASSILJEV'S *Pañcīśanus* 275—276, 302—303, three opinions about the origination of variegated colour are mentioned:

1. „wenn wir etwas Buntfarbiges sehen werden alle Farben desselben so viel über auch sein mögen... in dem zu diesem Buntfarbigen umgewandelten Sinn<sup>1</sup> des Sehens oder in Begriff zurückgestrahlt oder erzeugt. Eben dieses wird auch gleiche Menge des Subjects und Objects genannt.

2. „Andre sagen auch dass... bei der Betrachtung von etwas Buntfarbigem, weder die dunkelblaue noch die gelbe, noch die übrigen Farben sich bei uns darstellen, sondern nur die Buntfarbigkeit und nur diese Form nimmt der Sinn des Sehens an, dieses wird die Zertheilung in die Halften eines Eies genannt“.

3. „Nach Andern... wenn man etwas Buntfarbiges sieht, entsteht — wenn auch das Object selbst sich in dunkelblauer, gelber und den übrigen Farben darstellt, — in dem Sinn des Sehens dennoch nicht eine solche Menge, sondern es wird nur in der Form der Buntfarbigkeit vorgestellt. Dieses wird auch die unterschiedlose Mannigfaltigkeit genannt“.

The difference of the second and third opinion wants a short explanation. According to the third, which agrees with the one, given by modern physiological psychology, the blending of the many colours into the one variegated colour, is a subjective, i. e. somato-psychical process. According to the second the separate colours are themselves changed and blended into one colour, before exercising their influence upon the human eye.

References. — See especially DE LA VALLÉE-POUSSIN, *Mus.* II, p. 189 n. 111.

6. A percept is a result of intuition i. e. the seizing of the object by the sense-organs, combined with reflexion, in which reflexion (*ālīkya-sāga*) remembrance has a predominant part. The only disavowing of this important psychological prin-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. here p. 92 n. 1.

ciple, we may notice, does much credit to the acuteness of Indian thought.

References. 1. *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, Mus. II p. 201—203 description of the Vaibhāṣika school; 2. SATIḢ CANDRA VIDYĀ-  
BHĪṢAṢA, *Mediaeval School of Indian Logic* p. 85 § 14 description  
of Dignāga's explanation of perception; 3. *Praçaṣṭapāda-bhāṣya*  
p. 186 l. 16—19; 4. *Nyāyakandali*, p. 189 l. 13 &c. translated  
here in book III; 5. ATUALAYE'S notes on the *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 215.

§ 7. *Mādhava's description of the Sautrāntika and  
Vaibhāṣika schools.*

With reference to MĀDHAVA'S description of the Sautrāntika and  
Vaibhāṣika school I should like to limit myself to the following  
points:

1. In the dialogue between the Yogācāra- and the Sautrāntika-  
Buddhist Mus. II p. 185—193 only two points of the five which  
I have distinguished <sup>1</sup> in Mādhava's account of the Yogācāra system,  
are considered, namely those termed *c* the temporal relation be-  
tween object and percept and *v* the direct proof for the oneness  
between object and percept. The answer to point *c* runs „L'objet,  
mis en contact avec l'organe, possède la qualité d'imprimer sa forme  
à la connaissance qui va être produite: et il s'en ensuit que cet  
objet possède la qualité de pouvoir être connu par raisonnement  
(*anumāna*) en raison de la forme [qu'il a] imprimée [à la connais-  
sance]” [M. II p. 188]. The answer to point *v* contains inter alia  
the following argumentation: „L'objet qui est interne apparaît  
comme externe? Cela est inadmissible car étant posé qu'il n'y a  
pas de choses externes puisqu'elles ne peuvent prendre naissance,  
il est absurde d'établir la comparaison 'comme externe', quelle per-  
sonne sensée dira jamais: 'Vasumitra a l'apparence d'un fils de  
femme stérile'” [Mus. II p. 187].

2. The explanation of *samudaya* or *pratityasamutpāda* [M. II  
p. 197—199] is not an enumeration of the twelve *nidānas* (KLRX,  
*Manual of Buddhism* p. 47), but the distinction of causes into two  
classes (*pratyaḡaya* and *hetu*) which might be called 'transient and  
immanent causes' or more correctly 'the materials and the succes-  
sive stages in the internal development of things'. Both classes of  
causes lead ultimately to pain (*duḥkha*) and further only they are

— — —  
<sup>1</sup> Here p. 89



asserted to be active in this world so that the activity of an *Iyara* is here excluded.

3. According to Mādhava's plan of composition <sup>1</sup> each sect of the Buddhists is shown to refute the preceding one: so the Yogācāras hold up the existence of self-consciousness (M. II p. 177 *sva-samvedhana*) against the Mādhyamikas, the Sautrāntikas the existence of external things against the Yogācāras. Similarly the Vaibhāṣikas refute the theory of perception given by the Sautrāntikas.

The last-mentioned school, as we have seen, explains perception by the imposition-theory. From the internal form of the *vijñāna* we infer the existence of the external thing with its form. The Vaibhāṣikas contradicting this explanation, assert our perception to be direct, when our sense-organs grasp the object, then we perceive by an immediate process this object. The seizing of the object by the organs and its perception are identical. A causal relation between the object and a supposed creation of an internal form does not exist, neither is therefore perception a kind of inference.

(M. II p. 200) „Si le connaissable ne peut être connu que par raisonnement, il n'existe aucune chose qui soit évidente: donc il n'est point d'appui pour la connaissance de concomitance invariable, donc il est impossible que le raisonnement entre en jeu”.

(M. II 206) „Les Vaibhāṣikas soutiennent que l'objet [même] est atteint par la connaissance: les Sautrāntikas ne veulent pas que l'objet du *pratyakṣa* soit extérieur” [in other words the Sautrāntikas teach that the external object creates by causal influence an internal form in the human *vijñāna*].

4. Besides a refutation of the imposition-theory we receive, from Mādhava's account of the Vaibhāṣika school, information concerning the positive belief of this sect about perception (M. II p. 201).

This is the theory of the *savikalpaka*- and *avikalpaka-jñāna* (M. II 201—203) which has been referred to in the precedent paragraph under n<sup>o</sup>. 6. This theory was not restricted to the Vaibhāṣikas; it was accepted by Dīrghāgā and in general by the Yogācāras, by the Brahmanic Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and Pūrva-mīmāṃsakas. Of the Buddhists the Sautrāntikas too have adopted it. This at least becomes probable from the description of the *śāundhas* which Mādhava gives in the passage dealing with that sect. For there (M. II p. 195 f.) we find the *vijñānaśāundha* defined as 'le courant des *pravṛtti-vijñānas* et des *ālāya-vijñānas*' and the *saṃjñāśāundha* as 'le courant des [*pravṛtti*]-*vijñānas* exprimés par les

<sup>1</sup> Cf. here p. 84.

mots '*rahas*' &c. cf. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN. *ibidem* note 132.

Moreover, this distinction between the vague or immediate sensations and the fully developed and by psychical influences distinct percepts, can be very well adapted to the imposition-theory. We have only to posit that the external object causes in our consciousness a vague form which only can be fully developed by the influence of associations with latent psychical impressions.

§ 2. *The Study of logic in Buddhism.*

The contributions of the Buddhists towards the science of logic will be expounded in book II chapter VI section 2.



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## BOOK II.

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DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM.

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## PRELIMINARY REMARK.

*Use of the sources and arrangement in the following exposition.*

SCALI, the Italian historian of Indian scientific philosophy, has followed principally the arrangement of the Indian compositions themselves: thus he discusses successively: the categories in general, the category of substance, of quality, of movement, of generality, of particularity, of inherence, of negation: only deviating from his Indian examples in so far as he has given separate chapters on the theory of causality and on the theory of knowledge at the end of his account.

This order has its advantages and disadvantages. It offers great facilities when dealing with the more recent texts of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika: nearly all of which are based on the same scheme of composition. But when we have to do with texts such as the Vaiṣeṣika-Sūtra and the Praçastapāda-Bhāṣya which differ greatly from each other in composition, there the advantage, gained by SCALI'S method is completely lost.

But there is a more serious objection. The form, chosen by the Indian scholiasts, is anything but praiseworthy. The separate treatment of substances, then of qualities and lastly of actions (movements) instead of a complete discussion of every substance together with its characteristic qualities and actions, does not give scientific insight, but has only led to worthless, dialectic subtleties. And should we still force ourselves to obey the original form of composition, there would be the chance of our overlooking interesting thoughts in our system through the overwhelming mass of scholastic formalism.

Therefore, we need a new arrangement, in which according to European habits of thoughts, physics, mathematical speculation, psychology, logic, ethics, theology, will be chosen as headings.

But though in this way, I hope to make my subject more interesting, I do not deny that the adopted scheme presents certain drawbacks. So for instance the form of Praçastapāda's Bhāṣya is in agreement with its aim of giving a full and accurate classification and distinction of the categories and their subdivisions, whereas I have treated this subject as of secondary importance and bestowed on it a single paragraph.

As I have intimated before, I have limited my study principally to Kaṇāda's Sūtra, Praçastapāda's Bhāṣya and Cudhama's Nyāya-kandalī. Before I entered upon the study of these works, I had to make myself acquainted with their methods and aims, as well as I could, with the help of the easier texts, written in India during the last centuries on behalf of elementary instruction, works such as: the Tarkabhāṣā, the Tarkakauṃudī, the Nyāya-siddhānta-muktavah. No doubt, references to these works would have been easy, the more so as these texts of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiçṣika have often been explained in the last years both by Occidental and Indian scholars; I think it however, not desirable to begin a comparison of the oldest form of the Vaiçṣika system with its latest outcome, and to leave out the historical link between them: the scholastic researches of GANGEJA and his immediate followers. And to extend my studies already as far as the Tattva-Cintāmaṇi, would be a hopeless undertaking.

With reference to my use of the Sūtra, Bhāṣya and Kandalī I have to make the following remarks. I have put the results of my study of the Kandalī, in the form of translations of the most important fragments. They make the third book of the present work. In this book, I have referred to the Kandalī only occasionally, in those cases where it could be of use for the understanding of the older texts.

Further, I have as a rule followed in my exposition this order: first I have collected all the sūtras which bear upon the subject and quoted the translation, given by NĀNDA LAL SINGH, then I have examined, how far this translation is based on the context and drift of the sūtras themselves and to what extent Çaṅkara Miçra's interpretations might have obscured the original meaning. After this I have consulted the passages of Praçastapāda's Bhāṣya, bearing on the same subject. If necessary, I shall translate them, otherwise merely refer to them. A full translation of the Bhāṣya seems superfluous, since this work has been promised by SCALF<sup>1</sup>.

From what I have said, the relation of my exposition to the Sūtra- and Bhāṣya-text will be clear. What Kaṇāda and Praçastapāda have treated separately under the headings quality and action, will be discussed here immediately in connection with the substance to which they belong. The subject-matter which Praçastapāda has collected under the headings, generality, particularity and inherence, forms a part of the next chapter.

<sup>1</sup> See Introduction, p. 32 note.

## CHAPTER I.

### GENERAL QUESTIONS OF METAPHYSICS.

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#### SECTION I.

#### GENERAL EXPOSITION AND APPRECIATION.

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§ 1. *Sūtras bearing upon the division of the categories.*  
(Nanda Lal Sinha's translation).

I, 1, 4 The supreme good [results] from the knowledge, produced by a particular *dharma*, of the essence of the predicables, substance, attribute, action, genus, species and combination, by means of their resemblances and differences.

Or: the supreme good [results] from [the study of] this treatise or system, produced by a particular virtue, which teaches the knowledge &c.

5 Earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self and mind [are] the only substances.

6 Attributes are colour, taste, smell and touch, numbers, measures, separateness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, understandings, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion and volitions.

7 Throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contraction, expansion and motion are actions.

§ 2. *Quotations from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B*  
(containing extracts from Candrakānta Tarkālakāra's notes, p. 1.

To sūtra I, 1. 4: „*Dharma* presents two aspects, that is, under the characteristic of *pravṛtti* or wordly activity, and the characteristic of *nivṛtti* or withdrawal from wordly activity. Of these *dharma*, characterised by *nivṛtti* brings forth *tattva-jñāna* or knowledge of truths, by means of removal of sins and other blemishes... The



separate enumeration of *sāmānya* &c. is unnecessary on account of their non-divergence: for *sāmānya* &c., falling, as they do, within substance &c. do not differ from the latter. Their separate mention, however, is justified on the possibility of difference in the mode of treatment, adopted by the author. Systems, differing in their methods are thought for the benefit of embodied souls, differing from one another. This is, then, the Vaiśeṣika system, of which the distinctive features are *sāmānya* &c. . . . Accordingly, this system is enabled to stand apart by means of *sāmānya* and the other predicables, and so it is called the Vaiśeṣika system. .

„*Sāmānya* means possession of similarity. . . Doubt and error arise from [observation of] *sāmānya* and from non-observation of *viśeṣa* or [distinctive] peculiarity. . . False cognition, again, is the root of all suffering. It is for this reason that *sāmānya* has been separately mentioned.

„*Viśeṣa* is that by which a thing is reduced to itself. False cognition which springs from [observation only of] the common property is corrected by the observation of the distinctive property: whence arises correct knowledge which is called *tattva-jñāna*. . . For this reason *viśeṣa* is separately mentioned, although it is included in substance &c. If again it is a single reality that, being determined in particular ways, comes to be used as *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, then it falls within [the class of] attributes. Or, if these are mere technical names, then they are not additional predicables.

„*Samavāya* means complete approximation, i. e. identification, as has been said ‘*samarāya* is inseparable existence’. . . *samarāya* is an attribute, which is the counter-opposite of separateness, either characterised as plurality or characterised as difference in kind. It inheres in substance, and does not possess attribute; nor is it a form of action. Now, birth means a particular conjunction [of the self] with the body, the senses and the feelings. Thereafter the Jiva errs that the self has no separate existence from the body &c. in consequence of which a person transmigrates and suffers a multitude of pains and on the cessation of which he is liberated, the stream of sufferings being dried up. Hence *samarāya*, though included in attribute, is separately mentioned. . .

„The supreme good results from knowledge of truth about the self, &c. while knowledge of truth about the rest is auxiliary to it. False knowledge about the self &c. is of various kinds, e.g. the sense of non-ego in the ego, the sense of ego in the non-ego.”

Ibidem p. II note to I, 1, 5; „CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA observes: the separate mention of time and space is intended to

indicate the difference in the uses of these terms according to the difference of the effects. *Īkāṇa*, though it is one, still admits of a variety of names and uses, according to the difference of effects. It is not that time and space are essentially different objects from *ākāṇa*, ether."

§ 3. *Annotations to sūtras I. 1, 4—7 and to Nanda Lal Sinha's translations*

I. 1, 4 is considered by BODAS (J.R.A.S. Bombay Br. vol XIX p. 329) as not authentic. "This sūtra . . . most probably later interpolation. . . . Besides it is very awkwardly worded, if not positively ungrammatical. . . . According to the Kiraṇāvali this passage of the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya [scil. Praç. Bh. book I chapter 1 § 2 & 3] explains only the first three sūtras of Kaṇāda which implies that the fourth sūtra quoted was unknown to the scholiast".<sup>1</sup> According to my opinion UDAYANA intends only to say that paragraph 3 refers to sūtra I. 1, 1—3, but he does not mean to comment on paragraphs 2 and 3 together. For it is quite out of the question to suppose that V.S. I. 1, 4 containing the important enunciation of the categories was lacking not only in PRAÇASTAPĀDA'S, but even in GRIDHARA'S and Udayana's time.

Though I believe Praçastapāda to have known the four first sūtras in the form in which they are now preserved, still in accordance with my introduction<sup>2</sup> I uphold the idea that sūtra I. 1, 4 has only gradually got its present redaction. So *sādharmya* was originally the same as *sāmānya*, and *vidharmya* the same as *viśeṣa* and moreover only three categories were distinguished: *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman* (Cf. V. S. VIII. 2, 3). In those days the sūtra might have run for instance: "*dravyagūṇākarmāṇāṃ* <sup>3</sup> *padārthāṇāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣābhyāṃ tattvajñānān nīhreyasam*". I am inclined to believe that and the sūtras I. 1, 1—3 and the expression "*dharmaviśeṣa-prasūtāḥ*" in sūtra 4 are of later origin than the rest of sūtra 4.

With reference to NANDA LAL SINHA'S translation I should like to remark that I myself am accustomed to use the expressions: categories, quality, generality, peculiarity (or difference) and inherence, instead of those chosen by Nanda Lal Sinha: predicables, attribute, genus, species and combination. The signification of

<sup>1</sup> The passage referred to by BODAS occurs on p. 13 of the Benares-edition of this work (1885) at the end of the comments on Praçastapada-bhāṣya book I chapter 1 § 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. here p. 12; p. 18; p. 21 § 3.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Nyaya-sūtra I. 1, 1.

*sāmānya* is not yet fixed in the sūtra, sometimes preserving the old meaning: resemblance, generality, sometimes approaching the notion of genus. A similar remark applies to *viśeṣa*. For *śamavāya* cf. here Introduction p. 12.

I. 1. 5. The translation of *ākāśa* by ether is very misleading. *ākāśa* has nothing in common either with the Greek notion of *αἴθερ*, or with the notion of ether, as conceived by modern European physics. It is „space as the medium through which sound is transmitted”. I have called it ‘physical space’ in order to distinguish it from *diś*, i.e. space regarded with reference to direction, termed by me ‘mathematical space’.

I. 1. 6. In my translation of *parimāṇa* I use without discrimination the terms: measure or extension: for *bodhi* I have chosen as translations: intellection or cognition.

I. 1. 7. I cannot agree with the explanation of the five kinds of movements which was given by ATHALYL. See his notes on the Tarkasamgraha and here book II chapter III.

#### § 4. *Criticism on the notes of Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra.*

Although CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṂKĀRA’S edition of the Vaiśeṣika Darśana is highly praised by JACOBI (in his article on Indian Logic), I must confess that I was not favourably impressed by the extracts which NANDA LAL SINHA has given from this editor’s comments. I considered therefore a full study of this work unnecessary. His notes have the same tendency as shown by older Indian commentaries. These scholars instead of explaining what needs explanation seem to consider it their task to put in the text their own thoughts as far as possible. They remain theologians and philology is not to be expected from them. Typical in this respect are: the mentioning of doubt and error, false knowledge and suffering on account of the term *sāmānya*, of *tattvajñāna* on account of *viśeṣa*; of the relation between body and soul on account of *śamavāya*.

Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra’s opinion, according to which mathematical space, time and physical space are considered by the Vaiśeṣikas to be really one and only by appearance several, is not based on any sūtra and is explicitly contradicted by the Bhāṣya.

#### § 5. *Appreciation of the table of categories in the Vaiśeṣika system.*

Although the composition of the Vaiś.-Sūtra is far from clear and elegant, yet the classification of categories, which it has given,

deserves the highest praise. To prove this, I cannot do better than take a quotation from the *Logic* of CHR. SIGWART, in which this European scholar of the nineteenth century tries to delineate the most general rubrics of the human notions. This quotation runs as follows:

„Was wir uns vorstellen und was als Subject oder Prädicat oder Teil des Subjects und Prädicats in unsere Urtheile einzugehen vermögen, sind:

I. Dinge, ihre Eigenschaften und Tätigkeiten, mit deren Modificationen:

II. Relationen der Dinge, ihrer Eigenschaften und Tätigkeiten, und zwar theils räumliche und zeitliche, theils logische, theils causale, theils modale.”

The *Vaiçeśika* table differs from Sigwart's classification: in taking the spacial and temporal relations as qualities (belonging to the second group): in not mentioning the causal relation in the enunciation, though much attention is paid to it in the system itself; in treating number as a quality, although just like generality, particularity and inherence, it is a relation resulting from human comparison: in not distinguishing modality as a separate category. Another difference is this that the *Vaiçeśika* system takes the category 'action' in a much narrower sense than Sigwart. But the proposition of the *Vaiçeśikas* asserting that qualities and actions have no qualities and the formula, chosen by Sigwart, that qualities and actions possess modifications, are probably to be taken as expressions of the same thought.

The great resemblance in both classifications has its foundation in their origin. They are based, just as well as the Aristotelian table of ten categories<sup>1</sup>, on the properties of the human language. For, when taking, into consideration the typical and most original meanings of the word-classes, we are allowed to say that substantives, adjectives, verbs and particles respectively denote things, qualities, actions and relations. And this holds true, though a more developed form of language possesses substantives which denote qualities, relations or actions as well as objects. The adjectives are an exception — and apparently an original one — to this general rule, in as far as several relations, of number, distance, time, rank, must always have been expressed by attributive words. So it is quite natural, that these relations are considered as qualities by the *Vaiçeśika* system.

<sup>1</sup> DEISSEN, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* I. 3, p. 359 also refers to Plato p. 251 C and Plotinus VI. 1—3, where five categories are accepted: *οὐσία*, *ποιεῖν* and *κίνησις*, *πᾶσι* and *ἐν ᾧ* and *ἐκ*.

A semasiological classification of the verbs will show in the clearest way, how the Vajesika conception of action namely as movement or cause of movement is related towards the signification of this part of speech in general. Although such a table, as far as I know, has never been constructed, nevertheless it would have been useful for grammatical speculation. For the system of the cases of any language cannot be explained without an understanding of the relations which may occur between noun and verb. And this again requires a division of the verbs under a few headings, according to their meaning. The following classification is given as an attempt in this direction and at the same time as a basis for my further discussion on the Vajesika categories.

Classification of verbs.

I. Verbs which describe the world in general.

1. intransitives of general description.
  - a. verbs of rest or movement.
  - b. verbs of qualitative state and change.
2. transitives of general description (conveying an idea of causality).
  - a. verbs which express an influence on the rest or movement of neighbouring objects.
  - b. verbs which express an influence on the qualitative state or change of these things.

II. Verbs of description of mental states and processes.

1. verbs of the physical processes which cause mental states
2. verbs of the psychical states and processes themselves.
3. verbs of human actions & sociological verbs.

III. Verbs of abstract relations.

1. verbs expressing relations which result from human comparison and distinction.
2. verbs of temporal relations.
3. verbs of causal relations
4. verbs of modal relations

If we accept as a principle that the main categories may be found by taking the most typical meanings of the word-classes, our group III, the abstract relations, falls out. The same remark holds good to a certain extent for groups I, 2. II, 1 and II, 3, as implying an idea of causality. So three classes of meanings remain: first rest and movement, secondly qualitative physical state and change, thirdly psychical state and process. Rest, physical and psychical state may be left out again, as we had better take them as qualities or relations.

It follows from the enunciation which Kaṇāda gives of action in V.S. I. 1. 7, that he limits this category to physical movement and its causation: only the fixing of the attention in external perception and reflection is explained by him as a movement of an internal organ (*manas*). But all other psychical processes and further all physical changes without exception are taken by him as qualities.

§ 6. *Sūtras bearing on the notion 'karmata' specially.*  
(Nanda Lal Sinha's translation.)

- A. II. 2, 25 The resemblance [of sound], although it is an attribute with actions, consists in its speedy destruction.
- B. V. 1. 1 Action in hand [is produced] by means of conjunction with, and volition, of the soul.
- 2 And from conjunction with the hand a similar action appears in the pestle.
- 3 In the action, produced in the pestle &c. by impact, conjunction with the hand is not a cause, because of the absence [of volition].
- 4 In the case of action in the hand, conjunction with the soul [is not a cause].
- 5 The action [i. e. upward motion] in the hand is from impact and from conjunction with the pestle.
- 6 Action of the body and its members is also from conjunction with the hand.
- V. 2, 21 Space, time and also ether are inactive, because of their difference from that which possesses activity.
- VI. 2, 16 [It has been] declared that the actions of the soul taking place, salvation [results].

NOTE. NANDA LAL SINHA'S appendix B does not contain any notes on these sūtras

§ 7. *The notions qualitative change and action, compared.*  
*Explanation of the sūtra, quoted in § 6 sub A.*

That qualitative changes are not to be considered as actions, is explicitly stated by Kaṇāda in V.S. II. 2, 25, to which CAṆKARA MĪTRA'S commentary (in NANDA LAL SINHA'S translation) runs thus:

..If it is said that as it speedily disappears like throwing upwards &c., therefore, sound is an action; so he says: 'The resemblance' &c. . . . *Apavarga* means speedy destruction. And this, even in the case of attribute-ness, is dependent upon the incidence of a rapidly appearing destroyer, in the same way as duality &c. are.

This constitutes only its resemblance to actions and not its action-ness. The quality of undergoing rapid destruction which you [i.e. the objector] advance as an argument, is not one-pointed, i.e. multifarious, because it is found in duality, knowledge, pleasure, pain, as well. This is the import."

The passage requires some explanation.

The sūtra which I have quoted is a part of a discussion on physical space (ākāśa) and sound. The Vaiśeṣikas teach that sound is only a quality of physical space, and not for instance of a musical instrument, in which only conjunctions and disjunctions take place. These movements produce a quality sound — and not a vibration of molecules, as an European scientist would say — in the immediately surrounding space. This quality sound, spreads itself gradually through space in the same way as the waves do over the water. But its duration is only momentary at every spot of its course. For this reason the opponent in the Upaskāra says: "If it is said, that as it speedily disappears . . . , sound is an action."

The defendant in his answer compares sound first to "duality", afterwards to qualities of the soul: intellections, pleasure and pain. The first comparison will get fully clear in the chapter on Mathematical Notions. For the present I shall merely state that numbers are not thought of as real and intrinsic qualities of objects, but as only momentarily inherent in them and creations of the human mind — or to follow the Vaiśeṣika-system more closely — of the human soul (*ātman*). Certain qualities of this soul namely 'intellections' of numbers, of the number two &c., cause the existence of the correspondent numerical quality in the objective world. Just as the intellection in the soul is considered only to exist three moments, so is the quality in the objects destroyed after three kṣaṇas. This destruction of number in the objects is effectuated by processes — i.e. new qualities — in the soul in a similar way as the production was brought about.

The meaning of this strange theory will be afterwards examined, for the present I only intend to prove that action, i.e. movement, is sharply distinguished from transient quality, and consequently from qualitative physical change.

§ 5. *The notions Psychological Quality and Action, compared.*  
*Explanation of the sūtras, quoted in § 6 sub B.*

The proposition that soul reveals qualities and not actions seems to be less strictly adhered to. It is clear that confusion has arisen

between the popular meaning of the word action and its technical signification, accepted by the school. The sūtras which bear (or may be explained as bearing) upon our subject, are V. 1, 6; V, 2, 21; VI, 2, 16.

Gough formerly translated V. 1, 6: „Action of the soul is also from conjunction with the hand”. ČAṆKARA MĪCRA gives as explanation: *ātma-cāhlah carīcāyagacapara upacārāt*, which was translated by Gough: „The term soul tropically signifies a portion of the body”. It is impossible for such a forced interpretation to be true, at least if we accept Gough's translation. But we may make it more reasonable by taking *ātman* as a pronoun and translating: „Action of oneself is also from conjunction with the hand” and the comments:) „The word *oneself* tropically signifies a portion of the body [or the body and its members, if one prefers to take *carīcāyagacapa* as a dvandva]”.

I should like however to propose another explanation of the sūtra, for which purpose it will be necessary to consider the whole passage in which the sūtra occurs, beginning from V.S. V, 1, 1. For the first five sūtras I can accept without any change the translation which NANDA LAL SINHA has given of them.

The sūtrakāra describes in this place what is happening when a person is using a pestle. The first movement downwards is caused by volition of the soul (sūtra 1 & 2); the movement upwards results from impact with the mortar (sūtra 3, 4, 5); when pestle and hand have again reached the state of rest, then a volition of the soul arises, for hand and soul are mutually connected, (which connection implies that the resting of the hand is perceived by soul).

If we accept this interpretation of the sūtra: „action of the *soul* is also from conjunction with the hand”, then the word *also* might refer f. i. to the wish (*icchā*), of grinding the corns in the mortar.

One might be inclined to take *ca* V.S. V, 2, 21 in the meaning of ‘and’: the commentators, however, interpret it as ‘also’: f. i. Čaṅkara Mīcra *cakārād ātmasaṅgrahah* — i. e.: the word ‘also’ implies the addition of soul. (Cf. Praçastapāda-bhāṣya p. 21 Vizian. edition).

The translation of VI, 2, 16, given by Nanda Lal Sinha, is in accordance with the Upaskāra, where we find the gloss: *ātma-karmasa saṅga*. We may, however, explain this sūtra as a reference to V, 2, 18, then its translation would run: „*mokṣa* has been explained in [our discussion of] the movements (actions) of the soul.”<sup>1)</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. here book II chapter IV section 3 § 30.



Moreover we need not take the former member of the compound *ātma-karmasa* as standing in the relation of a subjective genitive to *karmān*, we are free to assign to it the meaning of a *śaṁkha-suptanāṁ*: in this case the translation would run „Emancipation is declared as dependent on the actions in behalf of the soul”, i. e., on the actions, such as hearing and meditation, which lead to the right conception of soul.

The conclusion of our examination of the three mentioned sūtras may be, that it is not quite certain that Kapāda has always strictly adhered to the idea of the soul being without actions.

*Karman* therefore never signifies qualitative physical change and seldom denotes any psychical state or process. From this, however, arises a certain lack in the table of categories, in as far as there is no sufficient distinction between the notions ‘quality’ and ‘qualitative change’, f. i. the yellow colour of wax and the melting of wax above a fire. The original shortcoming of their table led the Vaiṣeṣikas to accept the *asatkārya-cāda*, the doctrine that a product (f. i. a pot) is not identical with its material (clay).<sup>1</sup> This denial of identity, however, only concerns the qualities of the product and the material, but has no reference to their constituent atoms. This *asatkārya-cāda* enabled the Vaiṣeṣikas to describe a qualitative change, f. i. the melting of wax, as an anterior non-existence of fluidity and a posterior existence of this quality through the influence of fire.

I cannot therefore accept Haxbr’s theory that the *asatkārya-cāda* of the Vaiṣeṣikas should be contradictory to their theorem of the eternity of the atoms, and consequently I am obliged to deny his conclusion that this contradiction should prove the Buddhistic origin of the Vaiṣeṣika-system.

Though the limiting of the term *karmaṇ* to movement is a weak point in the table of categories, yet this classification as a whole highly deserves our praise. But a final appreciation of it must depend on the question, whether the general categories may be derived from grammar, or from another source, f. i. from an analysis of scientific reasoning or from psychology.

#### § 9. *The Praçastapāda-bhāṣya on the classification of categories and the notion of karmaṇ.*

With reference to the Praç. Bhāṣya we have to state that *karmaṇ* is here strictly limited to the movement of the physical bodies and atoms, and the movement of the internal organ

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 29, § 2.

For in the first place the absence of movement in soul is clearly implied in Bhāṣya book II chapter 1 § 4 (see here book IV section IV table B n°. 4).

In the second place a parallel to V.S. V, 1, 6 is lacking in the Bhāṣya. The two references in Dvivedin's accordance<sup>1)</sup> (see here book IV section V) are valueless. On the other hand Bhāṣya book IV § 9 (edition p. 297) omits entirely the *ātmakarman*.

V.S. VI, 2, 16 is compared by Dvivedin with Bhāṣya book III chapter 2 § 58 (edition p. 281). We find here i. a. the expression: *...airbījaśyātmanah carirādānicṛtliḥ*, i. e. 'the abstainment of the germless soul from body &c.' So we see here again the careful avoiding of the expression *ātmakarman*.

## SECTION 2.

### DISCUSSION ON SOME OF THE CATEGORIES IN DETAIL.

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing upon the categories: Sāmānya, Viśeṣa, Bhāva, Abhāva, Samavāya* (Nanda Lal Sinha's Translation).

A. Sūtras, on *sāmānya, viśeṣa, bhāva*.

1. 2, 3 The notions genus and species are relative to understanding.
- 4 Existence, being the cause of assimilation only, is only a genus.
- 5 Substance-ness, attribute-ness and action-ness are both genera and species.
- 6 [The statement of genus and species has been made] with the exception of the final species.
- 7 Existence is that to which are due [the belief and usage,] namely '[It is] existent' in respect to substance, attribute and action.
- 8 Existence is a different object from substance, attribute and action.
- 9 And as it exists in attributes and actions, therefore it is neither attribute nor action.
- 10 [Existence is different from substance, attribute and action] also by reason of the absence of genus-species in it.

<sup>1</sup> Bhāṣya III chapter I § 25 and III chapter II § 10.

- 1, 2, 11 Substance-ness has been explained by means of its containing more than one substance.
- 12 Substance-ness is distinct from substance, attribute and action also by reason of the absence of genera-species in it.
- 13 That attribute-ness is distinct from substance, attribute and action is explained from its existence in attributes.
- 14 Attribute-ness is distinct from substance, attribute and action also by reason of the absence of genera-species in it.
- 15 That action-ness is distinct from substance, attribute and action is explained from its existence in actions.
- 16 Action-ness is distinct from substance, attribute and action also by reason of the absence of genera-species in it.
- 17 Existence is one, because of the uniformity of the mark, viz. that it is existent and because of the absence of any distinguishing mark.

*B. Sūtras, on abhāva.*

- IX, 1, 1 In consequence of the non-application of action and attribute to it, an effect is non-existent prior to its production.
- 2 The existent becomes non-existent.
- 3 The existent is a different object from the non-existent, inasmuch as action and attribute cannot be predicated of the non-existent.
- 4 The existent also is non-existent.
- 5 And that which is a different non-existent from these, is absolutely non-existent.

*C. Sūtras on samavāya.*

- VII, 2, 26 That is combination<sup>1</sup>, by virtue of which arises the intuition in the form of 'This is here', with regard to effect and cause.
- 27 The negation of substance-ness and attribute-ness in combination is explained by existence.
- 28 The unity of combination is explained by existence.

§ 2. *Quotations from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B, p. III.*

*J.* „CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṂKARA explains 1, 2, 8 thus: Existence is a different object from substance, attribute and action. Substance,

<sup>1</sup> I prefer to translate *samavāya* by 'inherence' instead of the translation 'combination', given by NANDA LAL SINHA, cf. here p. 12. Similarly I should prefer to translate *samavāya-kāraṇa*, not by 'combinative cause', but by 'inherential cause'.

attribute and actions are called objects (VIII, 2, 3). Existence is, therefore, included amongst them. But it is not contained in the ascertained classes of substance, attribute and action. Hence it is said to be a different object from them (the known classes)."

Ibidem: "He reads I, 2, 17 with the omission of the word *linga* in *vicesa bhāvat*."

B. Ibidem p. VI: "He interprets IX, 1, 2 and 3 to mean that whatever is non-existent prior to its appearance as an effect, is non-existent only by the nature of an effect, but is really existent at the time by the nature of a cause, and that, therefore, it is essentially different from absolute non-existence."

C. Ibidem: "He interprets VII, 2, 25 to mean that combination is proved to be an attribute in the same way as existence and further that like existence, combination also is produced by itself, i. e. does not depend upon any other combination for its production."

### § 3. Explanation of these sūtras.

A. The second āhnika I, 2' of the Vaiṣeṣika Sūtra treats of *sāmānya* and *vicesa* with the exception of the two first sūtras which belong in contents to the first āhnika.

The sūtras I, 2, 3—17 can be divided into four groups: *a.* on generality and peculiarity themselves 3—6; *b.* on existence 7—10; *c.* on *dravyatva*, *guṇatva* and *karmatva* 11—16; *d.* on the oneness of existence (*bhāva*) 17.

In sūtra I, 2, 3 *sāmānya* and *vicesa* are declared to be subjective categories, in comparison with the first three, objective, categories (cf. I, 2, 7).

In sūtra 4 *anuvṛtti* has been translated by NANDA LAL SINHA as assimilation: I myself prefer the rendering: agreement, accordance.

In sūtra 5 *dravyatva* is called a species in comparison with *bhāva*, but a genus with reference to *prthivīatva*.

For sūtra 6 we find two explanations in the Upaskāra (see transl. p. 45 and Bibl. Ind. edition p. 58) "Ante 'vasāne bhavantīty antyā, gato na vyāvarthakāntarām astīty avārgyāḥ; utpādarināṣaṇor ante 'vasāne bhavantīty antyā nityaharyāṇi teṣu bhavantīty antyā vicesā itī vṛttikṛtaḥ. By the title *avārgya* often UDAYANA-ĀCĀRYA is meant: in his Kiraṇāvali (Benares edition p. 24, in the comments on Praç. Bhāṣya I ch. 2 § 5) we read: "Ke te 'atyā' ante 'vasāne bhavanti santīti gūrat: yebhyaḥ 'pare vicesā na santīty arthah". As mentioned in my introduction <sup>1</sup> the *Vṛttikṛt* to whom ÇAṆKARA MIÇRA refers,

<sup>1</sup> p. 35 no. 3 and p. 37.

has not yet been identified. Now it is interesting to notice that in the *Pracastapāda-bhāṣya* itself both interpretations are contained (see the explanation of the sixth book which I have given in § 5 of this chapter).

Returning to the sūtra itself we cannot fail to notice that the Indian interpretations of this sūtra, as bearing on atomism is not the only one possible. In sūtra 4 *bhūva* is stated to be a mere genus; in sūtra 5 *dragyatra*, *gunatra* and *karmatra* are called genera-species, one would expect as import of sūtra 6, in the same way as *dragyatra*, as a species, is contained in the genus *bhūva* and in its turn contains the species *pañcītra* &c., so is *pañcītra* a species of the genus *dragyatra*, but contains as genus the species *paśāntatra* &c.; and so we may continue the series until we arrive at the ultimate species, i. e. . . . the individuals.

It is clear that the traditional interpretation is based on a logical fault: in stead of distinguishing the notion of containing which applies to genus and species from the notion of containing which applies to part and whole, the Vaiṣeṣikas, confusing these two notions, did not consider the individual things, with their individual arrangements of qualities and relations to the surrounding world, as the terminus in the series genus-species; but conceived the qualities of the atoms as such.

We are not sure whether the Sūtrakṛt has already made this logical mistake; at all events, even if he has done so, these *vaiṣeṣika-guṇas* of the atoms would have been brought in so parenthetically, that, when comparing this with the importance attached to the method of characterisation (*vaidharmya-* or *viśeṣa-nirūpaṇa* we can no longer doubt about the origin of the name Vaiṣeṣika Darśana.<sup>1</sup>

Sūtra 5 needs no explanation. 'Object' here is the translation, chosen by Nanda Lal Sinha for *padārtha* (category, object of a categorial notion).

Sūtra 9 suggests the question why are only qualities and actions mentioned? I should like to propose the following answer: the Sūtrakṛt did not expect a confusion between existence and *dragyatra*, but only between existence and the other two categories, for we see in language the participle *sat* used in the same way as e. g. the adjective *guhla* and the verbum finitum *bhacati* as *gacchati*.

The comments on sūtra 10 given by Čaṅkara Miśra and translated by Nanda Lal Sinha p. 17, may be paraphrased, the notion of the class 'existence' is different from the notions of the species

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 18.

'substance', 'quality' and 'action' in as far as the term 'existence' has not the same „connotation” as the term 'substance' &c.

The translation of the sūtras 11—16, given by Nanda Lal Sinha, does not seem to me satisfactory. The sūtra 13 and 15 are parallel to sūtra 11, thus f. i. *ganeṣa bhācāt* means here *anekagopavattveṇa*. Further the sūtras 12, 14 and 16 are not only verbally identical with 1, 2, 10, but also parallel to it in signification. *Dravyatva*, *gūḥyatva* and *karmatva* are here the classes *sāmānyānām* and *pṛthivyānām* &c. the species or sub-generalities *sāmānyā-viśeṣāḥ*. So we arrive at the following translation e. g. for the sūtras 12—14.

12. [Substance-ness is distinct from earth-ness, water-ness, fire-ness &c. similarly by reason of its not being a sub-generality<sup>1</sup> i. e. by reason of different connotation, when compared with its species].

13. [Quality-ness] has been explained by its existence [i. e. inherence] in [several] qualities.

14. [Quality-ness is distinct from colour-ness, smell-ness &c.] similarly by reason of its not being a sub-generality.

With reference to sūtra I, 2, 17 we may notice that PRAÇASTAPĀDA in a parallel passage Bhāṣya book V § 2 reads „*lakṣaṇā-viśeṣāt*” and „*viśeṣalakṣaṇābhācā*”; from this we must not conclude that the sūtra had another redaction in Praçastapāda's time, but only that this commentator rightly considered *līṅga* to have here the original, wider meaning of property, and not yet the technical meaning of *hetu* (i. e. inferential mark, or probans).

B. The passage IX, 1, 1—5 demands several annotations.

In the first place we must notice that these sūtras occur in a discussion on perception, whilst *abhāva* is mentioned in the Bhāṣya intentionally in connection with inference. This discordance is really of slight importance. For perception — in the ordinary sense of the word, i. e. the *savikalpakam vijñānam* of the Buddhists — and argumentation are both very complicated processes having many factors in common. Thus for instance we find in both the application of relational notions. One of these is the notion of existence, by which an object receives its place and importance in the totality of the real, whereas by the notion of non-existence the possession of such a place in objective reality is denied to an object of our thought. Thus although *abhāva* is mentioned by

— — — — —

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the compounds formed of a noun-predicate and *-bhāva*, SPYER, Sanskrit Syntax § 214.

Praçastapāda under the heading of *anantaratā*, still it is occasionally said in his paragraph on *pratyakṣa* Bhāṣya book III chapter II § 21 p. 187 l. 5. that a thing is seen to be existent.

According to the Upaskāra sūtra IX. 1, 2 refers to *ābhāva* or posterior non-existence: this interpretation is in complete accordance with the meaning of sūtra 1. Both formulate the *asatkārya-vāda* of the Vaiṣeṣikas, a theory which means that the aggregates (*avayavins*) must be called transient in as far as the change in their qualities and movements is concerned, but not with reference to the ultimate atoms of which they are composed. The difference therefore between the Vaiṣeṣika *asatkārya-vāda* and the Sāṃkhya *satkārya-vāda* is more a question of words, than a variance in ideas.

The argument, given in sūtra 1 for the legitimacy of the notion *prāgabhāva*, is applied mutatis mutandis to the notion *ābhāva* in sūtra 3. As we may notice, in these three first sūtras the non-existence is merely applied to substances.

Sūtra 4 *sacchēsat*, which in formulation is nearly identical with sūtra 2, is explained by the Upaskāra as referring to mutual or reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) and is illustrated by the examples: '*asau arṣo parātmanā*' i. e. 'the horse is non-existent by the nature of a cow', '*asau gauḥ acchātmanā*', or in other formulation: '*anarṣo gauḥ*', 'a cow is a not-horse': *agauḥ arṣah*.

Sūtra 5 is no less enigmatic than sūtra 4. Çaṅkara Miçra explains it as follows (Bibl. Ind. edition p. 377

*..atah = pūrvoktād abhāvatragād  
gād anyad āsat.  
tad āsat = tad atyantāsattvam.*"

According to this explanation the most important notion of the whole sūtra: *atyanta* absolute, would be merely implied.

Not only are the sūtra IX. 1. 1—5 — which according to Çaṅkara Miçra distinguish four forms or *abhāva*: prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, mutual non-existence (i. e. difference of notions) and absolute non-existence — of a very enigmatic form, but they are nearly totally ignored in the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya.<sup>1)</sup> On the other hand ÇRĪDHARA mentions the distinction of the four forms of *abhāva* in the Nyāya-kandālī, p. 230, and ÇIVABHYA in his Saptapadārthī and all writers of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika attach much importance to this *abhāva*-theory. In chapter V section I, dealing with perception I shall try to find an answer to the question: how much

<sup>1)</sup> See here p. 29.

authenticity we can accredit to the verbal tradition of the text in the passage IX. 1. 1-5) and Candakara Mītra's interpretation.

Here I should like to limit myself to showing the insufficiency of this *abhāva*-theory. *Abhāva*, namely, is a composite relational notion, containing the notions of negation and existence. Negation, however, can be applied to all kinds of relations and not only to identity and existence, as supposed by Cūḍhara and his followers. Therefore if in any way a complete classification of its use were needed, then the one, given by the Vaiśeṣikas, would be quite insufficient. They evidently reasoned as follows: non-existence or negation — these two notions were for them identical — can be applied either to one object or to two. In the former case the non-existence of the object may refer to all times: absolute non-existence, or to the time before the production (prior non-existence) or to the time after the annihilation (posterior non-existence). Secondly the non-existence with reference to the relation of one thing to another means the non-existence of their identity.

The classification, thus obtained, is far from exhaustive; and this whole *abhāva*-theory has led in syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to that needless complication and bulkiness of expression which make its study a torment to the European reader. For its technical language has not been limited to a predilection for such terms as *abhāva*, *anāva* &c., but the relation between *bhāva* and *abhāva* was again considered a special case of *pratyogitā*, i. e. „the fitness of one object of thought for enabling us to have an idea about something else which cannot be conceived of, independently of it” (see GHATE'S note on n<sup>o</sup>. 73 of the Saptapadārthī).

C. Passage VII, 2, 26-28, although short, is still very interesting. As we have noticed before, the discussion of *samavāya* has been placed by the Sūtra-redactor next to the explanation of the second group of qualities, which bear on physical as well as on psychical matters. This arrangement is logical enough, although deviating from the *śāstra*.

In the definition of *samavāya* (sūtra 26) we have to notice in the first place its vagueness. ‘*Theḍam*’ forms in its enigmatic form a companion to the definition ‘*aspedam*’ of *lauṅgikam jñānam* (inferential knowledge) in V.S. IX, 2, 1.

In fact the original Vaiśeṣika system distinguished three forms of necessity: 1. the logical necessity, *vyatishedhi*, between correlative notions (such as parts and aggregate, thing and quality); 2. the necessity implied in the notion of cause (i. e. of the causa



tiendit: 3. the necessity expressed in the major of a syllogism.<sup>1</sup>

Of these three forms of necessity—the second, the causal relation has not yet been explicitly defined by the original Vaiśeṣika system, neither by Kaṣyapa nor by Praçastapāda. Still by analysing V.S. X, 2 we shall find in the next section that causality is based according to them, either on *samavāya* or on *samanyatā*, although they do not examine, or at least unsufficiently, what is common to both forms of causality (cf. V.S. I, 2, 1 and 2).

Further we may observe that *samavāya* is a much more intimate relation than the relational notion which is the basis of *locatā* (*lata-jānānam*), a difference expressed respectively by the locative-like adverb '*iha*' and the genitive '*agha*'. Moreover we learn from the mere sūtra VII, 2: 26 that the relation of *samavāya* is always to be considered a form of causality (thus the thing the cause of its qualities, the parts of the aggregate), whereas causality may be found in cases [namely of conjunction], where *samavāya* is not met with.

V.S. VII, 2, 27 is a reference to I, 2, 8—9 and states inherence to be neither a substance nor a quality, so that its not being an action is taken for granted.

V.S. VII, 2, 28 is a reference to I, 2, 17 and states the oneness of inherence—we should say: the property of inherence for not giving rise to the application of number. That *tattva* here means *ekatva*, is confirmed by comparing the passage V.S. II, 1, 29—30 with the redaction of V.S. I, 2, 17 and by the information received from the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya (see next paragraph).

#### § 4. *The fifth book of the Bhāṣya, treating of sāmānya.*

The fifth book (SĀMĀNYA) of the BHĀṢYA consists of two paragraphs. The first of them may be divided again into three parts: *A.* definition of generality; *B.* *sattā* as *param sāmānyam*; *C.* *aparam sāmānyam*.

In part *A* *sāmānya* (generality or genus) is described as:

1. *śva-viśaya-sarva-gatam*, omnipresent in the objects resorting to it (this refers to the „denotation” of a term).
2. *abhinātmatmakam*, possessing the same character in all instances.
3. *aneka-cyūthi*, abiding in several [specimens].
4. *eka-dvi-bahuc ātma-svarupānyama-pratyaya-kāri*, bringing about

<sup>1</sup> The nearest equivalent of the Indian syllogism is not the categorical term Barbara but the hypothetical syllogism „if A is, then B is; now A is, ergo B is”; this necessity of B's existence in the case of A's existence is indicated by Kaṣyapa's *śaspatam*.

the notion of the agreement with its own innate nature, after one, two or several specimens [having been perceived].

5. *śarapābhedenādāhāreṣu prabandhena cartamānam*, abiding chainlike [or uninterruptedly, *prabandhena* = *anuparamena*, according to ĆRĪDHARA] in [several] abodes whilst it remains identical with its essence.

6. *anucitti-pratyaya-kāraṇam*, cause of the notion of concordance.

After this, the interrogative particle *katham?* introduces an explanation which in the redaction of DUVÉDIN'S edition runs thus:

*Pratipindam sāmānyāpekṣam prabandhena jñānotpattīc abhyāsa-pratyaya-janītāc ca saṃskārād atila-jñāna-prabandhot-pratyavekṣaṇād gad anugatam asti, tat sāmānyam.*

Now we find in the Nyāyakoṣa p. 929 note 2 a varia lectio in which besides other deviations, we notice the absence of *ca* after *janītād*: further in the Nyāyakandalī *pratyavekṣaṇād* is explained as *smaraṇād*. If it be allowed to use these two means of help, I should like to propose the following translation: „When an intellection arises, referring uninterruptedly to several specimens, one after the other, in consequence of a generality — [this takes place] through the *saṃskāra* or psychological latency of a notion, which was often repeated and through the remembrance of this series of previous intellections — then that which is the congruent [part], is the generality.”

Part *B* of § 1 runs as follows:

„Among these [two kinds of generality], the generality ‘being’ is only cause of the notion of concordance. Just as the accordance of the notion ‘[this is] blue, [that is] blue’ takes place with reference to leather, cloth and wool, though differing from each other, in consequence of their common connection with a blue substance [i. e. with blue paint], so is one undistinguished accordance of the notions: ‘[this is] being, [that is] being’ met with in substances, qualities and actions, though differing mutually [cf. V.S. I, 2, 7]. And this [accordance in the notions] must result from another category [than substance, quality and action: cf. V.S. I, 2, 8], therefore that other *padārtha* is being: so then [being] is proved. The concordance of notions: ‘[this is] being, [that is] being’ [results] from the connection with existence; therefore this is only a generality [and not a species]. [cf. V.S. I, 2, 4].”

Part *C* begins thus:

„The lower [generality]: — the generality of substance (*dravyatva*), that of quality and that of action, — is both a generality and species, since it is the cause both of accordance and of distinction [cf. V.S. I, 2, 5].”

Then this general definition is explained with reference to the generality of substance. This is the cause of concordance in the case of earth, water &c., but of distinction in regard to quality and action.

The same formula is then *mutatis mutandis* repeated for the generality of quality and that of action. After this the genera still lower, such as earthiness (*pṛthivīteja*), colourness, throwiness, cow-ness, clothness &c. are mentioned and characterised as both genera and species. In the first place *prādūṣāṅga* they must be considered as generality, and by transference (*bhaktiḡā*) they receive the name of species.

§ 2 gives a characterisation of *sāmānya* which applies to its highest as well as to its lower forms. „In consequence of the difference in properties *lakṣaṇa* it is proved that *sāmānya* is another category than substance, quality and action [cf. § 1 and V.S. I, 2, 5]. Its eternality also follows from this [i. e. because quality, action and composed substance are transient, and because *sāmānya* is different from them]. [The lower generality *dravyateja* is other than, non-identical with that of *guṇateja* &c., so] there is ‘otherness’ (*ananyateja*) between them. Considered one after one, there is oneness of the generalities [i. e. there is one highest genus: being: one genus earthiness &c.], because there is non-difference of properties and there is not a property [in the *sāmānya*] of having differences *lakṣaṇā-viśeṣād, viśeṣalakṣaṇābhācāteja*. [cf. V.S. I, 2, 17 where *līṅga* is used instead of *lakṣaṇa*].

§ 5. *The sixth book of the Bhāṣya, treating of viśeṣa.*

The sixth book (VIṢEṢA) of the Bhāṣya consists of one paragraph. This may be divided into three parts: *A.* definition of the notion, *antya viśeṣāḥ*<sup>1)</sup>, and explanation of how these *antya viśeṣāḥ* are perceived by the yogins; *B.* and *C.* refutation of two objections.

In part *A.* „*antyaḥ*” is explained as „*ante bhavāḥ*” and according to the Nyāya-kandalī this would mean: „*utpāda-vināśayor ante ‘vasthitaścād antaḥśabdavācyāni antyadvacyāni, leṣa bhavāḥ sthita ity arthaḥ*” i. e., the eternal substances are meant by the word *anta* (border), because they reside at [i. e. beyond] the border of origination and annihilation: the existence [of the *antya viśeṣāḥ* is] based on these [eternal substances]; such is the meaning of the passage”. — It seems however that *antya* is used by Praçastapāda

1. Cf. here p. 117 and 118.

ambiguously and sometimes equivalent to *atyanta* in the following *passus*.

The term *viçeṣas* is used, continues the Bhāṣya, „since they cause their abodes to be different [from other objects]. They are causes of the intellections about the ultimate or: very last, *atyanta* distinction, in as far as each of them resides — one in one substance, another in another — in the eternal substances which are void of origination and annihilation. And just as in [ordinary] human beings as we are, a distinction of notions is seen [to arise] with reference to cows &c. compared with horses &c. — a distinction which finds its cause in like shapes, qualities, actions, parts, conjunctions; and which may be expressed thus: [this is] a cow, white, with swift (?) movement, with a fat hump, with a large bell — so there arises in men superior to us, namely in the yogins, a distinction of notions with reference to all eternal substances in as far as they possess like shapes, qualities and actions, namely with reference to atoms, liberated (?) souls and internal organs — [a distinction of notions] which can be expressed with respect to several objects as: ‘this is different from that’. Similarly those [yogins] possess recognition with reference to one and the same atom, distant in space and time, [a recognition which can be expressed in the words]: this is the same as that. [That this distinction of notions and this recognition result from the distinctive properties in the eternal substances, follows] from the fact that there is no other cause (*anya-nimittābhācāt* p. 321 l. 20). These differences [now, in the eternal substances] are the ultimate differences (*antyā viçeṣāḥ*).”

Part *B* refutes the objection: could not this distinction of notions originate from the *dharma* which the yogin himself possesses and not from the properties of the things?

In the beginning of part *C* the question is raised: why does the distinction of the eternal substances take place with the aid of distinctive features, and why not directly? The answer to this question is: *Tādātmyāt*. This expression is then explained as follows:

„Here [i. e. in daily life, or: among ordinary human beings] one feels assured [of objective existence] with reference to *atadāt-makāni* [i. e. things which have not got ‘nature of that’, in other words: the nature of rousing our assurance themselves], when something else brings that about. For instance [such feeling of assurance arises] with reference to pots &c. in consequence of a lamp; but not with reference to a lamp in consequence of another lamp. Just as impurity exists by itself e. g. in cow’s and horse’s meat and only through connection with that [impurity] in other things,

so there arises here too by itself, the distinction of notions percepts, *pratyaya*s through *tādātmya* the nature of that, i. e. the nature of revealing itself with reference to the *antya cīṣaṅh*, but through connection with these with reference to the eternal substances."

This explanation of *tādātmya* seems to be rather forced, yet, I do not doubt, I have grasped the meaning of PRAÇASTAPĀDA's words: the more so, since on the words: „*yathā ghaṭādisu pradīpāt, na tu pradīpe pradīpāntaraḥ*” we find in the Nyāya-kandah the following gloss:

*yathā ghaṭādisu  
pradīpāntarāḥ*

*aprakāṣa-svabhāveṣu  
prakāṣasvabhāvāt  
prakāṣo bhavati.*

*na tu pradīpe pradīpāntarāt prakāṣah, kim tu sceta eva.*

At all events with the technical meaning 'identity' which the term *tādātmya* has in the writings of Buddhist logicians (cf. SATIĆ CANDRA VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA, Mediaeval school of Indian logics p. 110 § 59 n°. 1 and DE ŚRĪ HERBASŌKI Muséon N.S. vol. V p. 114) we cannot explain the passage quoted. *Tādātmya* must be interpreted here as 'immediateness, independence'.

#### § 6. *The last book of the Bhāṣya, treating of samavāya.*

The last book (SAMAVĀYA) of the Bhāṣya consists of five paragraphs. The first paragraph gives a definition and examples of this notion: in § 2 the notion '*samavāya*' (inherence) is opposed to *samyojya* (conjunction): in § 3 it is proved that inherence must be acknowledged as a separate category, after that the oneness of *samavāya* is upheld: § 4 contains a polemical dialogue about the last-mentioned point: § 5 states first the eternality of inherence, then gives an answer to the question „in what way does inherence [itself] abide in the substances &c.?” and finally proves that inherence cannot be perceived, but is inferrible (*anumeya*).

§ 1 begins with the definition „*ayatasiddhānām ādhārṇūdhāra-bhōtānām yathā sambandha ita-pratyaya-hetuḥ, sa samavāyah.*” This definition occurs in the Berhampore edition of the Sūtra (p. 38, as 1, 2, 13. I should like to translate it as: „inherence is the relation between things inseparably coexistent and of which one is the recipients and the other the recipiendum: [in other words:] [inherence is] the cause of the idea: [this is] in that.”

This definition is then again enlarged with the evident wish of expressing it more accurately. „The name 'inherence' is given to

the relation, from which 1<sup>2</sup> there arises the intellection: "[this is] in that with reference to [objects such as:] substances, qualities, actions—generalities, peculiarities, which objects may either be causally related (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhūtāḥ*) or not causally related: which objects inseparably coexist, whilst one is the recipients and the other the recipiendum. Moreover, 2ly from this relation called 'inherence' there results the *aviseśaḥbhāva* [i. e. the not totally being strange to each other, the *avasthābhāva*, non-independence, says (RĪDHARA] of such things which occupy a limited place and the non-identity (otherness, *anagata*) of which is conceived."

The last part of § 1 gives a list of examples: „the cloth is inherent in the threads: the mat in the reeds: qualities and actions in a substance, existence in substances, qualities and actions; substance-ness in substances: quality-ness in qualities: action-ness in actions; ultimate differences in eternal substances."

§ 2 distinguishes inherence by the following principles:

- 1 *sambandhī, sām agataścibhātrāt*: because of the necessary coexistence of the things related:
- 2 *anāstarakarmādi-nimittāḥ sambhūyāt* (cf. V.S. VII. 2. 9): because the movement of one of the things concerned &c is not the cause of it;
- 3 *vibhāgātātādāraṇāt*: because disjunction is not experienced as the terminus of it;
- 4 *adhikarānādhikartavyagor eva bhāvāt*: because it exists only between two such things of which one is the recipients and the other the recipiendum.

The thesis that the notion of inherence does not coincide with substance, quality and action is proved in paragraph 3 where the differences between existence and the existent things, between *dravyatra* and *dravya* &c. are used as *apṛāntas*. The last part of paragraph 3 is a paraphrase of V.S. VII. 2, 28.

Paragraph 1 begins with the objection: „*nañ gady ekah samavāyo, dravyagunakarmāṇām dravyatraguṇatvakarmatvādiviśeṣaṇāḥ saha sambandhaikatvāt padārthasāṅkaraprasaṅga itī?*" If we consider *ādi* in the compound, ending in *viśeṣaṇāḥ* as due to a mistake, we get the following translation: „If there were only one inherence, then the relation between *dravya* and its characterising [generality] *dravyatra*, the relation between *guṇa* and *guṇatra*, the relation between *karmaṇa* and *karmatra* would be identical, and thus an intermixture of categories would be the result". The most important part of the answer is contained in the words: „*iheti samavāyanimittasya jñāna-syāncāḥadarāṇāt sarvatraikah samavāya itī gamyate, dravyatvādinī-*

*sattvādātman evatirekabhāvaāt pratītiṃamo jñāyate.*" I. e. because we see agreement in the intellection "which is expressed by the words 'this' in 'that' and which has inherence for its cause, therefore there is everywhere one inherence; that is certain. And because we notice the exclusion of the intellections which have *dravyatva* &c. as cause, so we become aware of the restricted use of *samavāya*, compared with the notions just mentioned."

The eternity of *samavāya* is inferred in paragraph 5 from the circumstance that we cannot discover by *prāmāṇyas* trustworthy sources of knowledge any cause of its origination, just as little as we can do with reference to *bhāva*."

The answer to the second question: *kyāṃ pañc cettigā dravyādāśa samavāya evatire?*" is principally contained in the words: *"tādātmyāt . . . cettigābhāvasya samavāyasya nāgāṃ cettir asti"*. I. e. "Inherence does not reside in substances &c. either by conjunction, or by inherence", but by innate nature *"tādātmyāt = satat eva"*, in Ārīdhara's commentary. Inherence has no residing again, for its own essence is to reside'.

The imperceptibility of *samavāya* is upheld by means of two arguments: (1) *sattvādātman iva pratyakṣeṣa cettigābhāveṇ;* 2) *saṃyuktasamavāyānāṃ bhāveṇ*. The first expression is rightly paraphrased by Ārīdhara: *gathāṇ sattvādātman pratyakṣeṣa uttheṣa cettir asti, tena te saṃyuktasamavāyāṇāṃ indriyena gṛhyānte, naiva samavāyasya cettisambhavaḥ, ato 'tadāgā 'gam"*, and the second thus: *gathendriyēṇa samavāyāpratibhāvaḥ, naiva samavāya-pratibhāvaḥ*. I. e. „1) whilst existence &c. reside in the perceptible objects and thus can be perceived by the sense-organs, by means of *saṃyukta-samavāya* [i. e. owing to the fact that the sense-organ is conjoined with the object, in which the existence &c. inhere], inherence itself cannot reside [in anything] and therefore it surpasses the reach of the senses"; (2) whilst there is a clear perceptual understanding *saṃvedana*, *indriyena pratibhāvaḥ* of conjunction, such a clear understanding concerning inherence does not exist."

It may be interesting to compare with the last paragraphs of the Praj. Bhāṣya the following quotations from GANGAŚATRA JHA'S description of the Prābhākāra School of Purva-Mīmāṃsā (p. 89):

"Subsistence' or 'inherence' (*paratantratā*) is not *aitya* or eternal (like the *samavāya* of the logician), because it subsists in perishable things also, being a relation whereof it cannot be eternal; it is both produced and not-produced, and also perceptible and imperceptible, in accordance with the nature of things to which it belongs. Nor is it one like the logician's *samavāya*, it is many as there are things."

ÇAṆKARA ĀCĀRYA'S polemics against the notions of *samavāya* and *apūtasiddhi* have been related here p. 70.

§ 7. *Pṛthaktva* in *Sūtra*, *Bhāṣya* and the more recent *Vaiçeśika*.

The so-called quality *pṛthaktva*, the different shades of meaning of which correspond to the English terms 'concreteness, individuality, separate existence', is mentioned by the *Sūtrakāra* in the same aphorisms as *ekatva* (see here the next chapter, section 1). PRAÇAS-TAPĀDA bestows on it a separate paragraph (book III chapter 2 § 9). First he defines it as *apoddhāra-vyavahāra-kāraṇa* (*apoddhāra* = separation, distinction). Then he mentions *eka-pṛthaktva*, *dvi-pṛthaktva*, *tripṛthaktva* &c.: alludes to the dogma that *ekapṛthaktva* is eternal in eternal, transient in transient substances and *dvi-pṛthaktva* &c. are always transient. *Samkhyā* and *pṛthaktva* differ from each other in so far that one, two, three &c. are subordinate to the one general notion of number, whereas *ekapṛthaktva*, *dvi-pṛthaktva* &c. are not subordinate to a general notion [i. e. to a notion which has a name of its own]. „*Ētāvāṃs tu vīṣeṣaḥ: ekatvādivad ekapṛthaktvādivaḥ apara-sāmānyābhāvaḥ.*”

CRIDHARA has spun out this last-mentioned detail in his comments. Further he lays down the question: what is the difference between *atyantābhāva* and *pṛthaktva*? „*Itaretarābhāva-nimitto 'yam vyavahāra iti cet?* — *Na: pratiseḍhasya vidhi-pratyaya-viśayatvāyogāt.*” I. e. *pṛthaktva* cannot be the cause of [our notion of] mutual non-existence, in as far as a negation is not fit for being the object of a positive notion. In syncretic Nyāya-Vaiçeśika the difficulty has been more clearly answered. ATHALYE defines it as follows: „*pṛthaktva* . . . tells us something more than *anyonyābhāva*, for it not only informs us that a jar is not a piece of cloth, but also that it is a different thing. . . We can say that a jar is not the quality of blueness residing in it, but we cannot say that it is distinct from it, the two being inseparately connected. Similarly we say that a black unbaked jar is not the same red jar when baked, but it is not *pṛthak* from it.”

The passage, bestowed by CRIDHARA on *pṛthaktva*, does not allow us to decide whether he intended to lay down such a distinction, as defined by Athalye.

In concluding I must say that I do not admire the Vaiçeśika system for calling *pṛthaktva* a quality and combining number with it.



## SECTION 3.

THE CHARACTERISATION OF THE CATEGORIES AND  
THE THEORY OF CAUSALITY.

§ 1. *Sātras bearing upon characterisation and causality.*  
(*Nanda Lal Sinha's translation.*)

A. Sātras, containing the characterisation of substance, quality and action.

- I, 1, 8 The resemblance of substance, attribute and action lies in this that they are existent and non-eternal, have substance as their combinative<sup>1</sup> cause, are effect as well as cause, and are both genus and species.
- 9 The resemblance of substance and attribute is the characteristic of being the originators of their congeners.
- 10 Substances originate another substance, and attributes another attribute.
- 11 Action, producible by action, is not known.
- 12 Substance is not annihilated either by effect or by cause.
- 13 Attributes [are destroyed] in both ways.
- 14 Action is opposed by its effect.
- 15 It possesses action and attribute, it is a combinative cause — such [is] the mark of substance.
- 16 Inhering in substance, not possessing attribute, not an independent cause in conjunctions and disjunctions — such is the mark of attribute.
- 17 Residing in one substance only, not possessing attribute, an independent cause of conjunctions and disjunctions — such is the mark of action.
- 18 Substance is the one and the same cause of substance, attribute and action.
- 19 Similarly attribute [is the common cause of substance, attribute and action].
- 20 Action is the common cause of conjunction, disjunction and impetus.
- 21 Action is not the cause of substances.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 106.

I. 1. 22 [Action is not the cause of substance], because of its cessation.

23 A single substance may be the common effect of more than one substance.

24 Action is not the joint effect of many actions on account of the difference of their attributes.

25 Duality and other numbers, separateness, conjunction and disjunction [are originated by more than one substance].

26 Action which is the joint result [of an aggregate of two or more substances] is not known, as it is not found in combination with them.

27 Substance is the joint effect of many conjunctions.

28 Colour [is the joint effect] of many colours.

29 Throwing upwards [is the joint product] of gravity, volition and conjunction.

30 Conjunctions and disjunctions [are individually the products] of actions.

31 Under the topic of causes in general, action has been stated to be not a cause of substances and actions.

*B.* Sūtras containing a definition of cause and effect.

I. 2. 1 Non-existence of effect [follows] from the non-existence of the cause.

2 But non-existence of cause [does] not [follow] from the non-existence of the effect.

*C.* Sūtras discussing causality.

X. 2. 1 [It is the combinative] cause' — such [intuition and usage], with regard to substance [arise] from the combination of effect [in it].

2 And through conjunction [substance becomes the efficient or conditional cause also].

3 Through combination in the [combinative] cause actions [are non-combinative causes].

4 So also in colour through combination in the same object with the cause.

5 Through combination in the [combinative] cause conjunction [is a non-combinative cause] of the cloth.

6 And through combination in the cause of the cause [conjunction becomes a non-combinative cause by means of the major proximity] also.

7 The distinctive attribute of fire [i. e. heat] [becomes an efficient cause] through combination in the conjunct.

§ 2. *Quotations from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B:*

A. NOTES on passage I, 1, 8—31:

„CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA interprets I, 1, 13 to mean that an attribute sometimes destroys its cause (e. g. in chemical compounds) and sometimes does not destroy it (e. g. in physical compounds or masses).

„He observes under I, 1, 15: Although the self is void of action, i. e. change, still it appears to possess action by the action of the mind or internal organ of sense in the state of its phenomenal existence: and hence it is called a substance.

„He reads I, 1, 19 as *abhayaṭhā gṛhāṭh* instead of *tathā gṛhāṭh* and interprets it to mean that attributes sometimes become the cause of substance, attribute and action and sometimes do not.

„He reads I, 1, 21 and 22 as one aphorism and interprets it thus: Action does not become the immediate cause of substances. Why? In consequence of its cessation. For, when a substance becomes what it is, at that moment cessation of action takes place. Action in the constituent parts of a substance ceases on conjunction and the substance becomes what it is. Action therefore is not an immediate cause in the production of substances. What the author means to say is, as the expression shows, that the mediate causality of action in the production of substances is not refuted.”

B. NOTES on passage I, 2, 1—2:

„Candrakānta Tarkālaṇkāra introduces I, 2, 1 as follows: Predicables, called substances, attribute and action, have been mentioned. Their *sāmānya* or common characteristic has been stated. Their *viśeṣa* or distinctive characteristic, again follows from its contrariety to the common characteristic. All this is sufficient for the production of *tattvajñāna*. The supreme good results from *tattvajñāna*. This is *apavarga*, salvation. But what is its characteristic form? How does it appear? All this is now being explained.

„He explains the same to mean. Non-existence of the effect, e. g. the faults (namely desire, aversion and infatuation) &c., (results) from non-existence of the cause, e. g. false knowledge (e. g. the idea of the self in the non-self) &c. “Thus pain, birth, activity, faults and false knowledge -- on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before the other” (Nyāya Sūtra I, 1, 2), the ultimate consequence being emancipation, the return of the self into its own nature.

„He introduces I, 2, 2 as follows: the aphorism is meant for them who think that *apavarga* is mere absence of pain, and he explains

it thus: non-existence of the cause, viz. birth, &c. does not follow from non-existence of the effect, viz. pain. Birth, &c. therefore, may still take place even when no pain exists. If birth &c. are thus possible, then there is possibility of pain also, in consequence of the appearance of the causes of pain. *Apararga*, accordingly, does not lie in the mere absence of pain, but in the permanent impossibility of pain, resulting in the order of the successive non-existence of false-knowledge, &c."

C. NOTE on passage X, 2, 1—7:

„Candrakānta Tarkālaᅒkāra reads X, 2, 4 as two aphorisms *tathā rūpe* and *kāraᅒaikārthasamacāyāc ca*."

§ 3. *Explanation of the sūtras, quoted in § 1, as far as bearing on characterisation.*

The theory of causality has been discussed in sūtra I, 1, 5—31 for the purpose of characterising the main categories, so I shall first consider these sūtras in this respect and then the conception of causality itself.

As already noticed<sup>1)</sup>, the sūtra characterises broadly the main categories, whereas the Bhāᅒya does the same for the subdivisions: substance and quality.

The order, followed by the Sūtrakāra in this characterisation, is shown in my marginalia (see here book IV section II).

First (sūtra 5) substance, quality and action together are characterised in comparison with the three last categories. As HANDB has noticed, *dravya* is conceived here as 'compound substance', thus excluding the atoms: since the theory of substance in the Vaiᅒesika system was originally a distinction of elements and not in the first place a doctrine of atomism<sup>2)</sup>, there is not the slightest objection against this interpretation.

Then sūtra 9 — which is commented upon by sūtra 10 — states that substances-parts effect substances-wholes, and qualities (f. i. the qualities of parts) qualities (f. i. the qualities of wholes); but action does not produce another action, [for the beginning movement of an object produces inertia as a quality of this object and this quality is cause of the movement in the subsequent moments]. Therefore cause and effect may be homogeneous in the case of substance and quality being cause, but not in the case of action (Bhāᅒya book II chapter 1 § 1; book III chapter 1 § 19; book IV § 1 n<sup>o</sup>. 11).

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. p. 33.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. p. 48 and p. 118.

If we follow the interpretation of the Upaskāra, then this would be the meaning of the sūtras 12—14: two substances relating to each other as cause—composing parts and effect—product or aggregate—do not destroy each other: for the cause of the destruction of the aggregate either lies in the *destruction* of the abode i. e. in the destruction of the parts, but not in the parts themselves or in the destruction of the adherence *āpāśhakti-saṃgraha* between these parts. In the case of qualities the effect can destroy the cause and vice versa: e. g. the first sound [i. e. the sound as a quality of the part of physical space bordering on the source of sound after having produced the second sound i. e. sound in the following part of *āhāra*] destroys it and the last sound [i. e. sound where it becomes inaudible] destroys the last sound but one. An action is always destroyed by its effect [i. e. by the conjunction of the moving thing and the obstructing thing]. The interpretation of I. 1, 13 given by CAṆKARA MĪTRA, is forced and doubtful. By blotting out *ca* in sūtra 12 the first two sūtras could be translated as follows: „The substance-effect does not annihilate its cause [S]. The quality-effect may or may not annihilate its cause [i. e. when the quality of the aggregate is produced in the qualities of the composing parts, then these remain in existence, but when pleasure e. g. gives rise to desire, then pleasure itself is annihilated].” With V.S. I. 1, 12 corresponds Bhāṣya book II chapter 1 § 1; with V.S. I. 1, 14 Bhāṣya book IV § 1 n<sup>2</sup>. 17 (see here book IV section IV table *b* and *c*): a passage corresponding with V.S. I. 1, 13 is lacking in the Bhāṣya. If my emendation and interpretation is right, then the three sūtras tell us about the three first categories whether they are annihilated or not after having produced their effect.

The sūtras 15—17 contain definitions of substance, quality and action. Three different kinds of causality: inherential, dependent and independent causality, are applied in these definitions. Partly these terms have been already explained<sup>1</sup>, partly I shall dwell again on this topic in the next paragraph. For the present it is sufficient to state that the term causality is taken in a very wide sense: so e. g. substance is called the cause — and namely the inherential cause *samarthyī-kāraṇa* — of its qualities and movements, and similarly the parts are called the *samarthyī-kāraṇa* of the aggregate. Cf. in the Bhāṣya book II chapter 1 § 1 and 4; book III chapter 1 § 1; book IV § 1 n<sup>2</sup>. 2 and 8. A passage stating that quality, if independent, cannot be the cause of conjunctions and

<sup>1</sup> II. 6 p. 30 § 3.

disjunctions, is not met with in the chapter on the characterisation of qualities Bhāṣya book III chapter 1; since, however, the *karmatvān saṃyogavibhāgaśe anapekṣa-kāraṇatvam* is mentioned in the Bhāṣya, it is certain that the sūtras I, 1, 15—17 existed in their present form in Praṣastapāda's time.

In the sūtras 18—22 it is said that substance may be the cause of substances, qualities or actions. Quality too may be a cause of a substance (e. g. the conjunctions as qualities of the parts produce the aggregate), of a quality (e. g. the colour of the parts effects the colour of the aggregate) or of an action (e. g. the conjunction between a moving hand and a pestle produces the movement of the latter). Movement, however, is no cause of substance (21), nor of movement (this is implied by sūtra I, 1, 20 and is explicitly stated by I, 1, 31), but only of the three qualities: conjunction, disjunction and impetus. By comparing this sūtra with I, 1, 17 and 30, and Bhāṣya book IV § 1 n<sup>o</sup>. 8, and by considering the fact that *vega* (or *saṃśkṛta*) is not explicitly mentioned in I, 1, 6, one would be inclined to surmise as original form of the sūtra: „*saṃyogavibhāgaśe karmā sāmānyam [kāraṇam]*”. For the interpretation of I, 1, 22 cf. the Upaskāra and V.S. V, 1, 13.

Two points deserve notice in the sūtras discussed (I, 1, 8—22): the term *sāmānyam* is used here (18 and 20) in a distributive meaning; all these sūtras refer to substance, quality or movement as causes.

The sūtras 23 and 24 belong together; the translation by NANDA LAL SINHA of sūtra 24 cannot be right; his expression „on account of the difference of their attributes” is completely void of sense (cf. V.S. I, 1, 17 „*agaurātmā . . . iti karma-lakṣaṇam*”); neither is Čamkara Miśra's interpretation correct: „it has been already stated that the resemblance of substance and attribute is that they originate their congeners; also it has already been denied that actions are productive of actions in the aphorism: ‘action, producible by action is not known’: this is here repeated”. Before giving my own translation I should like to notice that *sāmānyam* has here a collective meaning, and substance, quality and action are treated in their function of effect. We may render the two sūtras: „A single substance may be the joint effect of more than one substance, [And so may a single quality be the joint effect of more than one quality]. Action is not the joint effect of several actions [i. e. the action of the aggregate is not brought about by the actions of the parts], since it differs from quality, [here, namely, the colour of the aggregate is the effect of the colours of the parts].” Cf. the parallel passages in the Bhāṣya book II chapter 1 § 3 and book III chapter 1

and § 13: but in book IV chapter 4 § 1 an explicit denial with reference to action is absent.

Sūtra 25 states that some qualities e. g. duality are produced by, i. e. reside in several substances, (scil. as we must imply) in substances which remain apart, so then such a quality is an effect of these several, loose substances. One action, according to sūtra 26, is never a joint effect of several [loose] substances; for, as the Sūtrakāra tautologically adds, an action never inheres [in several substances at the same time]. A discussion on this topic with reference to substance seems to have been considered superfluous. Cf. Bhāṣya book III chapter 1 § 5: book IV, § 1 n<sup>2</sup>, 2.

The sūtras 27—29 examine to what extent substance, quality and action can be the joint effect of many qualities. By comparing I, 1, 29 with e. g. V, 1, 1 and V, 2, 3 one would be inclined to restitute as original form of the sūtra: *pratyakāśa-nyogābhīyām utkṣepaṇam*, i. e. throwing upwards is the joint effect of volition and conjunction. — Cf. with this passage: Bhāṣya book III chapter 1 § 13 and book IV § 1 n<sup>2</sup>. S. *„garutva-dravatva-pratyakāśa-nyogātman*”; since however this dvandva has a distributive, and not a collective meaning, it is not likely that Praçastapāda intended here to allude to V.S. I, 1, 29. Perhaps we may conclude that the whole passage I, 1, 27—29 did not yet exist in his time.

In sūtras 30 and 31 we should expect the question: to what extent can substance, quality and action be the joint effect of several actions? Thus the import of sūtra 30 would be: „conjunction [can be the joint effect] of [several] actions [residing in several objects], and so can disjunction.” And similarly sūtra 31, which is in form a reference to I, 1, 20, should be explained: „[substance is never the joint effect of many actions, nor is action such a joint effect], for it has been said in the passage dealing with cause in general (I, 1, 9—22) that ‘action does not produce substance or action’.” The sūtras 30—31 give us a strong impression of being later additions.

Since the passages I, 2, 1 and 2; X, 2, 1 — i exclusively bear on causality, they will be explained afterwards (§ 5 of this chapter). The theological explanation, which CANDRAKĪRTA TARKALAKṢHARA has given of I, 2, 1 and 2 is not even worth refuting.

#### § 4. *The method of characterisation in the Praç.-Bhāṣya.*

The Bhāṣya gives characterisations of the main categories in book I chapter 3, of the substances in book II chapter 1, of the

qualities in book III chapter 1, of the actions in book IV § 1.

The Bhāṣyakāra has not given (in book I chapter 3) such a full characterisation of the main categories as is found in the Sātra. He only gives points in which six, or five, or three categories resemble each other. And he specially contrasts the first three categories with the three last. But he does not try here to distinguish substance from quality or action &c., although he must have known V.S. I, 1, 9—31, even if not in its complete present form.

Different reasons may have induced Praṇastapāda to deviate from his example. So for instance he has gained by his arrangement parallelism between the chapters I, 3; II, 1 and III, 1, where he first gives characterisations of the whole class and then of some subdivisions. Or he wished to conceal the points in which he disagreed with the Sātra: for here classes are often defined by characteristics, only holding good for some of their species.

A few other points in the Bhāṣya still deserve our notice.

In book I chapter 3 § 1 *astītya* is used with reference to the six categories. *Astītya*, corresponding with the term *bhāva* of syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, can be rendered by 'positive' being'.

In the same chapter § 5 *sattāḥsamābhāṣita* i. e. connection with *sattā*, is used with reference to substance, quality and action. We could render *sattā* thus by 'objective' reality'.

And in § 9 *scātmāṣattva* and *bodhīlakṣaṇatva* are assigned to generality, difference and inherence: this *scātmāṣattva* can be paraphrased as: 'a way of existing typical for them' and *bodhīlakṣaṇatva* as 'subjective form of existence'.

In a later paragraph I shall return to this distinction: for the present it suffices to show how Praṇastapāda has obtained a greater accuracy of technical language than the Sātrakāra. For in the sūtra *sat* and *sattā* are in I, 1, 8 and I, 2, 7 exclusively attributed to substance, quality and action, whilst *bhāva* is used in āhnika I, 1, as a synonym for *sattā* so that the form of existence found in the three last categories and the form common to all six have been left undetermined.

Another point worthy of our attention is the use of the term *vaiśeṣika-guṇa* and *sāmānya-guṇa* in Bhāṣya III chapter 1 § 7 and 8: these paragraphs clearly show that *vaiśeṣika* was originally synonymous with *vaidharmika*, thus signified 'distinctive, characteristic' and had nothing to do with atomism. Atomism, indeed, is a later addition to the Vaiśeṣika, which system at first intended to give characterisations. Moreover the space, allowed in the fundamental texts for dissertations on the subject, do not leave us any doubt.



I must postpone the discussion on two other interesting points in the chapter mentioned, namely: the theory of causality<sup>1</sup>, and the theory holding that sound and psychical quality only 'cover' a part of (physical) space and soul.

§ 5. *Explanation of the sūtras, quoted in § 1, as far as bearing on causality; the theory of causality in the Bhāṣya.*

In taking up again the explanation of the sūtras, quoted in § 1, as far as they refer to causality, we may begin by noticing that sūtra I. 2. 1 and 2 do not give rise to any difficulties, they simply contain a definition of cause and effect, the two notions which were often made use of in the characterisation of substance, quality and action in ābhika I. 1.

Further we may observe that in sūtra I. 1. 15 and 17 the Sātrakāra himself introduces the terms *śamavāyī-kāraṇa* and *asamavāyī-kāraṇa* and in the passage X. 2. 1—7 NANDA LAL SINHA is obliged to use many insertions in accordance with ČAṆKARA-MIŚRA'S explanation. In these insertions we meet with the terms, *śamavāyī-kāraṇa* (combinative or inherential cause), *asamavāyī-kāraṇa* (non-combinative or non-inherential cause), *nimitta-kāraṇa* (efficient cause). Although these terms are found in Praçastapāda's Bhāṣya, yet I doubt that they were existent in the time of the Sātrakāra. Before, however, explaining my own conception of sūtras X. 2. 1—7 I think it desirable first to explain the causality-theory, implicitly accepted by Praçastapāda.

According to the still current Vaiçeṣika teachings (cf. here p. 126 § 6 and ARHATJE'S notes on the Tarkasamgraha p. 98) *śamavāyī* is of six kinds: 1. the relation between parts and aggregate, 2. thing and qualities, 3. thing and action, 4. atom and distinctive qualities, 5. genus and individual, 6. being and the main categories. In the four first cases the component parts or the thing as abode (*āśraya*) are considered to be the cause of the aggregate, the qualities &c. This causality, coinciding with the relation of inherence, is termed *śamavāyī-kāraṇa* by the Vaiçeṣikas.

Further we learn from the tabellie exposition of the Praç. Bhāṣya in book IV section IV table E n°. 5 and 9, table C n°. 19—21, n°. 26—28:

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 140.

action, cause of conjunction, disjunction [and impetus], is exclusively *asamavāgi-kāraṇa*:

the psychological qualities, not only *bodhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa* and *pragatā*, but also *dharmā*, *adharma* and *bhāva* (latent impression) are exclusively *nimitta-kāraṇa*:

the warm touch *usma-sparśa* [which partly, residing in the component parts, brings about the warm touch in the aggregate, and which partly, residing in fire, brings about the warm touch in earth &c., conjoined with fire], is sometimes *asamavāgi-kāraṇa*, sometimes *nimitta-kāraṇa*:

conjunction [which partly, residing in an aggregate or a part with reference to a second object, brings about respectively conjunction in the part or the whole; which partly, e. g. in the case of drumstick and drum, brings about the quality of sound in the surrounding (physical) space; which partly, e. g. in the case of the moving hand and the pestle, brings about the movement of the object conjoined, and which partly, in the case of the conjoined parts, brings about the aggregate, thus a *druma*], is sometimes *asamavāgi-kāraṇa* and sometimes *nimitta-kāraṇa*:

disjunction [of which similar cases can be distinguished as of conjunction] is sometimes *asamavāgi-kāraṇa* and sometimes *nimitta-kāraṇa*:

on the other hand, to quote only one example:

*rūpa*, which is merely *samāna-jātā-āra-dhātā*, is exclusively called *asamavāgi-kāraṇa*.

I think, the given distinctions can be explained by the following hypothesis: originally only *kāraṇa* and *nimitta* were accepted, the former term corresponding to our notion of cause (i. e. *causa fiendi*), the latter to the notion reason or motive (*causa cognoscendi*, *causa agendi*). Subsequently the notion *nimitta* was applied to all psychological states and *kāraṇa* was divided into *samavāgi-kāraṇa* (i. e. *kāraṇa* coinciding with *samavāgi*), and that form of *kāraṇa* which was not *samavāgi-kāraṇa*. Finally the application of the term *nimitta* or *nimitta-kāraṇa* was still more widened and also used in those cases where one quality could function as a cause in different respects.

In syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika for instance in Gaṅkara-Miśra's Upaskāra the notions *asamavāgi-kāraṇa* and *nimitta-kāraṇa* have changed in character. *Nimitta-kāraṇa* is here left undefined; *samavāgi-kāraṇa* has preserved its old meaning; *asamavāgi-kāraṇa* is defined (e. g. Upaskāra on V.S. X, 2, 3, Nanda Lal Sinha's translation p. 334): „Non-combinative causality is causality combined in (*samaveśa*) one and the same object connected with the relation of effect

and cause. Such causality results either from combination in the same object with the effect, or from combination in the same object with the cause. Of these the former is called, in the terminology of the Vaīṣṛikas, the slighter or minor and the latter, the greater or major proximity (respectively, *laghva* and *mahatyā pratyāsattiḥ*). The relation between movement and subsequent conjunction, is an example of *asamarāyikāmatrasa laghvaṇā pratyāsattiḥ*, because movement inheres in the same object in which the effect, i. e. the conjunction, inheres. The relation between the conjunction, technically called *praveśa*, i. e. [‘loose’] accumulation, residing in the constituent parts of a bale of cotton and the magnitude in the bale of cotton is mentioned by Āṇkara Miśra as an example of *asamarāyikāmatrasa mahatyā pratyāsattiḥ*, because here the conjunction inheres in the same object, scil. the parts, in which the cause (or abode) of the magnitude inheres (see Upaskāra on V.S. X, 2, 6).

I can scarcely believe this definition to have been known by PRAĢASTAPĀDA, for then he would not have called the psychical facts — e. g. an intellection causing another intellection, or an intellection causing a pleasure — *nimitta-kāraṇāni*, but [*laghvaṇā pratyāsattiḥ*] *asamarāyikā-kāraṇāni*.

And whilst Āṇkara Miśra’s conception of causality differs from that of Praḡastapāda, his interpretation of the still older ideas of KATĪDA’s is neither right. For, we may notice that a translation of the sūtras X, 2, 1—7 is possible without introducing the terms *samarāyikā*-, *asamarāyikā*-, *nimitta-kāraṇāni* into them.

Sūtra 1: ‘[It is the] cause’ — such [intuition and usage] with regard to substance [arise] from the inherence of effect [in it].

Sūtra 2. Or from conjunction [e. g. the moving hand is called the cause of the movement of the pestle].

Sūtra 3. Actions [are causes] through inherence in the cause [e. g. action is cause of conjunction, because it inheres in the cause or abode of the subsequent conjunction].

Sūtra 4. So also, ‘[it is the] cause’ — such [intuition and usage] with regard to quality, [arise] from inherence in the same object with the cause; [e. g. the colour of the parts inheres in these parts in which also inheres the aggregate, cause of the effected colour].

Sūtra 5. Through inherence in the cause, conjunction [is a cause] of the cloth.

Sūtra 6. And, through inherence in the cause of the cause

[conjunction becomes a cause] also: [e. g. the *pracaṃ* as a cause of the magnitude in the bale of cotton].

Sūtra 7. The distinctive quality of fire [i. e. heat]. [becomes a cause] through inherence in the conjunct.

The sūtras, translated, give rise to the following observations:

Sūtra 3 gives the impression of being an insertion, for *a*: we should have expected the discussion of *karmaṇ* to be placed after the examination of the qualities. *b*) the grammatical form of sūtra 1. '*kāraṇam itī dracye*' and of sūtra 4 '*tathā rope*' would require a correspondent formulation in sūtra 3, namely: '*tathā karmaṇi, kāraṇe samarāḡṇāt*'.

Further we may observe that in these sūtras, causality is either based on inherence, or on conjunction, or on a double inherence, or on inherence combined with conjunction.

The occasional dependence of causality on conjunction may be examined a little more fully. In European science the notion of physical causality has often been treated in connection with the notion of spacial contiguity. In this case one considers the law of mutual attraction between material bodies to need further explanation and attraction to be a similar process as light and heat. Further we find in European thought an aversion to the ideas of telepathy or the direct influence of human will at a distance. And even if psychologists do not pertinently deny such ideas, still they believe that such telepathy or magical influence if existent, will one day be explained by a process carried on over a series of adjacent points. One of the postulates, underlying European science, is that all causal actions between things, suppose an activity in interjacent space.

This idea is not meant by the Vaīceśikas, when they teach that causality is based on *samyoga*; for soul, according to them, is omnipresent and thus conjoined to all things in space; the perception of things at a distance is therefore possible for yogins; and similarly the action of their will at a distance. Nay even the influence of the *adṛṣṭa* of any ordinary person, e. g. of a potter, possesses such a (we may say) magical influence on neighbouring objects, e. g. the clay from which the pot is originating. Further the Vaīceśikas had not yet learnt to consider gravity as an effect of attraction; gravity was merely a quality of one thing, taken by itself.

§ 6. *Exposition of a theory of relations and causality, based on the distinctions of grammar.*

In his notes on the *Tarka-saṃgraha* ATHALYE has compared the theory of causality, given by the syncretic Nyāya-Vaīceśika, with

the distinction of four kinds of causes by ARISTOTLE. As both theories have indeed very little in common and the Aristotelean exposition of the notion of causality may be considered to be antiquated in Europe, this comparison has remained rather unfruitful.

Much more satisfactory results, I think, may be obtained by taking the theory of causality not apart, but in connection with the theory of relations.

This theory of relations is in many points still an open problem in European philosophy. For we are placed here before the same methodological difficulties as we meet with in explaining the distinction of the main categories, namely: must the principal forms of relations be found by means of an analysis of language, a psychological analysis of human consciousness, an examination of the history of science, or a special dialectical form of thinking such e. g. as taught by HEGEL. I do not intend to study this question: it may suffice to state that here too we may obtain some elucidation by the aid of grammar. Independent, however, of the method used, we may be sure to find a certain vagueness of transition between the different main forms of relations.

When for this purpose we consider the relations occurring in language between the different parts of speech, for instance between subject and praedicate, between praedicate and adjuncts, between main clause and dependent clauses, we may distinguish three main groups for which I shall use terms borrowed from general philosophy<sup>1</sup>:

- A. The reflective relations,
- B. The constitutive relations,
- C. The modal relations.

A. By reflective relations I understand those relations with reference to which the part played by our consciousness in their formation, is easily made conscious: these relations can be likened to a net, thrown by the human mind over the things; and although they are not capricious inventions, still to a certain extent they seem to be subjective.

Examples of such reflective relations are:

1. The relations of identity and otherness --- in which relation we can easily state our subjective act of identification and distinguishing.
2. The relation of inherence, e. g. between a quality or

<sup>1</sup> Compare with the following exposition: CURT STÜWART, *Logik* I § 6 and WILHELM VON STÜRTZBECK, "Von System der Kategorien" (in the *Festschrift zu Stüwart's 70stem Geburtstag* 1900).

an action and an object — in which relation without difficulty we can trace our subjective act of abstracting.

3. The (qualitative) relation of likeness and unlikeness — a relation clearly originated by our subjective act of comparing.

4. The quantitative relations of number, measure, weight &c. — the subjectivity of which relations is unmistakable, for we are free to choose the things which we wish to count, to compare in size &c.

5. The relations of coordination, subordination &c. between individuals, species, genera — in which relations the subjective processes are so many and involved that it almost seems as if this distinguishing of classes is a completely subjective and even capricious act of the mind. Thus nominalism, the *apohavāda*, could arise notwithstanding the fact that a deeper investigation would have shown the legitimate, scientific and, in this respect, objective character of the distinguishing of classes.

6. The relation of logical necessity between facts, namely between such facts of which one cannot be said to have produced the other: e. g. two sides of a triangle are equal, because two corners are equal. I. e. the relation, called *ratio essendi* by SCHOPENHAUER.

B. By constitutive relations I understand those relations which seem to constitute, to 'build up' the world; in other words: those relations which *prima facie* seem to be exempt of subjective influences. Such relations are:

1. the spacial relations,
2. the temporal relations,
3. the causal relations.

Concerning these relations I should like to make the following observations:

When we examine how far these relations are applicable to the physical and psychical world, we may state: that the spacial relations are only applicable to material nature, that the temporal relations bear on physical nature as well as on soul, that causal relations are partly of an unconscious character (physical causality, causal actions of nature on soul, causal action of soul on the surrounding nature) and partly of a conscious character. In the latter case we may distinguish the argumentative causality, or relation between reason and conclusion, from the volitional causality or process of motivation, i. e. the relation between motives and volitional decision. Thus the relation of causality contains three species

which were called by Schopenhauer: *ratio praei*, *ratio cognoscendi*, *ratio agendi*.

Further we may notice that the reflective and constitutive relations are often interwoven, thus all spacial relations, directions as well as distances, suppose the application of numeral relations (cf. group A n<sup>2</sup>. 1). Similarly, the ratio *essendi* (group A n. 6) and the ratio *cognoscendi* (group B n<sup>2</sup>. 3) are closely connected.

C. By modal relations I understand those relations in which at least one of the related members is a psychical state. We may subdivide them into:

1. the relations accepted as existing between our percepts or concepts and the objective world: e. g. the correspondance or repugnance between our mental ideas and what is considered to be the reality;
2. the relations between our emotional or volitional states and the objects to which they refer.
3. the relations between appreciative judgments and the psychical states to which they refer.

We may notice here again the close coherence between the relations of group C n<sup>2</sup>. 1 and the reflective relations of group A.

Before we can use the table given as a canon for appreciation we are obliged to consider two questions more closely: 1. where must the notion of existence be placed in this table? 2. does the notion of inherence indeed belong to the reflective relations, or is it—as WINDELBAND asserts in the article quoted—one of the constitutive relations?

In answer to the first question we may state that the object is called existent, when it can be made either the object of a trustworthy normal perception, or can be inferred by trustworthy normal inferences from the data of perception, that the object, thus called existent, receives its place in the totality of the objective world; and conclusively that existence may be called a reflective relation, closely connected with the modal group.

In answer to the second question we may acknowledge that there is an appearance of reason for considering, as Windelband does, inherence to possess the same objective character as the thing and the quality themselves, but on the other hand I myself feel more for the decision chosen by the Vaiśeṣika system, which declared *samarāṅga* to be *bakthyapekṣa*, i. e. reflective. The following fact pleads for this decision—in the same way as the legitimacy of the notion *sāmānya* was denied by nominalism, by the *apohavāda*, so the notion *samarāṅga* was denied to be trustworthy by the dialectician ĀYAKARA ACĀRYA. This polemics would certainly never have taken

place, if the relation of *samavāya* possessed the character, attributed to it by Windelband.

§ 7. *Appreciation of the theory of relations given by the Vaiṣeṣikas.*

Taking as a basis the table, given in the precedent paragraph, I should like to formulate my appreciation of the Vaiṣeṣika theory of relations in the following way:

1. In spite of my admiration for the category-theory of the Vaiṣeṣikas I still think it more correct to accept four main categories viz. *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma* and *sambandha* instead of their six or seven. Cf. the expression *jāti-kriyā-guṇa-sambandha* in an eggression in CAṆKARA ĀCĀRYA'S *Gītābhāṣya*. Poona-edition p. 355).

2. It is a pity that the Vaiṣeṣika system has not succeeded in giving a complete classification of the *sambandhas*. It only accepted two *sambandhas*: *saṃyoga*, which is called at the same time a quality, and *samavāya* which is one of the *padārthas*. The insufficiency of this *sambandha*-theory will become apparent, when we shall explain V.S. VII. 2, 14—20, where the relation between word (*śabda*) and meaning (*artha*) is made the subject of discussion without any satisfactory result.

3. The notion *samavāya* was looked upon by the Vaiṣeṣika system (see here book IV section IV table A n° 9) as belonging to the reflective relations, by the Pūrva-mīmāṃsakas to the constitutive relations, this last follows from the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-theory stating that *samavāya* is visible in visible and invisible in invisible things.<sup>1)</sup> As is clear from the precedent paragraph WINDELBAND'S exposition agrees with the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, whereas I for myself should like to admit the Vaiṣeṣika conception.

4. Number, spacial farness and nearness, temporal farness and nearness were considered by the Vaiṣeṣikas as reflective relations (Bhāṣya book II chapter 1). This is for *paratva* and *aparatva* only partially right: see here § 6 letter B.

5. *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* were called by the Sūtrakāra himself *buddhy-apekṣa*, i. e. reflective: V.S. I. 2. 3. Cf. here § 6 sub A 5.

6. My appreciation of the teachings about *bhāva*, *abhāva*, *pṛthakta*, *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* has been given together with the exposition: see p. 119—121; p. 129; p. 138—141.

<sup>1)</sup> See here p. 128.



7. The modal relations were not specially treated by the Vaisesikas. *Sambhava* (numerical inclusion, e. g. of the number hundred in thousand) is wrongly interpreted by modern pandits as probability (cf. Upaskāra, Bibl. Indica edition p. 106 and here chapter V section 3 § 4).

#### SECTION 4.

### THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE VAJESIKA SYSTEM.

#### § 1. *Sūtras bearing on the notion apeksābuddhi.* *NANDA LAL SINHA'S translation.*

1. 2. 3 The notions genus and species are relative to the understanding
- VIII. 2. 1 This', 'that', 'done by you', 'feed him' — such [cognitions are dependent upon understanding.
- 2 [Such cognitions depend upon previous other cognitions] in as much as they appear in respect of objects seen, and do not appear in respect of objects unseen.

#### § 2. *Annotations to the sūtras bearing on apeksābuddhi.*

NANDA LAL SINHA, as we see, gives two translations for *buddhy-apeksā*, 'relative to the understanding' and 'dependent on understanding'. The latter pleases me best. In the precedent section I have given as rendering 'reflective', and in accordance with this I should like to translate *apeksābuddhi* as 'reflective cognition'. Moreover I shall make use of the translation 'fundamental cognition' for *apeksābuddhi* in accordance with the expression by which this term is explained in the Praśastapāda Bhāṣya (book III chapter 2 § 7, and see here chapter III section 1 § 5): '*buddhir gāṁ apeksya...*' i. e. 'an intellection on the basis of which [certain relations are momentarily created in the objects]'.

Whereas in V.S. I, 2, 3 only the notions *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are called reflective, we find in the Praś. Bhāṣya this reflective character assigned to more notions: to *sāmānya* (see here book IV section IV table A n°. 9), to *dr̥iteādi*, *dr̥ip̥thakteādi*, *paratva* and *aparatva* (ibidem table C n°. 18).

ČAMKARA MIČRA introduces his gloss on VIII, 2, 1 in the following way (translation Nanda Lal Sinha p. 283):

„Having described the mode of production of perceptual cognition, both discriminative *savikalpaka* and non-discriminative *avikalpaka* now the author, with a view to describe the perception of [a double specialised nature, or] the being specialised in the specialised (*cicīṣṭa-caicīṣṭya*), gives a few examples (*ekadeśam āha*) &c.”

Then all the words in the sūtra including *kṛtam* and *bhōjaya* are explained as examples of *apekṣābuddhi*.

I do not think that the notion of *cicīṣṭa-caicīṣṭya*, introduced here by Čamkara-Miçra, goes back as far as the Sūtrakāra, and further it seems to me that only the words *ayan*, *eṣa*, *trayā* and *enam* are meant as examples. In other words: the Sūtrakāra says that the pronominal indication, which we find in language, is an example of a reflective category. The reflective character becomes apparent by the fact that this pronominal indication only takes place after the perception of individual objects [and is not realised together with the perception].

From DIVYEDIN's concordance<sup>1)</sup> we learn that these two sūtras (X, 2, 1 & 2) are ignored by PRAÇASTAPĀDA. Perhaps they are a later insertion.

### § 3. *The apekṣābuddhi of the ācāra.*

Special importance is attached to the *apekṣābuddhi* of the Lord during the time of creation. This 'fundamental intellection' of the *ācāra* is left out in the detailed description of the world-creation (Bhāṣya book II chapter 2 § 6; see here chapter II section 1 § 4), but is met with in the paragraph on extension (Bhāṣya book II chapter 2 § 8; see here chapter II section 2 § 5). Extension is said here to originate from three causes: number, extension and loose conglomeration. When two pieces of iron are welded, the extension of the piece thus formed, is caused by the extension of the two original pieces. When porous substances like cotton balls, are heaped together, the extension of the heap is caused by *pravaya*. But when at the time of the world-creation the separate *ayus*, are comprehended by the Lord's *apekṣābuddhi*, in numbers of two, three &c., then the ultimate atoms without extension create the smallest physical bodies with extension. In this case the *apekṣābuddhi*

<sup>1)</sup> See here book IV section V.

is not momentarily active, but during the whole time of the world's existence up to its *pralaya*.

This *tejavatā-pakṣābheda* is clearly an artifice to get rid of the self-contradiction in the idea that corporeal bodies with extension are formed out of *paramāṇus* without extension.

#### § 4. *The naive realism of the Vaiśeṣika system.*

European science has accustomed us to the idea that the qualities of material bodies are of two kinds—primary qualities, such as weight, volume and movement, which can be expressed quantitatively, and secondary qualities such as sound, colour and taste, and further that the perception of the so-called primary qualities is much more adequate to objective reality than our perception of secondary qualities.

Secondly Kantian philosophy, in many respects the culmination of European philosophical development, has gone further and has asserted that all our perceptions, conceptions &c. concerning the world, in their most essential structure, are of a subjective character and that it is our mental habitus which moulds all experience into the form of things with qualities and actions; of things existing in space and time and causally influencing each other. In other words: the distinction of the main categories: thing, quality and action in general and the constitutive relations especially possess a reflectional nature: and the reflection, the mental creation, on which they are based, is sub- or prae-conscious.

This Kantian conception is not a capricious illusionism. For objectivity here consists in the legislative character of consciousness. Objectivity is an ideal which science seeks by applying constantly the norms of our conscience of the true. But it does not consist in an adequate correspondence of our notions with a kosmos, the existence of which is upheld by realism.

If we try to characterise Indian philosophy in comparison with these two European conceptions, we may notice: first that Indian physics has never made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, a natural result which arises from its neglecting the methods of mathematics in its research of nature; secondly that De Stcherbatskoi's explanation of the Buddhist *vijñāna-vāda* with the help of Kantian philosophy, is too favourable with respect to this Indian system of thought. For the corner-stone of Kantian thought is the notion of the 'a-priori', the notion of 'norms of scientific conscience'. We can scarcely expect such notions to be

reached by Indian philosophy. A scientific explanation of nature, an insight of any value in 'causal explanation' has never existed in India. The theological conception of human *adṛṣṭa* with its magical influence on the whole kosmos, was moreover opposed to such development of science.

When we finally direct our attention to the Vaiçeśika system, we find here a naïve realism without any consciousness concerning possible difficulties. Whereas the Nyāya-sūtra bestows some polemical passages on the nihilism of NĀGĀRJUNA, Vaiçeśika Sūtra and Praç. Bhāṣya are totally silent on this point. And it is only in ÇRĪDHARA'S Nyāya-kandalī and in an insertion of the Vaiçeśika Sūtra (VIII. 1, 10 & 11), perhaps posterior to Praçastapāda, that any regard is given to the theses of the Vijñāna-vāda.

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## CHAPTER II.

### PHYSICS.

#### *1. Introductory remark to the chapter on Vaiçeṣika physics.*

The discussion on the substances in the Vaiçeṣika-system, though of less value than the classification of the categories, is not less interesting.

Kaṇāda sums up nine *dravyāṇi* in V. 1, 5: earth, water, light, air, wind, physical space, time, mathematical space, soul and the internal organ. The first four form the group of the elements (*dravyā-craṇabhūtaṇi* cf. Praçastapāda-bhāṣya p. 24). These together with physical space which does not originate individual things and therefore is not an element, are called *bhūtāni* by Praçastapāda (p. 22). We may arrange the substances in three groups: 1. the *bhūtāni*, the treatment of which will show the physics of the system, 2. space and time, 3. soul and mind, the subject-matter of psychology.

The Vaiçeṣika physics will be discussed under the following headings: the general theory of matter, the theory of sound, the physiological notions; the physics of the other Indian systems; the physical notions of the ancient Greeks, compared with those of the Indians; appreciation of the Vaiçeṣika physics.

The movement of the different elements and its causes will be explained more extensively in the third section of the chapter on mathematical notions.

## SECTION I.

## THE GENERAL THEORY OF MATTER.

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing upon the theory of matter.*  
*Nanda Lal Sinha's translation.*

A. 1<sup>st</sup>. Sūtras bearing upon the gross elements in general.

- II, 1. 1 Earth possesses colour, taste, smell and touch.  
 2 Waters possess colour, taste and touch and are fluid and viscid.  
 3 Fire possesses colour and touch.  
 4 Air possesses touch.  
 5 These [characteristics] are not found in ether.  
 6 The fluidity of clarified butter, lac and wax through conjunction with light is similar to that of water.  
 7 The fluidity of tin, lead, iron, silver and gold through conjunction with fire, constitutes their similarity to water.
- II, 2. 1 The non-production [of the smell which is perceived in the cloth] after or during its contact with a flower, from the attribute [of the constitutive cause of the cloth] is the mark of the non-existence of smell in the cloth.  
 2 Smell is established in earth.  
 3 By this hotness is explained.  
 4 Hotness [is the characteristic] of fire.  
 5 Coldness [is the characteristic] of water.

A. 2<sup>nd</sup>. Some sūtras, bearing upon the movements, typical for the different elements. (For a complete treatment see next chapter, on mathematical notions).

- V, 2. 3 The falling of waters, in the absence of conjunction, is due to gravity.  
 4 Flowing [results] from fluidity.  
 13 The initial upward flaming of fire, the initial sideward blowing of air, and the initial actions of atoms and of mind are caused by *adṛṣṭa*.

A. 3<sup>rd</sup>. Sūtras bearing specially upon air.

- II, 1. 8 That it has horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the extremity and a dewlap — such is the admitted mark of being a cow.



- II, 1. 9 And touch [is a mark] of air.  
 10 And it is not the touch of the visible substances; hence the mark [of the inherence] of air is not the mark of the visible substances.  
 11 Air is a substance, because it does not [contain or reside in substance].  
 12 Air is a substance, also because it possesses action and attribute.  
 13 The eternality [of air] is evident from its not combining with other substances.  
 14 The collision of air with air is the mark of its plurality.  
 15 There being no perception of the association [i. e. universal relation] with air, there is no visible mark [of the existence of air].  
 16 And by inference by analogy air is not proved as a particular substance, but as substance only.  
 17 Therefore, [the name] 'air' is proved by the Veda.  
 18 But name and effect are the mark [of the existence] of beings distinguished from ourselves.  
 19 Because name and effect follow from perception

B. Satras bearing upon the atoms 1<sup>st</sup>. their existence, 2<sup>nd</sup>. their qualities.

1. 2. 6 See here p. 115 and p. 117 &c.

- IV, 2. 1 The eternal is that which is existent and uncaused.  
 2 The effect is the mark [of the existence] of the [ultimate atoms].  
 3 The existence [of colour &c.] in the effect, [follows] from [their] existence in the cause.  
 4 'Non-eternal' — such [intuition and expression] can be accounted for only as the negation of the eternal.  
 5 [It is] an error [to suppose that the ultimate atom is not eternal].

- VII, 1. 1 Attributes [have been] mentioned [above].  
 2 The colour, taste, smell and touch of earth, [water, fire and air] are also non-eternal, on account of the non-eternality of their substrata.  
 3 By this is implied eternality [of colour &c. which reside] in eternal substances.  
 4 And also in consequence of the eternality of their [respective substrata [colour &c.]] are eternal in water, fire and air.

VII. 1, 5 In non-eternals [colour, &c., are] non-eternal in consequence of the non-eternality of their substrata.

C. (No passage occurs in the Vaiṣeṣika sūtras on the creation and the destruction of the world).

D. Sūtras bearing upon the changes in the atoms, caused by fire

VII. 1, 6 In earth, [colour, taste and touch] have for their antecedents [like] attributes in [its combinative] causes [and are also] due to the action of heat.

7 Because their substratum is the same.

X, 2, 7 The distinctive attribute of fire [i. e. heat] [becomes an efficient cause] through combination in the conjunct.

§ 2. *Quotation from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B p. 17:*

„CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA prefers to read IV. 1. 3—5 as two aphorisms only, viz. *kāraṇabhūcāt kāryabhūco 'nitya itī* and *viśeṣataḥ pratīṣedhabhūco 'vidyā* and interprets them to mean, respectively, 'The nature of the effect, [though] following from the nature of the cause [which is eternal] is non-eternal' and 'It is an error to suppose that because things [e. g. atoms] exist as effects [e. g. compound bodies], therefore they cannot exist in the causal [or atomic] state'<sup>1)</sup> — in order to explain the application of the word 'non-eternal' in I. 1, 8, where the reference is to things which are products.'"

§ 3. *Annotations to the sūtras, bearing on physics.*

11. Annotations to the sūtras on the gross elements in general.

In V.S. II, 1, 2 *dravāḥ saigdṛāḥ* is probably an insertion, as is shown by the context and the word order, used in the sūtra itself.

In V.S. II, 1, 5 *te* is explained by ČAMKARA MIČRA as *rupādayaḥ*. Then he discusses the objection *ananyā dādhi-dhavalam ākāśam itī katham pratīti itī cet?*. A similar discussion is already found in the Ny.-kandālī (p. 179 l. 9 &c.).

To Vaiṣeṣika Sūtra II, 1, 7 Čamkara Mičra annotates (Bibl. Ind. ed. p. 76, NANDA LAL SINHA'S transl. p. 60): „This is an indication (*apalakeṣaṇā*): bell-metal, copper, brass &c. are also implied.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. the use of the term *causa* in the Sāṃkhya system, here chapter II section 4.

The character which is common to those which have been mentioned (*śakya*) and those which are implied (*lakṣya*) is that they are the foundation (*adhikāraṇatva*) of the fluidity which is produced (*janya*), but not destroyed (*anucchedya*) by the closest conjunction of fire."

GHATE in his notes on n<sup>o</sup>. 76 of the Saptapadārthi says: "it is clear... that the bright glittering and the difficulty of reducing it to a gaseous state with the application of intense heat, induced the Naiyāyikas to regard gold as *tejas* and opposed to *pṛthivī*."

It is not quite clear how the difficulty of reducing metals to a gaseous state can have led the Vaiśeṣikas to assign to the metals the nature of light. The peculiar glance found on the surface of all metals without exception, must have been the only reason for regarding them as mixture of light and earthly matter (see Praç. Bhāṣya book II chapter 2 § 4: Vizian. edition p. 39). At all events the *anucchedya-dhātava* given by Çaṅkara Miçra to the metals, is mentioned nowhere in the Praç. Bhāṣya (see e. g. the paragraph on *dhātava*, book III chapter 2 § 52 Vizian. edition p. 234).

The sūtras II. 2. 1—5 are evidently an insertion, for they transgress the order of the enunciation, in as far as the last sūtras of the precedent lesson (II. 1. 20—31) are bestowed upon physical space and the following sūtras (II. 2. 6 sqq.) upon time and mathematical space. In sūtra 1 the first member *guṇāntara* of the compound stands in an ablative relation to the final member *aprādur-bhāva*. The argumentation of the five sūtras may be paraphrased as follows: when a cloth, [first possessing a smell of its own, which smell also belongs to the threads] comes into contact with a flower, it gets the scent of the latter. This smell, not originated from that of the threads, is not an essential quality of the cloth. Similarly when water possesses a smell, this is owing to the fact that it is mixed with the element characterised by smell, scil. earth. Touch, which is common to all four elements, may be divided into warm touch, cold touch, and [touch which is neither warm nor cold, i. e. which is merely pressure]. Warm touch is the characteristic quality of fire; when water or earth is warm, this is due to the addition of fire. Cold touch is typical for water, a qualification evidently given by the Vaiśeṣikas, because water, when of the same temperature as the surrounding atmosphere and thus colder than our body, absorbs more animal heat than other objects in contact with it.

12. The sūtras V. 2. 3: 1 and 13 mention movements typical for [earth], water, fire and wind. Judging from modern European standpoint the ideas, developed in these three

sūtras, are of more value than the definitions, based on the supposed correlation between the elements and their respective impressions on the sense-organs. (See § 1 section 5 of this chapter).

The term *adṛṣṭa* in V, 2, 13 may be paraphrased as 'the unseen quality of soul': it is namely that quality of soul which is not directly perceived in reflection (see here book IV section IV table C n°. 11 & 12). This *adṛṣṭa* is to be compared to naïve European conceptions of Divine Providence: this notion makes up, but in a very capricious and unscientific way for the laws of nature, accepted by methodical research. My exposition of the creation of the world and of the changes, caused in earth by baking, will make this still clearer. To illustrate the notion of *adṛṣṭa*, I shall now quote a sūtra of Kāṇḍa's with the comment of the Upaskāra.

V.S. VII, 1, 22: Physical space is (infinitely) great, because it is all-pervasive, and so is soul.

Upaskāra: All-pervasiveness is conjunction with all material (things) and as this is not possible without infinite greatness, it obliges us to infer this infinite greatness. For the coming into being of sound is experienced both here in Benares and in Pāṭaliputra at the same time. In respect to this only one physical space is the inherential cause. Thus the pervasiveness of physical space is proved. — [We can paraphrase Čamkara Miçra's thought thus: man, wherever he goes, will meet with physical space, as the substance which carries sound; therefore physical space must pervade the whole universe]. — Pervasiveness is only possible, in case [a substance] possesses infinitely great extension; for there would be a needless intricateness, if we suppose several physical spaces. Therefore we must admit only one physical space. The expression 'a [certain] place in physical space', is only metaphorical, as it is based on the condition of conjunction with a pot and the like, [things] which possess place; the metaphore here is [based on the fact] that physical-space is conjoined with substances possessing place. 'And so is soul' — physical space is infinitely great, because it is all-pervasive, i. e. because it is conjoined with all material [things], and so [for the same reason] soul is infinitely great. If there were no conjunction of soul with all material [things], then action [i. e. movement] would not arise now in this and now in that material [thing] as a result of the conjunction with a soul possessing *adṛṣṭa*, in as far as the unseen [quality], being seated in different [souls], causes these actions in consequence of its close proximity (*pratyāsatti*). And this close proximity is only [possible] in the case of conjunction [of the material things] with a soul, possessing the unseen quality. In this

way whilst the human body is moving, the arising of knowledge, pleasure &c. first in reference to this and then to that object could not take place but for the pervasiveness of soul. Therefore soul is all-penetrating. But soul is not, like physical space, merely one, because we see respective differences, [one soul is happy, another is unhappy &c.], thus it is said [V.S. III, 2, 19]. This is then the meaning [of Kāṇada's sūtra]. And this greatness is absolute and eternal, just as the smallness in the atoms. We may in the same way conceive [the idea of] infinite length in physical space &c. as of infinite shortness in the atoms."

13. The sūtras II, 1, 8 sqq. bear specially upon air. They do not seem to possess a great authenticity: at least the sūtras 15—19 are probably a later addition. Let us first consider the separate sūtras.

In II, 1, 8 *dyṣṭa*, has been translated by Nanda Lal Sinha as „admitted” and similarly by GORGH as „received”. This corresponds with the comments of the Upaskāra, where we read for instance: „*sāśnācattā to prasiddhau gotre līṅgam*” (nearly synonymous to *prasiddham*, . . . *līṅgam*). Indeed, the context, in its present form, does not allow another interpretation. In as far as the expression „*dyṣṭam līṅgam*”, however, is also a technical term (Praçastapāda Bhāṣya p. 205 l. 19, which is opposed to „*sāmānyato dyṣṭam*”, met with in V.S. II, 1, 16, the use of *dyṣṭam* in our sūtra is rather surprising.

The sūtras II, 1, 8—10 contain the complete proof for the existence of air (8) often we make a conclusion about a thing — for instance we infer the class to which it belongs — from particular properties, possessed by it; (9) so we infer the existence of air, from its being an object of our sense of touch and (10) from its not being an object of our visual organ.

The sūtras 11 and 12 give a reason, why we should consider air to be a substance, and not for instance a quality. Sūtra 13 gives an argument for the eternity of the aerial atom; „*paramāṇu-lakṣaṇa-vāgyor iti çeṣab*” as the Upaskāra annotates; sūtra 14 proves the multiplicity of air.

Suddenly after this, sūtra 15 repeats more broadly the ideas of sūtra 10. To this sūtra 16 adds: „and by inference by analogy [air is] not [proved] as a particular [substance, but as a substance only].” For the present I leave aside the question whether the translation „inference by analogy” is not rather misleading. Here I want to point out that from the vagueness of our knowledge about air — which substance is only perceived by tactile perception and not by sight — the sūtrakāra draws the conclusion:

„II, 1. 17 Therefore [the name] air is proved by the Veda!” — Cf. the gloss by Čaṅkara Miśra, *vāyor iti nāmāṅgamikam, āgama l'lohaḥ*. Indeed this addition of *nāma* follows from the neutral form *āṅgamikam* and from the following sūtras.

The sūtras 18 and 19, namely, deviate from the subject-matter and unexpectedly begin to prove that there must be beings, superior to man and institutors of human language. In sūtra 18 *saṃjñā-karma* is explained by the Upaskāra as a *deandva* and accordingly translated by Nanda Lal Sinha as „name and effect”; a comparison with VI, 1. 2, however, shows that this interpretation is wrong: the Upaskāra explains there rightly *saṃjñā-karma* by *nāmakarṇam* i. e. the making, the attributing of name. Whilst sūtra 18 thus infers the existence of superhuman beings from the existence of human language, sūtra 19 adds that these beings must possess intellect, „because the making of names must be preceded by the perception [of the things to be nominated].”

I think, the given analysis sufficiently shows that the sūtras II, 1, 15—19 can hardly be original.

B. The notions eternity and transiency are mentioned several times in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra: 1) in a passage (IV, 1. 1—5) following the discussion of the substances (II and III); 2) in a passage (VII, 1. 2 sqq.) referring to the first group of qualities (*rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa*); 3) in some separate sūtras, bearing on extension (VII, 1. 10—20), number and *pṛthaktva* (VII, 2. 8).

The place of the sūtras IV, 1. 1—5 shows that they must bear on the eternal substances. Since the existence of soul, internal organ, physical space, mathematical space and time has been discussed, we may methinks accept Čaṅkara Miśra's interpretation of these sūtras as bearing upon the existence of the atoms.

Granting this the sūtras IV, 1. 1—3 are clear by themselves.

The Upaskāra gives two interpretations of IV, 1. 4; both are based on the same admissions: that the suffix *tas* may have the meaning of a genitive and that the term *vaiśeṣa* may be synonymous with *nitya*. The first admission is improbable: the second contrary to the terminology of the Vaiśeṣika Darśana, although it complies with that of the Sāṅkhyaṃs. Thus the two interpretations of Čaṅkara Miśra's can no longer be upheld. Instead I should like to suggest the following rendering: „the negative expression ‘non-eternal’ is used with regard to distinction” [i. e. places ‘non-eternal’ things against eternal things].

The Upaskāra interprets sūtra IV, 1. 5 by the following gloss, „*paramāṇor anityatvacaiśyaḥ sarvāṇy anūmitir acidyā, bhramarūpā.*”

Similar interpretations occur in ÇAMKARA ACARYA'S *Çarṇaka-Bhāṣṇa*, in as far as the sūtra is explained as a condemnation of one or other opinion about the atoms. Cf. here p. 34 and Vaic. Sūtra VII, 2, 5. Although this interpretation is allowable, yet a comparison with VII, 1, 21, similarly closing a passage on eternity, would suggest the following rendering: „non-knowledge is a probans of knowledge: i. e. the false theory, that substances may be divided still further, will lead to the right knowledge, that the atoms form the last stage in the dividing.”

The sūtras VII, 1, 1—5 are easy. We should notice here that the atoms, according to the Vaiṣeṣikas, do not only possess mathematical qualities (size, position, movement) as in the Democritic system of the Greeks, but also colour &c.

D. Annotations to the sūtras on the influence of fire on earth &c.

In Çamkara Miçra's explanation of the three sūtras, quoted in § 1 under letter D, much attention is bestowed on the division of cause into *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* and *nimitta-kāraṇa*. Thus when the black clay, after having been shaped on the potter's wheel, gets baked by the fire into a red pot, the atoms of the clay — which in the meanwhile have changed in colour — are the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* (inherential cause) of the pot. The conjunction between atoms and fire — a conjunction therefore which partially inheres in the atoms — is the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of the originated red colour of these atoms (see Upaskāra, Bibl. Ind. ed. 293 1, 2 & 3). The heat, inherent in the fire, is the *nimitta-kāraṇa* of the colour. In chapter I of this book (p. 139 &c.) I have expressed my doubts on the accuracy of this view. Nothing really proves that the Sūtrakāra has troubled much about such a distinction. Thus we may translate sūtra VII, 1, 6 as: „[the qualities originated] in earth through the influence of fire, are preceded by the [same] qualities in the causes (i. e. in the component atoms)”, and V.S. X, 2, 7 as „The distinctive quality of fire [becomes a cause] through inherence in the conjunct.”

Sūtra VII, 1, 7 offers more difficulties. In the first place we may notice that its translation by Nanda Lal Sinha, does not agree with Çamkara Miçra's comments. On the whole the connection between sūtra and commentary is difficult here. Let us first consider the text of the Upaskāra. It consists of two parts, the second part being a correction of the first. The translation of the first part runs as follows (cf. Nanda Lal Sinha p. 219, whose rendering I have partially used):

„In order to establish that the colour of the terrene ultimate

atoms have conjunction of fire as their non-inherential cause, he says, . . . : the expression 'of [qualities] produced from burning' is the complement of the aphorism. 'Being qualities' and 'being effects' are also intended here. Thus the formal syllogism *pratyogā* runs as follows:

*Pārthiva-paramāṇu-rūpāḥ saṃyogā-samavāyikārahakāḥ;  
kūṣṭhagatve 'i. e. kūṣṭhagatve gatatve eva' sata, nitya-nāsthā-  
'advīṣṭa-gatatvāt;  
cābdharad, bodhgyādhicava.*

The colour &c. of terrene ultimate atoms, have conjunction for their non-inherential cause:

inasmuch as these, being effects and qualities, are at the same time non-incongruent qualities, inhering in eternal:

like sound, and like understanding &c."

We may paraphrase this argumentation as follows. . . It is an innate tendency of the human mind to explain changes in the objective world as mechanical processes, thus as changes of a mere quantitative nature: therefore we are inclined to doubt whether the qualities colour &c. of the terrene atoms, could change through conjunction with fire: this doubt is not well-founded, because the originated colours are effected qualities which arise in eternally existing substances [scil. in the atoms], and which are not excluded by their nature from such inherence. For we also see [that] sound [arises in the eternally existing physical space, owing to a conjunction e. g. between drum and drumstick] and [that] intellection [arises in the eternally existing soul, through a conjunction between the senses and the objects]."

Although this argumentation is not a direct comments on the sūtra: *ekadriyagatvāt*, still a connection may be found between aphorism and gloss, when we remember that *ekatva* oneness inheres eternally in the ultimate atoms, in soul and in physical space. Thus it seems probable that *advīṣṭa* must be corrected into *advīṣṭha*, i. e. 'non-inhering-in-two'. Then we have to emend the above-given translation of the *hetu* or *apadeśa* of the *pratyogā* as follows.

inasmuch as these, being effects and qualities, are at the same time qualities inhering in eternal and not inhering in [aggregates of] two [or more parts].

Nanda Lal Sinha's translation is in accordance with the Vivṛti, which recent commentary is, however, of no decisive importance.





days one of the most important chapters of the Vaiśiṣṭik philosophy must have had its origin in or before the days of Prācāstapāda. Since, however, the development of this theory belongs to a more recent form of our system — which does not belong to the province of my investigation — it may suffice here to refer to the passages dealing with this topic, which occur in the *Neosāśandhikā*<sup>1</sup> and are here translated in book III (segment 6).

C. The destruction & recreation of the world.

Prācāstapād-Bhāṣya, p. 183, 7.

„Here now the process of the creation and destruction of the four kinds of material things is explained. At the time that Brahman, approaching the end of a hundred years as measured by Brahman-chronology, reaches his liberation, whilst at the same time the Great Lord, the Ruler of the Universe, desires the destruction of the world in order to give rest at night to all living creatures, exhausted by *saṁskāra* — then there is no longer activity of the unseen [qualities] possessed by all souls and with which bodies, organs and material objects cooperate: then in consequence of the Lord's wish and the conjunction between atoms and souls, *utkins* [movements] arise [in the atoms of the bodies and the organs]; from this *separations* result in the atoms, the causes of [i. e. the material of] bodies and organs; and when the *annihilation of mutual conjunction* takes place, there is an *ultimate destruction* of these [bodies and organs], till only loose atoms remain. So in the same order the material things: earth, water, fire and wind are successively destroyed. Hence the ultimate atoms remain separated and likewise the souls which are rid of the *saṁskāras* on their merit and demerit, for the same duration [i. e. for a hundred Brahman-years].

„After this there arises the wish of the Great Lord to create the world in order that all living beings may experience [pleasure and pain]; the unseen [qualities], possessed by all souls, recover their activity, then conjunctions between these [i. e. the souls and the atoms] arise; then actions [movements] originate in the ultimate atoms of wind and by the mutual conjunction of these atoms wind as a developed element is gradually produced through the series of double atoms &c.; and then in physical space this wind is blowing and blowing. Immediately afterwards, having arisen through a similar process from the ultimate water-atoms, the great ocean in the midst of this wind is flowing and flowing. Then again in the midst of

— — — — —  
<sup>1</sup> p. 31.

this ocean the earth, as a developed element, is formed from the ultimate earthly atoms thus forming a compact mass. After this, having originated from the fire-atoms through the series of double atoms' etc., an enormous fire in the midst of the same ocean is blazing and flaring. When, thus the four great elements have arisen, a large egg is created by the mere meditation of the Mighty Lord from the fire-atoms combined with some ultimate earthly atoms, then in this egg the Lord creates Brahman, four-lotus-faced, Pita-maha, grandfather of all the worlds together with the universe, and he entrusts this God with the creation of the creatures. And Brahman, in obedience to the order of the Great Lord, undertakes his task, and so, possessing superior Knowledge, Passionlessness and Power, and knowing the different ways in which the *harman* of the living beings ripens, he creates his sons, the Prajāpatis, who have knowledge, objects of enjoyment and [sort of] life according to their *harman*, then the Manus, Devasis and Hosts of Fathers, who are excellent in power of mind, and then the four castes from his mouth, arms, thighs and feet, and last of all the other beings, noble and vile; next he provides them with merit, knowledge, passionlessness and power according to their *ācārya* 'treasure of *sauśīlitas*.'

With reference to the translated passage from the Praçastapāda-Bhāṣa, I should like to make the following remarks:

1. The destruction and annihilation do not completely correspond to each other in this description. The destruction takes place in the order: *a.* the Lord's wish and the non-activity of the unseen qualities, *b.* the destruction of bodies and sense-organs (cf. V.S. IV, 2, 1) *c.* the destruction of the four elements: earth, water, fire and wind. This order corresponds to the enumeration in V.S. I, 1, 5. The creation takes place in the order: *a.* the Lord's wish and the renewed activity of the unseen qualities, *b.* the creation of the four elements: wind, water, earth and fire, *c.* the formation of the world-egg, *d.* the creation of the *devas* and other beings. The principal difference lies in the order of the elements: fire, instead of being created immediately after wind, is formed last. The author's reason for changing the order was to place the creation of the fire immediately before the formation of the mundane egg, the *kiraṅga-carbha*, which being of gold, consisted of a mixture of fire and earth. The harmony of the system was thus broken for the purpose of complying with current mythological ideas.

2. The distinction of *karmāṇa*, *vibhāga*, *saṃyoga-nivṛtti* and *vināśa* in the detailed description of the creation, is an instance showing how the author liked to divide all processes into momentary stages (see here p. 32 and 33 § 1).

3. The importance of the Lord's *apokṣābhūti* for the formation of double atoms &c. from the ultimate atoms, is unmentioned (cf. here p. 147 § 3).

4. On the whole the role of the Lord, compared with the unseen qualities of the souls, is superfluous.

5. The passage, taken altogether, with its eclectic tendencies, gives the impression of not having formed part of the original Vaiśeṣika system. A question, which next rises, namely, whether the Vaiśeṣika system might have been originally atheistic, will be considered in the sixth chapter of this book.

6. As we have seen in book I p. 67 and p. 72 sub. 1, this Vaiśeṣika theory of the creation and destruction of the world is refuted by BĀDARĀYAṆA and CAṆKARA ĀCĀRYA. The cosmogony of these Vedāntin teachers (see DEUSSEN, *Das System des Vedānta* p. 254) is based on Taittirīya-Upaniṣad II. 1, where we read that from soul is originated physical space, from space wind, from wind fire, from fire water, from water earth, from earth the plants &c. — For the difference between the Vaiśeṣika cosmogony and the Sāṃkhya (see here section 4 § 1).

#### D. The changes, caused in earth by fire

Praṣastapāda-Bhāṣya p. 106

„The process of the arising of 'new' qualities by the influence of fire, namely of colour &c. in the ultimate earthly atoms

„When an unbaked substance (a clay-pot for instance, which is in conjunction with a fire, is pressed or beaten against by this fire, then consequently *actions* (movements) arise in the atoms which form the thing. By these, *separations* originate, by the separations, *destructions of conjunctions* originate, by the destructions of conjunctions the *product-thing* is *destroyed*. When this is destroyed, then the *destruction of the black colour* &c. takes place in the independent atoms, by the conjunction with the fire — which conjunction itself is in its activity dependent on the heat [of the fire]. Again by another conjunction with the fire, assisted by its heat, the 'new qualities, colour &c.', produced by fire, arise. Immediately afterwards in the atoms which possess the arisen fire-produced qualities, actions arise, in consequence of the conjunction between the souls and the atoms — which conjunction itself is in its activity



the ear hears the sound. Thus arose the idea of interpreting the colour and heat of the objects as subjective pictures of the movements and the primary qualities in the objective world.

A tendency towards this direction, shown so ingeniously by Greek science, may be recognised in the Vaiśeṣika theory concerning the influence exercised by fire on earthly and other things, e. g. on the black, soft clay in the producing of a red, solid pot; or on wax in the forming of a fluid.

When a man takes an iron hammer and smites a stone with it then the forces of cohesion, which hold the stone together, are conquered, the pieces fly about, till at last only a fine pulver remains. And whereas the stone was a hard object obstructing the movement of a foot or hand, the pulver is soft and yields to the touch of the parts of our body.

To this fact of common experience the Vaiśeṣika system added another explicitly expressed by Prāsaṅgapaḍā, Bhāṣa, book IV § 15, namely in his explanation of movement through *gataḥ bhavati bhāṣa* when you put your foot on mud not only the mud under the foot, but also that round it will be pressed down.

Thus when we expose soft, wet clay to the influence of fire, the sparks of this element beat against the surface of the clod, the shocks, received by the external parts, are transmitted to the centrum, and with more force than the blows of a hammer, dissolve the material into ultimate atoms, and this happens in too short a time for the human perception to grasp.

To this first stage in the process the Vaiśeṣika system added a second, which reminds us of the Vādiṇī theory of elements. According to this the elements can pass into each other. The Vaiśeṣikas modified this view in such a way that the ultimate atoms, when in a totally dissolved state and under the influence of fire, are supposed to lose certain qualities and to gain others.

The third stage in the process is similar to the creation of the world out of the ultimate atoms. The *prasaṅga* of the potter plays here the same role as the unseen qualities of all souls at the time of the arising of the universe.

3. With reference to the elementary stages accepted by Prāsaṅgapaḍā, I here book I, p. 72 and 73, § 1.

4. My supposition that the *śūnyatā-bhāṣa* may be looked upon as an attempt to explain the physical world by mere mechanical processes, is confirmed by the Upaniṣad-comments on A. S. VII, 1-7. For the difficulty which Cayana, Abhinava tries to solve here is again: how can material substances change their qualities? By

comparing this sūtra with the Bhāṣya-passage translated — it becomes doubtful whether this aphorism was extant in Prācāstapada's time.

#### L. The physical process of visual perception.

Although neither the Sūtra nor the Bhāṣya gives direct information concerning the way in which the physical process of perception is supposed to take place, yet we may safely attribute to them the theory which CERNĀRA still gives of it, in different passages of his *Kandali*, for instance where he tries to explain why we see objects close by and objects far off simultaneously, how the optical illusion of a double moon may originate &c. For his explanations do not differ in any respect from the most naive aetiology.

Already in the Upaniṣads the sense-organs are called „graspers“ (*grāhaks*) and the verb *grāhāti* and its several derivatives *grāhṇa*, *grāhata*, *grāhātā* are repeatedly used in the *Nyāya-kandali* with reference to perception. In the same way, then, as man grasps the object close by with his hand and feels its presence immediately — so that only centuries of scientific thought could show the necessity of the internal nerve-system in the process — so naive thought imagines eye-beams to leave our eyes, which — helped by objective light, grasp the object and then immediately make the soul conscious of its presence.

Whilst thus the eye-beams travel towards the object, the sound on the other hand is in naive thought conceived as entering our ear-holes. The difference is most likely due to the fact that the eye localises its objects with greater accuracy than the ear.

### SECTION 2

#### THE THEORY OF SOUND.

##### a. 1. Sūtras bearing upon the theory of sound. (V. or Lat. Sūtra's translation.)

##### 1. Sūtras on physical space (*ākāśa*).

II. 1. 20 Egress and ingress — such is the mark of the existence of ether.

21 There is no mark, as an action has but one substance as its combinative cause.

- II. 1. 22 And also because they differ in property from the characteristic of another [i. e. the non-combinative] cause  
 23 Action is not produced on account of conjunction.  
 24 The attribute of the effect is seen to be preceded by the attribute of the cause.  
 25 Sound is not an attribute of things possessing touch, because of the non-appearance of [similar] other effects.  
 26 Because it combines with other objects and because it is an attribute of sense-perception, therefore sound is neither an attribute of soul nor an attribute of mind.  
 27 By the method of exhaustion [sound] is the mark of ether.  
 28 The substance-ness and eternality of ether have been explained by [the explanation of the substance-ness and eternality of] air.  
 29 The unity [of ether is explained] by [the explanation of the unity of] existence.  
 30 [Ether is one], because there is no difference in sound which is its mark and because there exists no other distinguishing mark.  
 31 And individuality also belongs to ether, since individuality follows unity.

*B. Sūtras on doubt, and on sound.*

- II. 2. 17 Doubt arises from the perception of [the object containing] the general property, the non-perception of the differentia and the recollection of the alternatives, [all at once or in one act of thought].  
 18 And that which is seen, resembles that which was seen, this also is the source of doubt.  
 19 Doubt also arises where that which has been seen in one form, is seen in a different form.  
 20 Doubt arises also from science and nescience.  
 21 Sound is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the ear.  
 22 Doubt arises in respect of sound, because its difference is observed both in [from] homogeneous objects and in [from] heterogeneous objects.  
 23 Sound is not a substance, since it resides in one substance only.  
 24 Nor is sound in action, because it is not an object of visual perception.



- 25 The 'resemblance' of sound<sup>1</sup>, although it is an attribute with action, consists in its speedy destruction.  
 26 Sound does not exist before utterance, because there is no mark of sound as existing before utterance.  
 27 Sound is not something which only requires to be brought to light, because it differs in quality from what is eternal.  
 28 And sound is non-eternal, because it is observed to be produced by causes.  
 29 Nor is [the dependency of sound upon a cause] disproved by its modifications.  
 30 Sound is not eternal, because to effect it only requires to be revealed only, while eternally it is not.  
 31 Sound is produced from utterance, from distinction and from sound also.  
 32 Sound is non-eternal, also, because of its ruin.  
 33 Sound is eternal, because otherwise the occupations of both the teacher and the pupil will vanish out of existence.  
 34 From the world the text follows that sound is eternal.  
 35 The eternality of sound follows. Also from the possibility of recognition.  
 36 Parity [of sound] existing. These arguments are meaningless.  
 37 The existence of number to sound is with reference to the genus.

3.2. *Qudatras, Tapa, Ananta, Cā, Sphāsa, Aprakāśa, B*

1. NOTES on passage II. 1. 20-34

CAYAKAṬA (Tapa, Cā, Ananta) and II. 1. 25's two aphorisms, viz. also because of the non-appearance of the different effects (*anāntarāptatvābhaṅga*), and 'sound is not an attribute of tangible things' (*abhaṅga-sphāsatvācā-aprakāśa*), the meaning however remaining the same.

He observes here (II. 1. 27) that the idea of KAYAKA is that time as well as space are really identical with ether.

2. NOTES on passage II. 2. 11-37

1. *prathamaśānta* for 'darkened' read (II. 2. 34) *prathamaśānta* and the meaning remains unchanged (*anā* and others, e.g. the word).

The word II. 2. 36 is simply *pratyakṣa* supplying for himself

the reason for the declaration there, and joins the latter part of it to II. 2. 37 and interprets it to mean that in spite of plurality of individual sounds, their definite enumeration is possible by means of reference to their genera or types."

§ 3. *Annotations on the sūtras bearing upon sound.*

Sound is discussed in V.S. II. 1. 21—27 and V.S. II. 2. 17—34. The former set of sūtras occurs in its proper place; the latter transgresses the *utthāna*.

I. Annotations to the passage II. 1. 20 &c.

V.S. II. 1. 20 is explained by ČAṆKARA MĪTRA as a Sāṃkhya thesis. We indeed meet with this thought in the *Sāṃkhya-kāraṇa-digvijān* II. 32—see GARBE, *Sāṃkhya-Philosophie* p. 303 note 3; this is however a rather recent work—ibidem p. 68 n°. 2, although older than VIJAYABHĀṢA'S *Sāṃkhya-pravācana-bhāṣya*. In ČAṆKARA MĪTRA'S *Viśvayānubhāṣya*, dated about 800 A.D., this idea is attributed to the Buddhists (see here p. 28 note 1).

The three sūtras 21—23, which are not alluded to by PRACASTAPADA (see here book IV section V), are brought by Čaṅkara Mītra into connection with the theory of the three causes. He explains them as refutations denying respectively physical space to be the inferential, non-inferential or occasional cause of egress and ingress. NANDA LAI SINHA'S transl. p. 73—74. These interpretations seem forced and far from convincing. There is not the slightest allusion to *saṃvātan* or *anavāta-kāraṇa* in the sūtras 21 and 23, and as to sūtra 22 this could be translated and interpreted as follows.

Because of the logical connection and disconnection with regard to other causes [than this supposed cause—*ikāna*—]

that is to say *anavāta* in the sūtra is not to be explained by *lakṣaṇa* property as Čaṅkara Mītra suggests, but is synonymous with the term *anāra* and thus *anavāta-kāraṇa* is a *śūnyatā*, corresponding with the usual logical term *anvaya-vadirekha* (see p. 16).

This *anvaya-vadireka* argumentation may be expressed as follows:—  
 whenever *pragatya*, *paratya* &c. act on a substance, whilst no obstructing object is in the way, there action arises;  
 and—whenever action does not arise, i.e. whenever a substance is at rest, there either *anavāta*, *anāra* &c. do not act or an obstructing object is in the way.

The sūtras 24—27 give an argumentation for the thesis that sound is a quality of physical space. Sutra 24 is an introduction to sutra 25. In this sutra I want to deviate from Nanda Lal Sinha's rendering and to choose the formulation

„Sound is not a quality of things possessing touch, because of the non-appearance of other effects [i. e. of effect-qualities dissimilar to the qualities of the constituent parts].”

I agree here with Nanda Lal Sinha's rendering in accepting the first member of the compound *kāryāntara* as standing in the relation of a subjective genitive to the final member *apradurbhāva*, and in taking *kārya* synonymous with the karmadhāraya: *kāryagagana*, i. e. 'effected quality, quality as effect'. If my interpretation is right, then the arguments of sutra 24 and 25 are really identical although differently expressed (cf. Praç. Bhāṣya p. 58 l. 8—14 and Nyāya-kandali p. 59 l. 17 &c.). In sutra 26 *pratyaṣṭa* is explained by Çaṅkara Miçra as *bāhyendriyagatyaṣṭa*. The sūtras 24—26 give only arguments for the negative theses that sound is not a quality of tangible things nor of soul or the internal organ. Sutra 27 draws from this the conclusion „By the method of exhaustion (*pariçeṣāt*) [sound is] the probans of physical space.”

This sūtra is interesting for its term *pariçeṣa*, which is commented upon by Çaṅkara Miçra as follows.

...*Atirāpi*:

*cahatah kra vid āçetah.*

*gagatrāt.*

*rapāthrad*

*iti sāmānyato-dṛṣṭā āśa-draçgā-tviktā-draçya-siddhiḥ.”*

Whereas, namely, in the Nyāya-sūtra (I, 1, 5) three forms of *lavāṇika jñāna* are accepted, the Vaiçesika system — in the Praçastapūda-bhāṣya book III chapter 2 § 26, Viz. ed. p. 205 — only adopts *dṛṣṭam* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam lavāṇika jñānam*. In accordance with this Çaṅkara Miçra considers the *pariçeṣa*-argumentation to be only a form of *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*. The question will be fully discussed in the fifth chapter<sup>1</sup> of this book.

For the sūtras 28—31 see V.S. II, 1, 11—13 and I, 2, 17

*B* Annotations on passage II, 2, 17—37.

Examination of doubt. The sūtras 17—20 discuss doubt *samāyaga* in the form of an aggression, similarly as in V.S. III, 1, 3—17 the theory of inference is given for the purpose of introducing the discussion on soul.

In sūtra 17 *ca* is explained by Ćamkara Miĉra as *adhyāñādi* (cf. Praç. Bhāṣya p. 174 l. 21 : this interpretation is not convincing. *ca* only means *and* here. Further we may notice that all three conditions, mentioned in the sūtra, are together wanted for doubt to arise. This is clear from the comments, given by Praçastapāda Bhāṣya III. 2 § 6 p. 175).

„Doubt arises] also in reference to an object of perception: e. g. after seeing only the general property of tallness common to a trunk and to a man: after not-seeing the particularities such as crooked[ness] &c., and after remembering the particulars of both [supposed objects], whilst there is no appearance of particulars characterising the genus trunk &c., then our soul, which is drawn into two directions, wavers in its judgments: „Is this a three or is this a man?”

The sūtra 18—20 offer different grammatical difficulties, which we shall first consider. *Dṛṣṭavat* in sūtra 18 should, as it seems, be explained as an adjective with comparative meaning (cf. WHITNEY, Sanskrit Grammar 3d ed. § 1233 f.); *yathāḍṛṣṭam* in sūtra 19 is apparently a kind of elliptical expression (cf. SPEYER, Syntax § 460) and means ‘something which is seen in a certain state’: *vidyāvidyātah* in sūtra 20 could be explained as an ablativus causae, ‘owing to knowledge and to ignorance’ or as an ablativus limitativus, ‘as to [the question: is this] knowledge or ignorance?’ The former interpretation seems to be supported by the context.

Thus the literal translation of these sūtras would run:

18 [Something which is] seen and is like [something else] that was seen [previously], [may be the cause of doubt].

19 That which was seen formerly in a certain state [may be the cause of doubt], because it is now seen in not such a state.

20 [Doubt need not arise from a *pratyakṣa*, scil. *sāmānya-pratyakṣa*, and an *apratyakṣa*, scil. *viśeṣa-pratyakṣa*, as was taught in sūtra 17, but] doubt [may in general arise] from knowledge and lack of knowledge [i. e. from half knowledge].

In commenting on these sūtras Ćamkara Miĉra does not limit himself to an explanation of the text itself, but also tries to reconcile it with the paragraph in the Praçastapāda Bhāṣya on doubt. Here doubt is classified as follows:

*Samāyaya:*

A. *antah-samāyaya*

B. *bahih-samāyaya:* a. *apratyakṣa-viśaya* & b. *pratyakṣaviśaya*.

According to Ćamkara Miĉra sūtra 20 refers to *antahsamāyaya*; *apratyakṣa-viśayah samāyayah* is indeed a form of *pratyakṣa-viśayah*



and 5 non-p-reception, I shall give in full only the comments on the second point.

[illegible]

1. e. By the fact of being a quality of several [things &c.]. *Several* means homogeneous and heterogeneous, by the fact of being a quality of these several [things &c.], i. e. by the seeing the particular in the two groups. *Arthos* [i. e. whatever may become an object of our thought, things &c.] are distinguished from homogeneous and heterogeneous *arthos*, i. e. earth is distinguished from water &c. by its possession of smell, and by qualities and actions. The fact that sound originates by separation [i. e. the sound of cracking when a reed is broken], is a characteristic of sound. Doubt arises in regard to this: is it a thing, a quality or an action, as the characteristic is found in each group . . . If I rely on this particular, I do not grasp a quality which is decisive for one [of the three possibilities].

We may draw two conclusions from this passage, first that Gough's translation of VS II, 2, 22 is wrong, as this sūtra means "[...]since a characteristic [of sound] is perceived &c.", secondly that we have to do here with a very recent insertion, which can only be explained with the help of ideas current in the Nyāya-school.<sup>1</sup>

The discussion of sound with regard to its substantiality and eternality

For the rest the sūtras 21—25 are clear by themselves with the exception of sūtra 23. Candakara Mīśra gives the explanation, „*Ekam dravyam samavāyaṁ nāstyā, tat ekadravyam*.“ To understand this, we must remember that the term *samavāya* (i. e. *samavāya-kāraṇa*, 'inherential cause' has three meanings: 1. the several parts which build up one material thing, 2. a thing as seat of its qualities, 3. a thing as a seat of its actions/movements. We may therefore paraphrase the sūtra according to Candakara Mīśra's comments thus: Sound is no substance<sup>2</sup>, since it has only one substance as inherential cause.

Chlorine is a gas, and it is not possible to store it in a tank.

2. Cf. here section 4 § 4 p. 2 (idem § 5, book IV section VII sub letter II).

After settling the difficulty whether sound is a thing, a quality or an action, the author considers the problem whether sound is eternal or not. He decides for the latter alternative, whilst the Mīmāṃsakas choose the former.

The sūtras 26—37, dealing with this topic, may be divided into two groups, the second of which (33 &c.) begins with the quotation of Mīmāṃsā-argumentations.

The sūtras 26—29 may be explained as positive arguments for the transiency of sound [i. e. of speech-sound]: namely sūtra 26 refers to its *ucāranāt prāya abhāvāt*, sūtra 27 to its *ucāranāt vādham abhāvāt*, sūtra 28 to the fact that sound has a cause, sūtra 29 to the fact that sound is subject to phonetical change.

In this interpretation I deviate from the Upaskāra and from Nanda Lal Sinha's renderings. My reasons for doing so, will be given in section 4 of this chapter.

Accordingly I should like to translate sūtra 29 as follows:

„Nor is this [scil. the given argumentation] unproved; because of the modification [to which speech-sound is subject].”

Sūtra 30 is a refutation of the revelation-theory, i. e. of the theory that speech-sound is really eternal and its articulation is not a production, but merely a making audible of that which is latent. The refutation of the theory has in Čankara Miśra's gloss the form of an argumentation *ab absurdo*: if the articulation of language were the removing of a veil from a latent object, then not only one speech-sound, but all speech-sounds would become audible. This is not the case, ergo articulation is not revelation: „*kakācābhivṛgaktasāvaracārābhivṛgaktiprasāṅgah*.”

Sūtra 31 is explained by Čankara Miśra as referring to sound in general. Thus he mentions as examples of *śaṅṅgoga-vibhūṅgajalālabhau*: the sounds caused by the conjunction of a drum and a drum-stick and by the splitting up of a bamboo. *Ābalaḥ* is explained by him as follows: (Nanda Lal Sinha p. 99). „Where sound is produced in a distant flute, and the like, the sound which is produced in the order of a current, reaches the portion of physical space limited by the hollow of the ear, and thereby becomes heard. Therefore sound is produced from sound also.”

This interpretation whereby *ābala* is taken in its most general sense, is in accordance with Praçastapāda-bhāṣya book III chapter 2 § 59. Still I do not consider this to have been the original meaning of the sūtra; I look upon the whole passage 26—37 as a polemics against the Mīmāṃsakas and thus as merely an examination of speech-sound. I shall give my argumentation for this interpretation in

section 4 § 2 of this chapter. For the present I only want to say that the conjunctions and disjunctions, meant here, refer to the movements of our organs of speech, e. g. of our tongue toward and from the palate.

In sūtra 32 sounds of musical instruments &c. are mentioned as a probans for the transiency of speech-sound, so that here again articulated sound remains the principal subject. The Upaskāra gives here a formal syllogism (*prayoga*) running thus:

*Varṇātmikaḥ śabdaḥ 'nityaḥ;*

*jātimattve sati cōtragrāhyatvād;*

*vīṇādi-dhvanivād, iti.*

The sūtras 33—35 give Mīmāṃsaka-argumentations for the eternality of sound. The first and third of these sūtras are clear by themselves, the second is explained in the Upaskāra as follows:

(Nanda Lal Sinha p. 100): „The meaning is that the thrice recitation of the first and the last mantra for kindling of sacrificial fire, as enjoined in the text, ‘the first should be recited three times, the last three times’ is not justified or accountable without the steadiness of sound.”

The sūtras 36 and 37 are the rejoinder to these Mīmāṃsaka-objections. From Čaṅkara Miçra's explanations I should like to quote the following:

(Nanda Lal Sinha p. 101): „It is observed that there can be learning, repetition, and also recognition, also if there is a plurality or diversity of sound. . . . For ‘he learns dancing, he practices dancing, he danced the same dance twice’ . . . in these cases, learning, repetition and recognition [of action] are observed.”

(Nanda Lal Sinha p. 102): „The meaning is that the existence of the number, fifty, &c. arises from the class-notion of *ka*, *ga* &c. . . . in the same way as substances, attributes &c. are nine, twenty-four &c.”

§ 4. *The passages in the Praçastapāda-Bhāṣya on sound*  
(book III chapter 2 § 27 & 59, book II chapter 2 § 7).

*Śabda* is twice discussed in the Praçastapāda-Bhāṣya, once in the meaning of ‘sound’ and once in that of ‘verbal authority’. Only the passage on sound interests here; yet we may just mention that PRAÇASTAPĀDA in § 27 quotes V.S. II, 2, 23 *lingūc cā 'nityaḥ*, interpreting *śabda* as *āmnāya*.

In § 59 *śabda* is first defined as: a quality of *ambara* (= *ākāṣa*): perceptible for the ear; momentary; destructive for its effect and



its cause [each sound, as a quality of a certain point of *ākāṣa*, is supposed to annihilate the sound, as a quality of the precedent point; moreover the sound-quality of the last point but one, annihilates by its own destruction the last sound as well]; caused by conjunction, disjunction and sound [cf. V.S. II, 2, 31]: abiding in one portion [of the *ākāṣa*]: cause of homogeneous and heterogeneous effects [scil. 1. the sound of one spot of the *ākāṣa* causes the sound of the next spot of the *ākāṣa*; and 2. sound causes an intellection in human soul].

Then sound is divided into kinds: speech-sound (*varṇa*) and non-articulated sound (*dhvani*).

The origination of speech-sound is divided into the following stages:

conjunction between soul and the internal organ;

wish to utter the sound, a wish based on remembrance [of former utterances];

volition;

conjunction between soul and the air [of our lungs];

movement of this air;

upward-movement of this air and its striking against throat &c.;

conjunction of air and respective organ of articulation;

conjunction of physical space and this organ of articulation:  
sound.

Non-articulated sound is either originated from conjunction or disjunction. First e. g. takes place the conjunction between drum and drumstick; then the conjunction between drum and physical space, then sound.

Or first e. g. takes place the disjunction of [two] pieces of reed, then the disjunction of the reed from physical space, then sound.

After this the transmittance of sound [i. e. the succession of a series of sounds] through physical space is compared to undulation (*vīcī-santāna*); for neither the organ of hearing moves, nor sound, [but the origination of sounds travels in *ākāṣa*].

Besides the two paragraphs on *śabda*, also the paragraph on physical space (book II chapter 2 § 7) bears upon our subject. The passage is analysed here in book IV section III. A few remarks may be added to this. The paragraph corresponds principally with the passage on sound in V.S. II, 1, 20—31. The formulae *āṣṭrayān anyātropalabdheṣ ca na sparśavad-viṣeṣaḥ*, i. e. 'sound is not a quality characteristic for tangible things, i. a. because it is perceived elsewhere than in its abode' and *śrotram . . . nabhodeṣaḥ* i. e. 'the ear is a spot of physical space' will prove of importance for characterising the Vaiṣeṣika system in comparison with other Indian systems.

§ 5. *Conclusions to be drawn from the exposition in the precedent paragraph.*

We may notice in these passages the following points:

1. PRAÇASTAPĀDA seems to have known passage V.S. II, 2, 21—37; for he alludes to sūtra II, 2, 32. Further he mentions the fact that sound is originated by a cause and that it is momentary. Still there is a great difference between Sūtra and Bhāṣya, in as far as Praçastapāda limits himself to a positive discussion without the intermixture of polemics.

2. Praçastapāda explains V.S. II, 2, 32 as referring to sound in general, and he considers speech-sound only to be originated from conjunction.

3. Praçastapāda attributes to air only a very limited function in the origination of sound; air is only a factor of its production during expiration; but as soon as it gets into conjunction with the organs of articulation (palate &c.), then physical space is considered to be the medium through which sound is transmitted: further in the ear itself physical space, and not air, is involved in the perception of sound.

4. When it is said in the Bhāṣya that sound is perceived elsewhere than in its abode [in its source], then the contrast between sound and colour (*rūpa*) is implied. For although it has only been said explicitly by ÇRĪDHARA,<sup>1)</sup> still we may be sure that also the original Vaiṣeṣika system conceived sight as a process in which our organ of sight (the beams of our eye) travel towards the object and 'grasp' it in its place. On the other hand through a series of local *cahdas* sound is supposed to be transmitted to our ear. The reason why hearing and seeing are understood so differently by naive thought, is obvious. What we see, is clearly localised by our visual perception, the localisation of sound on the other hand is vague and uncertain.

5. The theory of sound-undulation, given by the Vaiṣeṣikas, has nothing to do with modern European physical notions, for the Hindus have never discovered that sound is due to vibration.

<sup>1)</sup> Ny. Kaṇḍalī p. 189 l. 12 & 13.

## SECTION 3.

## PHYSIOLOGICAL NOTIONS.

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing on physiological notions.*  
*(Nanda Lal Sinha's translation).*

- IV, 2. 1 The [afore-said] product-substance, earth. &c. is again threefold, under the names of body, sense and object.  
 2 [Nothing exists which is constituted by five elements, or], [the body] is not constituted by five elements, for the conjunction of things, perceptible and imperceptible, is imperceptible.  
 3 And by reason of the non-appearance of another attribute,<sup>1)</sup> it is not composed of three elements.  
 4 But a conjunction of atoms is not denied.  
 5 Of these the body is twofold, sexborn and not-sexborn.  
 6 Because [a-sexual bodies] are formed by ultimate atoms inconstant in direction and place.  
 7 And [the action of the ultimate atoms arises] from a particular *dharma* or virtue.  
 8 Also because names and definitions exist.  
 9 [The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved] from the primitiveness of the name.  
 10 A-sexual bodies exist.  
 11 [The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved] also from the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda.

§ 2. *Quotation from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B.*

„CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA reads IV, 2. 3 as two aphorisms, viz.: *guṇāntarāprādurbhāvē ca* and *na tryātmakam*”.

§ 3. *Annotations to the sūtras on physiological notions.*

It seems to be an opinion, easily accepted by naive thought, that the sensorial qualities of the surrounding objects find correspondent qualities in the human organism and that man, owing to

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. Nyāyabhāṣya III, 1, 28 „*pārthivaṃ guṇāntaropaplabdheḥ*”, and its varia lectio, quoted in the Upaskāra, sub IV, 2, 4 „*pārthivaṃ tadviśeṣaguṇopaplabdheḥ*”.

this correspondence, is capable of perceiving these objective qualities. The origin of this belief may be found in the fact that the understanding of passions and feelings of our fellow-man always supposes the experience of similar psychical states in our-selves. At all events the doctrine, found in Empedocles <sup>1)</sup>:

γαῖη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὁπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,  
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον,

is also accepted by Indian systems of thought. Thus we find it in Vaiç. Sūtra IV, 2, 1 and in Praçastapādashāṣya book II chapter 2 (§ 2 earth, § 3 water, § 4 fire, § 5 wind). Cf. moreover GARBE (*Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie* p. 320) who teaches the same doctrine for the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The remark which GARBE adds here, also applies to our system: the earthly touch-organ, the aquaceous taste-organ &c. are seated in our skin, in our tongue &c., but may not be confused with them; they are themselves *atindriya*; i. e. they transgress our perception.

To the theory about the composition of the different sense-organs the Vaiçṣika system has added a very fantastic mythological belief about bodies, consisting of water, of wind or of light, and living in the world of Varuṇa, the Maruts and Āditya. The same mythology, as HANDT has reminded us, is found in Jainism.

The sūtras 2—4 offer greater difficulties in the interpretation. A clear reference to these sūtras is lacking in the Bhāṣya. The meaning of the Upaskāra is not quite perspicuous in all details, yet with its help we may arrive at the following explanation:

of sūtra 2. The body cannot be considered as an organised aggregate (*avayavin*) of earth, water, fire plus wind and physical space, [or of earth, water, fire plus wind], because wind and physical space are imperceptible. And a conjunction between a perceptible and an imperceptible, i. g. a tree and air, is imperceptible. Were the body thus a conjunction of earth &c. with physical space, then it would be likewise imperceptible.

of sūtra 3. The body cannot be considered as an organised aggregate of earth, water and fire. Undoubtedly a *samyoga* between atoms, belonging to different elements, is possible, but such a *samyoga* does not produce an aggregate. For when an atom of fire which lacks taste, is added to an atom of earth which possesses taste, then the total formed by them, would be without taste. Or when an atom of fire which possesses hot touch, is added to an atom of

<sup>1)</sup> See RITTER & PREMER, *Historia Philosophiae Graecae* 8th ed., no. 176.

earth which possesses „neither hot, nor could” touch, then their total would be without touch, *„ekasya guṇasyāvacayavini guṇānūrām-bhakatvāt”*, i. e. because one quality [i. e. the quality of one atom, when not supported by the same quality in a conjunct atom] does not produce a new quality [i. e. does not produce the same quality in the product].

With the sūtra IV, 2, 4 and its explanation by the Upaskāra we may compare e. g. Praçastapāda-bhāṣya p. 44 l. 8, where it is said that earthly atoms &c. may offer a certain support (*upaṣṭambha*) and capability of enjoyment to aquaceous bodies.

To sūtra 5 we may annotate that the Bhāṣya also divides the bodies into uterine and non-uterine. The non-uterine bodies are: the aquaceous, aerial and ignious bodies, the bodies of different insects, and the bodies of ancient saints. (Praç. Bhāṣya p. 27 l. 22; p. 36 l. 4 &c.). The uterine bodies are divided into those directly born of the womb and those developed in an egg.

A clear reference to the sūtras 8—11 is lacking in the Bhāṣya. For their explanation see the Upaskāra (NANDA LAL SINHA's translation p. 161 &c.).

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#### SECTION 4.

### THE PHYSICS IN THE OTHER INDIAN SYSTEMS.

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#### § 1. *The theory of the elements, in the Sāṃkhya-system.*

In order to be able to compare the Vaiṣeṣika physics with those of the Sāṃkhyas, I now wish to quote a passage which GARBE has devoted to the theory of the elements in the latter system.

*Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie* (Leipzig 1917) p. 300: „Die feinen Elemente (*sūkṣma-bhūta*, *bhūta-sūkṣma*) oder Grundstoffe führen gewöhnlich den Namen *tanmātra*, etymologisch ‘nur dieses’, womit ausgedrückt werden soll, dass in jedem Grundstoff einzig und allein dessen specielle Eigenthümlichkeit ruht. Das ist so zu verstehen. Während von den fünf groben Elementen das nachfolgende jedesmal die Eigenschaft des vorangehenden mitbesitzt in der Weise, dass der Aether (als Träger des Tons) gehört, die Luft gehört und gefühlt, das Feuer gehört, gefühlt und gesehen, das Wasser gehört, gefühlt, gesehen und geschmeckt, die Erde gehört, gefühlt, gesehen,

geschmeckt und gerochen wird, haben die fünf Grundstoffe nur je eine Eigenschaft und heissen deshalb nach der Reihe der Grundstoff des Tons, des Gefühls, der Farbe, des Geschmacks und des Geruchs (*śabda-*, *sparśa-*, *rūpa-*, *rasa-*, *gandha-tanmātra*). Diese Grundstoffe sind als solche nur von den Göttern und Yogin's, aber nicht von uns gewöhnlichen Menschenkindern wahrzunehmen; wir erkennen nur ihre Wirkungen in den Eigenschaften der Derivate, d. h. der groben Elemente. Die Grundstoffe besitzen ihre Characteristica nur in abstracto: der Ton-Grundstoff den Ton, aber noch nicht die verschiedenen möglichen Töne, die wir hören; der Gefühls-Grundstoff das Gefühl, aber noch nicht die Varietäten weich, hart, schlüpfrig, kalt, warm u. s. w.; . . . Darum theilen auch die feinen Elemente noch nicht die Eigenschaften der groben Materie, je nach dem Vorwalten eines der drei *guṇa*'s entweder Freude oder Schmerz oder Apathie zu erregen; oder technisch: sie sind noch nicht *śānta*, *ghora* oder *mūḍha*. Aus diesem Grunde werden sie *aviśeṣa* 'die unterschiedslosen Substanzen' genannt, im Gegensatz zu den *viśeṣa* oder den mit Unterschieden behafteten groben Elementen. Wenn auch die Grundstoffe von ausserordentlich kleiner Ausdehnung sind, so darf man ihnen doch nicht Untheilbarkeit zuschreiben; denn kein Product ist untheilbar."

Several differences are to be noticed between the Sāṃkhya and Vaiṣeṣika systems:

The former distinguishes elements in an unmixed state, possessing only one quality, from the elements in their mixed condition. The latter does not know of such distinction.

GARBE (p. 298) informs us that in the Sāṃkhya system the mixed elements originate from the unmixed, which possess only one quality (sound, smell &c.); these again are produced from the spiritual substances (*buddhi* and *ahamkāra*). Such a common origin is not accepted in the Vaiṣeṣika-system. It is distinctly said in the respective paragraphs which PRAÇASTAPĀDA bestows on the four elements (*dravyārambhakāni*) that they are eternal as far as their atomical nature is concerned.

The Sāṃkhyins attribute sound to all elements (in their mixed state); the Vaiṣeṣikas consider it only a quality of physical space. The former system — at least in one of its more recent texts; see here book II chapter II section 2 § 3 A — takes the possibility of movement as an argument in favour of the existence of *ākāśa*, the latter denies this and only accepts sound as such a probans (*līṅga*).

The *tanmātras* of the Sāṃkhyins are very small, but still liable

to division; the *aṇus* of the Vaīᢢeᢢikas are infinitely small. The former system applies the term *viᢢeᢢa* only to products and with reference to the three *guṇas*: the latter uses the same term, originally in the meaning of *vaidharmya*, later with reference to the atoms and the other *nityāṇi dravyāṇi*.<sup>1)</sup>

The term *viᢢeᢢa* has given rise to the name of our system itself. The word Vaīᢢeᢢika namely may either be interpreted as: a philosopher who believes that absolute differences (*antya viᢢeᢢāḥ*) inhere in the original elements, or as: a philosopher who considers it his main task to minutely define the differences between the several categories and notions of human thought. The first interpretation would be in accordance with the name Kaṇāda or Kaṇabhuj, given by opponents to the sūtrakāra of our system; the name Vaīᢢeᢢika, thus taken as referring to the atoms, would characterise the system as principally a physical theory. We may indeed call it a current opinion, that the Vaīᢢeᢢika system is the physical philosophy par excellence of the six darṣanas. I can scarcely believe this to be right. A closer study of the texts shows that the Vaīᢢeᢢika philosophers have paid attention to all scientific problems which existed for the Hindu mind, not only to physics, but also to ontology, psychology, logic and *dharma*; on the other hand the Sāṃkhya-system contains no small amount of physical doctrines. Undoubtedly, we may conclude, the term Vaīᢢeᢢika originally was synonymous with Vaidharmika.

§ 2. *The passage on sound in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā-Sūtra.*

Cf. here book IV section VII letter F.

The passage on sound in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra contains three parts: the first, sūtras 6—11, contains pūrvapakṣa-arguments, upholding the transiency of sound; the second, sūtras 12—17, refutations of the six preceding sūtras, and the third, sūtras 18—23, other arguments, added to those of the second part.

Several of these sūtras offer difficulties in the interpretation.

The meaning of sūtra 9 was uncertain already in the days of КЕМЭРИЛА БИЛГҢА (and of ЧАВАРА-СВЭМИН?) see ᢢloka-vārttika transl. p. 410 (adhik. 6 kārīkā 9 and 10). Yet with the help of sūtra 15 cf. its interpretation ᢢloka-vārttika transl. p. 435 adhik. 6 kārīkā 163), we may guess the meaning to have been as follows:

If a speech-sound or a word, e. g. the word *gauḥ*, were eternal

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here p. 18.

[and one], then it could at a certain moment be used by only one person, but really it can be used (pronounced and perceived) by several persons in several places. Therefore it resembles the other things, made by man, it is met with in many specimens, is produced and perishable.

The answer (sūtra 15) runs: although the word *gauḥ* e. g. is eternal [and one], still like the one sun it may be perceived by several persons.

In this argumentation the notion of oneness is implied in that of eternity.

The mentioning of *vr̥ddhi* (sūtra 11), next to *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* (sūtra 10), suggests the idea that sūtra 11 had originally an other form and referred to *vr̥ddhi* in the grammatical sense of the word.<sup>1)</sup>

The translation of sūtra 12, given by BALLANTYNE, follows the reading: *samaṃ tu tatra darśanam*; GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ translates (Çloka-vārttika p. 413): „[The fact of being perceived] after effort is equal [to the theory of eternity as to that of non-eternity].” This supposes a reading: *samaṃ tu tatra darśanāt*, parallel with sūtra 6. Moreover *darśana* receives here a causative meaning: effort of producing, which is also adopted by Ballantyne in sūtra 15, where he uses the rendering: exhibition.

For the purpose of explaining sūtra 18 we may quote Çloka-vārttika, adhikaraṇa 242 (transl. p. 451): „Because a word, whose relation [with its meaning] has not been [previously] ascertained, cannot signify anything. Because if this could be the case [i. e. if such a word were to signify a meaning], then any previously unknown [newly-coined] word would be capable of signifying any and every meaning.”

Sūtra 19 is commented upon by PĀRTHA SĀRATHI MIṢRA in his *Nyāya-ratnākara* (Chowkhambā ed. of the Çloka-vārttika under kārīkā 355 p. 820) as follows:

„*Goḥabda uccarite sarvagatīṣu yugapat pratyaḥ bhavaty, ata ākṛtiracanah çabdo, na cā ’kṛtyā sambandhaḥ çakyate kartum, iti [Çabarasvāmi-kṛtaṃ] Bhāṣyaṃ sambandha-nityatām eva pratipadayati.*”

As one sees, the interpretation given here differs from that, offered by Ballantyne. It seems to me that sūtra 19 is nothing else than a variation of sūtra 9, due to a mistake of memory. Of the two synonymous redactions one was left in its original place, the other was placed in an other context and changed its signification.

Sūtra 20 *saṃkhyābhāvāt* is explained by Ballantyne and already

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here p. 43, the remark on Nyāya Sūtra I, 1, 24.



by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (transl. *Ḍoka-vārttika* p. 472) as *saṃkhyā-abhāvāt*. Yet we meet in VALLABHĀCĀRYA'S *Nyāya-līlāvātī* with a tradition which shows that once the sūtra must have been understood as *saṃkhyā-bhāvāt*. It was then used to show that *śabda* is a substance (see here book IV section VII under letter H first group of passages). Number, namely, is a quality; and whatever has qualities, must be a substance.

This Vallabhācārya, the author of the *Nyāya-līlāvātī*, a commentary on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, is mentioned in „a Canarese poem named *Darśanasāra*” written in the first half of the 13th century. (Cf. BODAS, J.R.A.S., Bombay br. vol. XIX, anno 1897, p. 338).

According to BHĪMĀCĀRYA this argumentation is assigned to the Bhaṭṭa-mīmāṃsakas (i. e. the followers of Bhaṭṭa-Kumārila)<sup>1)</sup>; in as far as the *Ḍoka-vārttika* explains the sūtra *saṃkhyā-bhāvāt* otherwise, this information (a surmise of Bhīmācārya himself?) seems to be wrong.

Yet the fact that the question concerning the substantial or attributive nature of sound is dealt with both in the *Vaiç. Sūtra* and in the *Nyāya-līlāvātī*, shows that the belief in the substantiality of sound must once have been a generally accepted dogma; also probably by some of the Mīmāṃsakas.

The scholiast Pārtha Sārathi Miçra connects sūtra 21 *anapekṣatvāt* with *Ḍoka-vārttika* adhikaraṇa 6 kārīkā 444: „In the case of the cloth &c. we find that they are destroyed either on account of their being cut by instruments, or on account of their becoming too old; whereas in the case of the word, there are no such causes of destruction.” (Chowkhambā-edition p. 844).

Sūtra 22 is explained by the scholiasts as meaning: „if the sounds were substances consisting of air, then these would be perceptible for the organ of touch, for the skin; as this is not the same, the sound cannot be a formation of air.”

In sūtra 23 which is not referred to by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *līnga* is explained as ‘proof, i. e. a text of the scripture’. This meaning is quite general in Pūrvamīmāṃsā-writings; see e. g. the *Arthasaṃgraha* text p. 6 and THIBAUT'S translation p. 12, where the meaning of the Mīmāṃsā-term is more accurately defined.

If we finally compare this passage in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā-Sūtra with *Vaiç. Sūtra* II. 2, 26—37, then it seems likely that they are historically connected. This may be shown by the following table;

1) See here book IV section VII table H.

Vaiç. Sūtra II, 2.	Pūrvamīm. Sūtra I, 1.
26 <i>Sato līṅgābhāvāt</i>	6 <i>Karmāike, tatra darṣanāt</i>
27 <i>Nitya-vaidharmyāt</i>	7 <i>Asthānāt</i>
28 <i>Anityaḥ cāyaṃ kārāṇataḥ</i>	8 <i>Karoti-ṣabdāt</i>
29 <i>Na cāsiddham, vikārāt</i>	10 <i>Prakṛti-vikṛtyoḥ ca</i>
33 <i>Dvayos tu pravṛttyor abhāvāt</i> (P.-mīm. thesis)	18 <i>Nityas tu syūd, darṣanasya parārthatvāt</i>
34, 36 & 37 <i>Prathamāṣabdāt &amp;c.</i>	20 <i>Samkhyābhāvāt</i>
35 <i>Sampratipatti-bhāvāc ca</i>	19 <i>Sarvatra yauḡapadyāt</i> (cf. the glosses, mentioned above)

This historical relation between the two sūtras need not be in such a way conceived that one sūtra-redactor used the sūtra of the other school; but both darṣanas here, although each of them adopted its own solution of the question, were the outcome of former disputes between the schools.

Supposing this comparison to be right, it follows that the whole passage Vaiç. Sūtra II, 2, 26—27 with the inclusion of sūtra 31, bears on *ṣabda* as speech-sound, and specially on *ṣabda* as *amṇāya*, sacred word.<sup>1)</sup>

### § 3. The passage on sound in the Nyāya-Sūtra.

In accordance with the more recent origin of the Nyāya-Sūtra, the discussion on sound (speech-sound) is much longer than in Vaiṣeṣika- or Pūrvamīmāṃsā-Sūtra. In the second āhnikā of the second adhyāya (see here book IV section VI) we find three adhikaraṇas on *ṣabda*, called in VIṢVAKṢEPA'S Vṛtti: *ṣabda-nityatva*-, *ṣabda-pariṇāma*- and *ṣabda-ṣakty-adhikaraṇa*.

The two first of these three adhikaraṇas deal with the eternality or transiency of sound (see here book IV section VII under letter G).

The first adhikaraṇa begins with a sūtra (II, 2, 81) mentioning three arguments for the eternality of sound; the following sūtras (82—85) contain a short dialogue between an opponent and a defendant, on the ideas expressed in sūtra 81.

Sūtra 86 gives a new argumentation in support of sūtra 81. Again follows a dispute.

In the sūtras 89, 92, 94 and 100 four *pūrvapakṣa*-arguments are brought forward in support of the eternality of sound. Each of the sūtras are followed by refutations.

<sup>1)</sup> See here p. 176 and 177.

I have quoted (in book IV) two sūtras, belonging to the adhikaraṇa on phonetical change as a proof for its transiency.

The historical connection of this passage on sound of the Nyāya-sūtra with those in Vaiṣeṣika- and Pūrvamīmāṃsā-Sūtra is evident.

§ 4. *The passage on sound in the Ṣloka-vārttika.*

The sixth adhikaraṇa of the Ṣloka-vārttika, containing the comments on Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra I, 1. 6—23, covers in GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ's translation about 75 pages. I shall limit myself to pointing out some passages of special interest in connection with the precedent paragraphs.

1. Kārikās 121—130 contain a description of sound-revelation (the *abhiryakti* of the polemical passage in the Vaiç. Sūtra) as conceived by the Çrotṛiyas (Pūrvamīmāṃsakas).<sup>1)</sup>

First volition on the part of the speaker takes place, then the internal air (*koṣṭhyo vāyuh*) begins to move upwards. Before this air leaves the mouth, the speaker produces different conjunctions and disjunctions between tongue and palate (*saṃyoga-vibhāgau tāl-vādeḥ*). After this the air, having left the lips, streams on, owing to its impetus (*vega*) and enters in conjunctions and disjunctions with the still air (*stṛimito vāyuh*; cf. Saptapadārthī n°. 14), through which it passes. „Having reached the *vyoman* = *ākāśa* of the ear, the air imparts a certain faculty (*cakti*) to the auditory sense. . . And since this sound is heard only when this [faculty] appears, therefore we admit of its existence in the shape of a change [*saṃskāra* — produced in the sense]. . . And this ‘faculty’ that we assume, is like the faculty of producing [the sound, held by the other party] (*utpattiçaktivat*).”

From this passage we learn that the *saṃyoga* and *vibhāga* in Vaiç. Sūtra II, 2, 31 were understood by KUMĀRILA BHATTA as conjunctions and disjunctions between the organs of speech; for the whole passage, analysed here, shows clearly the influence of the Vaiṣeṣika system.

Further it is necessary for us to bear in mind the difference between the described Pūrvamīmāṃsā- and modern European ideas. The movement of air from the speaker's mouth towards the hearer's ear is not the same as the air-vibrations, accepted by modern scientists. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā-theory that the change, caused in the ear by the influence of the air-current, makes human soul capable of

1) Cf. GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, *The Prabhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā* p. 59.

perceiving the latent and eternal<sup>1)</sup> sound, may not be confused with the European insight, which shows sound to be a mental process, brought about by several physical and physiological processes in the surrounding air, the ear and the connected nervous system. The Pūrvamīmāṃsakas have always believed in an external and objective existence of sound qua talis. Yet a certain resemblance between Indian and European conceptions cannot be denied, although we must attribute this more to chance than to merit on the side of the Indians.

2. In kārīkās 106—122, we find a refutation against the Jainas, who believe sound to be material<sup>2)</sup> and tangible, to travel from its place of origin to our auditory organ, and to consist of component parts (*pudgalas*).

„*Çabdasyā ’gamanaṃ tīvad adṛṣṭaṃ parikalpitam,  
mūrti sparṣādīmatvaṃ ca teṣāṃ abhībhaveḥ satām*” (cf. Gāṅgānātha Jhā’s transl. p. 477 sub 107—108).

This belief in the substantiality of sound must have had originally more supporters than the Jainas. In Europe too it has been upheld for a long time and is expressed by LUCRETICUS in his *De natura rerum*.

3. Kārīkās 113 sqq. contain the refutation of two conceptions, both assigned to the Sāṃkhyaṃs. Here it is said that some of these philosophers taught the moving of our auditory sense-organ towards the object [in the same way as the eye-beams travel towards the object seen] and others the immediate perception of sound at a distance [in the same way as some Buddhists believed ordinary sight to be a kind of telepathic process; see here p. 92 sub 2].

#### § 5. *The notion of sound in primitive human thought.*

The sound-theories, explained in the foregoing pages, give us occasion to examine more closely the question: how was sound conceived in primitive human thought.

Sound, then, that is to say: language, was conceived in a still mythological form of thought. Two conceptions very probably existed side by side. In the first place the names of things, like their shape, colour and taste, were qualities of these things. Secondly words were eternally existing things themselves. Although these two

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book IV section VII sub letter H, second group of passages.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. here book IV section VII sub letter H, where the doctrine of the substantiality of sound is falsely attributed to KUMĀRĪYA himself.

<sup>3)</sup> Cf. WALLESEY, *Die philosophische Grundlage des älteren Buddhismus* p. 32.

notions were contradictory, still being vaguely felt and never clearly pronounced and analysed, they could exist together.

I consider the formula *nāmarūpa* a clear indication of the first conception. The name of the thing is here coordinate with colour and shape. This belief will no longer be strange to us, when we take into consideration, that even advanced thinkers, like the Pūrva-mīmāṃsakas, believed in the *jñātatva* — the possessing the quality of being known — of the objects when seen or heard by man: that transitive verbs in all Indo-European languages express not only the causal relation, but also the relation between mind and object; that we ourselves are still involuntarily inclined to take beauty and ugliness as qualities of the objects, though they are really judgments pronounced by ourselves: in one word, that it is difficult to draw the right line between that which belongs to the objects and to our own thought.

How sound could be looked upon as an eternally existing thing, is easily explained by comparing it with fire. Fire, the process of burning, was called both in India and Greece, one of the elements; was considered to be matter in the same way as earth, water and air. This conception is not an invention of philosophers, but is already a common possession of the intellect of primitive man. So it is said in the fourth book of the *Odyssey* that the God Proteus by magical power successively assumed the form of water and fire. Further we may state that the idea of matter changing from one form into another without any gain or loss in quantity, is rather a new one. The wood burns and is gone, a few ashes, a little smoke in the air, that is all that remains. But that the quantity of matter, contained in these ashes and this smoke, is the same as that which was contained in the log of wood, has not occurred to primitive thought. The appearance and disappearance puzzles the naive man; fire comes, but where does it come from? fire goes, but where does it go to? It must have hidden itself somewhere and comes forward from its hiding-place on certain occasions, for instance when man rubs two pieces of wood, till they catch fire.

We may resume that the belief in the eternality and substantiality of sound belongs to a mythological way of thinking. And it is highly interesting to find some relics of this old view still preserved in Indian philosophical literature.

## SECTION 5.

## THE PHYSICAL NOTIONS OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS.

§ 1. *The theory of elements and atoms.*

In pointing out some analogies between Hindu and Greek physics, I shall for the sake of brevity refer as much as possible to RITTER & PRELLER, *Historia Philosophiae Graecae* (8th ed., Gotha 1898).

The Greek philosophers accepted either four or five elements. The number four is chosen by Empedocles (RP 164), by Plato (RP 332a), by Aristotle (RP 408d). We find the number five perhaps mentioned by some Pythagoreans (RP 79: Philolai fr. 20 M ap. Stob, Ecl. I 10 p. 18, 5 W. καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς σφαίραις σώματα πέντε ἐντί τὰ ἐν ταῖς σφαίραις πῦρ, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ καὶ ἀήρ, καὶ ὁ τῆς σφαίρας ὅλητος τέμπτον. The interpretation of this fragment is extremely difficult. I should like to read ὁ... ὅλης, a noun formed from ὅλος like μονάς from μόνος; in this case the word σώματα would have a wider meaning than element here, referring as well to the shape of the four elements as to the construction of the global universe. The whole fragment, I think, should be compared with RP 80 and Plato Timaeus 55 C and be considered of rather late origin, as it supposes a knowledge of the five regular polyhedrons of stereometry. Whilst it is thus uncertain whether the Pythagoreans acknowledged five elements, it remains an ascertained fact that the Peripatetic school held the number to be five.

Those who accepted four elements, considered as such: earth, water, air and fire. The fifth element of the Aristotelian school was αἰθέρ, the material of which the human soul<sup>1)</sup> and the heavenly stars consisted.

Though many a Greek philosopher maintained the existence of empty space, yet it was never reckoned an element. To prove their opinion they brought forward the same argument (cf. f.i. RP 75d) which is mentioned Vaiç. Sūtra II, 1, 20, whereas sound is never adduced, as far as I know, as an argument for it.

As in Hindu philosophy, the elements are defined by referring either to their typical movement or to the sensations which they

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. the *cyñāna* of some of the Buddhists.

cause in the human mind. RP 409d: „Quattuor elementa esse [ab Aristotele] duobus argumentis demonstratur. Nam primum quae contraria tactu, qui sensus ceteris omnibus subest, deprehenduntur, frigidum calidum, aridum udum, ea diverse composita singulis elementis ita continentur ut ignis sit calidus et aridus, aer calidus et udus, aqua frigida et uda, terra frigida et arida. De Gen. et Corr. II. 2. 3. — Deinde, sicut motus circularis aetheris proprius est, ita elementorum directus, qui naturaliter aut sursum tendit aut deorsum. Elementum grave quod deorsum fertur est terra, elementum leve quod sursum nititur ignis. Praeterea necesse est medium esse, quod et sursum et deorsum feratur: id duobus reliquis elementis continetur, aere et aqua. De Caelo IV, 4, 5.” — Moreover a passage in which Aristotle expresses a connection of the elements with our different organs of sense, is quoted by DEUSSEN, *Das System des Vedānta*, p. 256 Anm. (Aristoteles de sensu, p. 438B 17 &c.)

Φανερόν ὡς δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποδιδόναι καὶ προσάπτεν ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐν τῶν στοιχείων. τοῦ μὲν ὀφθαλμοῦ τὸ ὁρατικὸν ὕδατος ἱποληπτόν, ἄερος δὲ τὸ τῶν ψόφων αἰσθητικόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν, — τὸ δ' ἀπτικὸν γῆς, τὸ δὲ γευστικὸν εἶδος τι ἀφῆς ἐστίν. Though the differences of the quoted passages with Hindu views are considerable enough, yet we may recognise the same general tendency.

Both Greeks and Hindus were unacquainted with the property of expansion, common to air and all gasses. All they were aware of, was a horizontal displacement of air.

The Leucippean formulation of atomism, which attributes only primary qualities to the atoms, is recorded by ARISTOTLE (Metaph. I, 4, 985b 4 = RP. 192).

The resemblance between the Greek and Hindu doctrines of elements, however striking it may be, cannot be considered a sufficient proof for their historical connection. For the notion of the four elements: earth, water, air and fire, may be a priori expected in primitive philosophical thought. It is, in the first place, clear that the elements earth, water and wind are something similar to our three states of aggregation: solid, fluid and gaseous. Yet this conception itself was not yet known to the Greeks, nor to the Hindus: and never do we find f.i. the expression that water by freezing becomes a kind of earth. The elements earth, water and wind are cognate notions to our states of aggregation, but not the same. As to the fourth element I have mentioned how natural it was to consider fire, the process of burning, an element and how this idea, current in many fairy tales, is of ancient origin.

From the comparison of the Greek and Hindu theories of elements

with the modern European distinction of the three states of aggregation it follows that the greatest credit is due to those definitions which took into consideration the typical movements of the elements such as blowing, running and falling, or their impression on our sense of touch (hard and soft).

§ 2. *The explanation of sound by the Greeks.*

The need of air for the arising of sound was discovered in Greece at an early date. We find the following fragment f.i. in RP. 1776 concerning EMPEDOCLES:

Theophr. Sens. 7 (Dox. 500) Ἐμπεδοκλῆς... φησί... τὴν δ' ἀκοὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν γίνεσθαι ψόφου. ὅταν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς κινήθῃ, ἤχηϊν ἐντός. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἶναι κώδωνα τῶν ἴσων (Schneider emendavit: ἔσω) ἤχων τὴν ἀκοὴν ἣν προσαγορεύει σάρκινον ὄζον (Wimmer proposition: αἰλόν). κινουμένην δὲ παίειν τὴν ἀέρα πρὸς τα στερεὰ καὶ ποιεῖν ἤχον.

Empedocles teaches that hearing arises from noise around us. When the [organ of] hearing is moved by [the air of] the voice, then sound is produced within; for the organ of audition, called σάρκινος ὄζος<sup>(?)</sup> is a tube for the sound from outside; the wind in its movement beats against the hard [walls] and causes the sound.

UEBERWEG-HEINZE (*Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie des Alterthums*, Ste Aufl. Berlin 1894) paraphrases this quotation as: „Die Töne entstehen in dem trompetenförmigen Gehörgang beim Einströmen der bewegten Luft.“

The explanation, given by Empedocles, is still puerile, but the honour of finding the right explanation, belongs to Aristotle.

That sound is carried by air, is taught to pupils of modern European schools with the help of an aerial pump. A bell is placed under the clock of this instrument, whilst it is kept in movement by a spring, and as soon as the air begins to be pumped out, the sound gets weaker and weaker, and at last becomes inaudible.

This experiment is certainly clear and simple. But even observation without any instrument can lead to the same conclusion. When we notice that the vibration of a string causes sound, the hypothesis will easily occur to us that sound produced by flute and tube, must have a similar origin, that something must exist which, though unseen, is in vibration. The hypothesis becomes more certain, when we observe that the pitch of the tone in both cases, with strings as well as with pipes, depends on the length of the source of sound. This ingenious conclusion was arrived at by



Aristotle, who thus left the Hindus far behind him and anticipated modern science.

S. GUENTHER (*Geschichte der antiken Naturwissenschaft*, Nördlingen 1888) p. 52: „Die physicalische Erklärung der Schallerscheinungen nimmt ihren Anfang mit Aristoteles. Derselbe hat erkannt, dass die Luft die Trägerin und Vermittlerin aller Schallerscheinungen ist, er überträgt das pythagoreische Gesetz von dem Zusammenhange zwischen Saitenlänge und Tonhöhe auf Pfeifen, er weiss endlich, dass die Fortpflanzungsgeschwindigkeit des Schalles in den verschiedenen Tages- und Jahreszeiten eine ungleiche ist. An Aristoteles, den er wohl studiert haben muss, knüpft Vitruvius wieder an, der Begründer der Theaterakustik. Die Verbreitung des Schalles in kugelförmigen Wellen, deren Zentrum der Schallerreger ist, wird von Vitruv mit wünschenswertester Klarheit ausgesprochen.“

Yet in order to be just to the Hindus, we may not forget that also most Greek-Roman philosophers upheld ideas concerning sound similar to those proclaimed by the Jainas in India (see e. g. LUCRETIUS, *De rerum natura* IV 524 sq.).

### § 3. *Explanation of the physical process of visual perception.*

Greek and Indian philosophy agree in accepting the  $\gamma\nu\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\delta\omicron\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\tilde{\omega}\ \delta\omicron\mu\omicron\iota\omega$  (Empedocles' formula, preserved by ARISTOTLE, *de anima* I, 2). Further they believed in a movement of the sense-organ or eye-beams towards the objects: but the Greeks also postulated the existence of  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\delta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\sigma\iota\alpha\iota$  from the objects towards the eye and finally tried to explain in more details the importance which light has for the process of visual perception (see Lucretius, *De rerum natura* IV, 280—295).

### § 4. *Conclusion: the value of Greek and Indian physics compared.*

Finally if we undertake to estimate the relative value of Greek and Indian physics, we may notice that Indian thought offers nothing worth ranking with such discoveries and theories as: the Leucippean formulation of atomism, ARCHIMEDES' explanation of floating, ARISTOTLE's theory of sound-vibration. This difference between Greek and Indian science has been attributed to the different capabilities of the two nations: the power of observation on the one hand and the tendency towards meditation on the other. Methinks, this formula does not solve the question. I am inclined to refer to social and not to psychological causes. For what the

Indians have reached in grammatical and phonetical research, shows certainly their power of observation. And although their epic literature is too prone to absurd imaginations, still we must feel their love for animals and plants, their eye for the beauty of nature.

The difference between Greek and Indian physics lies principally in this fact, that the Greeks have taught us to apply mathematical methods to the study of nature, whereas the Indians devoted all their attention to *dharma*, *adharma* and *mokṣa*. In other words the Greeks soon reached a theoretical attitude of mind, whereas Indian thought was always surrounded by sacerdotal interests. We cannot indeed praise the Greeks highly enough for having so soon, already in Homeric times, put an end to the too great power of the priests.

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## CHAPTER III.

### MATHEMATICAL NOTIONS.

#### SECTION I.

#### NUMBER.

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing upon number. (Nanda Lal Sinha's translation).*

- VII, 2, 1 Because of its difference from colour, taste, smell and touch, unity is a different object.
- 2 Similarly, separateness [is a different object].
- 3 The non-existence of unity and individuality, in unity and individuality, is explained by minuteness and magnitude.
- 4 Actions and attributes being void of number, universal unity does not exist.
- 5 That [i. e. the cognition of unity in action and attribute] is erroneous.
- 6 In consequence of the non-existence of unity, however, secondariness would not exist.
- 7 Effect and cause are neither the same nor similar [in being equally distinguished from all other things]; therefore, unity and [single] individuality do not exist in them.
- 8 This, [as] explained in the case of the two non-eternals [namely, number and separateness, should be understood only in the case of non-eternal unity and separateness of one].

§ 2. *Quotations from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B, page 17.*

„CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṂKĀRA explains VII, 2, 5 as demolishing the view contained in VII, 2, 4 and explains VII, 2, 6 in support of this interpretation of VII, 2, 5, thus: Did not unity exist

everywhere, there would be no *bhakti*, production of things, at all. For, any one thing is the joint product of several things; but there can be no such production in the absence of one-ness or unity; unity, therefore, exists in all places.

§ 3. *Annotations to these sūtras.*

We may consider the sūtras 1—6 as relatively easy. In sūtra 1 it is said that oneness (twoness &c., thus number in general) is a notion which is different from the notions colour &c. The word *artha* is used here in the general sense of *padārtha* (category, general notion); cf. V.S. VIII, 2, 3 and Praç. Bhāṣya book I chapter 3 (= here book IV section IV table A n°. 5 and 9), where the word *artha* has the special meaning of ‘one of the three first *padārthas* (substance, quality and action)’.

NANDA LAL SINHA has translated the term *prthaktva* by „separateness”, the term *ekaprthaktva* sometimes by „separateness of one”, sometimes by „individuality”. For the meaning of these terms the reader is referred to the explanations, given here p. 129.

Sūtra 3 is a reference to VII, 1, 4, where it is said that measure (a special quality) is not found in measure, just as little as is any quality found in quality, or movement in movement. In the same way, then, number does not inhere in number.

Sūtra 4 may be paraphrased thus: oneness, (twoness &c.), being qualities, do not inhere, according to V.S. I, 1, 16 & 17 in qualities or actions. So then, the notion „number” cannot be applied to every object of thought.

The interpretation of sūtra 5 & 6 is uncertain. ÇAṆKARA MIÇRA explains sūtra 5 as a mere affirmation of 4 (Bibl. Indica edition p. 315, translation of Nanda Lal Sinha p. 236): „How, then, do such cognitions arise as “one colour”, “one taste” &c.? To this he replies: The meaning is that the cognition of unity which arises in the case of attributes and actions, is *erroneous*. ‘Cognition’ — this is the complement of the aphorism, because an objection of an opponent has been thrown into it. The application [of unity in these cases] is, however, *derivative*, and it is non-difference, or self-identity, which constitutes the derivation.”

Sūtra 6 is explained by Çaṅkara Miçra as an answer to an opponent who would deny the applicability of number even to substances (Upaskāra Bibl. Ind. p. 315, translation Nanda Lal Sinha p. 237): „It may be asked: ‘Let the application of unity be secondary

in the case of substance also. . .” To this he replies: „If unity in its transcendental or real sense be nowhere to be observed, then the application of the term could not be secondary, for the secondary has for its antecedent the primary use. Nor again could the intuition be erroneous, for error has for its antecedent certain knowledge. . .” This last argumentation that wrong knowledge always presupposes a right notion, often occurs in our system (cf. V.S. VII, 1. 21).

Whilst the sūtras 1—6 delineate the notions ‘oneness’ and ‘separateness’ with reference to substance, quality and action, the two following sūtras consider them in relation to causality. The causality, here meant, is according to the Upaskāra (transl. p. 237), the *śamavāgi-kāraṇatva* existing between parts and whole. The Sāṃkhyaṃ uphold the view that the whole is nothing else than the parts<sup>1</sup>). The Vaiṣeṣikas reject this thesis. A full discussion of this question is found in the Nyāya-kandalī p. 104. The sūtra of our passage has really a tautological form; its literal translation would run thus: „Since oneness and single-separateness do not exist in effect and cause, therefore oneness and single-separateness do not exist [in them].” The meaning seems to be: the cause (f. i. the threads) is not one with the effect (the cloth), nor is it the same individual as the effect; because it is not thus.


Sūtra 8 is paraphrased by Nanda Lal Sinha in the title, inserted above the sūtra, as: „only non-eternal unity and separateness of one proceed from like attributes in their causes.” This paraphrase is based on the comments of Čaṅkara Miçra’s which run as follows: (Upaskāra Bibl. Ind. p. 318, translation p. 239): „He points out that non-eternal unity and separateness of one have for their antecedents attributes of their causes.” The import of the sūtra, according to this explanation would be: the oneness and individuality of a transient and compound thing are produced by the oneness and individuality of its ultimate parts, in the same way as the colour of a thing is produced by the colour of its parts. On the other hand, twoness &c. of things are not caused by the qualities of the parts, but are based on ‘relative understanding’. Though this theory of relative understanding is found in Praçastapāda’s Bhāṣya, still the interpretation, given by Čaṅkara Miçra, seems to be rather uncertain. Pandit DVIVEDIN, the editor of the Praçastapāda-Bhāṣya, does not consider that the sūtras 6—8 are referred to in this work; in the Berhampore edition the sūtra *‘etad anityayor*

<sup>1</sup> See here book IV section VII table C n°. 13 and 18.

*vyākhyātam*’ occurs in another context and is used with reference to ‘*gonijāyonije çarīre*’ (Berh. ed. p. 97). Still it remains likely that the sūtra has its proper place in the vulgate text in connection with *ekatva* and *prthakva*, because we see the qualities ‘colour, taste &c.’ and the quality *parimāṇa* discussed likewise with reference to eternity and transiency (VII, 1, 1—5; VII, 1, 18—20). The interpretation of the sūtra, however, remains uncertain, the more so, since the precedent sūtra (VII, 2, 7) is evidently a newer insertion, meant as a polemics either against the Sāṃkhya or the Bauddhas. Possibly the sūtra owes its origin to an older reading which ran: ‘*etan nityānityayor vyākhyātam*’ i. e.: this topic [*ekatvaikapṛthakva*] has been explained [further] in [the passage dealing with] eternal and non-eternal (V.S. VII, 1, 2 &c.); in other words: number and *prthakva* are eternal and transient according to the nature of their abodes, similarly as in the case of colour &c.

§ 4. Two tables for the explanation of the *dvitva*-theory in the *Bhāṣya*.

A. Table for the explanation of Praçastapāda’s *dvitva*-theory (Bhāṣya book III chapter 2 § 7, p. 111 l. 6 &c.)



The line, beginning in 1, represents the *utpatti* (the arising itself) of the different stages in the processes. The stick line, beginning in 6, represents the *udpadyamānatā* (praegenetic state) of these stages. The letters  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$  and  $\gamma$  refer each to „one time”, of the translation.

× means *vināçyattā* (decline); ● *vināça* (annihilation); → *kāraṇatā* (causation).

In the translation of the passage I have used the following renderings:

1. *Indriyārthasaṃnikarṣaḥ* by „contact of objects and sense-organs”.
2. *Ekatva-sāmānya-jñānam* by „intellection about the generality ‘oneness’”.
3. *Apekṣā-buddhiḥ* by „fundamental intellection”.



4. *Dvītvam* (i. e. *dvītvā-guṇaḥ* by „twoness (i. e. the quality ‘twoness’)”).


5. *Dvītvā-sāmānya-jñānam* by „intellection about the generality ‘twoness’”.

6. *Dvītvā-guṇa-jñānam* by „intellection about the quality ‘twoness’”.

7. *Dravya-buddhiḥ* by „intellection about the substances”.

8. *Samskāraḥ* by „impression laid down in memory”.

B. Tabellaric exposition of the *sahānavasthāna-vadā*, polemised against by Praçastapāda (Bhāṣya, p. 112 l. 13 &c.)



§ 5. Translation of the passage in the *Bhāṣya* on number.  
(*Bhāṣya* p. 111.)

Number is the cause of expressions as one &c.

This number inheres in one or more substances.

Eternality and non-eternality occur in the number which is inherent in one substance, similarly as [eternity and non-eternity occur in] the colour &c. of water [ & fire] and the colour &c. of their ultimate atoms; [in other words oneness is eternal in every atom, and transient in their aggregates].

Number, inherent in more than one substance, begins with two and ends with *parārdha* (100.000 billions). Its origin is from units which are accompanied by an intellection of several objects. Its disappearance ensues from the disappearance of the *apekṣā-buddhi* (fundamental intellection). How?

When there is a contact<sup>1)</sup> of two objects, (either belonging to one or different genera), with the eye of the knower, then a knowledge<sup>2)</sup> of the generality ‘oneness’ originates by *samyukta-samaveta-samaveta*-perception; [i. e. the knower sees the objects themselves by contact-perception; he sees the quality ‘one’ in each object through the fact that it inheres in the object which is in contact with the eye, or in scholastic terms: he sees the quality ‘one’ in each object through contact-inherence-perception, i. e. *samyukta-samaveta*-perception; and finally he sees the generality ‘oneness’, because it inheres in the quality ‘one’, which itself inheres in the

1) See table A of § 4 under n°. 1.

2) ibidem n°. 2.

object &c., or in scholastic terms: he sees the generality 'oneness' through contact-inherence-inherence-perception, i. e. *saṃyukta-samaveta-samaveta-pratyakṣa*]

Then by the generality 'oneness', by its relation [to the quality 'one'] and by the knowledge about it, there is effected one intellection<sup>3)</sup> in [the one person] who perceives the objects, an intellection, namely, of two qualities 'one'.

Then with this one intellection as fundament, twoness<sup>4)</sup> originates in the two seats (objects) out of the two onenesses.

Then again the intellection of the generality 'twoness'<sup>5)</sup> arises with reference to this [originated objective twoness]; this intellection of the generality 'twoness' causes the decline (*vināṣyattā*) of the fundamental intellection; by the generality 'twoness', by the relation between this [generality and the quality 'two'] and by the intellection about it, there is brought about the prae-genetic state (*utpadyamānatā*) of the intellection about the quality 'twoness'.<sup>6)</sup> This then is one time [one moment of time].<sup>2)</sup>

After this now the complete annihilation (*vināṣa*) of the fundamental intellection (*apekṣā-buddhi*) causes the decline or the quality 'twoness'; the intellection about the quality 'twoness' causes the complete annihilation of the intellection about the generality 'twoness'; by the quality 'twoness' [which at this moment is in its decline], by the knowledge about this quality and by the relation of this [knowledge and this quality] is caused the prae-genetic state of the knowledge about the substances, [which knowledge is expressed in the words: „here are] two substances”.<sup>7)</sup> This again is one time [one moment of time].<sup>8)</sup>

Immediately after this take place: the complete genesis of the knowledge about the substances, [which knowledge is expressed by the words: „here are] two substances”; the complete annihilation of twoness; the decline of the intellection about the quality 'twoness'; and by the intellection about the substances is effected the prae-genetic state of *saṃskāra* (psychical impression stocked in memory). This again is one time.<sup>2)</sup>

After this, the annihilation of the knowledge about the quality 'twoness' takes place<sup>1)</sup>; by *saṃskāra* is similarly effected the annihilation of the knowledge about the substances.

<sup>3)</sup> „apekṣā-buddhi”. fundamental knowledge, table A under n°. 3.

<sup>4)</sup> See table under n°. 4.

<sup>5)</sup> ibidem n°. 5.

<sup>6)</sup> ibidem n°. 6.

<sup>2)</sup> See table line 2.

<sup>7)</sup> ibidem n°. 7.

<sup>8)</sup> See table line 8.

<sup>1)</sup> See table line 7.

<sup>1)</sup> Thus, in accordance with the reading of ms. V.

By this is explained the arising of twoness and other [numbers]. Their origin is from units which are accompanied by an intellection of several objects; their disappearance ensues from the disappearance of the *apekṣā-buddhi* (fundamental knowledge).

[Here I leave out the passage Praç. Bh. p. 112 l. 4—12 which only discusses a special case with reference to the exposition given. In line 12 a polemical passage is begun:]

This explanation, given from the standpoint of the *caḍhya-ghātaka*-theory — [i. e. the theory that any stage in the process *destroys* a previous stage only when the latter *may be destroyed*] — is quite satisfactory. But in the other theory (contradictory to the one just described = *virodha*), a theory characterised by *sahānacasthāna* [i. e. by the circumstance that two stages of the process which are required to coexist, *do not coexist*], the unwished-for consequence would be that the intellection about the substances could not originate. — How is this? — Because by the annihilation of fundamental intellection, the annihilation of twoness is brought about at the moment when the origination of the intellection about the quality ['twoness'] takes place: so then the consequence would be that the intellection about the substances<sup>7)</sup>, [which intellection is expressed in the words: „here are] two substances”, could not arise with reference to that [twoness].

[Opponent]: If the meaning were: „[the *dravya-buddhi* arises] from knowledge only [scil. from *dehita-guṇa-jñāna*], [and not with reference to something existent], similarly as in the case of inferential knowledge? Just as conclusive intellection (*anumāna*) may be originated only from knowledge, even when there is [for the moment] non-existence of the probans — [in other words]: in the case to which the sūtra „*abhūtaṃ bhūtaśya*”, ‘the non-existent [probans] of the existent’ V.S. III, 1, 11 refers — so could the cognition about [two] substances<sup>7)</sup> arise from the mere intellection of the quality [twoness]<sup>6)</sup>, even though the quality itself<sup>4)</sup> has vanished.

[Defendent]: No. For it, [the knowledge about the substances], is knowledge about a *viśeṣya* (something to be qualified): and the knowledge about a *viśeṣya* cannot exist without the relation to a *viśeṣaṇa* (a qualifier) on account of the compliance [of the *viśeṣaṇa* with the *viśeṣya*]. And similarly it has been said by the Sutrakāra, V.S. VIII, 1, 9: „From the inherent whiteness, from the intellection about the whiteness, [arises] the knowledge about the white object; these two [scil. the *viśeṣaṇa*, whiteness, and the *viśeṣya*,

<sup>7)</sup> &c. Cf. the correspondent ciphers in the tables.

the object] are related as effect and cause [i. e. as inherent quality in the function of characteristic, and the thing in the function of the matter to be qualified]'. But inferential knowledge does not originate from *abheda* [non-difference; here synonymous with *sārūpya* p. 112 l. 20, 'compliance', 'congruence', 'agreement', such as exists between *viçesya* and *viçeṣaṇa*]; therefore your mentioning [this as an example] does not hold good.

[Opponent]: No, [you are wrong]; because of the quickness of the process. Just as, when we state [the proposition]: „physical space possesses sound (is the seat of sound), three intellections [‘physical space’, ‘sound’, ‘physical space as characterised by sound’] quickly originate, so is it with the arising of the knowledge of twoness and other [numbers]. Ergo, there is no mistake. Moreover, if I should mean: a similar mistake occurs in the *vādhyā-ghātaka*-theory? Therefore, surely, also in this *vādhyā-ghātaka*-theory would arise the [same] unwished for consequence, nam. that the knowledge about the substance could not arise. How? Because of the annihilation of the fundamental intellection by [the origination of] its own *saṃskāra* at the same moment when the knowledge about the generality ‘twoness’ originates. — [The opponent bases here his argumentation on the generally accepted Vaiçeṣika view that any intellection only exists during three kṣaṇas, moments; in the third moment, namely, it becomes an impression stocked in memory].

[Defendent]: No, [you are wrong]. Because the knowledge of the composite [*saṃūha*; i. e. as ĆRĪDHARA explains: the knowledge about the substance as characterised by the quality ‘twoness’] is cause of a *saṃskāra*. The knowledge of the composite is the only cause of a *saṃskāra*; and not *ālocana-jñāna* [i. e. according to Ćrīdhara: *nirvikalpaka-jñāna*, vague, indistinct, not yet mature knowledge]. And thus there is no fault [in my theory].

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the unwished-for consequence would arise that [several] intellections would exist simultaneously [in the soul]<sup>1</sup> — that is to say: <sup>1</sup>) this unwished-for consequence, [simultaneity of intellections], would arise in the theory of my adversary, who defends the *vādhyā-ghātakatva* of intellections. [In as far as my adversary seeks refuge in the notion of a *saṃūha-jñāna*, he really advocates simultaneity or cognitions, which is absurd]<sup>2</sup>).

[Defendent]: No; [you are wrong]. Because the denial only bears upon the staying of two [intellections] which do not vanish [i. e. which are both in their fullest state of existence]. By the sūtra

<sup>1</sup> See Ćrīdhara's gloss p. 123 l. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. here p. 92 sub 4.

[III, 2, 3] *jñānāyanyapadya...* ('...non-simultaneity of intellections...') the simultaneous origination of two intellections and the simultaneous occurrence of [two] not vanishing [intellections] is denied. And the simultaneous origination of two intellections and the simultaneous occurrence of [two] vanishing [intellections] do not take place in this *cadhya-ghātaka*-theory.

§ 6. *Explanation of Praçastapāda's theory of number*

In trying to explain this *dvitva*-theory of Praçastapāda's the first point to be noticed in this capricious and after all nonsensical construction is the author's wish to analyse the whole process in successive steps, moments, *kṣanas*. This feature, which will strike us in several places of the Bhāṣya (in its discussion of *saṃyoga*, *vibhāga* and *karman*), has undoubtedly given rise to the name *Ardhavaivāṇīkikas* which the followers of the Vaiṣeṣika have received from the Vedāntins. For whilst on the one hand they believe in eternal space, time, atoms and souls, yet on the other hand they like to dwell upon the continuent flow of transient states in our world of experience.

When we now consider the table in which I have summarised Praçastapāda's views, then the order of the steps in the process will first demand an examination.

The first two steps (*indriyā-rtha-saṃnikarṣa* & *ekatva-sāmānya-jñāna*) do not need much explanation. They express the well-known fact that for the arising of a perception an action of the object on the soul is not sufficient, but that a more active attitude of the soul is required. This point, the theory of *nirvikalpaka* & *savikalpa-jñāna*, will be more fully explained in the chapter on *pratyakṣa*. The first two steps then express: that first a contact between soul and objects must take place; secondly to the impression, thus originated, the soul must answer by producing some general ideas, i. a. the general idea of „oneness" which belongs to each of the objects.

The third step in the process, the *apekṣā-buddhi*, is the most important of the whole series. In this the autor has expressed his conviction of the subjective nature of number. But this „subjectivity" has been exaggerated as well as applied rather naively by the Vaiṣeṣika philosophy. For though man is free in choosing what things he likes to count, to measure, to weigh, yet neither is an objective factor lacking. When the standard of counting, measuring, weighing, is given and the objects to be counted, measured, weighed, then this subjectivity stops and only one objective answer is possible.

In calling the application naive, I am specially thinking of the view, upheld by the Vaīᅒeᅒikas, that the activity of our soul creates number in the things. This is similar to the *jñānatā*, the quality of 'being known' which the Mīmāᅒsakas accept to be created in the perceived things by human soul during the time of perception. As we shall see presently, in the explanation of the Vaīᅒeᅒika-theory of *saᅒyoga*, this takes place in consequence of the omnipresence (*vibhūta*) of soul. The wrongly understood and applied notion of the subjective character of number has led again to another consequence. According to the original Vaīᅒeᅒika doctrine psychical states are momentary, that is: their fullest state of existence only lasts one moment; as a rule, this *kᅒaᅒa* of complete existence is preceded by one moment of arising and one moment of vanishing, but this is not strictly adhered to. In as far as, then, psychical states only last in their fullest form one moment, and altogether a few *kᅒaᅒas*, the Vaīᅒeᅒikas concluded that number, created in the things by psychical states, follows the same rule with reference to its duration. So we have now explained the three first steps of the process: 1. the contact of the things and soul; 2. the *saᅒikalpaka-jñāna* with reference to each of these things, including the idea of oneness; 3. the relating knowledge, which creates in the things the quality of twoness, threeness, &c.

In a similar way as the *saᅒᅒikarᅒa* (1) was followed by the *ekatva-sāᅒāᅒya-jñāna* (2), so is now the creative intellection (3), which to a certain extent may be compared to a *saᅒᅒikarᅒa*, followed by an intellection (4) which contains the general notion of created number. The further steps are a result of the author's insight that this idea of number and the perceived objects must be brought into a certain relation; that is, the number must be conceived as a quality of the things. This is realised by two steps, first the intellection arises: 'this number is a quality', and then the intellection: 'this qualifying number belongs to these substances'. According to the general rule that a psychical state leaves behind its 'impression stocked in memory', the psychical process, just described, is followed by its *saᅒskāra*.

Now that we have explained the order of the steps, another point deserving our attention is the complicate speculations which Praᅒastapāda bestows upon the development and vanishing of these steps and their order of succession. It would not be worth while examining all the motives of its capricious construction. Yet we may state that very probably the *palᅒa*, upheld by the opponent, was the older one: every step in the process was brought to nought

by the total annihilation of the precedent step and every step had its own *samskāra*. This, however, led to the difficulty (see table B of § 4) that *deitva* has finished existing, whilst *dravya-buddhi* is arising: to avoid this difficulty, the total duration of *apekṣābuddhi* and *deitva* has been extended to four *kṣaṇas*.

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## SECTION 2.

### SPACE AND TIME.

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§ 1. *Sūtras bearing upon space and time.*  
(Nanda Lal Sinha's translation.)

#### A. Definition and ontological properties of time.

- II. 2, 6 'Posterior' in respect to that which is posterior, 'simultaneous', 'slow; 'quick', — such [cognitions] are the marks of time.
- 7 The substance-ness and eternality [of time] are explained by [the explanation of the substance-ness and eternality of] air.
- 8 The unity [of time is explained], by [the explanation of the unity of] existence.
- 9 The name time is applicable to a cause, inasmuch as it does not exist in eternal substances and exists in non-eternal substances.

#### B. Definition and ontological properties of space.

- II. 2, 10 That which gives rise to such [cognition and usage] as 'This [is remote, &c.] from this', — [the same is] the mark of space.
- 11 The substance-ness and eternality [of space are] explained by (the explanation of the substance-ness and eternality of] air.
- 12 The unity [of space is explained] by [the explanation of the unity of] existence.
- 13 The diversity [of space] is due to the difference of effects.
- 14 [The direction comes to be regarded as] the east, from the past, future, or present conjunction with the sun.
- 15 South, west and north also are similarly [distinguished].
- 16 By this the intervals of direction are explained.

C. Time & space, considered in relation to movement and causality.

- V. 2, 21 Space, time, and also ether are inactive, because of their difference from that which possesses activity.
- 22 By this, actions and attribute are explained (as inactive).
- 23 [The relation] of the inactive [i. e. attributes and actions], [to substances], is [combination] [which is] independent of actions.
- 24 Attributes are, however, non-[combinative] causes.
- 25 Space is explained by attributes.
- 26 By way of [efficient] causality, [the reference of action to time as its seat, being explained] time [is explained to be inactive, so far as combinative causality is concerned].

D. Distance (*paratva* and *aparatva*).

- VII. 2, 21 The prior and the posterior [are produced by two objects] lying in the same direction, existing at the same time, and being near and remote.
- 22 [Temporal priority and temporal posteriority are said, by suggestion, to arise respectively] from priority of the cause and from posteriority of the cause.
- 23 The non-existence of priority and posteriority, in priority and posteriority, is explained by minuteness and magnitude.
- 24 Actions are [void] of actions.
- 25 Attributes are [void] of attributes.

E. Extension or size (*parimāṇa*).

- VII. 1, 8 Cognition and non-cognition of the atomic and the extended or massive, respectively, have been explained in [the book treating of] the eternal.
- 9 [Largeness or magnitude is produced] from a multiplicity of causes also.
- 10 The contrary of this is the atomic.
- 11 '[It is] smaller', '[It is] larger' — such affirmations, in respect of one and the same object, arise from the existence of the species [or of the peculiarity] and from the non-existence of the species [or of the peculiarity].
- 12 [The attribution of smallness is secondary], because of the simultaneity [of the cognition of largeness and smallness in respect of the same object].



VII, 1, 13 Also because there is the analogue.

14 The non-existence of minuteness and magnitude, in minuteness and magnitude, is explained by the explanation, already given of the non-existence of actions and attributes, in actions and attributes.

15 Actions have been explained [to be void] of actions and attributes of attributes.

16 By minuteness and magnitude, actions and attributes are explained [to be void of minuteness and magnitude].

17 Hereby are explained length and shortness.

18 In the non-eternal [measure or extension also is] non-eternal.

19 In the eternal [measure or extension also is] eternal.

20 *Parimaṇḍala* is eternal.

21 False knowledge is, moreover, the [inferential] mark of [true] knowledge.

24 By attributes, space is explained [to be all-pervasive].

25 Time [is the name given] to [a specific, or a universal] cause. [Hence, in either case, it is all-pervading].

## § 2. Quotations from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B:

p. IV, on passage II, 2, 10—16. — „CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA observes under II, 2, 12: according to KANĀDA it appears, there is but one substance, variously called as ether, time and space. For, he has taken much pain to establish the difference of ether from tangible things, self and mind, but he has made no attempt to prove the difference of time and space themselves from any other substance. It may be, therefore, considered that with the difference of ether, the difference of time and space also have been established. But it may be asked, if there be one substance only, how does it come to be variously called ether, time and space? He replies that this is due to the variety of effects produced by it (II, 2, 13) and also to the variety of external conditions attending it (II, 2, 14—16)”.

p. V, on passage VII, 1, 8—25. — „Candrakānta Tarkālaṇkāra interprets VII, 1, 16 to mean that minuteness and magnitude may be predicated of action and attribute. He takes the word *parimaṇḍala* in VII, 1, 20 in the sense of perfect sphericity and introduces VII, 1, 22 as giving examples of it which may be both small and large”.

p. V on the formula: „*tattvam bhāvena*”, (occurring II, 1, 19 with reference to *ākāśa*, II, 2, 8 with reference to time, II, 2, 12

with reference to space and VII, 2, 28 with reference to inherence): „Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra interprets VII, 2, 28 to mean that combination is proved to be an attribute in the same way as is existence and further that like existence, combination also is produced by itself, i. e. does not depend upon any other combination for its production.”

### § 3. *Introductory remarks.*

Before explaining the sūtras quoted it may be stated that a complete definition and analysis of the notions ‘space’ and ‘time’ would require the following points to be mentioned: space allows mental construction which is bound by the tri-dimensionality of space and has consequently to do with three kinds of figures: lines, planes and bodies; space has two fundamental forms of mensuration: mensuration of straight lines (distance) and mensuration of corners (direction); further a movement of an object is not only defined spacially by the distance described and the direction followed, but thirdly by the sense of direction in as far as the object may first reach a spot *a* and afterwards a spot *b*, or first the spot *b* and then the spot *a*. In all three respects time is distinguished from space: time does not allow a direct mental construction (a comparison of time-intervals with straight lines is only a symbolical artifice), it has only one form of mensuration and the moments of time are occupied by the events only in one fixed order which does not allow inversion. In contrasting time and space we must, moreover, notice that the notion ‘simultaneity’ has not an equivalent correspondent in relation to space; for, whilst (infinitely) many events occur at one and the same moment, only one physical body occupies its part of space, a property of matter, called impenetrability in physics, though in mathematical argumentation it is supposed that different (mathematical) bodies may occupy the same place. On the other hand, in as far as time and space equally allow the application of number it follows that both are infinitely great, so that whatever extent in space or whatever duration in time is thought of, still a greater extent or duration is to be accepted: that both time and space are infinitely divisible &c.

### § 4. *Explanation of the sūtras.*

I intend to give first a discussion of the passages quoted, sūtra after sūtra, in order to finish with an appreciation of the total contents on the basis of my introductory remarks.

A. In passage II, 2, 6--9, sūtra 6 strikes us in mentioning: „posterior in respect to that which is posterior”, whilst we should expect: „posterior in respect to that which is anterior (& vice versa).” This reading is indeed met with in the Berhampore edition and seems to be the original one. Strangely enough the reading: „*aparasmīna aparām*” which inversely implies: „*parasmīna param*”) is in fact not explained in the *Upaskāra*. We find here the following comments (Bibl. Ind. ed. p. 108, transl. p. 82): „If we make a youth our point of view or starting point (*yacānam acathim kṛtvā*), then the cognition of priority is produced in an old man, whose birth has been distanced by a large number of the revolutions of the sun. . . .; in the same way the production of posteriority should be ascertained in a youth with an old man as the starting point.” We find, however, a satisfactory explanation in another recent *Vaiṣeṣika* work, namely in KEÇAVAMIÇRA’S *Tarkabhāṣā*. The passage, in question, runs as follows (Poona edition 1909, p. 76): „*Sam- nibhite vṛddhe sannidhānād aparatvārhe viparītam paratvam utpadyate; vyavahite yūni vyavadhānāt paratvārhe viparītam aparatvam*”; it is paraphrased by the editor PARANJPE thus: „Although an old man is sitting immediately near the speaker and deserves for that reason to be called *apara* (nearer in point of space), still an idea of remoteness is produced in connection with him: whereas an idea of nearness is created with regard to a young man, although he is not sitting immediately near the speaker and deserves for that reason to be called *para* (more distant in point of space). Thus ideas of remoteness in an old man and of nearness in a young man, not being the result of *diṣ*, lead one to infer that their cause must be *kāla*.” This explanation which makes the sūtra express in a very subtle way the logical independence of temporal distance from spacial distance, seems to be right, in as far as a similar thought is expressed in sūtra II, 2, 14. The subtlety of the thought seems to be, however, an indication of the relatively recent origin of the reading.

The substantiality, attributed to time in II, 2, 7 can of course not be accepted, though this thought naturally enough will suggest itself to human understanding.

In sūtra II, 2, 8 *tattva* is translated by NANDA LAL SINHA as *unity* in accordance with the *Upaskāra*, where we find *ekatva* as interpretation of *tattva*. The correctness of this interpretation is proved by comparing V.S. II, 1, 29, where the same formula is found, and II, 1, 30, with V.S. I, 2, 17.

Sūtra 9 considers time in connection with causality. This subject

is more fully treated in passage V, 2, 21 &c. The word *iti* is accepted by ĆAṂKARA MIĆRA in a causal sense, namely with reference to the precedent ablative (Bibl. Ind. ed. p. 112; transl. p. 85). We had, however, better explain its use as indicating the conclusion of the discussion of the topic 'time'. Instead of translating the expression „*kāraṇe kālaḥ*” thus: „the name time is applicable to a cause”, I should prefer giving the rendering: „the name time applies (or refers) to a cause”. This part of the sūtra is repeated without change as sūtra VII, 1, 25 and in the form: „*kāraṇena kālaḥ*” in sūtra V, 2, 26.

B. Nanda Lal Sinha's interpretation of „*ita idam*” (in II, 2, 10) is in accordance with the Upaskāra, where the sūtra is completed by the impressions *param* & *aparam*.

Sūtras 11 & 12 are to be explained similarly as 7 & 8.

In sūtra II, 2, 13 CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṂKĀRA's interpretation (see here p. 210 § 2) is different from the one, given by the Upaskāra and followed by Nanda Lal Sinha. According to Candrakānta, namely, *nānātva* would refer not only to *diṣ*, but to *ākāśa*, *kāla* and *diṣ* together. When we, however, remember that *ākāśa* is discussed at the end of āhnikā II, 1, and is separated from the examination of *kāla* and *diṣ* by the sūtras II, 2, 1—5 which treat of qualities, this interpretation seems rather doubtful. Still it is a fact worthy of notice that even later Vaiṣeṣika philosophy (cf. here book IV section IV table A) did not try to sum up the distinguishing characteristics of time and space. This and the fact that European science does not recognise a distinction of physical and mathematical space have very probably suggested this interpretation to Candrakānta Tarkālaṁkāra.

In sūtra 14 & 16 I should prefer not to follow Nanda Lal Sinha, but to use the same translation for *diṣ* as before, namely: mathematical space (cf., however, sūtra VII, 2, 21 and here p. 211 § 3). Sūtra 14 is amply explained by the Upaskāra (Bibl. Ind. ed. p. 116; transl. p. 88) as: „The east (*prāci*) is so called, because the sun first (*prāk*) moves (*añcati*) there. Thus that direction is called the east, wherein the first conjunction of the sun took place or will take place, or is taking place, in the course of its circulation round Mount Meru.”

C. In order to understand passage V, 2, 21 &c. one must remember that Vaiṣeṣika philosophy distinguishes three kinds of causes: 1. the inherential cause (*a*. a substance is the inherential cause of its qualities and movements; *b*. the parts are the inherential cause of the whole); 2. the non-inherential cause (as such qualities and actions occur;

i. e. an action, i. e. movement, is the non-inherential cause of the following conjunction: 3. the occasional or efficient cause which is one, other than the inherential and non-inherential cause. Cf. here p. 138 § 5).

Now it is said in V. 2, 21 that time and space are without movement. In 22 and 23 the same is mentioned, by way of egression, with reference to qualities, movements and inherence, whilst *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are left out. Next to these sūtras which examine the relation which time, space, qualities &c. bear to movement, we find some sūtras (24—26) which consider the connection of these notions with causality. Things have their spot in space and their duration in time, similarly movements occur in space and time. Since, however, the portions of things are already considered to be the inherential cause of the things and the things themselves the inherential cause of their movements, and since on the other hand space and time are without movement, therefore space is considered to be a non-inherential cause of everything which it contains (sūtra 25), similarly as a quality is a non-inherential cause (sūtra 24); and time is called an occasional cause — according to Čamkara Miçra's explanation of sūtra 26, where *kāraṇena* is to be taken as *śānta-kāraṇena* — of movement, and in general of all things existing in time (cf. II, 2, 9). No doubt, the passage V. 2; 22—26 is an insertion. This is clear both by the context and by the fact that the distinction of the three kinds of causes is of rather recent origin.

D. In passage VII. 2, 21 I should like, in accordance with the Upaskāra, to replace Nanda Lal Sinha's translation by the following: „The [expressions, notions] ‘prior and posterior’ are produced by two objects being [respectively] near and remote, which [either] lie in the same direction (*diç*) [or] exist at the same time.” ‘Nearness’ is paraphrased by Čamkara Miçra as: *samyukta-samyogālpataratva*, the state of containing a smaller number of conjunctions with the conjunct (i. e. with that body which is in immediate conjunction with our sense-organ). The expression ‘remoteness’ is paraphrased by *samyukta-samyogabhāyastva*. The expression: „which lie in the same direction” refers to spacial nearness and remoteness, in as far as relative distance is most directly perceived when the perceiving person and the two objects in question are placed in one straight line. The expression: „which exist at the same time” is explained by means of the example of an old man and a young man, in which case the birth of the former is more remote than the birth of the latter. We notice that the word *diç* is here used in the more

original meaning of *direction*, and not yet in the technical signification of *space* (a notion which includes two forms of mensuration: direction and distance). The interpretation, given by Çaṅkara Miçra, agrees with the one, by PRAÇASTAPĀDA. A more detailed excursion on the origination of the notions 'nearness' and 'remoteness' is found in the Nyāya-kandalī (p. 168).

Sūtra 22 (as we shall soon see) must be explained with the help of II, 2, 9. The Upaskāra refers sūtra 22 merely to time; the Vivṛti to space as well. DIVYEDIX, the editor of the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya, connects our sūtra with the paragraph on space (p. 63 line 21 &c) as well as with the paragraph on time (p. 67 line 1 & 2). Now, we have to notice that the reference in the former place is a literal quotation, whereas an indication in the latter place really does not exist. The meaning of the sūtra, according to Praçastapāda and Çaṅkara Miçra would be thus: „we call two events A and B respectively near [recent] and remote [old], when the event A is *conjoined with* a nearer point of time and the event B is conjoined to a remoter point of time.” The formula of the sūtra itself is clear when we remember that time is called the (efficient) cause of everything existent. The sūtra really hints at the fact that time has only one mensuration and that its moments only allow of one order without inversion.

We may paraphrase the sūtras 23—25 thus: just as movement does not inhere in movement (23), nor any quality in quality (24), nor the special quality minuteness in minuteness (23, cf. VII, 1, 14), so does not priority inhere in priority.

E. With reference to the passage, treating of *parimāṇa* (VII, 1, 5—25) I want to make the following remarks. — Sūtra 8 refers to the fourth book; see specially IV, 1, 6 & 7. Whilst *anupalabdhi* (in sūtra VII, 1, 8) is both related to *anor* and *mahataḥ*, *upalabdhi* of course can only relate to *mahataḥ*, since the atoms are always imperceptible (except for the yogins). Nanda Lal Sinha's insertion of „respectively”, therefore cannot be right. — Sūtra 9 is explained by the Upaskāra as referring to the origination of *parimāṇa*. The particle *ca* is explained there as implying *parimāṇa* and *pracaya* (loose conglomeration) under the causes of *parimāṇa*. Extension is produced by number, when tertiary atomic aggregates originate from ultimate atoms; here number itself is an effect of the Lord's *apekṣā-buddhi* (fundamental intellection).<sup>1)</sup> Extension is produced by extension.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. Praç. Bhāṣya p. 131 l. 5.

when solid things are joined together. Extension is produced by *pracaṇa*, when loose, porous matter, like cotton balls, is heaped into one mass. This explanation is in accordance with a passage in Praçastapāda's Bhāṣya (p. 131 l. 4—14). Still I do not consider the sūtra a decisive proof of the Sūtrakāra's already possessing the theory of *apekṣā-buddhi*: not unlikely the particle *ca* is an insertion in sūtra 9. — Sūtra 11—13 are explained by the Upaskāra with the help of such a conception of the notion '*anu*', as is explicitly stated by Ćrīdhara (Nyāya-kandalī p. 137 l. 7) and which seems to completely agree with the ideas of Praçastapāda's (Bhāṣya p. 131 l. 14—17). According to Ćrīdhara an atomical size, added again to an atomical size, would produce a still more atomical size. By addition, namely, the quality itself, and not its counterpart, would increase. Small, added to small, would produce 'smaller' or 'smallest', but not 'larger'. For this reason a tertiary atom (which possesses size) could not be formed by simple addition of three ultimate atoms, but only by a fundamental intellection of the Lord. It is clear, when we define 'ultimately small' as a variable quantity which, in course of its variation, becomes smaller than any quantity taken ad libitum (the only definition which can be used in mathematical science), that then the sum of two 'infinitely small' quantities is not smaller, but larger than the two separate terms. So then Ćrīdhara's argumentation that *anu*, added to *anu*, becomes *antara*, appears to be the outcome of a wrong analysis of the notion *anu*. Returning now to the interpretation of sūtra 11 we should notice that in the Vaiṣeṣika system *anu* properly and rightly means 'ultimately small', and figuratively 'small'. Thus sūtra 11 is explained by Ćamkara Miçra in the following way: we can call the same thing small [in comparison to large things] and large [in comparison to small things], because [smallness is only a figurative expression, in as far as] the particularity [greatness] exists [in all experienced objects] and the particularity [smallness, taken in its real sense] does not exist [in any experienced object]. — Sūtra 13 is explained by Ćamkara Miçra thus (Bibl. Ind. p. 300; translation Nanda Lal Sinha p. 224): „The meaning is that it is seen likewise that in the natural order of things (*vastuḡati*) the practical recognition i. e. the application (*cyavahāra*) of large, larger and largest, must be with regard only to things possessing magnitude . . . just as the application of white, whiter and whitest is according to the nature of things (*vastuḡati*) with regard only to white objects. . .” When we, however, compare the sūtras 11—13 with Praç. Bhāṣya p. 131 l. 1—4 another interpretation suggests itself. Then *viçeṣabhāvād*

*viçeṣābhāvācca* seems to be parallel with *prakaraṣubhāvābhāvam apekṣya* so the translation of the first two sūtras would run thus:

sūtra 11. [The use of the expressions: 'it is] small' [and 'it is] large' [with reference to the same object] results from the existence of the peculiarities [smallness and largeness] and the non-existence of [these] peculiarities in it; [i. e. from the limited existence of these distinctive qualities in it].

sūtra 12. Because [they inhere] at the same time [in the same object].

The translation of sūtra 13 remains verbally the same as the one, given by Nanda Lal Sinha, although its interpretation must be changed. — Sūtras 14—16 state that minuteness and magnitude do not inhere in minuteness and magnitude according to the general rule that quality does not inhere in quality. Another consequence of the same thesis is that minuteness and magnitude do not inhere in quality and action in general. Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra's interpretation of sūtra 16 breaks the consistence of the system. On the other hand his interpretation of sūtra 20 in which *parimaṇḍala* would refer both to atomic and infinitely sphericity is worthy of notice.<sup>1)</sup> — Sūtra 21 is explained by Çaṃkara Miçra in the following way: (Bibl. Ind. p. 305; translation Nanda Lal Sinha p. 228): „...it is admitted by those who hold the doctrine of of *anyathā-khyāti*, illusion of the senses, that everywhere unscientific knowledge (*apramā*) is just preceded by scientific knowledge (*pramā*).<sup>2)</sup> So that true consciousness of minuteness as well as true consciousness of shortness, should be inferred. This is the meaning. In like manner, secondary use of words (*bhāktah çabdasaṃyogah*) being impossible without the primary use (*mukhya*), minuteness and shortness, in the primary sense of the terms, must be thought of to be present somewhere.” — In the comments of sūtra 24 Çaṃkara Miçra says (Bibl. Ind. p. 308; translation Nanda Lal Sinha): „*gunaiḥ*”: by qualities i. e. by qualities, characterised as priority and posteriority inherent (*niṣṭha*) in all dense bodies, and appearing in the forms of the intuitions of the east, the west &c. common to all persons inhabiting all the inlands or divisions of the globe...” We may notice that two facts are expressed in this *vibhūta* of space: 1. that all persons have notions of space: 2. that all things are in spacial relations to one another. — In the comments of

1) Cf. however Prag. Bhāṣya p. 131 l. 24.

2) Cf. here book IV section VII table C n°. 31 and GANGANĀTHA JHA, Sādhana Lectures p. 63.



sutra 25 Āṅkara Mīra gives four arguments for the *vibhūta* of time, which can really be reduced to two: 1. *all persons* form temporal notions — or (to express it more in the terms of the original) when people use words like posterior, anterior &c., then time is the efficient cause of these words through the intermedium of the notions, whilst physical space, the medium for sound, is the *satatvāgi-bhāva* of these words — 2ly, time is known to be the efficient cause of *all that is produced*. In the insertion of Nanda Lal Sinha's „specific” seems to refer to time as a cause of our notions and „universal” to time as a cause of all things. Strangely enough *vibhūta* with reference to space and time is explained here in the same way, namely, both as general applicability and as general conceitibility; but the great difference in our concepts of time and space are totally ignored.

§ 5. *Appreciation of the Vaiśeṣika theory of space and time.*

Finally I shall attempt to shortly formulate my appreciation of the Vaiśeṣika theory of space and time:

1. The tri-dimensionality of space has not been sufficiently understood (See V.S. II, 2, 14—16; VII, 1, 8 & 17, where only *anu*, *mahat*, *brāhma* and *dirgha* are summed up, thus only cubic and lineal quantities).

2. The twofold mensuration of space: direction and distance, is expressed in the sutra II, 2, 10 and II, 2, 14.

3. The non-inversible order of time is presupposed in VII, 2, 22.

4. The notions „infinitely small” and „infinitely great” are not yet sufficiently analysed; the notion of „continuance” is not yet attained. Even in later Vaiśeṣika philosophy the analysis of the notion *ananta* has remained unsatisfactory. Similarly the notion of time as a ‘quantum continuum’ has never been grasped; the Vaiśeṣikas have never learnt to understand that comparison of temporal durations — similarly as the comparison of spacial distances — leads to the idea of irrational number and in connection with this to the mathematical notion of infinitesimal; their *kṣaṇas* have always remained to them indivisible moments, time-atoms.

§ 6. *Passages in the Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya on time and space.*

The passages in the Praśastapāda-bhāṣya which refer to time and space, and to temporal and spacial relations, are principally the following (see here book IV table 3 and 4): Praś. Bh. book II

(substance) chapter I (characterisation of the nine substances; § 13 p. 25; then the two special chapters on time (book II chapter 8 p. 63) and space (book II chapter 9 p. 66); further the paragraphs in book III chapter 2 (nam. § 5 *parimāṇa* and § 12 *paratvāparatve*) and finally in book IV (*karman*) § 16 (absence of movement in *kāla* & *diś*).

In the first of these passages mentioned (bk. II ch. 1 § 13) time and space are both called *nimitta-kāraṇa* of all things. In the comments of ÇAMKARA MIÇRA'S on sūtra V, 2, 25 & 26, however, space is called an *asamavāgi-kāraṇa* and only time a *nimitta-kāraṇa*. Since this explanation is evidently supported by the context of the Darśana, it seems probable that in Praçastapāda's time the passage V.S. V, 2, 23—26 did not yet exist (cf. here p. 29 § 1 sub 7).

The special chapter on time in PRAÇASTAPĀDA'S Bhāṣya does not contain much that is new in comparison to the sūtras. It mentions the *parāvaparavyatikara*, the reciprocity of posterior and anterior, so that it seems probable that the Bhāṣyakāra still has read *parasminu aparan* in sūtra II, 2, 6. — Time is called both the *nimitta-kāraṇa* of human notions concerning temporal relations and duration, and the *hetu* of the origination, existence and perdition of things (cf. Çamkara Miçra's comment on VII, 1, 25). Praçastapāda understands *tattva* in II, 2, 8 as *ekatva*. He quotes literally (under the formula *iti-vacanāt*) V.S. VII, 1, 25 and VII, 2, 22. The *nānātva* of time is explained by the *upādhis*, here the two similes of the *maṇi* and the *pācaka*, already known from Sāṃkhya sources, are brought in. The *nānātva* of time is not explicitly mentioned in the Sūtras (for CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṂKĀRA'S interpretation of II, 2, 13 cannot be accepted), but was certainly implied.

Neither does the chapter on space add anything new to the discussion in the sūtras. The qualities, attributed to the one space, are the same as those belonging to time and — with the addition of *çabda* — to physical space (See here book IV section IV table D).

In the passage on *parimāṇa* we find the same unsatisfactory division as in the sūtras, namely the distinction of *anu*, *mahat*, *dirgha* & *hrasva*. Further the following subjects are discussed: — *anu* in its eternal form (inhering in *manas* & the ultimate atoms; to these the term *pārimāṇādulya* is restricted); *anu* in its transient form (belonging to the double atoms); the term *anu* in its secondary meaning (*bhākta*); — *mahan nityam* & *mahad anityam*; — (*anitye*) *dirghatvahrasvatve* inhering in the same things as (respectively) *mahattrāṇtve*; — the three causes of *nityam parimāṇam*: namely, *samkhyā*, *parimāṇa* & *pravaya* (Transient *mahattva* & *dirghatva* are

originated in the case of triple atoms by the Lord's *apekṣā-buddhi*; transient *anulva* & *hrasvatva* are similarly created in the double atoms); — a question about the difference between *mahat* & *dirgha*, *anu* & *hrasva*, is answered by referring to the distinct use of these terms in language „*mahatsu dirgham ānīyatām, dirgheṣu ca mahad ānīyatām iti viṣiṣṭa-vyavahāra-darṣanāt*” (‘*ānīyatām*’ = ‘one should calculate’<sup>2</sup>); — the vanishing of *anityam parimāṇam* takes place by the vanishing of its abode.

*Paratva* and *aparatva* are not qualities of space and time, but of the things which abide in them (cf. here book IV section IV table D). These qualities are not perceived directly, by the senses: but are obtained by reasoning. They are called in *Praçastapāda-bhāṣya* (book III ch. 2 § 12) the causes (*nimitta*) of the terms and notions *para* and *apara*. Further this paragraph contains a long discussion on the origination of *dikkṛte paratvāparatve* (the state of being farther or nearer than a certain point, with reference to an observer) and *kālakṛte paratvāparatve* (the state of having happened previous to, or later than a certain event). After this discussion, the author still more broadly dwells upon the vanishing of these notions. I should like to insert here the translation of the passage, dealing with *dikkṛtaṃ paratvam* (Pr. Bh. p. 164 l. 6—11): „When two objects, lying in the same direction [from the observer], are conjoined to the [place] conjunct [with the observer: i. e. with the spot on which he stands], respectively by many and few conjunctions; then, in case he makes the neighbouring object [i. e. the object conjoined by few conjunctions] his starting-point, there will arise [in the soul] of this one observer a „remote intellection”; [an intellection, which resides] in the abode of *paratva*, [and which can be expressed by the words]: ‘This is remote compared to that’. Then, on the basis of this [intellection] the quality ‘*paratva*’ is originated by the conjunction [of this thing] with this farther spot of space.” — In order to understand this passage we must remember that every soul (just as well as space, time, and physical space) is omnipresent. Therefore a thought, arising in the soul, can be at the same time located in a certain object. And similarly as we have formerly seen that the human intellection ‘twoness’ creates in the things the corresponding quality, so will the intellection ‘*paratva*’ create the quality ‘*paratva*’. This parallelism in the theories of number and distance becomes more striking in *Praçastapāda*’s discussion of ‘*paratvasya vināṣaḥ*’. I have summarised his ideas on, this point in the appendix to this chapter. We may notice there that similar steps occur in the processes of *paratvasyotpatti-vināṣe*

as in those of *dvitvasyotpatti-vināṣe*. The *apekṣā-buddhi* is followed by the origination of [the quality] '*paratva*'; this by a *paratva-sāmānya-buddhi*; this again by a *paratva-guṇa-buddhi*, and this in its turn by a *dravya-buddhi*. The causes of the vanishing of the quality '*paratva*' are three in number: 1. the vanishing of the relating intellection; 2. the vanishing of the conjunction between the thing and its previous spot in space (in which case the object begins to move in the same *kṣaṇa* in which the relating knowledge arises); 3. the vanishing of the thing itself (in which case one of the portions which make up the thing in question begins to move just one *kṣaṇa* before the arising of the *apekṣā-buddhi*; then namely the quality *paratva* is destroyed by *dravya-vināṣa* at the moment immediately following its own origination. Moreover the Bhāṣya-kāra has constructed four complicate cases (by putting case 1 with case 3; 2 with 3, 1 with 2, and finally 1, 2, 3 together).

### SECTION 3.

### MOVEMENT.

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing on movement, conjunction & disjunction.*  
(Nanda Lal Sinha's translation).

- V, 1, 1 Action in hand [is produced] by means of conjunction with and volition of the soul.
- 2 And from conjunction with the hand a similar action appears in the pestle.
- 3 In the action, produced in the pestle &c. by impact, conjunction with the hand is not a cause, because of the absence [of volition].
- 4 In the case of action in the hand, conjunction with the soul is not a cause.
- 5 The action [i. e. the upward movement] in the hand is from impact, and from conjunction with the pestle.
- 6 Action of the body and its members is also from conjunction with the hand.
- 7 In the absence of conjunction falling [results] from gravity.
- 8 Owing to the absence of a particular molecular movement, there arises no upward or sideward notion [in the fruit, bird and arrow].

- V. 1. 9 Particular molecular movement [results] from particular volition.
- 10 From particular molecular movement [results] particular throwing away.
- 11 By the action of the hand the action of a child [has been] explained.
- 12 The same [is action directed towards the killing of a felon] when [a house set on fire by him] the body of a person burnt therein, is torn open by fire.
- 13 Movement of the sleeping [takes place] in the absence of volition.
- 14 Action in the grass [arises] from conjunction with air.
- 15 The movement of the jewel and the approach of the needle have *adṛṣṭa* as their cause.
- 16 Peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions of the arrow are the mark of the diversity of its action.
- 17 The first action of the arrow is from impulse; the next is from resultant energy produced by that [i. e. the first] action; and similarly the next, and the next.
- 18 In the absence of propulsive energy, generated by action, falling [results] from gravity.
- V. 2. 1 Action in earth [results] from impulse, impact and conjunction with the conjunct.
- 2 [If action in earth happens] with a particular consequence, it is caused by *adṛṣṭa*.
- 3 The falling of waters, in the absence of conjunction, is due to gravity.
- 4 Flowing [results] from fluidity.
- 5 The sun's rays [cause] the ascent [of water], through conjunction with air.
- 6 [Particles of water fly upwards], by means of concussion with impulse and of conjunction with the conjunct.
- 7 The circulation [of water] in trees is caused by *adṛṣṭa*.
- 8 Condensation and dissolution of water are due to conjunction with fire.
- 9 The pealing of thunder is the mark of that.
- 10 [There is] Vedic [proof] also.
- 11 [Thunder-clap results] from conjunction with and disjunction from water of the cloud.
- 12 The action of fire and the action of air are explained by the action of earth.
- 13 The initial upward flaming of fire, the initial sideward

blowing of air and the initial actions of atoms and of mind are caused by *adrṣṭa*.

- 14 The action of mind is explained by the action of the hand.
- VII. 2. 9 Conjunction is produced by action of any one of two things, is produced by action of both, and is produced by conjunction also.
- 10 By this disjunction is explained.
- 11 The non-existence of conjunction and disjunction in conjunction and disjunction is explained by minuteness and magnitude.
- 12 Actions are [void] of actions: attributes are [void] of attributes. This [is explained] by minuteness and magnitude.
- 13 In consequence of the absence of separate existence, there exist not conjunction and disjunction of effect and cause.

§ 2. *Quotations from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B:*

p. V: „CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṢKĀRA reads in V. 1. 7 *saṃskāra*-in stead of *saṃyoga*-. He explains *adrṣṭa* in V. 2. 2 in the sense of unseen natural forces, the causes of seismic disturbances, of the revolution of the terrestrial globe round the sun, and of other actions in earth. He splits up V. 2. 8 into two aphorisms, viz. *Apāṇa saṃghātaḥ* and *vilāyanaṃ ca tejaḥ-saṃyogāt*. He reads VII. 2. 12 as two aphorisms, viz. *karmabhīḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ* and *Aṇu-tramahatvābhyām iti* and explains them in the same way as VII. 1. 16”.

§ 3. *Annotations to these sūtras.*

The two āhnikas of book V are so related that the first discusses movement and its causes in general, and the second the movement of the different substances.

We can distinguish in āhnika I four coherent passages: 1—6 the movement of a pestle held the whole time by the hand, 8—10 the particular movement of an object thrown away with the hand (for I shall prove this to be the import of the passage); 11—13 human action done in an automatic way: 16—18 the movement of an arrow shot off with a bow. It seems probable that the third topic, mentioned, was a later insertion and that the āhnika originally existed of three parts which respectively described movement of an object, moved by the hand, thrown away with the hand and thrown away with the help of an instrument.

The passage 1—6 has already been discussed above (p. 113):

however, I should like now to draw the attention to the meaning of *abhigḥāta* in sūtra 3: according to the comments of ÇAṆKARA MIÇRA's it means: a conjunction (*saṃyoga*) between two objects (in our case the pestle and the mortar) giving rise to a movement which separates the two objects conjoined. The definition agrees with the context, for the sūtras mention here the case of a hard object recoiling through the reaction of a hard surface.

The passage 8—10 has to do with the notion *nodana*; this is defined in the Upaskāra (again under V, 2, 1) as: a conjunction giving rise to an action which does not cause the separation of the two things conjoined. This definition too is in agreement with our text, for it is said in sūtra 10 that a particular throwing away results from a particular *nodana*: i. e. when we throw away an object with our hand, then during the time in which the movement of the hand is transferred to the object, no separation takes place between hand and object, and only afterwards separation is caused, not by the *nodana*, but by the *saṃskāra* of the object. The translation, therefore, given by NANDA LAL SINHA as 'molecular movement' is quite misleading. According to my opinion, sūtras 8—10 are to be interpreted thus: „A [solid or fluid] object will neither move upwards nor sideways, [but will fall downwards], when [literally, because] no movement has been transferred to it from a conjunct object. A particular *nodana* (transference of movement) arises from a particular volition. This particular *nodana* gives rise to a particular throwing up- [or sideways].” It is scarcely worth noticing that in these sūtras *viçeṣa* has nearly the meaning of an indefinite pronoun. The insertion which Nanda Lal Sinha has made in sūtra 8 is based on the comments of Çaṅkara Miçra's of this and the preceding sūtra 7. This sūtra 7 is merely a variation of V, 2, 3 (cf. moreover the reading, mentioned by CANDRĀKANTA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA and sūtra V, 1, 18) and is here in disagreement with the context. Çaṅkara Miçra, endowed with the gifts of an Indian commentator, explains '*saṃyogābhāvāt*' as meaning by implication: '*saṃyogābhāvāt, prayatnābhāvāt, saṃskārābhāvācca*'.<sup>1)</sup> And consequently sūtra 8 must be explained thus: „when there is no conjunction [in the fruit], no volition [in the bird], no impetus [in the arrow], then there are no upward or sideward movements [in these objects].”

The sūtras 11 & 12 are explained by Çaṅkara Miçra thus: though the movements of a child and an action, done under excusable

1) Cf. Praç. Bh. p. 304 l. 16; p. 263 l. 26.

anger, are effected by volition, yet these, so as the automatic action of the hand' (sūtra V, 1, 5), brought about by conjunction with the pestle, do not cause *dharma* or *adharma*. According to Čamkara Miçra, the movements, made in sleeping, are 'caused by [vital] air' (*vāyuhṛtā*).

For the explanation of V, 1, 15 see the *Upa-kāra*: the 'jewel', referred to, is a magical means for discovering a thief: the *adṛṣṭa* of the thief's soul causes its movement: — the 'movement of the needle' takes place by the influence of a magnet, and magnetism is according to Indian thought, a result of the *adṛṣṭa*, belonging to souls.

The translation of '*anugāpat-samyogaiveśāḥ*' in II, 1, 16 by 'peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions', as given by Nanda Lal Sinha, cannot be accepted. The meaning is simply: 'the several...' or 'the particular non-simultaneous conjunctions'. The import of the sūtra is: what we call a movement in daily life, is really a series of movements, in as far as each movement lasts only one *kṣana*. In the first moment *karman* is produced by *nodana* (conjunction between arrow and bowstring, from which the movement is transferred): this *karman* creates *samśkāra* (impetus, Nanda Lal Sinha: resultant energy) in the arrow: this creates — until it is exhausted — a series of successive *karmāṇi*.

To āhnikā 2, treating of the movements of the several substances, I should like to add the following annotations. Sūtra 1 mentions three kinds of *samyoga* by which motion is produced. Sūtra 2 is an egression, *viçeṣa* is explained in the *Upa-kāra* as 'with a particular consequence' or as 'in deviation from' [i.e. when the forms of *samyoga*, mentioned in sūtra 1, are lacking]. Very probably sūtra 3 had originally the form '*samyogābhāve...*', *apām* was afterwards added. The sūtras 5 and 7-11 form an egression, some of them do not even relate to the movements of water, but to its states of aggregation. It seems that '*nodanāpādanāḥ*' (in sūtra 6) should be taken as a *dvandva* and as a synonymous variation of '*nodanābhijhātāḥ*' in sūtra 1. Čamkara Miçra and Nanda Lal Sinha, following his example, take it as a tatpuruṣa. Perhaps we must explain sūtra 5 as follows: '[in the same way as the flames of fire, dancing and moving by the influence of wind, cause the water of the cauldron to evaporate], so do the sunbeams, when conjoined with [and brought into movement by] wind.' In sūtra 8 both freezing and melting are explained by the influence of heat: this reading is supported by the explanation of Čamkara Miçra's and by the older parallel passage in the *Prācāstapāda-bhāṣya* (see below).



The breaking up of the sūtra into two parts, as has been done in the edition of Candrakānta Paṭkāṅkārā's, is a weak attempt to free the Vaiṣeṣika system from one more absurdity. For sūtra 9—11 see the Upiṣkāra. Whilst sūtra V. 1. 11 with *hastakarmapā* refers to sūtra V. 1. 5 motion physically caused, sūtra V. 2. 14 explaining the movement of the internal organ, refers with *hastakarmapā* to V. 1. 1 motion psychically caused. *pratyakṣa-kṛta*.

In passage VII. 2. 9 &c. which deals with *saṃyoga* and *cibhāga*, the translation of sūtra 12 by Nanda Lal Sinha seems rather absurd. That qualities are void of qualities, actions of actions, was already stated in book I of the Darśana and need not be explained 'by minuteness and magnitude'. If the tradition of the text is trustworthy, I should like to render it: "[The quotation of] '*anvācamaḥatvābhyaṃ*' [i. e. of VII. 1. 16] [in the preceding sūtra, refers to the general rule]: 'qualities are void of qualities; actions of actions.'" In sūtra 13 effect and cause must be taken as aggregate (*avayavin*) and parts (*avayava*). Conjunction exists between parts mutually, for these can be removed from each other; but intimate relation exists between the parts and the whole. Therefore when disjunction takes place between the parts, and the aggregate is destroyed, we are, strictly speaking, not allowed to say that the parts are separated from the aggregate.

#### § 4. Passages in the Praç.-Bhāṣya on movement &c.

The passages in the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya, treating of *karman* and its causes, are partly found in the fourth book and in some paragraphs of the third book chapter 2 § 10 conjunction, § 11 disjunction, § 50 *pratyakṣa*, § 55 & 56 *adrṣṭa*, § 51 weight, § 52 fluidity, § 53 adhesion, § 54 *samskāra*.

I shall give an account of these passages in the order in which I have mentioned them with the exception of *pratyakṣa* & *adrṣṭa*, for which I refer to book II chapter IV (psychology) & chapter VI (ethics & theology).

In the book '*karman*' of the Bhāṣya § 1, the different properties which are characteristic for movement, are summed up (see here book IV section IV table E). In § 2—6 the definitions are given of *utkṣepaṇa*, *arakṣepaṇa*, *ākuñcana*, *prasāraṇa* and *gamana*. Here *utkṣepaṇa* (throwing upwards) is limited to the parts of the body and those things which are in conjunction with them. The definition of *arakṣepaṇa* is similarly restricted. This limitation is in correspondence with the transitive meaning of the verb *kṣip*. *Ākuñcana*

(bending) and *prasāraṇa* (stretching) are movements by which the form (attitude) of the body is altered. *Gamana* is defined as 'movement which causes conjunctions with, and disjunctions from unconfined spots of place'. This classification, if it may be called so, is very unsatisfactory. In origin it has merely to do with all possible bodily movements: our arms and legs we can move upwards, move downwards, stretch and bend, we can go ourselves to any place whatever. This popular distinction was sanctioned by the school which vainly tried to use it for scientific purposes.

§ 7 begins thus: „*Etat pañcavidham api karma çarīrāvayaveṣu tatsambandheṣu ca satpratīyagam āsatpratīyagam ca, yad anyat tad apratīyagam eva. Tese aṇeṣu ca tad gamanam iti.*” In connection with the beginning of § 9, 10, 11, 12 it is necessary to explain 'satpratīyagam' as referring to 'çarīrāvayaveṣu' and 'āsatpratīyagam' as referring to 'tatsambandheṣu' [read: *tatsambaddheṣu*]. So we get the following classification:

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| <p><i>A.</i> Movements of things which are under the control of soul (<i>ātmanādhiṣṭhiteṣu</i>) § 12</p> | <p><i>a.</i> Movements of the limbs of the human body (<i>çarīrāvayaveṣu</i>) = movements with accompanying consciousness (<i>satpratīyagam karma</i>).</p> <p><i>b.</i> Movements of objects, directly or indirectly conjoined with the body (<i>tatsambaddheṣu</i>) = movements of which the effecting psychical state exists no longer (<i>āsatpratīyagam karma</i>).</p> |
| <p><i>B.</i> Movements of external material things (<i>anadhiṣṭhiteṣu bāhyeṣu mahābhūteṣu</i>) § 12</p>  | <p>= Kinds of movements which are always void of consciousness (<i>apratīyagam karma</i>).</p>   |

*Aa* = *pañcavidhāni karmāṇi* (thus *gamana* included)

*Ab* & *B* = *gamanam eva*.

The actions *Aa* are discussed in § 9 'satpratīyaga-karma-vidhiḥ', the actions *Ab* in § 10 'pāṇimuktesu gamana-vidhiḥ', and in § 11 'gantramuktesu gamana-vidhiḥ': the actions *B* in § 12 sqq.

With the exception of the few lines, containing the division, just described, § 7 gives a proof for the thesis that there are no more than five species of movements. § 8 discusses the difficulty: is *gamana* a synonym of *karma* or is it a species of it? I have given a summary of them in the Appendix to this chapter;

they are neither interesting in themselves nor in reference to the system.

The point which deserves most attention in the following paragraphs, is their correspondance with the sūtras of the Darṣana § 9—11 (the explanation of *sat-* & *asatpratyaya-locana*) corresponds with V.S. V. āhnikā 1: § 12 *xc.* with V.S. V. āhnikā 2. And specially § 9 with V.S. V. 1. 1—5 (6) movement of the hand and of the pestle: § 10 with 8—10, throwing away *ślashta*; § 11 with 16—18, shooting an arrow. Since the same thought as in V.S. V. 1. 15, is expressed in the Praṣastapāda Bhāṣya p. 309, l. 14 & 15, we may conclude that PRAṢASTAPĀDA considered V. 1. 7; V. 1. 11—15 as mere egressions. This is in agreement with the result which I arrived at by the analysis of this āhnikā (above p. 29 § 1 sub 7 and p. 223 § 3). Further my explanation of sūtra V. 1. 5, deviating from ČAMKARA MIČRA and NAYDA LAL SINHA, becomes affirmed by corroborative evidence (see here p. 224).

For the rest the description which Praṣastapāda has given of the different stages in the movements of the hand, the pestle, the arrow, is still more ridiculously spun out than that which we find in the sūtras. Our interest is only roused at the end of § 9 where we find the question raised: is at the moment of recoil a new *saṃskāra* produced or does the old *saṃskāra* of the moving pestle continue [whilst only the direction of the movement is changed]? Since this dilemma is left open, we cannot say that the Vaiṣeṣikas have already discovered the 'principle of action and reaction' as it is called in European mechanics. Neither do we find here any attempt to explain the *abhigḥāta* (recoil) by the *sthitiśthāpaka* (elasticity) of the two colliding objects.

§ 12—17 from one coherent passage, treating of the movement of the different substances. § 12 and § 13 (really belonging together: the first sentence of § 13 even belongs grammatically to the last of § 12) treat of *saṃyoga* (in its forms: *śodana*, *abhigḥāta* and *saṃyukta-saṃyoga*) as a cause of actions in the four elements earth, water, fire and wind. The definitions of *śodana* and *abhigḥāta* are the same as those occurring in the Upaskāra (there p. 224). At the end of § 13 *garatva* is only attributed to earth and water, and is called the cause of falling. With reference to the correspondance between the Vaiṣeṣika Darṣana & the Bhāṣya we may state the following points: Bhāṣya book IV § 12 and the beginning of § 13 correspond with V.S. V. 2, 1 & 6 & 12 (*saṃyoga* in three forms as cause of movement of the four elements): the last part of § 13

with V. 2, 3. § 14 (flowing of water) with V. 2, 4. — Whilst the egression in V.S. V. 2, 5 and 8—11 on the states of aggregation and the origin of thunder do not occur in the Bhāṣya, on the other hand § 15, the discussion of 'rotation by *saṃskāra*' — a subject, the insertion of which in the Bhāṣya itself deviates from the plan of its composition — is not found in the sūtras.

§ 16 treats of two subjects: the movements of vital air and the lack of movement in physical space, time, mathematical space and soul. The first topic is not found in the Vaiç. Darçana; V.S. V, 2, 12, namely, to which DIVYĒḌIN refers, treats only of air in general, whereas in the passage of the Bhāṣya vital air is discussed. Its movement, whilst one is awake, depends on conscious volition (*icchā-dveṣa-pūrvaka-prayātna*, literally: volition dependent on wish and aversion); in sleep it depends on unconscious volition (*jivana-pūrvaka-prayātna*, literally volition, based on life, or: vital volition). The second part of § 16, treating of the absence of movement in the four last substances (physical space &c.), is parallel to V.S. V, 2, 21 (by *ca* soul is implied, cf. here p. 113, according to the explanation of Çaṅkara Miçra's).

§ 17 first treats of the movements of the internal organ and then of all those movements which are caused by *adṛṣṭa*. The movements of the internal organ are always effected by the conjunction between this organ and soul (cf. V.S. V, 2, 14): the character of this movement varies according to whether soul is qualified by conscious volition (fixation of attention), by unconscious volition (at the moment when one awakes), by merit and demerit: *a.* at the time of death and birth, cf. V.S. V, 2, 17; *b.* in the case of yogins, whose souls may wander freely to any desired region. For details I refer to the chapter on Psychology. At the end of § 17 we find a discussion of all the movements by *adṛṣṭa* (cf. V.S. V, 1, 15; V, 2, 2; V, 2, 13); or as expressed by Praçastapāda (Bhāṣya p. 309 l. 10) "all those movements in the gross elements which are capable of bringing advantage or disadvantage [to the souls] and of which no [other] cause can be found by perception or inference." *Mahābhūtānām prakṣobhanām* in line 11, is explained in the Nyāya-kandali as *bhūyolaktānām cetanām*. This seems partly in accordance with the explanation which CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA has given of V, 2, 2. It is, however, clear from the context of our Bhāṣya-passage that *adṛṣṭa* in all these cases is considered as a quality of soul (or souls) and not in the sense of the European notion 'force, natural force'.

I have already mentioned (p. 226) that several paragraphs of

book III in the Bhāṣya are of interest for our present subject, nam. § 10 & 11 *saṃyoga* & *vibhāga* and § 50-56 volition, weight, fluidity, adhesion, *saṃskāra*, *atyaśa*. I shall give a summary of these paragraphs with the exception of those treating on the two psychical qualities 'volition' & 'atyaśa'.

The paragraphs on *saṃyoga* and *vibhāga* remind us much of the theory of number. In the same way as number, so are conjunction and disjunction considered to be qualities which have no objective foundation and are based on (i. e. created by) human intellection. Though one should expect a complete parallelism between the theory of conjunction and that of disjunction, yet one finds that the second notion has given rise to much more complicated discussions than the first. This finds its origin in a peculiar conception of the notion *vibhāga*. Whilst conjunction is used with reference to objects which come into contact and to those which abide in conjunction; disjunction is only used for objects which become separated, but never for objects which are placed at a distance from each other.

§ 10 page 139 begins with characterising *saṃyoga* in respect to causality: it is called the efficient cause (*nimitta*) of the notion 'conjunction' [in the same way as time is the *nimitta-kāraṇa* of the notions 'former', 'later' &c.], the independent cause (*airapekṣa*) for the origination of substances, the dependent cause (*sāpekṣa*) for that of qualities and actions. I have already explained these technical terms in the Introduction, p. 31. There we have found that *saṃyoga* is called an independent cause of substances, in as far as the mere conjunction of the parts is supposed to originate the aggregate. The *saṃyoga* of our hand with a tree causes a *saṃyoga* of our body with the tree, always by the intermediation of the *samavāya*, the inherence of our body in the parts which compose it, i. e. in the hand. A *saṃyoga* between hand and pestle causes a movement in the pestle, only in as far as there exists (inheres) movement in the hand.

After this *saṃyoga* is divided into three kinds: 1. conjunction consequent on movement in one of the two objects which come into contact; 2. conjunction consequent on movement in both objects; 3. conjunction dependent on another conjunction. This division agrees with V.S. VII, 2, 9. Of the two first kinds the following examples are given. 1. conjunction between trunk and hawk; conjunction between the infinitely great substances and the material things of limited extension; 2. the conjunction between two wrestlers or two rams. The conjunction, caused by another conjunction,

is described p. 139 l. 22 (cf. here p. 236 § 2) as „a conjunction of something [A] inactive [= not moving] which has originated just now or some time ago, with other things [B] which are not causes [i. e. which are not composing parts, but are aggregates themselves], but have conjunction with composing parts [of the aggregate A]: — [a conjunction] which is based on a conjunction of causes [= component parts of A] with non-causes [= things which do not originate things again, i. e. which are themselves aggregates; B] and which is located in the effect [= aggregate A] and the non-effect [= B which, namely, is not produced by the composing parts of A, just mentioned].” For this wonderful and deep abacadabra we find in the *Nyāya-kōśa* the following explanation, for the case that the thing inactive [A] has just originated: (cf. Appendix):

„A conjunction of a piece of cloth [woven] from two threads, with a blade of grass (which has conjunction with the two threads). — this conjunction is based on the conjunction of the two threads with the grass-blade, and is located in the two-threaded cloth and the grass-blade.”

This ‘conjunction, originated by conjunction’ is subdivided into three kinds: ‘from one, from two, and from more’. Following examples are given: *a.* the conjunction of a grass-blade with one thread originates conjunction of the grassblade with the cloth; *b.* the two conjunctions of [two] threads with physical space originates a conjunction of the two-threaded cloth with physical space; *c.* the many conjunctions between threads and the weaver’s brush originate one conjunction between brush and cloth. The author surpasses himself by discovering another, fourth subdivision (p. 140 l. 6—19); fortunately I can refer here to Nanda Lal Sinha’s translation of the *Upaskāra* (p. 147) where a parallel passage occurs.

In p. 140 l. 19—p. 141 l. 3 the *Bhāṣya-kāra* remarks that conjunction is never eternal, because — the *sūtras* do not mention this (cf. V S. VII, 2, 9—13); and it is a fixed rule in the *Darśana* that the eternality, if occurring, of a category is stated (f. i. VII, 1, 20, where the eternality of *parimāṇa* is mentioned, i. e. the eternality of a certain species of dimension).

In p. 141 l. 3—l. 7 the *Bhāṣya-kāra* states that the conjunction of the ultimate atoms and physical space is one of the first kind (i. e. a conjunction consequent on the movement of one of the two conjunct objects); and that no conjunction exists between omnipresent substances (f. i. soul and space: space and time &c.).

because there is no *vyatāsiddhi* between them. This *vyatāsiddhi* is then defined. (For the explanation see below the discussion on *vibhāga*).

At the end of § 10 (p. 141 l. 7—13) the Bhāṣya-kāra discusses the annihilation of conjunction: this has two forms: 1. conjunction destroyed by a disjunction now located in the same objects in which formerly the conjunction was located; 2. conjunction destroyed by the annihilation of the abode. The last form is explained more fully (cf. here p. 237 § 2 B); we find as example given, the conjunction of two threads one of which is destroyed by a movement or a composing particle. Here the author again indulges in his usual meaningless distraction of stages.

Though the discussion of *vyatāsiddhi* in the Bhāṣya § 11 is more involved than that of conjunction, my exposition of it can be simplified. The contents of this paragraph can be put under the following headings: Definition and characterisation of disjunction with reference to causality (p. 141 l. 1 & 5). Division into three kinds: 1. disjunction, caused by movement of one of the two objects in question; 2. disjunction, caused by movement of the two objects; 3. disjunction, caused by another disjunction (l. 5 & 6). Subdivision of the third species into *lāṅghana-vibhāgāt* and *akāraṇa-vibhāgāt* (p. 141 l. 7—p. 142 l. 7). Egression on *vyatāsiddhi* (p. 152 l. 7—19). Discussion on the annihilation of disjunction: (For the last three topics cf. here p. 237 § 3 A, 3 B and § 4).

I should like to make a few notes on some of these subjects. The first sub-species of the third species of disjunction: the one called *lāṅghana-vibhāgāt* refers to the case when a movement arises in one [A] of the two portions which compose an aggregate: from this a disjunction arises between the two portions [A & B], the aggregate is destroyed, and the disjunction located in the two portions, effects a disjunction of the moving portion [A] from its original spot in physical space. The second refers to the case when a movement i. e. of the hand (a cause, i. e. a composing part of the body), effects disjunctions of this hand from the spots, occupied by it in physical and mathematical space. — [these spots are here the non-causes] — then these disjunctions between the cause and the non-cause effect disjunction between the effect [i. e. the aggregate or the body] and the non-effect [i. e. the spots of physical and mathematical space].

The notions *vyatāsiddhi* and *avyatāsiddhi* are discussed in some syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works (e. g. in the Tarkabhāṣya) in connection with causality, in the Praj.-Bhāṣya together with *samarāya*,

*saṃyoga* and *vibhāga*; and in the Vaiç. Sūtra with *saṃyoga* and *vibhāga*. These arrangements are logical enough, if we bear in mind the fact that causality itself according to the Vaiṣeṣikas depends either on inherence (*samarāṅga*) or conjunction. *Yatasiddhi* (or as it has been translated by Nārāyaṇa Lal Sinha 'naturally unassociated existence' is a condition of conjunction and disjunction... It is [a] the *prthagbhāva* the independent possession of movement) of two, or of one of two things [the Nyāya-kandali gives respectively as examples: two ultimate atoms, an ultimate atom and physical space], this in case of eternal things; — and [b] it is inherence in separate abodes, in the case of transient things; thus we find *yatasiddhi*, *saṃyoga* and *vibhāga* between the sense-organ of touch and the body [the sense-organ of touch, namely, is not a portion of the body, but an addition to the body; this is clearly shown by the fact that the body is made of earth, and the *indriyāṇi* are all formed out of different materials: the sensory of sight out of light &c.]; similarly between an ultimate atom and physical space [in as far as the ultimate atom moves through physical space, whilst this remains at rest]; but *yatasiddhi*, *saṃyoga* and *vibhāga* do not occur between part and aggregate, i. i. thread and cloth (cf. V.S. VII, 2, 13: between two omnipresent substances [such as soul and space: for these do not possess movement]).

The last part of § 11 (p. 152 l. 21—p. 154 l. 15; cf. here p. 238 § 5) contains a widely spun out discussion on the annihilation of *vibhāga*. It begins with the sentence: „*cināṣas tu sarvaṣya vibhāgasya kṣaṇikatrāṇi uttara-saṃyogāvacadhi-sadbhāveṇī kṣaṇika itī*”; if we are allowed to consider ‘*kṣaṇikatrāṇi*’ as an addition of a copulist, the translation may run: „The annihilation of every disjunction ‘happens within a extremely short time’ (*kṣaṇika*) in as far as the last conjunction forms a terminus” [i. e. when the object is moving, it is in successive conjunctions with a series of spots in space: but when its movement is checked by an impeding object, then „the last conjunction” takes place: the ‘becoming separated’ is finished: we cannot say anymore that there is disjunction, *vibhāga*, between the object *A* and *B*; they are simply at a distance from each other]. Secondly the annihilation of disjunction can be caused by the annihilation of the abode. The discussion of this point takes the form of a dialogue. P. 153 l. 3—11 contains the defendant’s exposition which can be paraphrased thus: it may happen f. i. that, in the moment following on that in which two threads *A* & *B* become disjoined from each other, the thread *A* gets annihilated, then this annihilation will cause the annihila-



tion of the disjunction between *A* & *B*. — P. 153 l. 11—p. 154 l. 3 gives the argumentations of an opponent: if one of two objects, which are getting disjoined, is annihilated, and this annihilation causes the annihilation of the disjunction between the two objects, then the absence of this disjunction will bring about the absence of the disjunction of the moving object from its spot in place: this absence will cause again the absence of the '*uttarasamyojaka*', of the 'last conjunction' which finishes action, thus: the action will be endless in the case when the moving object is something eternal, self, an ultimate atom. (And according to Vaiçesika conception endless movement is an absurdity). — The solution, or more correctly the two solutions (p. 154 l. 3—8 and l. 8—15), given by the defendant, are no less subtle examples of Indian dialectics, but would, I am afraid, surpass the patience of the European reader.

In § 51 the Bhāṣya-kāra states 1. that weight is the cause of the falling of water and earth (cf. V.S. V, 2, 3 and my explanation above p. 225), 'the fact that wind', i. e. air, possesses weight, was unknown to the Vaiçesikas: nor did they ever offer an explanation of floating and sinking; 2. that weight cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred from the falling of things (cf. V.S. IV, 1, 10: 'the pressure which things, when carried, exercise on our skin: the tension which they cause in our muscles, is not even alluded to'); 3. that it is counteracted by conjunction, volition and impetus *samskāra*: cf. Çankara Mīra's explanation of V.S. V, 1, 7, quoted above p. 224; 4. that it is eternal in atoms and transient in aggregates.

In § 52 fluidity is called natural and artificial. It is natural in water, and artificial in earth and light. [as I have formerly shown, the metals, owing to their peculiar metallic glance, are considered by the Vaiçesikas as being in essence light and as having weight only through additional earthly matter]. Natural fluidity is eternal in atoms and transient in aggregates. It is not right to deny the existence of natural fluidity on the ground that water exists also in frozen form (*samghāta*, cf. V.S. V, 2, 8); for this solid character of ice is the consequence of a substance-forming conjunction (or cohesion, *dravyānubhāva-samyogah*) of the water-atoms, when conjoined to heavenly light, i. e. to the light of the sunbeams, cf. above p. 225]. Finally a list is given of the stages in which the melting of earth (wax &c.) and light (gold &c.) is supposed to take place through the influence of fire.

In § 53 *śuśka* is mentioned of water (cf. V.S. II, 1, 2; 6; 7);

it is the cause of its sticking to a surface, of its fitness for cleaning &c. It is eternal in atoms and transient in aggregates. [We might translate *sauha* by adhesion, remembering, however, that the Vaiṣeṣikas did not know this property as common to all matter].

In § 54 *saṃskāra* (the property of bringing forth again a state which existed before) is divided into *vega* (impetus, inertial), *bhāvanā* (the condition of remembrance, cf. my chapter on Psychology) and *sthitiśthāpaka* (the returning to a previous form). — Impetus belongs to the four gross elements and the eternal organ [this is not explicitly stated in the Darṣana: cf., however, V.S. V, 1, 17; V, 2, 12; V, 2, 14]: it is effected [either by the movement of the moving object itself, or] sometimes by the impetus which inheres in the parts forming the aggregate [namely, as Ācārya explains, in those cases where a mass of water moves]. — *Stthiśthāpaka* inheres in aggregates, formed out of one of the four gross elements. When these originally possess a fixed arrangement of their parts, and, after being acted upon by a disturbing influence, remain existing, then they receive by this *sthitiśthāpaka* their first form. [The best translation for *sthitiśthāpaka* would be 'elasticity': yet we do not know, how the Bhāṣya-kāra would apply this notion to water, wind and fire: in European elementary textbooks of physics the molecular forces of expansion which arise in fluids and gasses, when their volume is compressed, are compared with the elasticity of solid bodies. Yet it is more likely that the Vaiṣeṣikas have thought of such phenomena as: the returning of the water-surface to the horizontal level after interceded disturbance, or: the going back of a current of water &c. into its former direction on the removal of the impeding object. In other words, it is far from certain that the Vaiṣeṣikas have grasped the full importance of the physical notion 'elasticity'. Yet we may consider the explicit statement of the notion *sthitiśthāpaka* a progress in the Bhāṣya in comparison to the Darṣana. On the other hand the acceptance of impetus, psychical retention and elasticity under the one notion *saṃskāra* is undoubtedly a great mistake. For the rest it is superfluous to say that the Indians have never realised the complicate character of falling, which results from the cooperation of *vega* and *gurutva*, for even in Europe this idea was not grasped before the ingenious discoveries of the Italian founders of modern science].

§ 5. *The passages in the Vaig. Sūtra which bear upon the qualities, related to movement.*

The qualities, discussed in the Prac. Bhāṣya book III chapter 2 § 50—56: volition, weight, fluidity, adherence, *saṁskāra* and *adṛṣṭa*, are mostly met with in Vaig. Sūtra V āhn. 1 and 2. Thus *pragatā* is mentioned e. g. V. 1, 1 explaining the movement of the hand; *garutva* in V. 1, 7 explaining the falling of bodies; *droceta* in V. 2, 4 explaining the movement of water; *saṁskāra* in the signification of impetus in V. 1, 17 explaining the movement of an arrow; *adṛṣṭa* in V. 1, 15 explaining the movement of a magnet &c.

On the other hand *saṁhā* is only mentioned by way of eggression in II, 1, 2: *saṁskāra* in the signification of *sthitiśhūpa* is not yet found in the Sūtra.

The quality *garutva* is referred to in V.S. IV, 1, 10, if we believe the Ūpaskāra. Should its interpretation of this enigmatic sūtra be right, then at any rate it must be an insertion.


## APPENDIX.

§ 1. *The annihilation of two-ness, according to Bhāṣya book III ch. 2 § 7.*

Table for the explanation of *dvitvasya cinaṁgah, dvitvasya-cinaṁgat* (p. 112 l. 4—12).

*mdruga-vṛtha-saṁyogakṛtyā*  
*ekatva-samānva-pūnam*  
*apṛkṣābaddhā*  
*dvitvam*

*dvitva-samānva-baddhā*



*dvitvasya cinaṁgat*  
*dvitvasya-cinaṁgat*  
*dvitvasya-cinaṁgat*  
*dvitvasya-cinaṁgat*

§ 2. *Conjunction originated by conjunction and the annihilation of conjunction according to Bhāṣya book III ch. 2 § 10.*

A. Saṁyogajāḥ saṁyogajāḥ (cf. here p. 234).

Pracastapāda-bhāṣya p. 139 l. 22.

Saṁyogajas tatpamasya cinopambasya vā nishkriyasya karana-saṁyog-gibhīr akāraṇāḥ, kāraṇākāraṇa-saṁyoga-parvakaḥ, kāryakāryagataḥ saṁyogajāḥ.

Explanation, given in BHIMĪCHARYA JHALA-KIKAR'S *Agāya-hoṇa* (p. 847 note 1) with the help of an example

utpānamātrasya	niskriyasya	dvitantukasya	patasya
kāraṇasaṁyoginā		:	kāraṇasya tantol saṁyoginā
akāraṇena		:	avṛjṇena (tṛpavīṇeṣeṇa)

yaḥ saṃyogaḥ  
 sa kāraṇasya : tantor  
 akāraṇena : vīraṇena  
 saṃyogāt  
 kārye : dvitantuka-paṭe  
 akārye : vīraṇe  
 jāyate.

B. Vināṇaḥ saṃyogasya, ācraṇavinaṇṇāt (cf. here p. 232).

Pracastapāda-bhāṣya p. 141 l. 9.

1. Yadā, tantvoh saṃyoge saty, anyatara-tantv-ārambhaka aṃṇau  
*karmo* 'tpadyate,
2. tena karmaṇāmevāntarād *vibhāgaḥ* kriyate.
3. vibhāgācca tantv-ārambhaka-*saṃyoga-vināṇaḥ*,
4. saṃyogavināṇāt *tantu-vināṇas*,
5. tadvināṇe tad-ācraṇasya tantv-antara-*saṃyogasya vināṇaḥ*.

§ 3. *Disjunction originated by disjunction according to Bhāṣya*  
*book III ch. 2 § 11.*

1. Vibhāgaḥ saṃyogasya, kāraṇa-vibhāgāt (cf. here p. 232).

Pracastapāda-bhāṣya p. 151 l. 9.

1. Kāryāviṣṭe kāraṇe *karmo* 'tpannam yadā (tasyāvayavāntarād  
 vibhāgam karoti, na tadākāṇḍideṇāt: yadā tv ākāṇḍideṇād  
 vibhāgam karoti, na tadāvayavāntarāt: iti sthitiḥ. Ato 'vayava-  
 karma),
2. avayavāntarād eva *vibhāgam* ārabhate.
3. tato vibhāgācca dravyārambhaka-*saṃyoga-vināṇaḥ*,
4. tasmīn vinaṣṭe (kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāva<sup>1</sup>) ity *avayavi-vināṇaḥ*,
5. tadā kāraṇayor vartamāno vibhāgaḥ (kārya-vināṇa-viṣṭam kalam,  
 svatantram vāvayavam apekṣya) sakriyasyaivāvayavaśya kārya-  
 saṃyuktād *ākāṇḍideṇād vibhāgam* ārabhate, (na niṣkriyasya,  
 kāraṇābhāvāt: uttarasaṃyogānutpattāv anupabhogyatva-prasaṅ-  
 gaḥ. Na tu tadavayavakarmākāṇḍideṇād vibhāgam karoti, tadā-  
 rambhakālātītatvāt: pradeṇāntarasaṃyogam tu karoty eva, akṛta-  
 saṃyogasya karmanāḥ kālātyavābhāvād iti).

For example, see *Nyāya-kōṣa* p. 704 note 1.

B. Vibhāgaḥ saṃyogasya, kāraṇa-kāraṇa-vibhāgāt.

Pracastapāda-bhāṣya p. 151 l. 22.

1. Yadā haste *karmo* 'tpannam (avayavāntarād vibhāgam akurvad),
2. ākāṇḍideṇābhyo *vibhāgaṇ* ārabhya.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. V.S. I. 2. 1.

3. pradeṣāntare *saṃyogān* ārabhate.
4. tadā te kārṇāṅkāraṇavibhāgāḥ — karma yāṃ diṣaṃ prati kārṇāraṇabhābhūmukhaṃ. tām apekṣya — kāryākārya-*vibhāgān* ārabhante.
5. tadānantarāṃ kārṇāṅkāraṇa-saṃyogācca kāryākārya-saṃyogān. Iti.

§ 4. *The notion yutasiddhi according to Bhāṣya book III  
ch. 2 § 10 and 11.*

Praṣastapāda-bhāṣya p. 111 l. 6 (cf. p. 152 l. 9 and here p. 232).  
[Yuta-siddhiḥ]. Sā punar dvayor anyatarasya vā prthaggaṭimattvaṃ  
prthagācraṇācraṇītvāṃ ceti.

Sā punar dvayor anyatarasya vā prthaggaṭimattvaṃ: iyaṃ tu  
nityānām: anityānām tu yuteṣv ācraṇeṣu samavāyo yutasiddhir iti.  
Tvagindriya-śarīrayor prthaggaṭimattvaṃ nāsti, yuteṣv ācraṇeṣu  
samavāyo 'sti: itī paraṃpareṇa saṃyogaḥ siddhaḥ;  
Any-ākācraṇos tv ācraṇāntarābhāve 'py anyatarasya prthaggaṭimattvāt  
saṃyogavibhāgaṃ siddhaḥ:

Tantu-paṭayor anīṭayor ācraṇāntarābhāvāt parasparataḥ saṃyoga-  
vibhāgābhāva iti:

Dig-ādīnām tu prthaggaṭimattvaṃ nāsti, iti paraspareṇa saṃyoga-  
vibhāgābhāva iti.

NOTE. Cf. the following passage in the Upaskāra under VII, 2,  
9 Bibl. Ind. p. 326. transl. NANDA LAL SINHA p. 248: (the  
insertion in the last line is by me)

„Moreover, *yutasiddhi* or uncombined or naturally unassociated  
existence is a necessary condition of conjunction (*saṃyogam prati  
prayojikā*), and it is not possible in the case of two all-pervading  
substances. For *yutasiddhi* is [a] merely the separate existence of  
two, or one of two (unrelated) things, or [b] the relation of one  
thing being inherent in another as its substratum, when the two  
[i. e. the two substrata] have been externally brought into relation  
with each other.”

(„Yuta-craṇācraṇītvam” in this passage is parallel to „prthagācraṇā-  
craṇītvam” in Bhāṣya p. 111 l. 6)

§ 5. *The annihilation of disjunction according to Bhāṣya  
book III ch. 2 § 11.*

A. Vibhāgasya vināśaḥ, ācraṇa-vināśāt. 1st example.  
Praṣastapāda-bhāṣya p. 153 l. 3.

1. Yadā dvitantuka-kāraṇāvayava aṃśau karma 'tpannam.

2. aṃśv-antarād *vibhāgam* ārabhate,

3. tadvaiṣa tantv-antare 'pi *karma* 'tpadyate.
4. vibhāgācca tantv-ārambhaka-*saṃyogavināṇaḥ*,
5. tantv-antara-karmanā tantv-antarād *vibhāgaḥ* kriyate. Ity ekah kālāḥ.
6. Tato yasmim eva kāle vibhāgāt tantv-antara-*saṃyoga-vināṇaḥ*,
7. tasmim eva kāle saṃyoga-vinācāt *tantu-vināṇas*,
8. tasmim vināṣṭe tadāgritasya tantv-antara-*vibhāgasya vināṇa* iti.

Table for explanation.

<i>tantu A</i>	<i>dvitantuka A—B</i>	<i>tantu B</i>
<i>aṃcu a</i>	<i>aṃcu b</i>	
1 karman		3 karman
2 vibhāga		
4 saṃyoga- vināṇa	5 vibhāga	
7 tantu- vināṇa	6 saṃyoga- vināṇa	
	8 vibhāga- vināṇa	

*B. Discussion on vibhāgasya vināṇaḥ, ācraṇa-vinācāt* (1st ex.)

Prācāstapāda-bhāṣya p. 153 l. 11.

[Opponent]: Evaṃ tarhy uttara-vibhāgā-nutpatti-prasāṅgaḥ. Kāraṇa-vibhāgā-bhāvāt. Tataḥ pradeśāntara-saṃyogābhāva<sup>1</sup>) ity, ato virodhi-guṇā-sambhāvāt karmanāc cira-kālāva-tthāyitvaṃ nitya-dravya-samavetasya ca nityatvam iti doṣaḥ.

Glosses from the Nyāya-kandalī, p. 162 l. 3 &c.:

uttaro vibhāgaḥ : sakriyasya tantor ākācādidēcena  
saman vibhāgaḥ vibhāgo not-  
padyate

kāraṇa[śya] : tantvor

vibhāgasya bhāvāt

... Virodhi[no] guṇasyābhāvāt : uttara-saṃyogasyābhāvāt.

*C. Vibhāgasya vināṇaḥ, ācraṇa-vinācāt. 2d example*  
(given by the opponent).

Prācāstapāda-bhāṣya p. 153 l. 15.

1. Yadā 'pya-dvyaṇukārambhaka-paramāṇau *karma* 'tpranmam.

<sup>1</sup>) Reading in accordance with Ms. VII and the Nyāya-kandalī.

2. any-antārād vibhāgaṃ karoti.
3. tadaivānyantare 'pi karma.
4. tato yasmīn eva kāle vibhāgād dravyānambhaka-samyoga-vināśah.
5. tadaivāny-antara-karmāṇāḥ dvayuktānyor vibhāgaḥ kriyate.
6. tato yasmīn eva kāle vibhāgād dvayuktāṇu-samyogatasya vināśah.
7. tasmīn eva kāle samyoga- lābhād 'nyaśasya vināśah.
8. tasmīn vināśe tadāritrasya dvayuktāṇu-vibhāgasya vināśah.
9. tasmād virodhi-guṇāsamāhayan nityadravyasamavetakarmaṇo nityatvam. iti

## Table for explanation

<i>dravyaśata A</i>	<i>Relation A—B</i>	<i>and B</i>
<i>any a any b</i>		
1 karman		
2 vibhāga		3 karman
4 samyoga- vināśa	5 vibhāga	
7 dvayukta- vināśa	6 samyoga- vināśa	
	8 vibhāga- vināśa	

*D. Discussion on 'vibhāgasya vināśah, ācārya-vināśāt' continued.*

Prācāstapāda-bhāṣya p. 154 l. 2

[Opponent]: Tasmād virodhi-guṇāsamāhayan nitya-dravya-samaveta-karmaṇo nityatvam. iti.

[Defendent]: Tany-apev-antara-vibhāgād vibhāga ity adoṣah. Ācārya-vināśāt tantvor eva vibhāgo vinaśto, na tantv-apev-antara-vibhāga iti. Etasmād uttaro vibhāgo jāyate: anguly-ākāśa-vibhāgāc charitrākāśavibhāgavat, tatas tasmīn utpāne vibhāge karma samyogaṃ kṛtvā vināśyati, ity adoṣah.

Gloss from Nyāya-kandali p. 162 l. 20. The inserted figures and letters refer to the table below & the one, given under the 'first example'):

...dvitautuka-kāraṇe tantau [B] karman [3] utpānam, tantv-antarād [A] vibhāga-[5]-samakālān tad-apevānā [b] api tantu-[B]-samyuktēna samam vibhāgaṃ ārabhate, sa eva vibhāgas tantor [B] anyoc [b] cāvasthānād avasthīta ity āha. 'ācārya-vināśāt tantvor eva vibhāgo vinaśtah, tantv-apev-antara-vibhāgas tv avas-

thita" iti. . . . Yathā karmajād aṅguly-ākāṣa-vibhāgāc charīr-ākāṣa-vibhāgaḥ, evaṃ karmajād aṃṣu-[*b*]-tantu-[*B*]-vibhāgāt tantv-ākāṣa-vibhāgaḥ [*9*].

Table for explanation.

<i>tantu A</i>	Relation <i>b—B</i>	Relation <i>A—B</i>	<i>tantu B</i>	Relation between <i>B</i> & ākāṣa.
<i>aṃṣu a</i> <i>aṃṣu b</i>				
1 karman				
2 vibhāga			3 karman	
4 saṃyoga- vināṣa	5* vibhāga	5 vibhāga		
7 &c.		6 &c.		
	8* vibhā- gasyāva- sthānam	8 vibhā- gasya vināṣaḥ		
				9 vibhāga (effected by 8*)

*E. Vibhāgasya vināṣaḥ, ācraṇa-vināṣāt. 3d example.*

Praçastapāda-bhāṣya p. 154 l. 8.

Athavā: 1. . . . (not expressed),

2. aṃṣv-antara *vibhāgo* 'tpatti-samakālam,

3. tasmim eva tantu *karmo* 'tpadyate,

4. tato 'mṣv-antara-vibhāgāt tantv-āraumbhaka-*saṃyoga-vināṣaḥ*,

5. tantu-karmaṇā ca tantv-antarād *vibhāgaḥ* kriyate, ity ekaḥ kālāḥ,

6. tataḥ saṃyoga-vināṣāt *tantu-vināṣaḥ*,

7. tadvināṣacca tadācṛitayor vibhāgakarmaṇor yugapad-vināṣaḥ.

Table for explanation.

	<i>tantu A</i>	relation
<i>aṃṣu a.</i> relation	<i>aṃṣu b.</i> <i>tantu A</i> as	<i>A—B</i>
	<i>a—b</i>	a whole
1 karman		
2 vibhāga	3 karman	
	4 ā <sup>o</sup> -saṃy- vināṣa	5 vibhāga
	6 tantu-vināṣa	
	7 karma-vināṣa	7 vibhāga-vināṣa



§ 6. *Tables for the explanation of paratrasya vināyāḥ*. (Prajñāpādabhāṣya book III ch. 2 § 12 p. 164 &c. and here p. 221 § 6).

1) *apekṣā-buddhi-vinācāt* p. 164 l. 21:

*apekṣā-buddhiḥ* = *apekṣa-bh*  
*paratram*  
*parateva-sāmānyā-buddhiḥ*




*paratevā-guṇa-buddhiḥ*  
*dravya-buddhiḥ*

NOTE. The thick line, beginning in 1, represents the *utpatti* of the different stages in the process, the thick line, beginning in 4, the *utpadyamānatva* (prægenetic state) of the stages. The arrows represent *kāraṇatva* (causation), *vināyāḥ* (decline), ● *vināya* (annihilation).

2) *saṃyoga-vinācāt* p. 165 l. 7.


*apekṣā-buddhiḥ*  
*parateva-guṇāḥ*<sup>1</sup>  
*parateva-sāmānyā-buddhiḥ*  
*parateva-guṇa-buddhiḥ*



*paratevādharma-śāyave karmā*  
*dik-praṇā-cibhāgaḥ*  
*dīp-praṇā-saṃyoga-samācāraḥ*  
*parateva-guṇa-buddhiḥ*

3) *dravya-vinācāt* p. 165 l. 13.


*apekṣā-buddhiḥ*  
*parateva-guṇāḥ*<sup>1</sup>



*paratevādharma-śāyave karmā*  
*avayavāntarād vibhāgaḥ*  
*saṃyogasya vinācāḥ*  
*dravya-vinācāḥ*

4) *dravyā-'pekṣābuddhyor yugapad-vinācāt* p. 165 l. 19:

*apekṣā-buddhiḥ*  
*parateva-guṇāḥ*<sup>1</sup>  
*sāmānyā-buddhiḥ*



*paratevādharma-śāyave karmā*  
*avayavāntarād vibhāgaḥ*  
*saṃyogasya vinācāḥ*  
*dravya-vinācāḥ*

NOTE. The *saṃyoga*, meant in III, is the *dravyārambhaka-samyoga* (i. e. physical cohesion).

5) *dravya-saṃyogayor vinācāt* p. 166 l. 6.


*apekṣā-buddhiḥ*  
*paratram*  
*sāmānyā-buddhiḥ*  
*guṇa-buddhiḥ*




*prajñā-karmā*  
*dik-praṇā-cibhāgaḥ*  
*dik-praṇā-saṃyoga-vinācāḥ*

Signification of the Roman ciphers I *paratevādharma-śāyave karmā*; II *avayavāntarād vibhāgaḥ*; III *saṃyogasya vinācāḥ*; IV *piṇḍavinācāḥ*.

6) *saṃyogā-'pekṣābuddhyor vināṣat* p. 166 l. 17:



7) *trayāṇām samavāyy-asamavāyi-nimitta-kāraṇā-nām yugapadvināṣat* p. 167 l. 1.



Signification of the Roman ciphers: I *piṇḍārayave karma*; II *avayavāntarād vibhāgaḥ*; III *saṃyogasya vināṣaḥ*; IV *piṇḍavināṣaḥ*.

§ 7. *Proof for the thesis that there are only five kinds of movements.*

(Summary of Praṣastapāda-Bhāṣya Book IV § 7.)

- p. 292 Opponent: One ought not to distinguish five kinds of  
 l. 10— actions, but only one, nam. *gamana*, i. e. the movement  
 14. which causes the successive conjunctions with spots border-  
 ing one on the other.  
 l. 15— Defendent: There are two reasons for distinguishing five  
 19. kinds of actions: 1. *pratyaṅā-nvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-darśanāt*, i. e. because [we see that any occurring form of action] is included [in one of the five classes] and excluded from the other four]; 2. *ud-ādy-apasarga-viṣeṣāt pratiniyata-dig-viṣeṣa-kārya-'rambhakatvāt*, i. e. because [each of these five forms] brings about an effect, characterised by a defined spot; and this in accordance with the use of the several praefixes *ud* &c.  
 p. 292 Opponent: A refutation of this argument is based on  
 l. 20— the following grounds: 1. The *pratyaṅā-nvṛtti-vyāvṛtti*  
 p. 293 (the respective inclusion in, and exclusion from a notion)  
 l. 7. also holds good with reference to 'entering', 'leaving' &c. 2. And if you should say: 'in the case of the last-mentioned movements the agreement and disagreement only depends on the difference of the effects, but not on a difference in essence', then I deny that there is any reason for making such a distinction. [In this and in what follows 'effect'

refers to the visual impression caused in the observer's soul by the objective movement, cf. Bhāṣya p. 294 l. 2 '*paṇḍati*'; l. 4 '*avakṣate*', l. 6 '*paṇḍati*'.

p. 293 Notions such as 'entering', 'leaving' are relative, in as  
l. 7 - 19 far as they depend on the spot where the observer is placed.  
So then, if one should distinguish 'entering', 'leaving' as  
separate categories, *jāti-saṃskāra* (confusion of classes) would  
arise. Terms, therefore, such as 'entering' &c. are only  
based on difference of effects.

p. 293 Opponent. But how can several movements take place  
l. 19— in the same object during the same time? In other words:  
22. how can different persons who observe an object simulta-  
neously, have various notions about its movements?

p. 293 Defendent. But it is so, because there is difference of  
l. 23--- notions in regard to 'entering' &c. in as far as difference

p. 294 of effects exists (i. e. in as far as the observer, placed in  
l. 9 a fixed position with reference to the objects and their  
parts, receives different visual impressions, according to  
whether entering, leaving &c. takes place). So then, it is  
settled: the difference of notions in the case of 'throwing'  
&c. is based on real difference of class; but in the case of  
'entering' &c. it merely depends on variety of effects.

§ 8. *Discussion of the difficulty (saṃcaya), whether going is equipollent  
or subordinate to the notion 'movement'.*

(Summary of Praṣastapāda-Bhāṣya book IV § 8).

p. 296. Foundation of this doubt (l. 2—5). — First solution  
proposed: *gamana* is both a synonym of *karman*, and the name of a  
subordinate class which embraces all kinds of actions not falling under  
the notions: *utkṣepaṇa*, *avakṣepaṇa*, *ākuñcana* and *prasāraṇa*. —  
Second solution: (l. 12—16) *gamana* is properly subordinate to  
*karman*, but in a secondary sense the word is synonymous with *karman*.

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## CHAPTER IV.

### PSYCHOLOGY.

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#### SECTION 1.

#### THE SOUL AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL PROPERTIES.

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing upon the existence of soul and its ontological properties.*

- A. III, 1, 1 The objects of the senses are universally known.
- 2 The universal experience of the objects of the senses is the mark of [the existence of] an object different from the senses and their objects.
- 3 Perception [as a mark inferring the body or the senses as its substratum] [is] a false mark.
- 4 [The body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception], because there is no consciousness in the causes [i. e. the component parts of the body].
- 5 Because [there would be] consciousness in the effects.
- 6 And because it is not known [that any minute degree of consciousness exists in the waterpot &c.].
- 18 That [i. e. knowledge] which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object is other [than a false mark].
- 19 And activity and inactivity, observed in one's own soul, are the mark of [the existence of] other souls.
- B. III, 2, 4 The ascending life-breath, the descending life-breath, the closing of the eye-lids, the opening of the eye-lids, life, the movement of the mind, and the affections of the other senses, and also pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are marks [of the existence] of the soul.

- B. III. 2. 5 Its substance-ness and eternality are explained by [the explanation of the substance-ness and eternality of] air.
- C. III. 2. 6 There is no visible mark [of the existence of the soul], because there being contact of the senses with the body of Yajñadatta, perception does not arise, that [this soul is Yajñadatta].
- 7 And from a commonly-observed mark [there is] no [inference of anything in] particular.
- 8 Therefore [the soul is] proved by revelation.
- 9 [The proof of the existence of the soul is] not [solely] from revelation because of the non-application of the word „I” [to other designates or objects].
- 10 If [there are] such sensuous observations [or perceptions] such as ‘I am Devadatta’, ‘I am Yajñadatta’, [then there is no need of inference].
- 11 As in the case of [other] percpts. so, if the soul, which is grasped by perception, is also accompanied with, (or comes at the top of, marks from which it can be inferred], then, by means of confirmation, the intuition becomes fastened to one and only one object.
- 12 ‘Devadatta goes’, ‘Yajñadatta goes’, — in these cases, the belief [that their respective] bodies [go] is due to transference.
- 13 The transference, however, is doubtful.
- 14 Because the intuition ‘I’ exists in one’s own soul, and because it does not exist elsewhere, therefore [the intuition] has the individual soul as the object of perception.
- 15 The intuition of ‘I’ has the body for its object. Therefore to say, that, in ‘Devadatta goes’, there is a transference [of epithet], is a mere fancy.
- 16 The transference, [as characterised by you], however, is doubtful.
- 17 But the thoughts of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra do not become objects [of perception to them], while [they perceive] the difference of their bodies. [Therefore consciousness is not an attribute of the body].
- 18 [The soul is] not proved [only] by revelation, since, [as ether is proved by sound, so] [the soul is] proved in particular, by the innate as well as the sensible [cognition] in the form of ‘I’, accompanied by the

invariable divergence [of such cognition from all other things], as is the case with sound.

C. III, 2, 19 Soul is one, since there is no difference in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge.

20 Plurality of souls is proved by *stataś*.

21 [Plurality of souls follow] also from the authority or significance of the *Ṣāstras*.

D. VII, 1, 22 Ether, in consequence of its vast expansion, it infinitely large. So also is the soul.

§ 2. *Quotation from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B p. IV.*  
*Sūtras on soul in general.*

„CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA interprets III, 1, 3 to mean that the sense or the object cannot be a mark for the inference of the self.

„He reads III, 1, 5 and 6 as one aphorism and explains it in the sense that as cognition is found within one effect, e. g. the body, and it is not found within another effect, e. g. a jar, therefore it follows that there can be no cognition in their combinative causes (which must be the same in both cases).

„He explains III, 1, 7 [cf. here the chapter on *anumāna*] thus: Something quite different is the mark of inference [of the self]; [the sense or the object] cannot be such a mark. What this 'something quite different' is, is declared in the 18th aphorism of this chapter.

„He observes that in III, 2, 6—17 the author gives in the form of a dialogue, contrary arguments as to whether the self be an object of perception only, or of inference only, or of both, and gives his own conclusion in III, 2, 18.

„He interprets III, 2, 19: 20 and 21 in the monistic sense, namely, that there exists only one self, variously differentiated on the phenomenal plane, as witnessed by such texts as 'One only, without a second', 'One shining being is immanent in all created things', 'All selves become one', 'All selves emanate from this, same self', 'Two birds', &c.

(p. V *ibidem*) „He introduces VII, 1, 22 as giving examples of (*parimaṇḍala*) which may be both small and large.”

### § 3. *Explanation of the sūtras quoted.*

Introductory remarks. -- If we accept the translation by NANDA LAL SINHA as mainly correct, we may distinguish in the sūtras, quoted in § 1, the following groups according to the meaning:



1. Sūtras proving the existence of soul (III, 1, 1—6, III, 1, 18; III, 2, 4).

2. Sūtras stating the ontological properties of soul: its substantial and eternal nature (III, 2, 5) and the plurality of souls (III, 1, 19 & III, 2, 19—21). We may add to this group VII, 1, 22 on the infinite extension of soul and V, 2, 21 on the absence of *karman* in soul (cf. here p. 112 § 8).

3. Sūtras, discussing the difference between soul and body, and refuting the opinions that soul is known by perception and by revelation (III, 2, 6—18).

What strikes us first is the irregular arrangement of the sūtras which bear on the first two subjects. In this respect two suppositions can be made: Either we may consider III, 1, 1—18 as being originally the complete discussion on the existence of soul for III, 1, 19 compare the explanations, given further on, with an eggression in the middle of it (III, 1, 7—17) on *anapadeṣa* and III, 2, 1—3 as being the discussion on *manas*, which would thus close the treatment of the two substrata of all psychical phenomena. Or we may consider the discussion of *manas* to have been placed from the beginning within the two passages on soul (III, 1, 1—19 and III, 2, 4 & 5); the reason for this insertion was the mentioning of *manogati*, the movement of the internal organ in III, 2, 4. If we accept the first supposition, then III, 2, 4 would be a later addition, taken from the Nyāya-sūtra (I, 1, 10) with the omission of *buddhi* or *jñāna* to which the preceding āhnikā has already referred; and III, 2, 5 would have been added in order to get parallellism with the treatment of the other substances. In both cases the polemical passage III, 2, 6—16 will be of later date.

A. In III, 1, 1 *indriyārthāḥ* is explained in the Upaskāra as *indriyāṇām arthāḥ*, thus a tatpuruṣa; in III, 1, 2 *arthāntaryasya*, 'an object different from' as *ātmanah*, the soul *indriyārthebhyah* as *indriyebhya rthebhyasā*, thus as a dvandva. In CĀṆKARA MIŚRA's commentary on III, 1, 3 we read l. a.: „Lest it be said, let the body or the senses be the seat of general experience (*prasiddhi*), so he says..." & „The meaning is that the being an effect of the body or the senses is the mere semblance of a mark, inasmuch as it applies to the cognition produced by a lamp, and is therefore multifarious" (*anvikṛāntika*).

In other words: only the fact that something is a factor in the production of an intellection, does not make it the seat of the intellection. The sūtra III, 1, 3 is thus explained in such a way that the pronoun *sa* refers to a *līṅga* of an argumentation, upheld

by an opponent, in this case by a materialist. (Cf. V.S. IV, 1, 5 and its interpretation by Ćamkara Mićra).

According to CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA the pronoun *sa* refers to the argumentation in the two preceding sūtras: thus these sūtras would contain an opponent's opinion (*pūrvapakṣa*), whereas III, 1, 3 in combination with III, 1, 18 gives the *śūlthānta*. Thus the sūtra-kāra's argumentation can be paraphrased as follows: neither do the sense-organs nor the sense-objects, which undoubtedly exist, prove the existence of the soul: but something else, namely: experience, affords this proof: for intellection cannot arise merely from a working together of sense-organ and sense-objects, but supposes a third and most important factor which may be called the soul.

The interpretation of III, 1, 5 as, „because there would be consciousness” is rather forced: the emendation of Candrakānta Tarkālaṇkāra seems necessary.

We cannot decide between the two interpretations of III, 1, 18 given by Ćamkara Mićra and Candrakānta Tarkālaṇkāra without having settled the meaning of III, 1, 7 which (together with an examination of the coherence of the complete āhnika III, 1) I shall discuss in the section on *anumāna*.<sup>1)</sup> For the present we need only state that, no matter which of the two interpretations we accept, the import of sūtra 18 remains the same as that of sūtra 2: namely: we have to accept a soul as the subject of sensorial knowledge. Sūtra 18, however, expresses this thought in the form of a *circulus vitiosus*, scil. in Nanda Lal Sinha's translation: „That [i. e. knowledge] which is produced from the contact of the *soul*, the sense, and the object, is other than a false mark [i. e. is a real probans for the existence of the *soul*].” Or in Candrakānta Tarkālaṇkāra's interpretation: „Something quite different [from the object or sense] is the mark of inference [of the *self*], this ‘something quite different’ is ‘that which is produced from the contact of the soul [or *self*], the sense and the object’

If we accept the tradition of III, 1, 19 as trustworthy, then no doubt the interpretation, given by the Upaskāra (Bibl. Ind. p. 134, Nanda Lal Sinha p. 123) must be admitted. But there are two objections to this: 1. the sūtra breaks the logical order of the exposition in as far as it is placed between two discussions on the existence of soul (III, 1, 18 and III, 2, 4): 2. the analysis of Praçastapāda-bhāṣya, book II chapter 2 § 10 (see here book IV section III) seems to show that in the Bhāṣyakāra's time III, 1, 19

1) Chapter V section 2 § 6

had another redaction than the one, given by the present editions. In my analysis of this paragraph, namely, I have distinguished 8 points, which together prove the existence of soul. The first point 'the soul as the subject of sensorial knowledge' corresponds with V.S. III, 1, 18; the six last points 3—8 repeat V.S. III, 2, 4. The reader will observe that point 2 of the analysed paragraph (the soul as *pratyakṛtā*) treats of a topic, nam *pratyakṛtā* which occurs again in the list of psychical qualities, summed up in point 8. There can be no doubt, taking in consideration the complete parallelism between the Bhāṣya-paragraph and the sūtras quoted, that the Bhāṣyakāra followed here the example of the Darṣana. Now *prāṇti* and *niṣṇti*, which are mentioned in V.S. III, 1, 19, are indeed nothing else than the two forms in which *pratyakṛtā* can occur. Therefore I consider it likely that the original form of this sūtra might have been for instance "*prāṇti-niṣṇti ca pratyagātmanā apurāṇa bhāṇā*", i. e. 'activity and inactivity are moreover another probans with reference to the individual soul.'

B. On occasion of III, 2, 4 Cankara Miśra accepts besides *pratyakṛtā* in its ordinary sense "*īcāna-gorāḥ pratyakṛtāḥ*" or (as Nanda Lal Sinha translates 'volition the source of vitality'; this then would be a kind of unconscious volition<sup>1</sup>). "*saṅgīgāntara-cikṛṣāḥ*" has been translated by Nanda Lal Sinha as: 'the affections of the other senses', it would be clearer to render it by 'the affections of another sense [than the one on which the impression is made]'. The Upa-skāra gives as explanation Bibl. Ind. p. 173, transl. p. 130): "For surely is observed an overflow of the salivary juice, induced by a strong desire for the taste, of one who, after experiencing the particular taste, accompanied by the particular colour of an orange, . . . observes such fruit again." In Cankara Miśra's comments on III, 2, 5 we read: "As there is no proof for the supposition of parts in the ultimate atom of air, and therefore air is eternal, so also in the case of the soul." The proof for the eternity of soul is thus based here on the indivisible nature of soul.<sup>2</sup>)

C. The passage III, 2, 6—18 is one of the most difficult of the whole Darṣana. In my discussion of it I shall follow this order: that I first analyse the passus as conceived by Nanda Lal Sinha; then I shall examine how far this rendering is based on the annotations of the Upa-skāra and how far we must accept or reject it

<sup>1</sup> Praśastipada-Bhāṣya p. 206 l. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the proof given for the eternity of soul by the German philosopher MEISSNER.

for grammatical or other reasons: finally (in the next paragraph) we shall consider if PRAÇASTAPĀDA has known the present passage.

According to Nanda Lal Sinha's translation our passage consists of six pieces which we may paraphrase as follows:

a. (6—9). An opponent defends the thesis that the soul is known by revelation. — In the refutation the restricted use of the word 'I' is referred to: both revelation and inference are the source of knowledge by which we know the existence of soul.

b. (10—11). An opponent defends the thesis that the person [i. e. soul] is already known by perception: so that inference is no more needed. — In the refutation it is granted that the soul is perceived, but inference is still upheld as a corroborative means of proof.

c. (12). Expressions such as 'Devadatta goes' do not imply that Devadatta's soul and body are identical: for though the name Devadatta refers first of all to the soul, yet in this expression the name is applied metaphorically to the body.

d. (13—14). An opponent denies the metaphorical character of the expression quoted. — In the refutation the restricted use of the word 'I' is said to indicate that we also have a perception of something else [than our body: scil. of our soul].

e. (15—17). The opponent (sūtra 15) denies again the metaphorical character of the expression 'Devadatta goes'. — In the refutation it is said that we do not perceive somebody's thoughts by the mere perception of peculiarities of his body: body and soul, therefore, cannot be identical.

f. (18). The soul is not merely proved by revelation: the restricted use of the notion 'I' in its original as well as in its secondary meaning, gives a 'proof in particular' of soul.

The comments of Çaṅkara Miçra on III, 2, 6 begin thus: „*Samīkarse saty ayaṃ yajñadatta iti cet pratyakṣaṃ nāsti, tadā dṛṣṭaṃ (pratyakṣato gṛhītaḥyāptikaṃ) līṅgaṃ nāsti*”: Nanda Lal Sinha: „There being contact, if no such perception take place as 'This is Yajnadatta', then there is no visible mark, i. e. no mark the universal relation of which with the *sādhya* (or what has to be proved), has been grasped by perception.” Sūtra 7 is explained by Çaṅkara Miçra thus (Nanda Lal Sinha): „A commonly observed mark (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ līṅgaṃ*) also becomes a mark of inference. But it does not prove the soul as soul, nor as a substance over and above the eight substances.” (For the almost identical passage II, 1, 15—17 which bears on the existence of wind, see here p. 158).

The insertion of 'solely' which we find in Nanda Lal Sinha's translation

of sūtra 9, is due to Čamkara Mīra's comments, which contain the sentence: „*nāyatamānūṭam prāmāṇyam ātmam, kiṃ tu . . .*” (Nanda Lal Sinha): „revelation alone is not the proof for the existence of the soul, but &c.” Further this sūtra is explained by the Upaskāra in the following way: „but the soul is proved also by the inference that the word ‘I’ or the word ‘soul’ must have some designate (or objective reality corresponding to it), because it is a word, like the word ‘waterpot’, &c. Lest it might be said that it is earth &c. which are the designates, so he says, ‘because of the non-application’.”

In the same comments *dṛṣṭam* in sūtra 10 is explained to be an equivalent of a substantive, in other words to be synonymous with *darśanam* (perception); the insertion, given by Nanda Lal Sinha: ‘then there is no need of inference’, is taken from the Upaskāra: „*kim anamāna-pratyakṣena?*”.

The explanation of sūtra 11, given by Nanda Lal Sinha is very forced, evidently he has constructed the sentence thus: [*Anyā-* *pratyakṣavat, dṛṣṭa ātmam liṅge* [= *sa-liṅge*; or according to Čamkara Mīra: *sambhūta-sāmagrīke*], *dṛḍhatvāt* [= *pramāṇa-samplacanaṅyathā-bhāva-čamkā-nicartana-patulecāt*, according to the same commentator] *eka* [nominative, = *ekavaiśayika*, says Č. M.] *eva pratyakṣaḥ* [*syāt*]. Herein *pratyakṣavat* is explained by the Upaskāra as follows: „as even when there is perception of water from a distance, yet inference of water by the mark of the *bālak*s (waterbirds) is made for the purpose of corroboration. So it has been said, ‘skilful logicians desire to understand by inference even what has been grasped by perception’.”

We meet with another hazardous interpretation in sūtra 14, *arthāntara-pratyakṣa* is there translated by Nanda Lal Sinha as ‘intuition in which the individual soul is the object of perception’ (p. 137); in the Upaskāra we find here the gloss: „*arthāntaram ātmasvarūpam, yatra pratyakṣe, sa pratyakṣa arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ*”.

The interpretation of sūtra 16, with its sophistic insertion of ‘as characterised by you’ is more than doubtful, though Nanda Lal Sinha follows here Čamkara Mīra who says: „*Upāro ‘gam abhīmānikah, kim tu cāriṇa evāgam ahampratyakṣa iti yad uktam, tatpāra sandeha evety arthah.*”

The translation of *cariraviśeṣāt* by Nanda Lal Sinha in sūtra 17 as ‘while they perceive the difference of their body’ is based on the Upaskāra, where we find the paraphrase: *carirabhedam prāpya* and the grammatical rule: ‘the ablative has the meaning of an implied absolutive’.

In the comments on sūtra 18, given by the Upaskāra, we may distinguish several parts:

exposition of the objection to which the sūtra is supposed to give the answer: of this I should like to quote the beginning and the end: „It may be objected as follows.

The soul is not perceptible,  
since it is a colourless substance,  
or a substance without parts,  
like physical space.

„That which has to be supposed as the substance of pleasure &c. must be established by revelation. There is no perception of it.”

answer to this objection: „[the soul is perceptible, for] the cognition ‘I feel pleasure’, or ‘I am in pain’ is neither scriptural, nor verbally communicated, nor inferential, since it arises without the help of verbal communication or of marks of inference...

inference, given in support of the thesis that soul exists: „It has been said [by the Sutrakāra]: *ṣabdarad vyatirekāvyabhicārād viśeṣa-siddher*, i. e.: from proof of a particular [substance] by invariable divergence, as is the case with sound. As in the substances, earth, &c. the absence of sound is invariable, and there is thereby proof of a particular substance, namely physical space, in addition to the eight substances, as the substratum of sound, so on account of the invariable divergence of desire from earth, &c., the substratum of desire must also be different from the eight substances.”

the perceptibility of soul upheld: „lest it be argued that all this goes to show that the soul is a subject of inference, not an object of perception, the words ‘*aham iti mukhya-yogyābhyām*’ (by the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the form of I) are employed... The cognition in the form of I (*aham iti jñānam*) which is produced without the help of verbal communication (*ṣabda*) and mark of inference (*liṅga*) in one whose eyes are closed, should be explained by the innate [idea] of egoity [in the Sanskrit original: *mukhyena = ahamtvavatā*] and its sensible (or perceptible) attributes [in Skr.: *yogyena = pramāṇasiddhena*]. In this translation by Nanda Lal Sinha the word ‘idea’, which would correspond to a Sanskrit *pratyaya* has been inserted: moreover the rendering of *yogyena* (gloss: *pramāṇasiddhena*) by ‘sensible or perceptible attributes’ is very free and scarcely accurate. The literal translation would be: ‘by a secondary [notion], i. e. a notion which is based on an [other] proof’.

The many insertions, needed by Čaṅkara Miçra for his explanations

and his forced glosses such as *līṅga* interpreted by *salīṅga*, do not exactly inspire with much confidence. We may safely conclude that an authentic tradition with reference to the meaning of the passage III, 2, 6—11 was not current in his time. Our mistrust in Čamkara Mičra's comments increases when we see how they are contradicted by an implicit statement in one of the sūtras themselves. For whilst according to his discussions, quoted above, the existence of soul is proved by inference, by direct perception and by the authority of the Ćruti. V.S. VIII, 1, 1 and 2 say (Nanda Lal Sinha p. 271 & 273) „Cognition [has been] explained among substances [i. e. in the books which treat of substances, specially in the āhnikā which treat of soul: III, 2] Among substances the soul, the mind and others are not object of perception.” — It is true that sūtra IX, 1, 11 runs thus: „perceptual cognition of the soul [results] from a particular conjunction of the soul and the mind in the soul”, but this refers to an exceptional case, to the perception of the yogins.<sup>1)</sup>

Now before explaining the Sūtra-passage ourselves, we may notice 1) that *nāgamikam* does not mean *nāgamikamūtram* as it was explained by Čamkara Mičra, but is simply a denial of Ćruti as a proof for the existence of soul: 2) instead of complementing sūtra 10 with *kim anmānaprayāseṇa* we could interpret *yadi . . . iti* as synonymous with *iti cet* in later scholiasts: 3) in sūtra 11 we may explain *dr̥ṣṭa* (= *dr̥ṣṭe*) as concordant with *līṅge* and forming together an absolute locative: *ātmani* as a nimitta-saptamī, *eka eva* as a nominative concordant with *pratyaḡah*: 4) the translation of sūtra 15, given by Nanda Lal Sinha, is not demanded, even if we follow the Upaskāra. *pratyaḡakṣa* ‘perceptual: but also looking towards, bearing upon, referring to’ is explained there by *viśayaṃ*, ‘object’: now we can just as well take this to be, ‘the object of an inference’ as ‘the object of a perception’: by reason of these alterations we arrive at the following arrangement of the passage:

a. (6—9). An opponent defends the thesis that the soul is known by revelation, because an inference by means of a *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam* [*līṅgam*] would not prove the existence of a particular substance. The siddhāntin shows that soul is proved by inference, because of the restricted use of the word ‘I’.

b. (10—17) dialogue between an opponent who upholds soul and body to be identical and the siddhāntin who accepts soul as a separate entity. This dialogue may be divided into three parts

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. moreover here book II chapter V section 1 § 3 G.

10—12, 13—14, 15—17: each part begins with one sūtra pronounced by the opponent. Thus in sūtra 10 the opponent raises the objection: 'I am Devadatta, I am Yajnadatta', [such statements refer to] sensorial perceptions" and the siddhāntin answers: if a [sensorially] perceived probans with reference to the soul were seen, then there would be one [universal] opinion on this matter, because there would be certainty, as is the case with [any] other perception [whatever] &c.

c. (1S) sūtra 1S gives greater difficulties. Although the interpretation, by Čamkara Miçra, is very forced, yet no other seems to be possible. I am therefore inclined to take the present redaction as a wrong reading. The original form may perhaps be reconstructed by a comparison with sūtra 9. If we, namely, put these sūtras next to each other:

9 *„aham iti çabdaya vyatirekūn nāgamikam”* &

1S *„aham iti mukhyagogyābhāṣāṃ çabdayad vyatirekūvyabhicārād viçeṣasiddher nāgamikah”*.

then we may notice that *çabdayat* cannot have been the original reading; as such I should like to propose: *aham iti mukhyagogyayoh çabdayor vyatirekūvyabhicārād* &c.", i. e.: because the primary and the secondary words 'I' [or the word I, used with immediate reference to soul and the word I, indirectly used, f. i. applied to the body conjoined to the soul] are always used differently [from the words 'earth' &c.], therefore...

Although much in the passage III. 2. 6—1S remains uncertain, yet in concluding we may state that originally the Vaiçeṣika accepted the existence of soul to be exclusively known by inference, at least for ordinary men. And it is this standpoint which we shall meet with in the Praçastapādabhāṣya.

D. For III. 2, 19—21 see here p. 28, and for VII. 1, 22 here p. 157.

#### § 4. The paragraph in the Bhāṣya on soul and its properties.

A full analysis of the paragraph in the Bhāṣya on soul has been given here in book IV. One passage in this paragraph deserves our full attention, p. 70 l. 6—10, as it proves the statement with which I closed the preceding paragraph.

In Bhāṣya II, 2, § 10 we read (p. 70 l. 6—10):

„[The existence of the soul as] an abode of qualities, is proved by inference, because of [the existence of] the qualities: pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition [= V.S. III, 2, 4] and these are not qualities of the body or of the sense-organs. Why?



1) *ahamkṛteraitarāḥyatatābhāṇāt*

2) *pradevācittitāt*

3) *anācādharyā-bhāvitāt*

4) *bāhgeṇṛiyāpratyaḥsatāt* &c.

5) *tathāhāryābhāṇāpi prthivy-ādī-cabda-vyatirekāt*

i. e. 1) because [the qualities, mentioned above, pleasure &c.] can be put together in one sentence with the term 'I' [i. i. I feel happy, I feel unhappy &c.];

2) because they take place at one spot, [for explanation see here p. 265 sub B];

3) because they do not last as long as the substance [in which they inhere];

4. and because they are not perceived by the external organs of sense;

5) also because the word 'I' is [used] differently from the words 'earth' &c. [i. e. cannot be used in cases where we use the names earth &c.];

Moreover, p. 69 l. 6—9 in the same paragraph is of importance:

„Since the soul is imperceptible because of its subtlety (*saukṣmya*), its existence is proved by [the existence of] its organs, the auditory organ &c. which [in their turn] are proved by the perception of sound &c.: for we see that instruments (organs) such as an axe, have to be used by an agent.”

From these quotations we may conclude: that PRAÇASTAPĀDA considered inference as the only source by which ordinary men (thus yogins excepted) know the existence of soul, for he calls the soul imperceptible and has not bestowed one word on the question whether the proof for the existence of soul is supported by the Çruti; and that he attached importance to the restricted use of the pronoun 'I': but only together with the fact of our internal perception of pleasure, pain &c. Further we may surmise that his expression, '*bāhgeṇṛiyāpratyaḥsatāt*' (p. 70 l. 8) is a reference to V.S. III, 2, 6 and his expression '*ahamkābdena prthivy-ādī-cabda-vyatirekāt*' a variation of V.S. III, 2, 9 (without the later addition: *nāyamikām*).

NOTE. In Bhāṣya book III chapter 2 § 26 we find i. a. a division of *lōga* mark of inference, into two kinds: *dṛṣṭam lōgam* & *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam lōgam*. As an example of the first kind we find: when some one has noticed that a dewlap is peculiar to a cow, then another time, seeing an animal with a dewlap, he will conclude that it is a cow; and as an example of the second kind: when some one sees that the husbandman, the merchant and the royal servant

reach an aim in consequence of their activity, he will conclude that those, belonging to the castes and ācramas, who are active but not for a visible aim, still must obtain fruit. — It is clear that Praçastapāda refers here to V.S. VI, 2, 1 (of which X, 2, 8 is an untrustworthy variant): but we are not sure whether he was already acquainted with V.S. II, 1, 15—17 and V.S. III, 2, 6 last clause (*dr̥ṣṭa-līṅgam* na vidyatē). 7, 8, 11, where the distinction of *dr̥ṣṭam* and *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam līṅgam* is applied to the inferences about soul and body.

## SECTION 2.

## THE INTERNAL ORGAN AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL PROPERTIES.

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing upon the internal organ and its ontological properties.*

- III, 2, 1 The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge, on contact of the soul with the senses and their objects, are the marks [of the existence] of the mind.
- 2 The substance-ness and eternity of mind are explained by [the explanation of the substance-ness and eternity of] air.
- 3 From the non-simultaneity of volitions, and from the non-simultaneity of cognitions, [it follows that there is only] one [mind] [in each organism].
- VII, 1, 23 In consequence of the non-existence of [universal expansion], mind is atomic or infinitely small.

*Quotation from NANDA LAL SINHA's Appendix B p. IV:*

„CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṂKĀRA reads the words *bhāvcaḥ* and *abhāvcaḥ* in III, 2, 1 in a compounded form as *bhāvābhāvcaḥ*.“

§ 2. *Introductory remark.*

Whilst the Sāṃkhya system has hypostatized three psychical functions intellect, self-consciousness and attention-decision in *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and *manas*, the Vaiṣeṣika system accepts only *manas* as

a separate organ, considers *buddhi* to be a quality of *atman* and according to all probability, would have taken *ahankāra* as a special case of *buddhi* or *jñāna*.

Thus we see that only for that function of the soul which concerns the entrance of impressions and the exit of will-decisions the Vaiṣeṣika system has conceived a separate organ, for that function thus which stands on the border of soul and physical nature.

In the proof for the existence of this separate organ and its ontological properties the reader will notice how the Vaiṣeṣikas taught that at one moment the soul can only hold one psychical quality, either intellection or will-decision or sentiment. Although this view may be explained as an exaggerated expression for the limitation to which our consciousness is subject, still it is wrong. For the most simple facts of language, cannot be explained, unless we admit that simultaneously a complex of ideas forms the contents of our consciousness, whilst a different amount of psychical energy is diffused over them, so that one is clearly and another only indistinctly apperceived. Moreover each of these ideas, representations &c. contain a number of „subliminal“ component parts, and again all representations and parts, are associated with an innumerable series of other subliminal representations, the existence of which must be accepted in order to arrive at a satisfactory, scientific explanation of several facts in our psychical life. The discovery of the „subliminal“ — connected as it is with the name of *LEIBNIZ* — is undoubtedly one of the most important stages in the history of psychology and it is rather strange that never any of the subtle Indian analysts, who have given so much attention to the psychology of language, have postulated this notion.

### § 3. *Explanation of the sūtras.*

In sūtra III, 2, 1 only one argument is given for the existence of the internal organ: the dependence of our intellections on attention. Sūtra 2 is a reference to II, 1, 11—13, which according to the probable interpretations of the Indian scholiasts bear on wind in its atomical form. Thus III, 2, 2 would infer from the atomical size of *manas* its substantial nature and eternity: logically, therefore, this sūtra should have been preceded by VII, 1, 23.

Sūtra 3 shows that also the Indian philosophers have noticed the relationship between „attention“ in perception or thought, and will-decision. For the rest this sūtra has been fully appreciated in the introductory remark.

In VII. 1, 23 *ta* refers to *vibhava* (in sūtra 22), which is in its turn explained by *sarvavārtasamyogatva* in the Upaskāra. The reasoning, as understood by Çaṅkara Miçra, runs as follows: if *manas* were conjoined with all objects of definite extension, then it would be conjoined with all sense-organs at the same time, thus simultaneously many cognitions would be possible, but this is opposed to the view, upheld in III, 2, 3.

Really this argumentation is not fit for proving the infinitesimality of *manas*; it would only show that *manas* is too small to cover at the same time the seat of two *indriyāṇi*. It ensues from what has been further said by Çaṅkara Miçra that he only thought of two possibilities: either *manas* is indefinitely small or indefinitely large. The dim insight of the Vaiçeṣikas in the real nature of soul and psychical phenomena, which are void of extension and spacial relations, led them to deny definite size to *manas*. A clear expression for the truth, abstract as this is, cannot be expected from thinkers who believed that saints, men of extraordinary power, receive the gift of seeing mathematical space and time. (V.S., IX, 1, 11 & 12 and the Upaskāra ibidem: Praçastapāda-Bhāṣya p 187 l. 7—13).

#### § 4. *The Bhāṣya on the internal organ.*

The internal organ has been fully discussed Praçastapāda-bhāṣya book II chapter II § 11 (see its analysis here book IV).

It begins by giving three probantia (*līṅgāni*) for the existence of *manas*: 1) the dependence of psychical facts on our attention; 2) the arising of reminiscences, whilst the organ through which the original impression entered, is inactive; 3) the necessity of a separate organ for the perception of internal facts.

Further this paragraph contains quotations from the Vaiç. Sūtra (III, 2, 3: VII, 1, 23: V, 2, 17) and proofs for the different qualities of the internal organ. On the whole this paragraph does not offer difficulties. Only one expression deserves our attention for a moment: „*sādhārāṇaḥ grahaḥ atattvaprasaṅgād ajāatcam*”, i. e.: the internal organ does not possess consciousness, because the unwished for consequence would be that it would possess the body in common [i. e. two masters, soul and mind, would govern the body].

## SECTION 3.

## THE PSYCHICAL STATES.

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing upon the psychical states.*

A. 1. 1. 6 Attributes are colour, . . . numbers, . . . understandings, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and volitions.

B. X. 1. 1 In consequence of the difference of [their] causes, in the form of desirables and undesirables, and on account of [their] mutual opposition, pleasure and pain stand in the relation of objects different from each other.

2 And the non-inclusion [of pleasure and pain] in doubt or certainty is the mark that they are other than cognition.

3 The production thereof [i. e. of doubt and certainty] is by means of perception and inference.

4 „[It] was” — such [modal distinction] also [establishes the difference between pleasure or pain and cognition].

5 Also [pleasure and pain are not forms of cognition], inasmuch as the effect, [pleasure or pain], is not observed, where [the antecedents of cognition] are present.

6 [Pleasure and pain are not forms of cognition], because they are observed, when [there exist] other causes co-inherent in one and the same object [i. e. the soul].

7 The head, the back, the stomach, the vitals are in the parts of one and the same [body]; this their difference [results] from the differences thereof [i. e. of their causes].

C. VI. 2. 10 From pleasure [arises] desire.

11 [Desire and aversion arise] also through habituation to that.

12 [Desire and aversion arise] from *adṛṣṭa* also.

13 [Desire and aversion arise] from racial distinction.

14 Application to *dharma* and *adharma* has for its antecedents desire and aversion.

C. VI, 2. 15 Conjunction [of soul with body, sense and life] produced by them [i. e. by *dharma* and *adharma*] [is called birth]; disjunction [of body and mind, produced by them, is called death].

16 [It has been] declared that the actions of the soul taking place, salvation [results].

D. IX, 2. 6 Reminiscence [results] from conjunction between the soul and the mind and also from impression or latency.

7 So [also is] dreaming.

8 [So is] consciousness accompanying dreams.

9 [Dreaming and consciousness accompanying dreaming result] from *dharma* also.

10 False knowledge [arises] from imperfection of the senses and from imperfection of impression.

11 That [i. e. *avidyā*] is imperfect knowledge.

12 [Cognition] free from imperfection, is [called] *vidyā* or scientific knowledge.

13 Cognition of advanced sages, as also vision of the perfect ones, [results] from *dharma* or merits.

### § 2. *Quotations from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B p. 171.*

C. To the passage X, 1, 1—7:

„CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA reads *sati ca* of X. 1, 5 as a separate aphorism and explains it thus: Cognition arises, *sati* i. e. in respect of objects actually existing at the moment. Cognition accordingly relates to past, present and future objects. But this is not the case with pleasure and pain. Herein also, therefore, there is difference between cognition on the one hand and pain on the other.

„He reads *ekadeṣe iti* of X. 1, 7 with X, 1, 6 and explains it as giving an additional reason why pleasure and pain cannot be forms of cognition, the meaning being that pleasure and pain are localised in the body, whereas cognition is not so localised.”

### § 3. *Notes to these Sūtras.*

A. Enunciation of the psychical qualities.

In I, 1, 6 the sūtrakāra only enunciates those psychical qualities *buddhi* &c. which can be perceived by internal perception, but *adṛṣṭa* and *samskāra* (*bhāvanā*), the existence of which is inferred, are omitted.

*B. Discussion of pleasure and pain.*

ČAMKARA MĪCRA explains N. 1, 1 as referring to Nyāya Sūtra I, 1, 9 and to a Naiyāyika doctrine which teaches that pleasure is really a form of pain. It is not necessary to attribute this polemical intention to this sūtra: for the Vaiśeṣika system aims in the first place at distinguishing, it is therefore natural that it should characterise pleasure and pain naturally.

But, moreover, this antithesis of pleasure and pain is characteristic for sentiment, in comparison with intellections. And although according to the Sāmkhāra N. 1, 2 a similar antithesis may be found in the intellectual states of doubt and certainty, pleasure and pain are apparently no forms of these states of consciousness.

*Tayobh* in sūtra 3 could grammatically be explained as *sakṭadul-khayaobh* or as *saṃgrahāḥ, gṛahyobh*. With the Upaskāra I prefer the latter interpretation. The sūtra would then be an attempt to characterise sentiment in comparison with certainty and doubt. In as far as doubt and certainty are "stages in our research for trustworthy knowledge", they are clearly distinguished from sentiment. The Vaiśeṣika system, however, has not been able to clearly define this point, for origination from perception and inference (which it gives instead) is not limited to certainty and doubt, but also pleasure and pain have this origin. This dependence of sentiment on intellections is implicitly stated Phagastopāda-bhāṣya book III chapter 1 § 20 and 21, book III chapter 2 § 16 & 17). In the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra both perceptions and sentiments are considered to take their origin from a conjunction of objects, sense-organs, internal organ and soul (V.S. III, 1, 18 and V, 2, 15); the attempt, made in N. 1, 3, is therefore also inconsistent with other parts of the Darśana.

We may paraphrase and interpret sūtra 4 as follows: cognitions contain objects (*viśayas*); but sentiments do not contain objects themselves, but bear on the objects of the cognitions. A cognition or sentiment, when experienced, is of course experienced as present, but the object of the cognition may be placed in any of the three times. The sentiment by its mere subjective nature, lacks this form of temporal relation.

Paraphrase of sūtra 5: when a conjunction of objects, sense-organs, mind and soul takes place, then always a cognition arises and only sometimes sentiments. (Cf. my notes on sūtra 3).

Paraphrase of sūtra 6: the origination of pleasure and pain is dependent on different qualities [ : *adṛṣṭa*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna* ] of which intellection is more independent. (Cf. the Upaskāra).

Sūtra 7 can scarcely be based on a trustworthy tradition. The explanation of the Upaskāra is not only forced, but makes the sūtra totally transgress the subject-matter to be discussed. I am inclined to take the Sūtra as a product of misunderstood oral explanation. Originally then it would have had the enigmatic form: *ekadeṣe* and expressed the [supposed] property of [somatic] pleasure and pain to be localised in a certain part of the body. Then the formula *ekadeṣe* with a closing *iti* was first paraphrased by *ekasmin* [*deṣe*] in order to show that the compound was a *karmadhāraya*; further the separate „spots” of the body were enumerated in the oral explanation as nominatives, *śīrah*, *pīśṭham* &c.; and finally was added the formula *tadvīṣeṣād tadvīṣeṣebhāḥ*; i. e. the difference in that [i. e. pleasure and pain] ensues from the differences in the [parts of the body]; [for instance tooth-ache is an acute pain: head-ache more a depressing pain, &c.]. Although my conjecture may seem daring, still I can adduce some favourable arguments in its support: so we read Praç. Bhāṣya book II chapter 2 § 12 (p. 25 l. 4) that the characteristic qualities of physical space and soul [i. e. sound and pleasure &c.] are of one moment's existence and located in one spot; and ibidem book II chapter 2 § 10 it is said of „pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition that they abide at one spot (*pradeṣavṛttitva*): and the last-mentioned expression is paraphrased in the Nyāya-kandalī (p. 85 l. 1) as follows: *dṛṣyate pradeṣavṛttitvaṃ sukhādinām, pāde me sukham, śīrasi me duḥkham iti pratyaṅgāt. Tataḥ ca cāreṇḍriyagatvābhināsa, tadvīṣeṣagatvānām vyāpyavṛtti-vyābhicārāt. Ye ta cāreṇḍriyavīṣeṣagatvān, te vyāpyavṛttayo dṛṣṭāḥ, yathā rūpādayaḥ; na ca tathā sukhādayo vyāpyavṛttayaḥ*. It is true that here a localisation of all psychical qualities is upheld in order to distinguish them from somatic qualities, yet the expressions of the Nyāya-kandalī *pradeṣavṛttitvaṃ sukhādinām, pāde me sukham*” remind us much of our sūtra and almost prove that it has been formerly otherwise explained than by Çaṅkara Miçra.

#### C. The concatenation of the psychical states.

When we compare the concatenation of psychical states, given by Vaiç. Sūtra VI, 2, 10 with the similar attempt in the Nyāya-sūtra (see here p. 15), then it will strike us that the Nyāya gives a much more regular series. Yet both concatenations have this in common that they combine a very simple theory of the interdependence of psychical facts with the dogma of metempsychosis.

Thus V.S. VI, 2, 19 shows the dependence of pleasure [or generally of sentiment] on desire [and aversion]; the sūtras 11—13 add



further causes of pleasure (cf. the Upaskāra). The use of the term *śāṅga* in sūtra 10 instead of *vechā* is rather peculiar.

Sūtra 14 considers *praveṭṭi*, a notion which is parallel with *prapaṭṭa* in V.S. I. 1, 6. This *praveṭṭi* originates from *vechā* and *deśa*. Cf. the two links *doṣāḥ* [i. e. originally *deśa*] and *praveṭṭi* in the Nyāya-series (here p. 45).

Sūtra 15 has a very enigmatic form: Čamkara Miśra comments upon it: *ībhāṅga dharmādharmaībhāṅga saṁyogo jīvanat, aparevābhāḥ parirendroga-cetan-ībhāḥ sambandhaḥ saṁyogo ity ucyate. ībhāṅgas tu cācaraman-ībhāṅgo mārā, alakṣaṇaḥ* which is translated by NANDA LAL SINHA as „From them, namely, *dharmā* and *adharma*, conjunction, i. e. birth, results. Connection with non-pre-existing body, sense and life is here termed conjunction. *ībhāṅga* again denotes disjunction of body and mind, characterised as death.” In this explanation *tu* is rightly taken as a separate word, meaning: „then, consequently” and explained by *dharmādharmaībhāṅga* occurring in the precedent sūtra. Thus *jīvanat* originates from *praveṭṭi*. Cf. the two identical links in the Nyāya-series.

In sūtra 16 *ātmanākarmasa*<sup>1)</sup> is translated by Nanda Lal Sinha as: „the actions of the soul taking place” in accordance with Čamkara Miśra's gloss: *ātmanākarmasa saṅga*; yet the locative may also have meant a reference to the passage where the *ātmanah karmāṇi* were discussed, that is to say to the passage V. 2, 15-18 in a now lost redaction, the reconstruction of which will be attempted in the next section.

#### D. The cognitional states of soul in general.

After that the Sūtrakāra has discussed in adhyāya VIII and in adhyāya IX āhnikā 1: perception; in adhyāya IX āhnikā 2 sūtra 1—5 inference, he shortly mentions in the following sūtras 6—13 the remaining cognitional states. They are given without classification in the order: remembrance (6), dream (7, 9), false knowledge (10, 11), trustworthy knowledge (12) and inspired knowledge (13). I should like to add here the following annotations.

According to the Vaiṣeṣikas an infinitely great substance like soul and a substance of limited or infinitesimal extension may sometimes be conjoined and sometimes be separate: on the other hand two infinitely great substances are always conjoined. Thus it is said in sūtra IX, 2, 6 for instance that reminiscence results from conjunction between the soul and the mind.

The difference between *svapna* and *svapnāntika* is explained in

1) Cf. here p. 113.

different ways by Ānandadeva (p. 411 l. 6) i. e., „*etācān eva viveśo yat śvapnāntīkām parāśūbhavajanitā śaṃskārāt. śvapnāntīkām tu tattāllopaśūbhavajanatasamśkāraḥ eva*”. According to this interpretation *śvapnāntīka* is the conscious state which takes place during the waking from a dream and is still untrustworthy in consequence of the influence which the latent impressions, formed during the dream, still possess in our soul.

§ 4. *The Bhāṣya on the qualities and states of the soul.*

A. Enunciation of the psychical qualities.

The psychical qualities are enunciated by PRAÇAṢTAPĀDA in book II chapter 2 § 10 (p. 70 l. 10 &c.): first are mentioned the typically psychical qualities which admit of internal perception, then merit with demerit, then *saṃskāra* (a quality which in the form of physical inertia belongs to all moving bodies with the inclusion of mind, and in the form of latency of impression belongs to soul); after this are enumerated the general qualities: number, extension, individuality (separateness), conjunction and disjunction (cf. here book IV section IV table D).

The paragraph ends with quotations from the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (III, 2, 4; VI, 1, 5; IX, 2, 6; III, 2, 20; VII, 1, 22; V, 2, 15) in order to prove by reference to the authoritative sūtra, the existence of the typical qualities which can be internally perceived, of merit and demerit, of *saṃskāra*, of plurality (and individuality), of infinite extension, of conjunction (and disjunction).

The quotation, proving the occurrence of conjunction and disjunction in soul, has the following form: „*samāharaṣajatrāt sa-khādīnām saṃyogah; tad-rināṣakatrāt vibhāga itī*”, i. e. because [the Sūtrakāra mentions in V, 2, 15 that] pleasure &c. arise from contact [of soul, sense-organs, mind and object], conjunction [between soul and sense-organ &c.] exists; and because this [contact can be] destroyed, disjunction takes place.”

We may add that this is not the only case in which a conjunction between the infinite soul and a substance of limited or infinitesimal size takes place. So we meet e. g. in the Bhāṣya book II chapter 2 § 6 (p. 49 l. 13) with *saṃyoga* between *ātman* and *apṛas* at the time of world-creation; ibidem II ch. 2 § 11 (p. 89 l. 8) *saṃyoga* between *ātman*, *indriyāṇi*, *manas* and *artha* as a general cause of psychical qualities; ibidem III ch. 2 § 44 (p. 258 l. 2) *saṃyoga* between *ātman* and *manas* as a cause of inspired knowledge; ibidem III ch. 2 § 21 (p. 187 l. 2) *saṃyoga* between *ātman*

and *manas* as a condition for reflection or internal perception of the psychical qualities. III ch. 2 § 37 p. 280 l. 22 &c *yoga* i. e. *saṃyoga* of soul with bodies, sense-organs, objects,<sup>1</sup> pleasure &c. as the quintessence of *saṃsāra*.

Although conjunction and disjunction are attributed to soul cf. my annotation here to V.S. IX. 2. 6 here p. 266, farness and nearness are denied to it (Praçastapāda-Bhāṣya book III ch. 1 § 1).

*B. Discussion of the psychical qualities.*

Although a passage, parallel to Varg. Sutra X. 1. 1-7 in which sentiment is characterised in comparison with cognition is lacking in the Bhāṣya, still the psychical qualities are broadly discussed, partly in book III chapter 1 (specially § 20-23), partly in book III chapter 2 § 46 &c.

In book III ch. 1 § 20 *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa* and *prayatna* are called *asamāna-jātyārambhakāḥ*, and in § 21 *buddhi*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *saṃskāra*: *samāna-jātyārambhakāḥ*. That is to say, sentiment may cause wish or aversion, but not another sentiment; but intellection may cause an intellection just as well as some other psychical state.

In the same chapter § 22 and 23 *buddhi*, *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā* and *dveṣa* are called *srāṇāyasaṃvettārambhakāḥ*, whilst *prayatna* is termed *paratrārambhakāḥ*. That is to say: the first psychical qualities give all rise to other psychical states, whereas will-decision is followed by movements of the body, or as we also may express it: the first psychical qualities possess „immanent“, the will „transient“ causality.

Before leaving this chapter of the Bhāṣya I should like to add a few annotations to § 33, where (among other qualities) the psychical states are called *ayāvadbhāvanābhārinah*, i. e. not lasting as long as their abode does. About most of the conscious states we can, however, say still more. In the same way, namely, as the Vaiçeṣika system has exaggerated the limitation of our consciousness, by accepting the doctrine that only one representation can be present to us during one moment, so it has also used too sharp an expression for the fluctuation of our consciousness. We have, namely, seen in the exposition of Praçastapāda's theory of number that every intellection has only one moment's existence, or if we imply its preparatory and decaying states, at the utmost an existence of three moments. Apparently it has not been possible for the Vaiçeṣika system to strictly adhere to this view, so that in course

1: Strictly speaking there is *saṃyoga* between soul and pleasure.

of time we meet with the term *dhārāvahikajñāna*, which expresses a longer duration of one intellection which is due to a constant revival brought about by our attention (cf. e. g. Nyāya-kandaī p. 124 l. 18: p. 191 l. 11).

The discussion of the psychical states, given in Praç. Bhāṣya book III ch. 2 § 46, is on the whole of little interest. We find here definitions, divisions, causes and effects of the different psychical qualities enumerated without receiving real psychological information. So desire is divided in § 48 according to the objects to which it is attached. Further we may notice that in this paragraph there is no allusion to V.S. VI, 2, 11—13, unless in the *ādi* of *sukhādy-apekṣā*. Whilst § 48 gives definitions of the different kinds of *icchā*, § 49 only an enunciation of the species of *dreṣa*: probably we may state here a fault of the tradition of our text. In § 50 we meet with a division of *prayatna* into *jīvana-pūrvakah prayatnaḥ*, which we should term „reflexes and automatic movements” and *icchā-dreṣapūrvakah prayatnaḥ*. Among the first kind of *prayatna* the Bhāṣyakāra also reckons the first movement of *manas* after one’s awaking from sleep. In § 54 (p. 267 l. 2—13) *bhāvanā* is discussed: it is the cause of remembrance and recognition with reference to seen, heard and experienced objects, it is destroyed by [contradictory] intellection, by drunkenness and pain; it is originated from 1) *paṭupratyaya*, i. e. an impressive notion, for instance the perception which a donkey makes on an inhabitant of the Dekhan [in which country this animal does not occur], 2) *abhyāsa*, repetition, such as a pupil applies in order to master a science or a handicraft: 3) *ādara* i. e. interest, or *prayatnātiṣaya* (a surplus of exertion) as CRĪDHARA paraphrases it: for instance people, trusting in the tradition that at a certain date of the year (cf. Nyāya-kandaī p. 271) at midnight they will see golden and silver lotuses in the lake Devahrada, will apply all their attention to this expected view and then the perception, short als lightning, will leave a lasting *bhāvanā* in their soul.

#### C. The concatenation of psychical states.

One coherent passage, parallel to Vaig. Sūtra VI, 2, 10—16 and treating the concatenation of psychical states, is lacking in the Bhāṣya. For the rest see here chapter VI on ethics and theōlogy.

#### D. The cognitional states of the soul in general.

The treatment of the cognitional states of soul is in the Bhāṣya much more regular than in the Sūtra. Thus we find in the Bhāṣya book III ch. 2 § 15 (p. 172) and § 20 (p. 186) the following

classification which may be given here in Sanskrit and English with references to the paragraphs of the quoted chapter:

I <i>apramā</i>	I false knowledge
1 <i>saṃśaya</i> § 16	1 doubt
2 <i>viparyaya</i> § 17	2 illusion
3 <i>anādhyaवासāya</i> § 18	3 non-ascertainment
4 <i>scapna</i> § 19	4 dream
II <i>pramā</i>	II trustworthy knowledge
1 <i>pratyakṣa</i> § 21	1 perception
2 <i>anumāna</i> § 22—42	2 inference
3 <i>smṛti</i> § 43	3 remembrance
4 <i>āṛṣa</i>	4 inspired knowledge

I have already referred to the paragraph on doubt p. 173—174).

The paragraph on *viparyaya* (wrong notion) defines it as *ataśmā tad itī pratīyayāt*: it may arise 1) with reference to an object of perception, 2) in the case of absence of perception; 3) with reference to inference; the paragraph closes with the mentioning of several heretical dogmas as examples of *viparyaya*. It is specially of interest in connection with the broad discussions which this topic has found in later Vaiṣeṣika and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā philosophy (cf. GAṆGAŚATHĀ JHṂ, Sadholal Lectures on Nyāya, p. 51—70).

The notion *anādhyaवासāya* is discussed with reference to perception and inference. Whilst doubt (*saṃśaya*) was illustrated by the example *kim nu khale ayam sthānaḥ syāt, puraṣo vā?* non-ascertainment is defined as *kim iṣy ālocanamūlcam*, thus it is clear that *saṃśaya* refers to a definite question, *anādhyaवासāya* to a wider one. In scientific works we therefore have more to do with *saṃśaya*; and we often meet with this term both in Naiyāyika and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā works, where always the *saṃśaya* (the doubt or problem) is distinctly stated, before the two parties are allowed to pronounce their opinions.

Whereas the paragraphs on *saṃśaya*, *viparyaya* and *anādhyaवासāya* bear on logical or epistemological notions, the discussion on dream in § 19 has more psychological value. The paragraph begins with a short definition of *scapna* in two lines; then by the interrogative *katham* a long commentary is introduced on this definition; thus p. 182 l. 14—20 bear on *pratinamanaskah*; l. 20 on *aparāṇḍriyagṛāmah*; l. 21—23 on *indriyadevāreṇa*. The latter half of the paragraph gives a classification and discussion of the different causes of dream. What is most interesting, is the fact that here the Vaiṣeṣika system attributes to the internal organ what in older speculation

was an action of soul itself. Thus the internal organ is said to stand still within the heart during dream.

With reference to the paragraphs on *pramā* I wish to make here only a few annotations on the paragraphs 43—45. The discussion on *smṛti*, prepared as it is, by the previous broad explanation of latent impression, is very short. The fact that remembrance is classified as trustworthy knowledge, whereas the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā attributes *pramāṇtva* exclusively to primary impression (*anubhava*), deserves our notice.

Inspired knowledge (§ 44) principally belongs to the gods and the saints, who were the authors of sacred tradition, but also feelings about future events, arising in the hearts of ordinary people, belong to this class of knowledge.

§ 45 gives an argumentation for the thesis that *siddhadarśana* does not form a separate kind of trustworthy knowledge. What is called thus, is either a special form of perception or inference, or it is perception, together with inspired knowledge.

NOTE. In GHATE'S notes to the *Saptapadārthī* p. 78 we meet with the following explanation of the difference between doubt and non-ascertainment. ...*Anadhyavasāya*, non-a-certainment (indefinite knowledge) which does not specially refer to two extremes as opposed to each other, but refers to the thing in question in general terms, in the form *ko 'py ayaṃ*' (this is somebody), without any reference to the special character. Thus, for instance, when we see a tree whose name we do not know, we have a cognition 'this is a tree of some name. What may its name be?' This is *anadhyavasāya*. We do not have a *saṃśaya* proper, which would be the case, if the apprehension is of the form 'Is it a tree or something else?' &c."

#### SECTION 4.

#### THE FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNAL ORGAN.

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing upon the functions of the internal organ.*

V, 2, 13 The initial upward flaming of fire, the initial sideward blowing of air, and the initial actions of atoms, and of mind are caused by *adr̥ṣṭa*.

- V. 2. 14 The action of mind is explained by the action of the hand.  
 15 Pleasure and pain [result] from contact of soul, sense, mind and object.  
 16 Non-origination of that [follows] on the mind becoming steady in the soul: [after it, there is] non-existence of pain in the embodied soul. [This is] that *yoga*. ●  
 17 Egress and ingress [of life and mind, from and into body], conjunctions [i. e. assimilations of food and drink, and conjunctions of other products, — these are caused by *adhyakṣa*.  
 18 *Mokṣa* consists in the non-existence of conjunction with the body, when there is, at the same time, no potential body existing, and consequently, re-birth cannot take place.

NOTE. NANDA LAL SINHA'S Appendix B does not contain any notes on these sūtras.

### § 2. Notes on these sūtras.

Sūtra 13 is partly a closing to the passage V. 2. 1—12, where the movements of the elements are discussed, partly a transition to sūtra 14 dealing with the movements of the internal organ. Whilst the falling of solid bodies does not seem to deserve any further explanation, the upward flaming of fire and the sideward blowing of wind are explained by the influence of the unseen quality of soul. The adjective *ādyaṃ* does not relate to *agner ūrdhvacalanaṃ* and *cāyos tiryakpavanam*, as constructed by ČAṆKARA MIČRA and NANDA LAL SINHA.

Sūtra 14 contains a reference to V. 1. 1 (cf. the Upaskāra): sūtra 15 is an introduction to sūtra 16.

In sūtra 16 *çarīra* is explained by Čaṅkara Mičra as *çarīrā-cacchinnātman*; this explanation is of course wrong: the Sutrakāra means pain localised in the „body” (cf. my notes on V.S. X. 1. 7 p. 265). Originally it was according to all probability not the mind, but the soul, on whose standing still extasis depended. Similarly sūtra 17 and 18 must have borne on the *ātman*, for the exclusive mentioning of the mind as the organ with which the food, taken, is conjoined, makes a very strange impression: this food is also seen, tasted &c. Thus the *apasarpāṇa*, *upasarpaṇa* also are to be explained as having once referred to the soul. In the historical Vaiṣeṣika system an infinite substance can be conjoined or not conjoined with a substance of limited size: thus *samsāra* takes place without any

movement of soul; it only forms at another spot a conjunction with another body. It seems, however, that originally also the Vaīṣeṣika system had other notions about this subject and imagined the soul as really moving at the time of death and birth. *Kāryātutarasamyoga* is explained in the *Upa-kāra* as the conjunction [i. e. the physical adhesion between the parts] of another product [than the producers]. [i. e. of the embryo]; this explanation could be accepted.

*Tadabhlāve* in sūtra 15 is explained as *anāgataṣaīrānutapāde* by Čamkara Miśra, this explanation, at least in this form, is too forced to be true, originally the sūtra must have meant:

„When there is no longer [an *apasarpaṇa* or *apasarpaṇa* of the soul] and when it is no longer conjoined [with body or bodily experiences], then it does not come forward anymore; this is liberation.”

This interpretation of the sūtras 16—15 would agree with the expression *ātmaakarmasa* in sūtra VI. 2, 16 (cf. here p. 113).

### § 3. *The Bhāṣya on the functions of the manas.*

Although the *manas* is the most important instrument of the soul, so that without *manas* no perception, feeling or whatever psychical quality could arise, still all this is merely brought about by the movement, disjunctions, conjunctions, rest or *saṁskāra* of this infinitesimal organ. Thus the passages in the Bhāṣya which give the fullest information about *manas*, are besides the one specially devoted to it, those which bear on movement and *saṁskāra*.

*Samskāra* in book III chapter 2 § 54 is divided into *vega*, *bhāvanā* and *sthitisthāpaka*. *Vega* is attributed to substances of limited size [thus also *manas*, a substance of infinitesimal extension]; *bhāvanā* to the soul; *sthitisthāpaka* i. e. elasticity only to tangible substances. „*Tato vega mūrtimatsa pūncasa dravyeṣu . . . jāgate . . . Sthitisthāpakas ta sparśacaddravyeṣu vartamānaḥ*” &c. In as far as elasticity bears on the form of solid substances and *manas* is merely considered to be a moving mathematical point, this distinction is natural enough. What the Vaīṣeṣika system psychologically understood by this „speed” of the internal organ, is never clearly expressed. Perhaps the quality was merely attributed to it by analogy, still we may explain it as the inclination of our attention to persevere in the same direction, so that a change of occupation is always more or less difficult to us.

In book IV § 17 treating of the movement of the internal organ we find Vaīṣ. Sūtra V. 2, 17 partly quoted *apasarpaṇakarmopasarpaṇakarma cātmanamanah samyogād adṛṣṭūpekṣāt*. In the explanation of



the egress and ingress, we meet with an *atirāhikāgāra*, a body of transmigration, by which the *ātman*, when leaving the dying body, is supported, until it again reaches another body in which it remains for another existence. Moreover the *ātman* of the yogin can travel all over the world and back again according to his liking. The last lines of the paragraph (p. 309 l. 10) discuss movements of bodies, besides those of *ātman*s, which are caused by *abhyāsa*. Here V.S. V. 2. 13 & V. 1. 15 are quoted.

## SECTION 5.

### THE PSYCHOLOGY IN THE OTHER INDIAN SYSTEMS.

#### § 1. *Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika psychology compared.*

The psychology of the Sāṃkhya is given in this paragraph in short notes in comparison with Vaiśeṣika psychology.

1) The ontological qualities of soul. Both systems accept that soul is infinitely great, existing in infinite number, and eternal.

2) The ontological qualities of *manas*. The Vaiśeṣika system teaches that *manas* is infinitesimal and eternal. The Sāṃkhyins accept its small size, but deny its infinitesimality, moreover it is not an independent organ, but together with *buddhi* and *ahaṃkāra* a part of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. This organ is not eternal, but originates from the *prakṛti*.

3) The psychical qualities of the soul. In the Vaiśeṣika system knowledge, feeling &c. are qualities of the soul, the Sāṃkhyins teach that they are really qualities of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, although they seem by illusion to belong to the soul (*ātman* or *paraśa*). A simple classification of psychical qualities as we have met with in the Vaiśeṣika system, is lacking in the Sāṃkhya; the different psychical states are without much discrimination distributed over the different parts of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. The following quotations from GABBE'S book (*Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie*) may prove this:

„Das erste der inneren Organe ist das der Unterscheidung, der Feststellung, des Urtheils und der Entscheidung (*abhyavasāya*)“, (p. 307). „Die *buddhi* [ist] der Sitz sammtlicher früheren Eindrücke, die unserm Denken und Handeln die Richtung anweisen, und damit auch des Gedächtnisses“ (p. 308).

„Der *ahaṃkāra* [ist] das innere Thatorgan“ (p. 313), „das Prinzip vermöge dessen wir uns für handelnd und leidend &c. halten, während wir selbst, d.h. unsere Seele, davon ewig frei bleiben“ (p. 311).

„Wenn die Sāṃkhya-Lehrer dem Manas nicht die Funktionen des Wünschens und des zweifelnden Ueberlegens (*saṃkalpa-vikalpa*) zuschrieben, so würde es lediglich ein an sich indifferentes Zentralorgan sein, das seinen jeweiligen Charakter den Funktionen der äusseren Sinne verdankt, denen es sich in dem Augenblick angleicht, wenn diese in Thätigkeit treten“ (p. 314).

„Wiewohl *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* und *manas* sich in der geschilderten Weise specifisch von einander unterscheiden, . . . finden wir sie in unseren Quellen doch überaus häufig als ein einheitliches inneres Organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) zusammengefaßt“ (p. 315). „Dem Gesamit-Innerorgan (*antaḥkaraṇa-sāmānyā*) gehören nach der Sāṃkhya-Lehre diejenigen Qualitäten an, welche in der Vaiṣeṣika- und Nyāya-Philosophie der Seele zugeschrieben werden: Freude, Schmerz, Begierde, Abneigung u.s.w.“ (p. 316).

## § 2. *The Vedānta-psychology.*

A description of Vedānta psychology can be found in DEUSSEN'S *System des Vedānta* p. 305—352. The main dogma of the Vedānta — at least in the form in which ĆAṆKARA ĀCĀRYA teaches it — is the oneness of soul in the whole universe and the complete illusionism. On the whole, this system has bestowed very little attention on the empirical data of psychical life.

The following passage, taken from Deussen (p. 357) is of some interest for the theory of *manas*: „für [Ćaṅkara Ācārya] giebt es nur ein Innenorgan, das *manas*; und auch die *buddhi* ist ihm nicht ein besonderes Vermögen, sondern bald die Thätigkeit des Erkennens, bald das Erkenntnisvermögen, der Intellekt im allgemeinen. . . Ebenso ist *ahaṃkāra* in unserem Systeme kein besonderes Organ, sondern bedeutet zunächst „das Wort Ich“, &c.

A clear classification of the psychical qualities is lacking in the Vedānta. The theory of the four main states of soul: the being awake, dream, sound sleep and unconsciousness is of importance, although the mystical interpretation outweighs here again empirical observation.

## SECTION 6.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE VAJESĪKA SYSTEM.  
APPRECIATED FROM EUROPEAN STANDPOINT§ 1. *Introduction*

Whilst a fair and objective appreciation of Indian physics can be obtained by comparing it with the historical development of that science in Europe, the case is different when psychology is concerned. Even in Europe a consensus exists with reference to a very few subjects, as for instance the physiological-psychical research of the sense-organs, or the ingenious investigation of memory initiated by EBBINGHAUS; more general questions, such as the definition of soul, the classification of the psychical phenomena, are still topics of dissension.

In the following appreciation (which for these reasons necessarily has a subjective and personal tone) I intend to discuss the two following points: 1. Brahmanic psychology which believes in the existence of the soul, stands on a higher standpoint than Buddhistic psychology, which does not recognise this basis of all psychical phenomena. 2. the classification of psychical phenomena, given by the Vajesika system, possesses a fundamental value.

§ 2. *General appreciation of Brahmanic psychology*

In order to defend my first thesis I should like to refer to the book of SUZUKI, written in defence of Buddhism. In this writing the author considers the denial of soul as a substance, to be *the* outcome of psychological research in Europe, a result which was anticipated centuries ago by Buddhism. He further believes that only this denial of the Ego as a permanent entity, allows an eradication of Egoism. As long as man believes in the Ego, his feelings will remain concentrated upon this Ego.

Now it is true that the majority of modern European psychologists either deny in principle the existence of the Ego as a substance or believe at least that the development of empirical psychology demands our keeping aloof from such a metaphysical principle. However, the names of H. LOTZE and F. BREXANO, quite outweigh in my opinion the host of psychologists who have upheld the

baselessness and transiency of psychical phenomena. The denial of the soul as a substance, in other words: the disbelief in the verdict of our self-consciousness — by which self-consciousness I feel assured that I am the same being to-day as I was yesterday or years ago; by which I feel, when occupied with scientific argumentation, that I who now assert certain propositions, am the same I who asserted other propositions which are the premises for the assertions, arrived at now: by which I feel responsible for acts, done previously by me; by which I feel that premises, given now by me, will have an obligatory force for me in future — the disbelief in this our self-consciousness has really not been an outcome of psychological research, but a necessary stage in the development of philosophical thought. The denial of the substantial nature of soul was preceded by the denial of the „thing”. What is the thing apart from its qualities, apart from its form and volume, from its duration, from its hardness and weight &c.? Or if most of these qualities change, can we still talk of the same thing? If a piece of wax is melted above a fire, and volume, temperature, colour, hardness, form are changed, are then the hard piece of wax and the fluid which in time succeeds it, really identical? The question: is there a thing apart from its qualities, seems indissoluble; and the answer, given by the Buddhists and European scepticists, seems quite natural: there is no thing; only the qualities, in their conglomeration, or even more accurately the mental states of which these qualities are the object, is all that exists. However, common sense rebels against this view, and common sense is right here — to a certain extent. And it is one of the main teachings of Kantian philosophy, that if we analyse the most common daily experience, the most simple knowledge on which our daily doings are based, we shall find that this experience presupposes a belief in certain general principles — principles which, moreover, we have to accept as a basis for all methodical research, as the a-priori basis of science. One of these principles is the belief in the thing: the distinction of the remaining substance from its changing states — the notion of matter in physics e. g. in such an a-priori basis therefore, and not a result of physical research. Hegelian philosophy has arrived at another seemingly different, but really very cognate view. All dialectical examination of notions ends to show us the insufficiency of these notions, and obliges us to take refuge in others. But yet by this process the first notions are not put aside, they keep their importance in the equipment of the human mind: just as well as the notions, to which they gave rise, in their turn appear to be only

relatively valuable. We cannot give up the notion of the thing, even though it contains insoluble difficulties.

And what is true for the thing, is true for the soul. Consistence in debate, reliance on our memory, moral conduct, they would all become impossible, if we were to deny seriously the existence of soul as a remaining entity, as an acting factor.

Many scientists and philosophers in Europe have believed that the notion of causality could be formed independently of the notion of the thing, at least to a great extent. When we keep a stone in our hand and then open our fingers, the stone will fall. The movement of the fingers is the cause of the movement — one movement is the cause of another movement. CH. STEWART has opposed this view and upheld the one which he called the substantial theory of causation. Not the movement of the fingers is *the* cause of the movement of the stone, but gravity, i. e. the influence which the „thing“ in this case the earth, exercises upon another „thing“: the stone; an influence which becomes apparent under certain conditions. This is what physics really teaches, and what philosophy has still to understand about causality. We cannot believe in causality, unless we believe in the thing.

If we accept here the dualistic conception of the relation between soul and body, then the consequence of the substantial theory of causality will be that soul is to be considered as a substance which exercises and undergoes influences from the body as an organised thing. Besides this transient causality between soul and body, and indirectly between soul and the surrounding world, we are obliged to accept a second form of causality, the regularity, namely, by which certain psychical facts are followed by others: for it is a constantly returning experience that perceptions give rise to feelings &c. Here we do not see the influence of one thing by its movements or qualitative changes on the condition of another thing, but we see a series of states in the same substance — the soul. Thus we have to distinguish between a transient and immanent form of causality.

Let us now turn to another point, mentioned by SUZUKI: the thesis that the substantial conception of soul necessarily leads to Egoism. As long as, according to this author, man believes in the Ego, as a permanent entity, and has not yet risen to the insight into the transient nature of soul as a mere fluxus of psychical states, so long will the feelings of man remain concentrated upon this Ego. — If it were, indeed, true that Egoism depended on such theoretical conceptions as the permanent or fluctuating nature

of soul, the consequence would be that, as soon as man had reached the true insight into the nature of soul and fully realised that it is a mere conglomeration of phenomena, he would not only leave off attaching his sentiments and wishes to his own Ego, but he would at the same time become indifferent about his fellow-men whose soul-life too would be nothing else than deceptive phantasms.<sup>1)</sup> Morality, however, is really not so much a question of scientific insight, as of education and self-education. The basis of all morality is the moral judgment and the habit of putting our wishes and resolutions under the moral judgment. And in the same way as the compliance of one's wishes and actions with the moral judgment can only be got or at least aimed at, in a continued self-education, so does the moral judgment, though it really contains a canon in itself, not answer to all moral difficulties in an immediate and automatic way: it is only by experience of life that man, that mankind, become clearly aware of their duties. Although the „conscience-theory“ therefore is really to be considered as *the* standpoint of ethics, yet at the same time the theory of the *Summum Bonum* should not be completely set aside. For even supposing the verdict of moral conscience to be always clear in every particular case of private life, it would not be a sufficient help for man as a member of state and as such responsible for his political ideals. For this purport he must be able to lay before him, lines of moral conduct: moral maxims and aims, which, approved by his moral feeling, are built up and united into one Highest Aim by his imagination and intellect.

To summarise my opinion: scientific discussion and research presupposes the trustworthiness of our self-consciousness. The notion of soul as permanent during life cannot be given up. Egoism, and moral conduct in general, are not based on scientific insight, but on education and self-education. And certainly the eradication of egoism, as Suzuki pretends, does not depend on our belief in the absolute transiency of psychical life.

### § 3. *Appreciation of the classification of psychical phenomena by the Vajesika system.*

It is striking how closely the Vajesika classification of psychical phenomena resembles the most generally given division in European

<sup>1)</sup> In the Buddhist *Agos* that *the person to whom* *edimnates* in the paradox: the Saviour does not exist and the creatures do not exist: still it is the duty of the Saviour to save the creatures.

literature. When we leave aside *dharmat* and *adharma*, not mentioned in the *adhyaya* V.S. I. 1. 1 we may divide the six remaining typical qualities (*vyaya-jñāna*) of the soul (*jean*, *sakha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *aparigraha*) into three groups: intellectual, sentimental and volitional states. We may further conclude from the composition of the Vaiśeṣika sūtras that this tripartite division was also known to the Indian psychologists themselves. Undoubtedly this tripartite division has a fundamental value, although it has not been clearly pronounced before KANT whose three principal works are based on it (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, i. e. examination of the a-priori elements in human intellect; *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, i. e. examination of the a-priori elements which govern moral conduct, in other words, of conscience as the tribunal before which our *volitional* states are judged; *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, which has to do with our *sentimental* and emotional states). But really we can trace this division even in Greek philosophy, and throughout the centuries we may easily refer the different classifications to this fundamental one. A division of the psychical states into active and passive (*tactones* and *passiones*), as found in DIOSCURIUS, makes an exception.

Before examining the psychical foundation of this classification, we may notice that already some grammatical facts suggest to us the distinction of these three groups. So we see (i. e. in Latin that many verba sentiendi & declarandi (verbs which express intellectual states and their utterance) govern the accusative with infinitive; that a great many of the verba affectuum allow a construction with *quod*; that several verba volitiva require *ut* finale).

When we now consider the topic psychologically, we must in the first place distinguish between soul as a substance, and the series of experiences — states of consciousness — which it possesses and undergoes. Then we may notice that on the one hand sentiments and volitions bear in first instance on soul as the substance in which they inhere and that on the other, intellectual states (representations) bear in first instance on objects.

Both groups are connected with secondary states of consciousness or reflections. By these we know ourselves to be willing, to feel, to understand &c. These reflections may be called introjective, in comparison with the immediate representations which are projective. When we experience for instance sugar to be sweet, we do not attribute the sweetness to our representation of sugar, but to the sugar itself, i. e. to the object of the representation.

We are conscious of our feelings and desires by the reflections

which accompany them and in the same way as our representations of exterior objects may appear, in course of time, to need correction, so also the reflection about our feelings and wishes may afterwards prove not to have been correct. So we may be surprised by an action or utterance of ours, which shows the modality of our inmost self in a new light.

Thus reflections too are representations, and we may classify the psychical facts, found up to now, as follows:

I. representations: A. representations of exterior objects or projective representations, and B. reflections or representations of interior states:

II. feelings and desires (emotional and volitional states).

Besides these two main classes we may distinguish:

III. judgments, mental states in which the soul accepts or rejects representations according to their value, by which we pronounce scientific, aesthetic or ethical appreciations.

The acts of judgments and the volitional states resemble each other, in as far as in both cases the soul affirms or rejects, thus chooses; but on the other hand the obligatory character, typical for the judgment of our reason, forms a sharp difference. This obligatory character has been considered by Kantian philosophy as the link between man and God: that which man feels to be true, beautiful and right, might be mistaken and so have to be changed for other insights; but at all events his intellectual, aesthetic and moral judgments remain unshaken by his caprice; and he still keeps the conviction that by repeated self-criticism and by full experience mankind will get more clearly conscious of the right — and therefore one — canon of truth and morality.

Finally summarising my appreciation of the Vaīśeṣika psychology, we may accredit to this school: 1) the merit of a tripartition of of the psychical phenomena (into intellectual, sentimental and volitional) which is still the most usual in Europe and which, very nearly approaches the right division which was given by F. BRENTANO into representative, affectional and judiciary states: 2) the merit of discriminating in the right way between cognitions on the one, and sentiments &c. on the other side. 3) the merit, in this case, common to all Brahmanic psychology, of keeping up the belief in soul as a substance notwithstanding the attacks, delivered at it from Buddhistic side.



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## CHAPTER V.

### THE TRUSTWORTHY SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.

#### SECTION I.

#### THEORY OF PERCEPTION.

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§ 1. *Sūtras bearing on Pratyakṣa transl. Nanda Lal Sinha.*

- A. IV, 1, 6 External perception [takes place] in respect of an object possessing magnitude, by means of its possession of that which is composed of more substances than one and by means of its colour.
- 7 The non-perception of air, in spite of there being substance-ness and magnitude, is due to the non-existence of the evolution of colour.
- 8 Perception of colour [arises] from its combination with a compound of substances more than two, and from [its possession of] some special characteristic of colour.
- 9 Hereby is explained [perceptual] knowledge in the case of taste, smell and touch.
- 10 Because of the non-existence of this, there is no violation [of the above law of perceptibility in the case of gravity].
- 11 Numbers, magnitudes, separateness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, and action become objects of visual perception, through their combination with substances possessing colour.
- 12 In substances not possessing colour they are not objects of visual perception.
- 13 By this it is explained that knowledge in regard to attribute-ness and existence, is omnisensuous (or of all the senses).

- B. VIII, 1, 1* Cognition [has been] explained among substances.
- 2 Among substances the soul, the mind and [others] are not objects of perception.
  - 3 The mode of the production of cognition is being described, in connection with the differentiation of a particular cognition.
  - 4 Substance is the cause of the production of cognition, where attributes and actions are in contact [with the senses].
  - 5 In consequence of the non-existence of genus and species, cognition [of them] is due to that alone.
  - 6 [Cognition which is produced] in respect of substance, attribute and action, [is] dependent on genus and species.
  - 7 [Cognition] in the case of substance [is] dependent upon substance, attribute and action.
  - 8 [Cognition] dependent upon attribute and action, does not exist in the case of attributes and actions, inasmuch as attribute and action do not exist in attribute and action.
  - 9 The cognition ['it is white'] in respect of a white object [results] from whiteness of [the substance] in which combination [of whiteness] exists and from the cognition of whiteness. These two, [cognition of white object and cognition of whiteness] are related as effect and cause.
- C. VIII, 1, 10* In the case of substances [cognitions are] not causes of one another.
- 11 The sequence of the cognitions of the waterpot, the cloth &c. [results] from the sequence of their causes, due to the non-simultaneity of the causes and not in consequence of the relation of cause and effect [amongst the cognitions].
- D. VIII, 2, 1* 'This', 'that', 'done by you', 'feed him' — such [cognitions] are dependent upon understanding.
- 2 [Such cognitions depend upon previous other cognitions] inasmuch as they appear in respect of objects seen, and do not appear in respect of objects unseen.
  - 3 [The Vaigēśikas apply] the term 'object' to substance, attribute and action.

*E. VIII. 2. 1* In [the topic dealing with the ascertainment of] substances, [the theory] that bodies &c. are a compound of five elements, has been refuted.

5 By reason of its predominance and of possession of smell earth is the material cause of the olfactory sense.

6 In like manner water, fire and air [are the material causes of the sense-organs of taste, colour and touch], inasmuch as there is no difference in the taste, colour and touch [which they respectively possess from what they respectively apprehend].

*F. IX. 1. 1* In consequence of the non-application of action and attribute [to it], [an effect is] non-existent prior [to its production].

2 The existent [becomes] non-existent.

3 [The existent is] a different object [from the non-existent] inasmuch as action and attribute cannot be predicated of the non-existent.

4 The existent also is non-existent.

5 And that which is a different non-existent from these, is [absolutely] non-existent.

6 [‘It is] non-existent’ — such [perceptual cognition] is similar to the perception of the counter-opposite [of non-existence], because [in both cases] there is non-existence of the perception of that which is past and gone, and there is recollection of the past.

7 Similarly [there is perceptual cognition] of [antecedent] non-existence in consequence also of the perceptibility of the existent.

8 Hereby also are explained ‘not-waterpot’, ‘not-cow’, ‘not-*dharma*’.

9 That which has not been produced, does not exist; — this is an identical proposition.

10 The waterpot does not exist in the room — such is [the form of] the negation of association of the existent waterpot with the room.

*G. IX. 1. 11* Perceptual cognition of the soul [results] from a particular conjunction of the soul and the mind in the soul.

12 Perceptual [cognition is] similarly [produced] in the case of the other substances.

G. IX. 1. 13 They whose internal sense-organs are not attached to meditation, are those by whom meditation has been given up. They too [have perception of hidden and distant objects].

14 [Perception] of actions and attributes [arises] from [their] combination with substance.

15 [Perceptual cognition] of the attributes of the soul [results] from [their] combination in the soul.

§ 2. *Quotations from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B.*

B. Notes to passage VIII, 1, 1—9:

„CANDRAKĀNTA TARKĀLAṂKĀRA observes under VIII, 1, 2 that among substances, self, mind and ether are not objects of perception.

„He reads VIII. 1, 9 as two aphorisms, viz. *samacāyinaḥ cchaiti-tyāc cchaityabuddheya cete buddhiḥ* and *te ete kāryakāraṇabhūte*.”

F. „He introduces the topic of non-existence with the observation that non-existence is not the seventh predicable, inasmuch as absolute non-existence, e. g. a castle in the air, is not a predicable at all, while non-existence of the existent, in the form of non-production, destruction and absence of identity cannot exceed the number of the six predicables.

„He interprets IX. 1, 2 and 3 to mean that whatever is non-existent prior to its appearance as an effect, is non-existent only by the nature of an effect, but is really existent at the time by the nature of a cause, and that therefore it is essentially different from absolute non-existence.”

§ 3. *Notes on these sūtras.*

A. Notes to the passage IV, 1, 6 &c.

In sūtra IV, 1, 6 *anekadravyavattvād* is translated by NANDA LAL SINHA as: „by means of its possession of that which is composed by more substances than one”; this rendering is based on the following gloss by CAṆKARA MĪTRA: „*anekam dravyam ācra-yaḥ, tad anekadravyam, tad aśyasti, tad anekadravyavat; tad-  
bhāras* [— *anekadravyavattvam*].” In this explanation *anekadravya* is first accepted as a bahuvrīhi and then *anekadravyavant* as a new derivative; we may however explain *anekadravyavant* as a derivative with superfluous possessive suffix (cf. WACKERNAGEL, *Altindische Gram-  
matik* II, 1, § 53 b) and so we arrive at the translation, formerly

given by Gough „in consequence of its containing substances more than one.” The interpretation by Ćamkara Miĉra presupposes the molecular theory that every solid body consists of molecules, each of which containing at least three atoms. In ĆRIDHARA'S Nyāya-kandāli (p. 188 l. 21) *anekatvargavattvam* is explained as *bhāga-vayavāṅgatatva* 'the inhering in many parts', which is in accordance with Gough's translation (cf. moreover V.S. IV, I, 8).

In sūtra 7 tactile perception is excluded from the general notion of perception: therefore the existence of wind is considered to be known by inference (cf. V.S. II, I, 9). For the interpretation of the term *saṃskṛta* see the Upankāra.

Whereas Nanda Lal Sinha translates *aneka* in sūtra 6 by 'more than one', he uses in sūtra 8 the expression 'more than two', although there is no reason for this variation.

In his gloss on sūtra 9 Ćamkara Miĉra teaches that coexistence with colour is necessary for the perception of any quality, with the exception of touch [with reference to wind]. „*Sparṣātirikṭtānām rūpasāmānādhikaranyam eva bahirādriṇagrāhyatvaprayojakam*". Thus the perception of smell for instance would depend on 1) inherence in an aggregate; 2) coexistence with colour; 3) a particular form in which the smell reveals itself.

Sūtra 10 is explained by Ćamkara Miĉra as two sentences: *Tasyābhicārah*; *Acyabbhicārah*; and these are completed as follows: *tasya rūpatēndriyāṅgasyābhikarasya ca garutve bhāgān na garutvam pratyakṣam; ekaikendriyagrāhyatvam prati rūpatēndriyām pañcēnām jātīnām acyabbhicārah*.

I. e. according to Nanda Lal Sinha's translation:

„Gravity is not perceptible, because of the non-existence in gravity of this, viz. the genus of colourness, &c. and development or appreciability. . . There is 'non-deviation' i. e. unbroken uniformity of the five classes or universals, e. g. colourness &c. towards apprehensibility by each individual sense.”

This interpretation by Ćamkara Miĉra is very improbable. His argumentation is far from clear; it seems to be based on the following idea: each of the five qualities: *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *sparṣa* and *chābda*, has its specific sense-organ. But gravity is something else than these five qualities, thus imperceptible. But what does Ćamkara Miĉra mean by saying that there is no *ulbhava* in gravity? His interpretation tries to ascribe to the Sūtrakāra an idea, pronounced by the more recent Vaiĉṣika-system, for instance by PRAĀSTAPĀDA, viz. that gravity surpasses the reach of the senses; in the same way as wind was considered to be imperceptible, because it is a mere

object of tactile impression and debarr'd from ocular perception, so the quality 'gravity' was also put down as *atindriya*. We have, however, to take refuge in too forced interpretations, for explaining sūtra 10 as referring to gravity. Perhaps we may find its correct explanation by comparing in with Nyāya-kandali p. 188 l. 21: „*Ropasya prakāṣa adbhāva-samādhyaṭa ropasya dharmah, gadabhācāt cāristhe tejasi pratyaśabdhāt*”. If we accept the parallelism between this passage and sūtra IV, 1, 10, the translation of the latter might run:

„Because of the non-existence of this [adbhāva, or *adbhūta*], implied in the term *cipeṣa* of sūtra 5 there is no violation [of the above law of perceptibility in the case of light hidden in water, i. e. of lightning still abiding in the cloud].”

But even with this interpretation it seems doubtful, whether this sūtra has formed part of the oldest redaction of the Darśana.

With reference to sūtra 11 we may notice that only the qualities mentioned in the *virdeṣa* (I, 1, 6) are enumerated, so that e. g. *dravata* & *soḥa* are left out.

B. Notes to the passage VIII, 1, 1—9.

Sūtra VIII, 1, 1 & 2 is a reference to IV, 1, 6—13. Thus adhyāya IV is here explained by the author of this sūtra as bearing upon *dravyas* and not yet on *guṇas*. For him, it seems, the discussion of the qualities did not begin before VII, 1.

For sūtra 2 see here p. 256.

Sūtra 3 could be a reference to III, 1, 18 and III, 2, 1 & 3, where intellection is mentioned (*airdīyate*) as a proof for the existence of soul and internal organ, and at the same time is shown to be dependent in its origin (*airīpātto*) on conjunctions, resident in soul and mind. The Upaskāra, however, explains *uktah* as *ucyate*, i. e. as denoting an incipient action, with the help of Pāṇini III, 1, 71, and considers the *jñānavirdeṣa*, 'characterisation of intellection', to be the passage which now begins.

Since substance, quality and movement are considered to be objectively real, but generality and peculiarity to possess a more subjective nature (*abodhy-apekṣa*) according to I, 1, 5 and I, 2, 3, it is said in VII, 1, 1 & 5 that substance is „a” cause of the arising of the intellections about its qualities and movements, but „the” cause of the arising of intellections about generality and peculiarity.

For sūtra 6—8 see the Upaskāra.

Sūtra 9 is a comments on the three precedent sūtras. In this sūtra the importance of the objective quality and of our possession



of the notion 'generality' of the quality is stated with reference to our perception of an object as characterised by this quality. This theory reminds us of the *dvaita*-speculation of the Bhāṣya. The sūtra is referred to by Praçastapāda in his paragraph on number p. 112 l. 21).

C. Notes to the passage VIII. 1. 10—11.

The sūtras 10 & 11 are not referred to by the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya. They polemise against the Viññānavāda. In the beginning of sūtra 11 *kāraṇāṇyagapāpāt kāraṇakramān* two synonymous readings have been combined. The Upaskāra compares this sūtra with V.S. III. 2, 3 where the non-simultaneity of cognitions is attributed to the influence of the internal organ. By the action of this organ the surrounding objects are only allowed to exercise an influence on our soul successively.

D. Notes to the passage VIII. 2. 1—3.

The sūtras VIII. 2. 1 & 2 bear on the force of pronouns (this, that, you, him); it is not necessary to ascribe, as Çamkara Miçra does, the notion of *vaiçīṣṭavaçīṣṭyañāna* to the Sutrakāra.<sup>1)</sup>

In sūtra 3 substance, quality and action are called objects; implicitly they are placed by this term opposite to generality and peculiarity, which are dependent on intellect (*buddhy-apekṣa*), according to V.S. I. 2, 3.<sup>2)</sup> These three sūtras may be looked upon as an appendix to ālmika 1 of adhyāya VIII.

E. Notes to the passage VIII. 2. 4—6.

In IV. 2. 2—3 an argumentation was given in defence of the thesis that the body can only consist of one element: here in VIII. 2. 4 this argumentation is again mentioned and now applied to the sense-organs.

For sūtra 5 & 6 see the Upaskāra: with *bhūgastra* we may compare e. g. Praçastapādabhāṣya p. 28 l. 6 *jalādya-anabhibhūtaih pāthirācagavair*. In each sense-organ thus the correspondent element must have the predominance.

F. Notes to the passage IX. 1. 1—10.

The sūtras 1—5 have been discussed here p. 119 &c. We have seen there, that according to the Upaskāra

sūtra	1	refers to	<i>prāgasat</i> (anterior non-existence)
	2—3		<i>dhyamsa</i> (posterior non-existence)
	4		<i>anyonyābhāva</i> (reciprocal non-existence)
	5		<i>atyantābhāva</i> (absolute non-existence).

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here p. 117 § 2.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. here p. 116 § 2.

If we follow the same commentator for the next sūtras, then sūtra 6 refers to the perception of *dharmāsa*

7	..	<i>prāgabdhāva</i>
8	..	<i>anyo'nyābhāva</i>
9	..	<i>atyantābhāva</i>

10 forms an egression.

On the whole the meaning of these sūtras is uncertain, especially the interpretation of sūtra 9 as referring to absolute non-existence seems very forced. But let us first consider Čamkara Mičra's glosses in detail. According to him the statement of non-existence is a result of perception and inference. Thus we meet already in the comments on sūtra 2 with the expression: „*yathā kārāṇācyāpārāt pūrvaṃ pratiyakṣānumānābhāgāṃ kāryasyāsattvāṃ pramāṇyate*”, i. e. As the non-existence of the effect, prior to the operation of the cause, is proved by perception and inference, &c.

Thus at the end of his commentary on sūtra 6 Čamkara Mičra mentions a *tarka* (reductio ad absurdum) as an auxiliary to perception. Further we may notice in this comments that *virodhin* is explained in the sense of *pratiyogin* (counter-opposite) of the later Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya. The expression in the sūtra: „*asa-iti...* *virodhipratyakṣavat*”, therefore means: [the perception of] a ‘non-existence’ [e. g. a non-existent pot] is of the same kind as the perception of the counter-opposite [in the quoted example: of the pot].

In sūtra 7 *abhāva* is explained as *prāgabdhāva*. Similar explanations which presuppose that the most important word is left out by the Sūtrakāra, have already been met with before (cf. V.S. IX. 1. 5 with Upaskāra). The *va* at the end of the sūtra is explained as bearing upon *pratiyogi-smaraṇa* and the *tarka*, formulated at the end of the commentary on sūtra 6. Now this *tarka* is quite an invention of the commentator's, for there is not the slightest allusion to it in sūtra 6 itself. As for *pratiyogi-smaraṇa* we can really with some effort distil it from the precedent sūtra, where we meet with the two expressions *bhūta-smṛti* and *virodhi-pratyakṣa*, and where according to the commentator *virodhin* means *pratiyogin*.

In sūtra 8 according to the commentator the perceptibility of reciprocal non-existence is taught. Now *aḡḡatāḡ* and *agatāḡ* are terms, made by logicians, to indicate all objects with the exclusion, respectively, of pots and cows: let us admit that all these objects are perceptible. The case is more difficult with *adharma*: according to the ordinary use of the term *adharma* means demerit, i. e. one of the two forms of the unseen quality of soul. In order to give the wished for meaning to the sūtra Čamkara Mičra explains *adharma*

as non-merit, and paraphrases it by „knowledge, pleasure &c.”, which are the perceptible qualities of the soul.

The interpretation of sūtra 9 as bearing upon absolute non-existence demands still more scholastic skill. Our interpreter spins out the words *abhūtam nāsti* and *anarthhātaram* of the sūtra into five other formulae:

- 1) *bhūtam i tīrāṃ nāsti* i. e. a formulation of posterior non-existence.
- 2) *ibham nāsti*, i. e. a formulation of absolute non-existence.
- 3) *abhūtam*, the not being based on origination and annihilation (?)
- 4) *anarthhātaram* = *valabhiṣṭyākam*, i. e. „meaning the same”, e. g. ‘water is not earth’ and ‘earth is not water’ mean the same thing.
- 5) *nāsti*.

The last formula is introduced in the following passage (Upaskāra p. 353 l. 3) *Yad vastu yatra na kadāpi bhaviṣyati, na ca kadācid bhūtaḥ, tasya vastuḥ tatrātīrāntābhāvo mantavyaḥ*;

*bhūtabhaviṣyatoḥ ca tatra pradhvaṃsa-prāyabhāvācūlambana eva, tatrādhikāraḥ ‘nāsti’ ‘ti pratīyati*;

*ata evāgam ātīyāntikaḥ traikālika ity abhidhīyate*.

Of these three paragraphs the first and last refer to absolute non-existence, the second to temporal non-existence. The second paragraph, which with its repeated *tatra* is rather difficult, may be translated as follows:

„The cognition in the form that ‘it does not exist’ in a certain abode, is based on the posterior or anterior non-existence of that which has been or [respectively] will be in that abode.”

How all these deviations may be called an explanation of sūtra 9, will of course never be clear to a European reader.

Sūtra 10 is rather remarkable, because it shows more understanding about negation than the traditional Vaiṣeṣika teaching of the four kinds of non-existence. Non-existence is a relational notion which can be applied to any relation. Thus we can also deny a spacial relation between two objects. In the Upaskāra two attempts are made to reconcile the case of sūtra 10 with the traditional fourfold classification.

When we now look back at the four sūtras 6—9, it seems doubtful whether the four kinds of non-existence were originally taught here. Sūtra 9 is only a paraphrase of the term *abhūta*; the mentioning of this word is due to the words *agatāḥ*, *agataḥ* in the precedent sūtra. It seems probable to me, that the Sūtrakāra only taught in this passage the *asatkāryavāda*, so that e. g. sūtra 4 is only a subtle variation of sūtra 2 and sūtra 5 a later addition, whilst the sūtras 8 and 9 have nothing to do with *anyonyābhāva* and *ātīyāntikam asat*.

#### 4. Notes to the passage IX, 1. 11—15.

This passage is interpreted by the Upaskāra as referring to the perception of yogins: this is in accordance with the paragraph of the Praçastapādabhāṣya on perception. In the sūtras themselves it is not clearly said, for the sūtra 13 is rather strangely inserted and is enigmatic. We shall follow again first the interpretation by Çaṅkara Miçra. He begins in his comments on sūtra 11 by dividing the yogins into two classes: 1) the yogins who are called *yukta* and whose internal organ is still fixed (*samāhita*): 2) the yogins who have risen higher, who are called *viryukta* and whose internal organ need no longer remain fixed. The sūtras 11 & 12 bear on the *yukta yoginaḥ*. In these yogins there arises a special conjunction between mind and soul, a conjunction which owes its origin to merit, consequence of yoga. By this *ātmanāmasoh samyogaḥ* they obtain a perception of the soul, that is to say according to Çaṅkara Miçra: „of their own soul as well as of the soul of others.”

In sūtra 12 the *dravyāntarāṇi*: „the other substances” are explained by Çaṅkāra Miçra as: the atoms, the mind, wind, [mathematical] space, time and [physical] space. The commentator thinks that moreover different invisible qualities &c. are included in this word. „*Dravyapadeṇa tadupaśaṅgakarmanasāmānyāntarām . . . samgrahaḥ.*”

Sūtra 13 is explained as bearing on the yogins in the second stage. They have obtained several magical powers (*çarīrasiddhi* and *indriyasiddhi*), by which they feel that simple fixation of mind is insufficient; and thus with the aid of their superhuman powers „they make the whole universe of things, hidden and distant (*vyavahitaṃ viprakṣaṇaṃ ca*) objects of their perception. (On this last gloss Nanda Lal Sinha's translation of *teṣāṃ ca* is based).

Although sūtra 14 is clear in itself, the Indian commentator succeeds in combining it with some far off mythological conceptions. The yogins see (he says) the qualities and movements of the invisible substances (atoms, souls, minds &c.), because they inhere in their abodes; but this perception takes place in two ways: sometimes the yogin's own internal organ is conjoined with these objects, sometimes his soul uses „sterile minds” (*paṇḍitamānāṃsi*), i. e. minds which do not belong any more to souls, and these minds are conjoined with the objects.

For sūtra 15 see the Upaskāra itself.

The strange way in which sūtra 13 is inserted in this passage (for *tat* in *tatsamavayūt* of sūtra 14 refers to *dravyāntarāveṣa* of sūtra 12) seems to indicate that the tradition of this passage is not quite authentic. If we leave out sūtra 13, we may explain the remaining sūtras as follows:

Originally there were in the Vaiśeṣika school two branches: one of which taught the imperceptibility of soul (V.S. VIII, 1, 2), the other the perceptibility (IX, 1, 11 &c.). In these last-mentioned sūtras the reflection or internal perception by which we know our internal states and the substratum of these internal states was considered to be coordinate with external perception, and the manner in which psychical qualities are perceived (i. e. reflected upon) was compared with the process by which we perceive the qualities and movements of external things. But the first of the two branches got the upper hand; and the aphorisms, current in the second branch were accepted, but changed in their meaning. So it was taught that the existence of soul can only be inferred, or perceived with the aid of magical perception. This choice was natural enough. For also tactile perception in the case of wind was not considered to rank equally with visual perception, no wonder that reflection was underrated.

§ 4. *The paragraph on Pratyakṣa in the Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya*  
book III chapter 2 § 214.

Introduction.

p. 186 l. 12. Etymological definition of *pratyakṣa*.

l. 12—13. Enumeration of the six sense-organs (i. e. the five external senses and mind).

Ordinary human perception.

l. 15—16. *Śarīrapaṅgalocanamūtram* of substances described [i. e. according to the Nyāya-kandālī p. 189 l. 16 *śarīrapaṅgalocanamūtram*]. cf. V.S. IV, 1, 6. Conditions: (*mahattra*), *anekadravyavattva*, *udbhātarpāpakaṇa*. Process: a fourfold set of conjunctions [cf. Nyāya-kandālī p. 188 l. 26]. In this passage the meaning of *devīdhe* after *dravye* is not clear, it is not referred to in the Nyāya-kandālī.

l. 16—19. [*śarīrapaṅgalocanamūtram*] *pratyakṣam* described, cf. V.S. VIII, 1, 6.

l. 19—21. the perception of colour, taste, smell and touch, cf. V.S. IV, 1, 8 & 9.

l. 21—p. 187 l. 1. the perception of sound.

p. 187 l. 1—3. the perception of number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, farness, nearness, adhesion, fluidity, speed and movement takes place by ocular and tactile perception (cf. V.S. IV, 1, 11).

p. 187 l. 3—4. The [internal] perception of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and exertion, due to the conjunction of soul and mind. [Although these qualities are implicitly considered to be perceived in the passage on *ātman* V.S. III. 2, 4, yet nowhere states the Sūtra explicitly that 'reflection' is based on the conjunction of soul and mind].

l. 5—7 Generalities such as 'existence, substance-ness' are perceived by the same sense-organ which grasps their abodes (cf. V.S. IV, 1, 13 and VIII. 1. 5).

The perception of the yogins.

l. 7—11. The perception of *yuktā yogināḥ* bears on their own souls, other souls, (physical) space, (mathematical) space, time, wind and internal organs: on the qualities and movements, generalities and distinctions which are inherent in these substances: on inherence in general. It is due to the internal organ when helped by a *dharma* which originates from yoga. (Cf. V.S. IX. 1. 13 and *Upaskāra*).

l. 11—13. The perception of *viyuktā yogināḥ* bears on things which are too subtle, hidden or remote. It takes place by a fourfold set of conjunctions.

[NOTE. For the difference between *yuktāḥ* and *viyuktā yogināḥ* cf. *Nyāya-kandalī* p. 198 l. 5].

Definitions of *pramāṇa* &c.

l. 13—15. First definition of *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *pramāṭṛ* & *pramīti*.

*pramāṇa* = vague knowledge with regard to generalities and distinctions

*prameya* = substances &c.

*pramāṭṛ* = soul

*pramīti* = the knowledge which has substances &c. for objects.

l. 15—17. Note to this first definition.

l. 17—p. 180 l. 2. Second definition of these four notions:

*pramāṇa* = the trustworthy knowledge which arises with reference to all categories (owing to a fourfold set of conjunctions)

*prameya* = the categories: substances &c.

*pramāṭṛ* = soul

*pramīti* = the insight into the good, bad and indifferent qualities of things.

## SECTION 2.

## THEORY OF ANUMANA

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing upon the mark of inference.*

- A.* IX. 2. 1 It is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, contradictory to, or combined to, this' — such is 'cognition' produced by the mark of inference.
- 2 'It is its' — this cognition is sufficient to cause an elation to be made, whereas the introduction of the relation of effect and cause arises from 'a particular' member [of the argument].
- 4 Reason, description, mark, proof, instrument --- these are not antonyms.
- B.* III. 1. 9 The conjunct, the combined, the co-combined and the contradictory also [are marks of inference].
- 10 One effect [may be the mark of inference] of another effect.
- 11 The opposite i. e. the non-existent is a mark of the existent.
- 12 That which has taken place is a mark of that which has not taken place.
- 13 That which has taken place, [is a mark] of that which has taken place.
- 14 [These are valid marks], because the characteristic of an inferential mark is that it is preceded by [the recollection of the] universal relation [of itself and of that of which it is the mark]
- C.* II. 1. 8 That it has horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the extremity, and a dewlap — such is the admitted mark of being a cow.
- 9 And touch [is a mark] of air.
- 10 And it is not the touch of the visible [substances]; hence the mark [of the inference] of air is not the mark of the visible [substances].
- 15 There being no perception of the association [i. e. universal relation] with air, there is no visible mark [of the existence of air].

C. II, 1. 16 And by inference by analogy, air is not proved as a particular substance, but as a substance only.

17 Therefore the name, air, is proved by the Veda.

D. III, 2, 6 There is no visible mark [of the existence of the soul], because there being contact [of the senses with the body of Yajñadatta], perception does not arise that this soul is Yajñadatta.

7 And from a commonly observed mark [there is] no [inference of anything in] particular.

8 Therefore [the soul is] proved by revelation.

### § 2. *Introductory remark.*

A full explanation of Indian logic can only be obtained by comparing it with the European treatment of this science. This comparison will be given in the fifth section of this chapter. A few preliminary remarks, however, may be inserted here.

The Indian syllogism (*anumāna*) combines a deduction with a superficial induction. The form of the deduction resembles more our hypothetical than our categorical syllogism, although, as a rule, it is compared with the latter.

In the sūtra of KĀYĀDA'S the main notion of logic is the *līnga*. In the hypothetical syllogism:

If something is *A*, then it is *B*.

this thing is *A*,

therefore it is *B*.

the term *A* is called the *līnga*. Thus for instance in the much quoted example (which is here given only in its deductive part):

if something has smoke, then it has fire,

this mountain has smoke,

therefore this mountain contains fire.

the smoke is the probans for the fire.

We may distinguish in the relation between the probans (e. g. the smoke) and the probandum (in the quoted example the fire) as many kinds as there are species of relations in general. But also the source of evidence, possibility &c. of this relation can be different. Either the relation can be of an axiomatical, or of an inductual character (cf. the fifth section of this chapter). We may call it a shortcoming in Indian philosophy that it has not made sufficient distinctions in the logical value of universal propositions.



§ 3. *Explanation of the sūtras quoted*

A. IX, 2, 1—3. Probantial cognition *hānīkām jñānam* can bear according to this sūtra on four kinds of relation: inference, conjunction, causality and contradiction *virodha*. In the Upaskāra the last-mentioned notion is explained as follows: NANDA LAI SINHA p. 306.

„Inference from a contradictory or repugnant object is such as the inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes &c. from the observation of an excited snake which is its natural antagonist.”

If this explanation of ČAMKARA MĪCRA'S is right, then the *virodha-anumāna* would only be a special case of *kāraṇānumāna*, since the excitement of the snake is a consequence of the ichneumon's presence.

In sūtra 2 *kāraṇādārasambandikal* stands as Čamkara Mīcra rightly observes for all the relations, enumerated in the first sūtra these relations are only examples of the form which the probantial cognition may have. *Acayacāt* seems to be an adverb, in the meaning of „partly”. Thus the sūtra may be translated:

„It is its, [this cognition is sufficient to cause an relation to be made], whereas [the introduction of] the relation of effect and cause takes place with reference to a part [i. e. does not treat of the subject completely].”

The explanation of *acayaca* as one of the five members of the more recent *parārthānumāna* is very doubtful.

Sūtra 4 seems to indicate that in the days of the Sutrakāra the terms, used in logic, were not quite settled.

B. The passage III, 1, 9 &c. forming part of the discussion of *ātman*, is parallel to IX, 2, 1 &c. In sūtra 9 we find here again an enumeration of the kinds of relations which may be found in probantial cognition. We meet here with conjunction, and contradiction; inference is given in two forms, simple inference and co-inference; causality is left out. Since causality in the Vaiṣeṣika system is really based on inference or conjunction, this omission cannot surprise us. (Cf. here p. 122 § 3 and p. 141).

Sūtra 10 states explicitly co-inference as a form of probantial cognition.

Sūtra 11—13 are explained by Čamkara Mīcra as giving examples of *virodhānumāna*.

In sūtra 14 *prasiddhi* is explained in the Upaskāra as *svatṛṣṇānāṃ vyāptih*; it would be historically safer to translate „certain, trustworthy knowledge.” *Prasiddhi*, in this sūtra is opposed to *aprasiddha* in sūtra 15.

C. The passage II. 1. 8 &c., bearing on air and explained here p. 158 sub *A3*, is also of importance for the notion *līṅga*. In introducing sūtra 8 we may notice that the application of a general term to an individual object is indeed cognate to inference. Thus if the definition of a cow, given here by the Vaiçeśika, were right according to zoology, then we could formulate the following inference:

if an animal has horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the extremity and a dewlap, then it is a cow:

this animal has horns, a hump &c.;

thus it is a cow.

After this explanation of *līṅga*, the Sūtrakāra says that touch is the probans of air. In sūtra 15 and 16 the *līṅgāni* are then divided into *dr̥ṣṭāni* and *adr̥ṣṭāni līṅgāni*. Sūtra 46 is explained by Çaṅkara Miçra as:

*yasmād viçeṣāṅkūreṇa nānumitih, tasmād vāyur iti nāmāgamikam.*

This insertion of *nāma* in the sūtra is required by the following sūtra, so that we have to accept Çaṅkara Miçra's interpretation.

D. The passage III. 2, 6 &c., dealing with soul, is parallel with II. 1, 8. Yet the conclusions differ: in one case the name is supposed to be proved by the Veda, in the other case soul itself is taught to be *āgamika*.

#### § 4. *Sūtras referring to the term 'Anapadeça'.*

III. 1, 3 Perception [as a mark inferring the body or the senses as its substratum] [is] a false mark.

4 [The body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception], because there is no consciousness in the causes [i. e. in the component parts of the body].

5 Because [there would be] consciousness in the effects.

6 And because it is not known [that any minute degree of consciousness exists in the waterpot &c.]

7 A mark is certainly something else [than that of which it is a mark]. Hence [a mark which is identical with the thing of which it is a mark, is] no mark [at all].

8 [Although a mark is quite different from that of which it is a mark, still they are not wholly unconnected], for [any] one thing cannot be a mark of [any] other thing.

15 The unproved is a false mark; the non-existent and the dubious also are false marks.

16 Because [it] has horns, therefore [it is] a horse.

III, 1, 17 And 'because [it has horns, therefore it is] a cow' such is the example of a many-sided [mark].

18 That [i. e. knowledge] which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense and the object is other [than a false mark].

§ 5. *Quotations from Nanda Lal Sinha's Appendix B.*

NOTES on the passage III, 1, 3--8

„CANDRAKĀNTA TARKALĀMKARA interprets III, 1, 3 to mean that the sense or the object cannot be a mark for the inference of the self.

„He reads III, 1, 5 and 6 as one aphorism and explains it in the sense that as cognition is found within one effect e. g. the body, and is not found within another effect, e. g. a jar, therefore, it follows that there can be no cognition in their combinative causes (which must be the same in both cases).

„He explains III, 1, 7 thus: 'Something quite different is the mark of inference of the self, the sense or the object cannot be such a mark. What this 'something quite different' is, is explained in the 18th aphorism of this chapter.'

NOTE on the passage III, 1, 15--18.

„Candrakānta Tarkāṇkara splits up III, 1, 15 into two aphorisms: '*aprasiddho 'anupadeśaḥ*' and '*asambodhaya 'ānupadeśaḥ*'."

§ 6. *Explanation of the Sūtras, quoted in § 4.*

The passages III, 1, 3--8 and 15--18, which treat of *anupadeśa* false probans in connection with the proof for the existence of *ātman* are rather enigmatic.

In the first place we must notice that the translation of sūtra 3 by NANDA LAL SINHA is not quite clear. In order to correct this, I want first to quote the two first sūtras of this adhyāya, which I should like to translate as follows:

Sūtra 1. [The existence of] the senses and the objects is certainly known.

Sūtra 2. This certain knowledge about the senses and the objects is the probans for something else (*arthantāra*) than these senses and objects.

ÇĀṆKARA MĪMĀṂSA in introducing sūtra 3, makes an opponent say:

*Yanu çaritam indriyāṇi cā prasiddher āçraya 'ste,*

which thesis is supported by the following argumentation:

*cakṣaṇam çarīragrahaḥ,*

*tatkārgatvāt,*

*tadrūpādicat.*

The sūtra, then, is interpreted as a refutation of that argument:  
*Tatkāryatvam prātipajanyajñānādāc anālikūṭatīatīrād anapaḍeṣaḥ.*

The three quotations are translated by Nanda Lal Sinha as follows:

[Opponent]: „Let the body or the senses be the foundation of this *prasiddhi*...

consciousness is an attribute of the body,

being its effect,

like its colour.

[Siddhāntin]: The being an effect of the [body or the senses] is the mere semblance of a mark, in as much as it applies to the cognition, produced by a lamp, and is therefore multifarious.”

Thus following the Upaskāra, we have to translate sūtra 3 as follows:

„Consciousness (*prasiddhi* or *caitanya*), [considered as an effect of the body or the senses], is a false mark [with regard to the proving of the thesis that consciousness is a quality of the body or of the senses].”

Although the sūtra is thus clear, the interpretation demands too many insertions for us to call it trustworthy. With Čaṅkara Miçra's interpretation of this sūtra his explanation of the whole passage III. 1. 3---8 is connected. Here we can base our discussion on Nanda Lal Sinha's translation which clearly and correctly follows the Upaskāra.

Sūtra 4 consists of the compound *kāraṇajñāna*: if we had met with it elsewhere than in a philosophical work, we should have immediately translated it as: „ignorance about the causes”, the rendering, given by Nanda Lal Sinha, runs: „because there is no consciousness in the causes”, thus *jñāna* is taken as synonymous with *prasiddhi* in sūtra 1; further the first member *kāraṇa* is accepted as a locative in the strictest sense of the word.

The explanation of sūtra 5 is similar with the exception that the translation demands an irrealis: „there would be”. This difficulty could be removed by joining the sūtras 5 and 6 and accepting the interpretation by Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra (see here § 5).

Also the sūtras 7 and 8 require great insertions on the basis of the Upaskāra.

It is not possible for me to give an easier interpretation of the text, unless I may make use of an emendation, namely the omission of sūtra 6.

According to my idea Čaṅkara Miçra's interpretation of our passage and the insertion of sūtra 6 are both due to the wish of finding in the Vaiçṣika Darçana a passage parallel to the one,

occurring in the Nyāya Darśana, which refutes the theory that soul and body are identical. I myself should like to explain the passage as follows:

In the sūtras 1 and 2 the Siddhāntin infers the existence of soul from the existence of our knowledge about the objects and the senses. An opponent contradicts this view

Sūtra 3: „This is a false probans [i. e. this probans, viz. the existence of our knowledge about objects and the senses, is a false probans with reference to the thesis that there is a separate soul].”

Sūtra 4: „Because we have no knowledge about the cause [i. e. about any abode or substance in which the *prasiḍḍhi* of sūtra 1 and 2 inheres].”

Sūtra 5: „Because we possess only knowledge about the effect [i. e. about the inhering quality].”

Sūtra 7: „One thing as the probans [of another], this is a false probans” [i. e. We may not infer one thing — *arthāntaram* of sūtra 2 — from another, thus neither an unknown cause from the existence of the effect].

Sūtra 8: „One thing [considered as the probans] of another thing is a false probans.” [The sūtra is synonymous with, and perhaps an old gloss on sūtra 7].

After this wrong theory of inference, given by the opponent in the sūtras 3—8, the Siddhāntin gives the true theory of *hīṇa* and *lingābhāsa* in the passage III, 1, 9 - 17. Of these the sūtras 9—14 have been explained in a previous paragraph.

With reference to sūtra 15 we may notice that it contains two parts: a definition of the term *anapa-leṣa* and a division of this *anapa-leṣa* into two kinds *asan* and *sanatigḍḍhaḥ*, sūtra 16 contains the example of the former kind and sūtra 17 of the latter.

The interpretation of sūtra 18 may run as follows:

„That [i. e. knowledge which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense and the object], is that something else [*anyat* = *arthāntaram* of sūtra 2, which proves the existence of the soul].”

The sūtra states thus the correctness of the proof given in the two first sūtras of the adhyāya.

### § 7. The paragraphs in the Praçastapāda-Bhāṣya on inference.

Inference is discussed in Praçastapāda-Bhāṣya book III chapter 2 in two passages § 22—26 and § 35—42. See here book IV section III.

A The former passage treats of the probans, the latter of the complete Indian syllogism in its traditional fivefold form. The theory

of the probantial mark is based on KĀṢĀDA'S Sūtra: the theory of syllogism on the Nyāya Darśana.

§ 22 gives a definition of *līṅgikam jñānam*, § 23 consists of two śloka. The first śloka contains a definition of *līṅga*, the probantial mark:

- a. it is found in the *anumeya* [which term means here the *pakṣa* or the subject-matter of the discussion],
- b. it is found in the *taḍ-āucita* [i. e. *sapakṣa* or positive instances, i. e. instances in which the *sādhya* occurs],
- c. it is absent in *taḍ-abhāva* [i. e. *vipakṣa* or negative instances, i. e. instances in which the *sādhya* is absent].

The second śloka divides the false marks into three kinds: *viruddha* (contrary), *asiddha* (not-accepted, non-existent), *sanliṅgha* (doubtful). This division is attributed to KĀṢYAPA i. e. Kāṇāda (cf. Bhāṣya III 2 § 25); that is to say, it is based on a wrong explanation of V.S. III, 1, 15.

The next paragraphs in the Bhāṣya (24 and 25) are commentaries on the two śloka of § 23. In § 26 we first meet with an example of the application (*vidhi*) of a probantial mark:

if smoke is somewhere, then there is fire;

if there is somewhere no fire, then there is no smoke.

[NOTE: Thus the *sapakṣa*, mentioned in the first hypothetical proposition, are those instances — with the exception of the *pakṣa* — where both smoke and fire are met with: the *vipakṣa*, mentioned in the second hypothetical proposition, are those instances where the probandum, in the case quoted, the fire, is absent].

Then § 26 gives a formulation of this *vidhi*: the statement which follows: *evam sarvatra deśakālācīnābhūtam itarasya līṅgam*, is parallel with V.S. III, 1, 7 and 8 according to their probable original signification. Next to this the Bhāṣyakāra states that the formula V.S. IX, 2, 1 is only illustrative. Finally the *līṅgāni* are divided into two kinds, the *adṛṣṭam līṅgam* is for instance met with: when somebody, having first learnt in one specimen of a cow that this animal has a dewlap, afterwards on seeing an animal with a dewlap, infers that it is a cow.

[Thus when his argumentation runs:

if an animal has a dewlap, then it is a cow,

this animal has a dewlap,

ergo it is a cow].

The *adṛṣṭam līṅgam* is met with e. g., when somebody, having observed in a few cases that the husbandman, warrior and merchant

work for a certain aim, afterwards on seeing an ascetic exerting himself, concludes that also this religious man strives for an aim.

According to the Bhāṣya the difference between the two *hīṇam* is, that the ascertained *prastūṭha* and inferred *śūnya* cases of the *dṛṣṭam hīṇam* are of the same kind *atyanta-jātābheṇa*; whereas the ascertained and inferred cases of the *adṛṣṭam hīṇam* are of dissimilar kinds *atyanta-jātābheṇa*.

The paragraph ends with two sets of definitions of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa* with reference to *anumāna*.

B. In the second passage § 34 Ap. we first meet with a definition of *parārtānumāna*, it is the communication in a fivefold form of a truth, reached for ourselves by *parthogamāna*, to somebody who doubts, has a wrong notion or is ignorant about the matter. The following paragraphs give definitions of the five members of syllogism. Moreover we find here explanations of the fallacies occurring in the thesis (§ 35), in the *apadeṣa* or statement of the probantial mark (§ 37), and in the examples (§ 39). For the present I refer the reader to the table, given here in book IV section IV letter F, whilst in the next paragraphs I shall give a translation of two passages of some importance in the paragraph on *apadeṣābhāsa*.

In the second half of § 41 we find a summary of the theory of the five *avayavas*. In the following table I give the example which PRAÇASTAPĀDA uses here, and add in the second column the terms, applied by the Bhāṣyakāra himself and in the third column the terms, occurring in the Nyāya-kandali.

<i>çabala anityaḥ</i>	<i>pratijñā</i>	<i>pratijñā</i>
<i>prayatnānantarīyakatvāt.</i>	<i>apadeṣa</i>	<i>hetu</i>
<i>īha yut prayatnānantarīyakam, tāt</i>		
<i>anityam dṛṣṭam, yathā ghaṭaḥ.</i>	<i>sādharmyena</i>	}
	<i>nīlārçanam</i>	
		<i>udāharana</i>
<i>anityam aprayatnānantarīyakam dṛṣṭam,</i>		
<i>yathākūçam.</i>	<i>sādharmyena</i>	}
	<i>nīlārçanam</i>	
		..
<i>tathā ca prayatnānantarīyakaḥ çabalo</i>		
<i>dṛṣṭo, na ca tathākūçavad aprayat-</i>		
<i>nānantarīyakaḥ çabalaḥ.</i>	<i>anusandhāna</i>	<i>upanaya</i>
<i>Tasmād anityaḥ çabalaḥ.</i>	<i>pratyimāṇya</i>	<i>nigama</i>

When we analyse this example, then we shall notice that the *anumāna*, as thought by Praçastapāda, is a combination of deduction and superficial induction. It is asked to prove that sound is transient. This is done by the following syllogism:

if something follows directly on a human effort, then it is transient,

a sound follows directly on a human effort. Ergo: sound is transient.

But in the Indian *anumāna*, also a supposed proof for the general premise is given. This is done by putting first this general premise in two forms: 1. a hypothetical proposition with positive members. 2. the inversion of this proposition with negated members. Thus the proposition, „if something follows directly on a human effort, then it is transient”, becomes: „if something is not transient, then it does not follow directly on a human effort.”

According to the logical laws of immediate inference (see here section 5 § 3) these two propositions are identical. Indian logic, now, thinks it necessary to prove both forms, but by (in practice) a very insufficient means, that is to say by one example. Thus the proposition: „if something follows directly &c.” is supposed to be proved by the example of the pot, which is baked by the potter and transient: and the negated proposition by the example of (physical) space, which is eternal and independent of human activity.

According to Praçastapāda (cf. here section 4 § 5) an *anumāna* is only trustworthy, when an example (besides the *pakṣa*, the object for which the quality must be proved) can be quoted in behalf of the positive proposition, and an example on behalf of the proposition in its inversed, negated form, and no counter-examples exist in both respects. The more recent Vaigēśika-Nyāya school was generally satisfied, when the last and one of the two first conditions were fulfilled. <sup>1)</sup>

§ 8. *First egression in the paragraph in the Bhāṣya which treats of Apadeṣābhāsa.*

(Praçastapādabhāṣya p. 238 l. 20 &c.)

[Definition of *sandigdha*]. That probans which exists in the *anumeya* [here = *pakṣa*] and is common to objects homogeneous and heterogeneous with this [*pakṣa*], is *sandigdha*, because it gives rise to doubt (*sandeha*). For instance:

because [this animal] has horns,  
therefore it is a cow.

[Opponent]: Some say: when two probantial marks which are contradictory (*viruddha*) to each other, but possess the characteristics

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here section 4 § 5.



described, then this is another form of *sandigdha*, because here a doubt (*sandeha*) arises. For instance: [there is such a *sandeha*] with reference to the *mutatra* (limited extension) and *amūrtatra* of the internal organ, [either of which can be upheld, respectively] by reason of its aptibility for movement or the absence of touch in it.

[Defendent]: But we say: this [simultaneous occurrence (*sannipāta*) of *kriyāvatteva* and *asparṣavatteva*] is *asādhārāṇa* [i. e. does not allow *manas* to be both *mūrtā* and *amūrtā*], because one of these two contradictory opinions (*pakṣa*) cannot exist, just as little as an object can be simultaneously invisible and perceptible, and thus [this case] is *anadhyavasāya* [i. e. it is not an instance of *saṃcaya*, the not being able to decide in the affirmative or negative, but of *anadhyavasāya*, uncertainty in general].

[Opponent]. But in the *śāstra* [i. e. *Vaiṣeṣika Sūtra*] the *ubhayaathā darśanam* (the seeing of a thing in two respects) is often called a cause of *saṃcaya*.

[Defendent]: No, [you are wrong]: doubt arises from the seeing of a twofoldness of objects; in the arising of doubt the seeing of a twofoldness of objects is the cause; but in as far as these two [probantia, e. g. *kriyāvatteva* and *asparṣavatteva*] are of equal force, their mutual repugnance will not yet lead to certainty (*nirṇaya*), but not be the cause of *saṃcaya*. But moreover these two probantia [*kriyāvatteva* and *asparṣavatteva*] do not possess equal force, for one of the two statements about the *anumeya* [scil. the thesis that *manas* is of definite size] is contradicted by *āgama* [i. e. according to the *Nyāya-kandālī* by *Vaiṣ. Sūtra VII, 1, 23*]; thus it is merely a kind of *viruddha* (contradictory form of fallacy).

§ 9. *Second egression in the paragraph in the Bhāṣya which deals with Apadeṣābhāsa.*

(Praṣastapādabhāṣya p. 239 l. 10 &c.)

[Definition of *anadhyavasāya*]: That [probans] which is present in the *anumeya* [i. e. *pakṣa*], but absent both in the homogeneous and heterogeneous instances, is called the *anadhyavasāya* (not yet settled), because it gives rise to *anadhyavasāya*, in as far as it falls short in one of the two required respects, for instance:

the effect is existent [before the arising],

because it originates.

[the notions 'effect' and 'something which originates' are identical].

This form of fallacy is included in the formula [of Vaic. Sūtra III, 1, 15]: *aprasiddho 'napadeśah'.*

[Opponent]: But this kind of fallacy is mentioned in the cūtra as a cause of doubt, namely in the words [V.S. II, 2, 22]: *tulyajātigeṣu arthāntarabhūteṣu viśeṣasyabhayaṭhā dṛṣṭatvāt.*<sup>1)</sup>

[Defendent]: No, [you are wrong], for the meaning of the passage is otherwise. For although it is accepted that [there would be] no arising of doubt [as to whether sound is a substance, quality or movement], if we could perceive some characteristic mark (*viśeṣa*) in sound, yet mere audibleness [which is identical with the notion of 'sound'] would not suffice to characterise it as either a substance [or quality or movement]: but only a [more] general notion [to which sound is subordinate] could suffice. Why? [The answer is given by the sūtra quoted]: *tulyajātigeṣu* &c. i. e. ...because any [supposed] characteristic is seen on both sides: in the category [which is supposed to be] homogeneous as well as in any other category — [which means]: in all single species of substance &c. This is, however, no cause for [merely twofold] doubt, [but for vague uncertainty]: since otherwise the unwished consequence would be that doubt would exist with reference to the full six categories. Therefore doubt only arises with reference to a general notion. [i. e. could only arise, if we had first found the more general notion to which sound is subordinate].

### SECTION 3.

#### THE PRAMĀNAS WHICH OTHER SCHOOLS ACCEPT BESIDES PERCEPTION AND INFERENCE.

##### § 1. *Sūtras bearing upon Śabda as a Pramāṇa.*

A. VII, 2, 14 [There can be no conjunction of sound or words with objects, because (conjunction) is an attribute.

15 Attribute also is known [to be an object denoted by word], or is established [by word].

16 Because [word and object are] inert.

17 [Word and object are not in conjunction], also because in the case of a non-existent object there is such application [of word] as '[It] does not exist'.

1) Cf. here p. 171.

- A. VII, 2, 18 [Therefore], word and object are unrelated.  
 19 [Cognition of conjunction results] from [that e. g.] the staff which is in conjunction [with the hand of a man]; and [of combination] from a distinguishing element which is in combination [with the whole].  
 20 The intuition of object from word [takes place] according to the direction [of God].
- B. IX, 2, 3 Hereby [i. e. by the explanation of inference] verbal [cognition] is explained.
- C. 1, 1, 3 The authoritativeness of the Veda [arises from its] being the word of God [or as being an exposition of *dharma*].  
 X, 2, 9 The authoritativeness of the Veda [follows] from its being the word of God.
- D. II, 1, 17 Therefore, the name 'air' is proved by the Veda.  
 18 But name and effect are the mark [of the existence] of beings distinguished from ourselves.  
 19 Because name and effect follow from perception.
- E. III, 2, 8 Therefore [the soul is] proved by revelation.  
 9 [The proof of the existence of the soul is] not [solely] from revelation, because &c.  
 18 [The soul is] not proved [only] by revelation, since &c.  
 21 [Plurality of souls follows] also from the authority or significance of the Qāstras.

§ 2. Notes to these passages.

A. The passage VII, 2, 14—20, bearing on verbal authority, is an egression, added to the sūtras on conjunction. Although *ṣabda* as a topic is not mentioned in the sūtras before 18, yet the reference of 14 &c. to this subject, is sure enough. ČAṆKARA MIČRA in introducing this sūtra says:

„*Idānīm prasaṅgāc chabdhārthayoḥ saṃketikam sambandham sādhyatam prakaraṇāntaram. Tatra parcapakṣam āha.*”. I. e. according to NANDA LAL SINHA's translation: „Now follows from the context another section intended to establish the conventional relation of words and objects. Therein he states an adverse argument.”

I greatly doubt whether Čaṅkara Mičra's interpretation is right. The sūtra 14 and those following are based on Vaiṣeṣika notions

and cannot without difficulty be called a *pūrvapakᅒᅒa*. The drift of the whole passage seems to be: „there is neither conjunction nor inference — thus no relation at all — between word and object. But the object of the word is known by convention (*saᅒaya*).” Çaᅒkara Miçra and his predecessors have felt the absurdity of this reasoning and have invented a third form of relation. *sāᅒayikaᅒ sambandhaᅒ*, but we have really no sufficient guarantee for accepting this notion as a part of the older Vaiᅒeᅒika system.

Çaᅒkara Miçra further explains *guᅒatvāt* of sūtra 14 as *saᅒyogasya guᅒatvāt*; we could also complete the sūtra as *çabdasya guᅒatvāt*; for the signification would remain the same, namely: there can be no relation between word and object, for word and conjunction are both qualities (word of physical space, conjunction of any two things) and a quality cannot inhere in a quality.

For sūtra 15 see the Upaskāra.

It would be simpler to complete sūtra 16 by adding *çabdasya* than by *çabdasya kasya cid arthasya ca*, as proposed in the Upaskāra.

The sūtras 17—19 are satisfactorily explained by Çaᅒkara Miçra.

The explanation of *sāᅒayika*, given in the Upaskāra:

„*sāᅒayika, iti saᅒaya iᅒvaraᅒaᅒketah, ‘asmāc chabdād ayaᅒ artho bodhavya’ ity-ākāraᅒ*”,

seems very uncertain. In the Praçastapādabhāᅒᅒa the relation between word and object has been left undiscussed.

B. In sūtra IX, 2, 3 verbal cognition (*çabda*) is taught to be a special case of inference. For my appreciation of this opinion see here the beginning of section 5 § 1.

C. The explanation of *tad* by *dharma* seems to me more likely than that by *iᅒvara*; sūtra X, 2, 9 is merely a repetition of I, 1, 3 and has no authentic value. Similarly X, 2, 8 is a repetition of VI, 2, 1. But even on accepting sūtra X, 2, 8 and 9 as authentic, *tad* in sūtra 9 could refer to the ritual actions, referred to in sūtra 8.

D. & E. The passages II, 1, 7 and III, 2, 8 have been interpreted before in the chapters on psychology and physics. Here I should like to add the following supplementary remarks:

Although wind and soul are similarly related towards proof, yet it said, in the case of word, that its „name” is proved by revelation — this interpretation of the sūtra ensues both from the neutre *nāᅒamikam* and from the following sūtra *saᅒjñākarma* &c. — and in the case of soul that it itself is proved by revelation.

Sūtra II, 1, 18 seems to show that the *saᅒaya* need not be referred to a Lord, creator of the world, but may be applied

just as well to saints of olden times. It is, therefore, not proved that the oldest Vajesika system accepted the existence of an *avara*.

§ 3. *The paragraphs in the Praastapāda-Bhāṣya on Cabda.*

Bhāṣya book II chapter 2 § 59 deals with *cabda* as a quality of *abāṣa*. Ibidem § 27 discusses *cabda* as verbal authority. This paragraph contains short interpretations or simple quotations of V.S. IX, 2, 3, 1, 1, 3; II, 2, 32; VI, 1, 1; VI, 1, 3. PRAASTAPĀDA interprets V.S. 1, 1, 3:

*“saṁbhāṣakāṅgāḥ py āvāṅgo ca’līpīmanāyāpekṣah.”*

§ 4. *Sātra bearing upon apamāna &c.*

IX, 2, 5 [Comparison, presumption, subsumption, privation and tradition are all included in inference by marks], because they depend, for their origin, upon the cognition, namely, ‘it is its’.

§ 5. *Annotations to this sātra.*

The interpretation, given by CAṆKARA MĪCRA, of IX, 2, 5, is in accordance with Praastapādabhāṣya book III chapter 2 § 29—33 (p. 220—230), but is not required by the context of the Darṣana; we could combine the sātras IX, 2, 5 and 6 and explain them: the terms *hetu*, *apadeṣa*, *līṅga*, *pramāṇa*, *karaṇa* are synonymous, because the cases in which we use them, are all based on the notion *asyeṣam*, given in IX, 2, 1 as definition of *latīgikaṁ jñānam*.

The explanations of the terms *apamāna* &c. in the Praastapādabhāṣya are all short and clear. The commentary, by CRĪDHARA, contains long egressions for which I refer to my translations from the Nyāya-kandali.

Here I should only like to add an annotation on the term *sambhava*. This should not be translated by ‘probability’ as is often done by European scholars, but by ‘arithmetical inclusion’ (or subsumption, as NANDA LAL SINHA does). It expresses that a smaller number (e. g. hundred) is included in a larger number (e. g. thousand). Of course propositions of this kind differ in origin from such as: ‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire’. The former are of an axiomatic character, the latter are obtained by induction. The absence of this discrimination is one of the greatest shortcomings in Vajesika epistemology.

## SECTION 4.

THE THEORY OF INFERENCE IN THE NYĀYA, THE  
SĀMĀKHYA AND THE BUDDHISTIC SYSTEMS.§ 1. *Introductory remark.*

I shall here only compare the theory of inference which is taught by the different systems. In my translations from the Nyāya-kandālī. I have collected some material which is of more or less importance for the theory of the other *pramāṇāni*. For the rest I should like to refer to the works and translations of GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀṢ.

§ 2. *The theory of inference in Nyāya and Sāṃkhya.*

The passages in the Nyāya-darśana which are of importance for the theory of inference are: *a*) I, 1, 5; *b*) I, 1, 25; *c*) I, 1, 26 & 27; *d*) I, 1, 32—38; *e*) I, 1, 39—40; *f*) I, 2, 4—9; *g*) II, 1, 37—38. Let us first summarise the contents of these passages:

*a*. I, 1, 5 contains a division of *anumāna* into three kinds: *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, *sāmānyataḥ*.

*b*. I, 1, 25 gives a definition of *dṛṣṭānta*; this term is here not yet used in its technical signification of the later Vaiṣeṣika and Nyāya.

*c*. I, 1, 26 and 27 contain a division of *siddhānta* into four kinds:

*sarvatantra-saṁsthitiḥ*,  
*pratitantra-saṁsthitiḥ*,  
*adhikaraṇa-saṁsthitiḥ*,  
*abhyanupagama-saṁsthitiḥ*.

*d*. I, 1, 32 enunciates the five members of syllogism. Sūtra 33 defines *pratijñā*; sūtra 34 defines *hetu* in its two forms (positive and negative); sūtra 35 and 36 define *udāharaṇa* in its two forms; here we meet with the term *dṛṣṭānta* in its technical signification; sūtra 37 defines *upanaya*; sūtra 38 *niṣamāna*.

*e*. In a new *adhikaraṇa* (sūtra 39 and 40) *tarka* and *airṇaya* are defined.

*f*. In I, 2, 4 *hetu-ābhāsa* is divided into:

*sargabhicāra*,  
*viruddha*,  
*prakaraṇasama*,  
*sādhyaśama*,  
*atitakāla*.

The sūtras 5—9 give definitions of these five kinds of *hetvābhāsas*.

a. The two sūtras II, 1, 37 and 38 discuss a *pūrvapakṣa* with reference to *anumāna*. In order to show the untrustworthiness of *anumāna*, the *pūrvapakṣa* gives these examples:

One infers: that it has rained (previously), when a river is swollen -- however it is possible that somewhere lower down the river is blocked up.

One infers that it will rain (in future), because the ant-eggs begin to move -- however it is possible that the nest has been shaken.

One infers that peacocks are near (at this moment), because their screaming is heard -- however it is possible that somebody imitates this sound.

We shall now examine these passages more closely as far as may be of use for the history of the Vaiçeśika system.

a. The threefold division of *anumāna*, given in Nyāya Darśana I, 1, 5, has been accepted by the Sāṃkhya system. Thus we read in the Sāṃkhyakārikā n°. 5: *trividham anumānam ākhyātum*. In a decisive article BUECK has given a thorough examination of the extant commentaries on these two passages of the Nyāya-darśana and the Sāṃkhya-kārikā. I can fully accept his conclusions.

Already VĀTSYĀYANA who lived before PRAÇASTAPĀDA, gives (in his Nyāya-bhāṣya) two explanations of the three terms, mentioned. One of his interpretations combines N.S. I, 1, 5 with N.S. I, 1, 37—38. Thus the *pūrvacal anumānam* would be the inference of a [causal or temporal] consequent from an antecedent: the *śeṣacal anumānam* the inference of a [causal or temporal] antecedent from a consequent. The name *sāmānyato anumānam* for the third form of inference is however repugnant to this explanation.

We have therefore to accept the second of Vātsyāyana's interpretations: the *pūrvacal anumānam* is then to be defined as:

*yatra yathāpūrvam pratyakṣasabhatayor angataradarśanenāngatarasyā-pratyakṣasānumānam: yathā dhūmenāgnir iti.*

Thus *pūrvacal anumānam* corresponds exactly with the *dṛṣṭam anumānam*, as it is defined by Praçastapāda (in his Bhāṣya book III chapter 2 § 26, see here p. 303).

The *sāmānyato anumānam* of the Nyāya Darśana is of course identical with the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānam* of the Vaiçeśika system.

The third form of *anumāna* is not mentioned in the Vaiçeśika Darśana, nor does it occur in the Praçastapādabhāṣya where we should have expected it, scil. in the paragraph dealing systematically with *anumāna*.

We meet however practically with this *ceṣavad anumānam* in the proof which Praçastapāda gives for the existence of soul (book II chapter 2 § 10): here we also meet with the term *pariçeṣa*, which is synonymous with *ceṣa*.

Thus the *ceṣavad anumānam* is that form of inference which is termed „the dis-junctive inference” in European textbooks of logic. The major premise contains an exhaustive division of possible predicates of a certain subject-matter; the minor denies the applicability of  $n-1$  of these predicates; in the conclusion we infer the applicability of the  $n$ th term; thus:

*A* must be either *P*; or *Q*; or *S*; or *T*;

*A* is neither *P*; nor *Q*; nor *S*;

ergo *A* is *T*.

With reference to this disjunctive syllogism SIGWART (Logik I § 55) observes. „der sogenannte disjunctive Schluss beruht auf keinem eigentümlichen Princip, und es ist insofern nicht gerechtfertigt, ihn als besondere Schlussweise aufzustellen. . . Der Unterschied des disjunctiven Schlusses vom hypothetischen ist nur in der grammatischen Form begündet.”

Although we must not accord to Praçastapāda the discovery of the truth that the disjunctive syllogism is merely a form of the hypothetical syllogism, yet his omission of the *ceṣavad anumānam* becomes now clear. The Indian logicians felt the secondariness of the *ceṣavad anumānam*, even where they were not capable of analysing the reason for this fact.

*b* and *c*. In the passages on *dṛṣṭānta* and *siddhānta* these notions are opposed to each other. A *dṛṣṭānta* is a proposition accepted both by men of the world (*laukikas*) and scholars or experts (*pariṣaṅkas*); a *siddhānta* is a thesis, taught by a school. GOTAMA distinguishes four kinds of these *siddhāntas*, which we may arrange in two sets of two: either a thesis is taught by all schools (*sarva-tantra-siddha*) or by a few schools (*pratitantra-siddha*); either a thesis is itself the basis for other propositions (*adhikaraṇa-siddha*), or it is itself dependent on other propositions (*abhyaṅga-gama-siddha*); in the latter case it is often possible for us to accept the fundamental thesis as if it were true; thus one may start from the surmise that sound is a substance and then examine the question: whether it is eternal or transient. It is clear that all these distinctions between *dṛṣṭānta* and *siddhānta*, and the different kinds of *siddhānta* arose from the exigencies of debate, where partisans of different schools met each other.

*d* and *e*. The theory of the *avayavas* and the notions *tarka*



and *nirāyā* were accepted later on by the Vaiṣeṣika system.

f. The theory of the *hetu-ābhāsa* has had no influence on the speculations of Praçastapāda's. For the rest it seems that Gotama's distinctions here again only formulate the rules of debate.

The *sanyabhicāra* argument which leads astray, i. e. away from the point to be proved is also called *anābhāntika* (i. e. an argument which does not settle the problem in the one, desired direction).

The *viruddha* fallacy is a probans which is inconsistent with propositions previously upheld in the debate by the disputant himself.

The *prakarana-sama* probans is the mentioning of the point which gave rise to the problem, with the intention of using it to solve the question. For instance: we do not see an eternal or transient quality in sound, and therefore we lay down the problem (*samāyā*): is sound eternal or is it transient? It would now be a fallacy to argue:

sound is eternal,

because it possesses an eternal quality.

The *sādhya-sama* is the mentioning of the thesis to be proved, as an argument in behalf of the proof.

The *atitakāla* fallacy (otherwise called the *kā'āl-gagāpadisṭa*), may have originally meant: the bringing forward of an argument at too late moment during the debate, thus when the adversary has already — although implicitly — proved the insufficiency of this argument. I consider, this interpretation of the term fits the context best, even although it has been given by none of the commentators.

g. The passage II, I, 37 and 38 is of no importance with reference to the development of the Vaiṣeṣika system.

### § 3. *The historical relation between Vaiṣeṣika and Buddhist logic according to the exposé by De Stecherbatskoi.*

A history of Buddhist logic has been given by SATE CĀNDRA VIDYĀBHÜṢAṆA (1909). TH. DE STECHERBATSKOI has published in *Le Muséon* (N.S. vol. V, anno 1904) an article, containing speculations on the relation between Buddhist and Vaiṣeṣika logic.

In this paragraph and the following I shall first give an analysis and then a criticism of this article. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's book will be occasionally referred to.

De Stecherbatskoi's article consists of an introduction, seven chapters and an appendix. As a source for DIGNĀGA's theories he uses the Nyāya-bindu, written by his adherent DHARMAKĪRTI, for Dignāga's Nyāya-praveça could not yet be consulted by him.

In his introduction he mentions JACOBI's opinion about Vaiṣeṣika and Buddhistic logic: the Buddhistic logician Dignāga should have derived his innovations in logic from PRAÇASTAPĀDA's Bhāṣya: and thus Praçastapāda have lived in or before the 6th century of our era. De Stecherbatskoi contradicts this view, according to him Praçastapāda has borrowed from Dignāga and he thinks that important conclusions may be derived from this relation:

„Une période de dix siècles environ, pendant laquelle s'accomplit l'évolution parallèle du Bouddhisme et du Brahmanisme, aboutit à une époque de plein épanouissement de la culture indienne, époque à laquelle le Bouddhisme atteint à son parfait développement. A ce moment, brahmanes et bouddhistes entrent en lutte sur le terrain de la philosophie pour assurer le triomphe de leurs principes. Le point central de leur converse, c'est la question de savoir s'il nous est permis d'affirmer l'existence de l'être universel, principe éternel de toute chose? Pouvons-nous en pénétrer l'essence? A cette question, à laquelle les bouddhistes opposent une dénégation formelle, les brahmanes répondent affirmativement.”

Then De Stecherbatskoi gives a short exposé of the epistemology, upheld by Dignāga and his later adherent Dharmakīrti. They taught: there is no real object which could function as a probans: „logical consequence” (*anumānānumeyabhāva*) depends on the „condition of inherence and substance” (*dharmadharmibhāva*), which is created by our mind. This doctrine may be compared with Kantianism and especially with the neo-kantianism of COHEN (I. I., p. 131 note).

Chapter I contains an examination of the notions on *anumāna* which are found in the oldest Nyāya and Vaiṣeṣika writings and in Buddhistic logic. Jacobi has tried to find a relative chronology by the way in which the different authors subdivide or do not subdivide at all the relation between probans and probandum. To this De Stecherbatskoi says.

„Nous croyons, au contraire, pouvoir démontrer que la notion de connexion indissoluble appartient en propre aux bouddhistes, et que Dignāga en fut le promoteur. Cette notion se rattache logiquement à l'idée fondamentale de sa philosophie. Les Vaiṣeṣikas se l'assimilent d'une manière toute superficielle, puisque cette notion, ne s'adaptant point au point du départ de leur système — conception réaliste de la genèse de notre savoir. — se trouve par là-même dépourvue chez eux de toute valeur.”

„Tout au contraire des bouddhistes, les Vaiṣeṣikas et les Naiyāyikas ont pour point de départ une conception réaliste de la genèse

de notre savoir: les phénomènes du monde extérieur et intérieur ont, selon ces écoles, une existence réelle, et notre savoir est le produit du contact direct (*sauṃkārya*) entre nos sens et les objets. Ce contact, — ou bien, ce qui revient au même, cette expérience, — étant nécessairement limité à un champ restreint, notre intelligence ne peut arriver à la connaissance des lois universelles et immuables, et, ceci acquis, il ne peut pas, à proprement parler, y avoir de connexion indissoluble. Aussi UDDYOTAKARA réfute-t-il cette notion, n'admettant même point que la loi de causalité ait une portée universelle."

After this discussion of a speculative nature De Stecherbatskoi tries to find a historical proof for Dignāga's priority. For this purport Uddyotakara's Nyāya-vārttika and Vācaspatiṃcra's Tātparyatīkā are used. Uddyotakara never mentions his antagonists by name; Vācaspatiṃcra [who lived much later] explicitly attributes the definition of *anumāna* [which is common to Praçastapāda and Dignāga] to the latter.

The last part of this chapter is again given to speculative argumentation. From this I should like to quote the following passus:

„Quant aux rapports réels, les bouddhistes les entendent d'une manière toute différente de celle des Vaïṣeṣikas. Ceux-ci identifient les rapports réels avec la connexion logique, déclarant par cela même connaissables les rapports réels des choses. A la différence des Vaïṣeṣikas, les bouddhistes nous entendons parler ici, comme partout ailleurs, de l'école des Yogācāras déclarent toute réalité inconnaissable, dans son essence comme dans ses rapports. Leur manière de voir s'accorde avec celle de KANT en ce que, tout en admettant l'existence de l'objet en soi, comme base réelle (subtrat) de notre savoir, elle le déclare à tout jamais inaccessible à notre entendement."

In a note to this passage De Stecherbatskoi goes even so far as to construct a table of „ideas a priori", accepted by the Yogācāras, and to appreciate this table as follows: „En comparant ce tableau avec celui de Kant, on est frappé d'y rencontrer justement celles des catégories de Kant qui ont résisté à la critique ultérieure, et d'y constater l'absence de celles qui ont été rejetées par cette critique."

Chapter II contains an examination of the theory of *liṅga* which is given in the Praçastapādabhāṣya and in Buddhistic logic. Both systems of logic require three conditions for the probans:

„1. Le moyen terme est présent dans le sujet (*pakṣa* ou 'petit extrême') du syllogisme. Exemple: il y a de la fumée sur la montagne.

2. Le moyen terme est présent dans tous les cas semblables. Exemple: partout où il y a de la fumée, il y a du feu.

3. Le moyen terme est absent dans tous les cas dissemblables. Exemple: la fumée est totalement absente dans tous les cas où il ne peut y avoir du feu, par ex. sur l'eau."

This theory is polemised against by Uddyotakara without any name of the antagonist and by Vācaspatiṁśra, who confesses to attack Dignāga. The last clause of this chapter may be inserted here:

„Il est encore digne de remarque qu' Uddyotakara attaque la précision concise de la définition, par Dignāga, des trois conditions qui constituent le moyen terme. 'Le moyen terme est présent dans le sujet de la conclusion (ou 'petit extrême') et dans les cas semblables, et il est absent dans les cas dissemblables'. Ainsi formulée, la définition ne serait point parfaitement exacte. Il ne suffit pas que le moyen terme soit présent dans le sujet de la conclusion, il faut encore qu'il y soit compris dans toute son étendue et non en partie seulement. De plus, le moyen terme ne se peut rencontrer que dans des cas semblables, mais il n'est point obligatoire de le rencontrer dans chacun de ces cas et il doit nécessairement être absent dans tous les cas dissemblables. Les nuances indiquées sont exprimées en sanscrit par l'emploi de la particule *eva*; sa fonction consiste à 'accentuer' le mot, dont elle est immédiatement précédée. Ce mode de style est parfaitement en accord avec la théorie bouddhique sur la signification de la parole (*apoha*). Adopté plus tard généralement dans la littérature, il est incontestablement de source bouddhique."

Chapter III contains an examination of the theory of the *hetu-ābhāsas*. This theory is based on the three conditions of the *hetu*, which conditions were discovered by Dignāga; ergo the theory of the *hetu-ābhāsas* must also have been his work. But moreover:

„Praṣastapāda ne se borne point à reproduire purement et simplement les trois classes des bouddhistes et à les attribuer à Kaṣṣāpa. Entrant dans le détail de cette classification, il soumet à un examen critique les vues de Dignāga et il leur oppose les siennes propres. Ces dernières, il prend soin de les attribuer à Kaṣṣāpa.

„C'est ce qui ressort des considérations suivantes.

„Parmi les subdivisions du moyen terme douteux, une place à part est réservée par Dignāga au moyen terme „contraire et pourtant certain (*viruddhābhāsīcārin*). C'est le moyen antinomique, dont la certitude est contraire à une autre certitude, toutes deux également admises. . .

„En retraçant l'histoire des variations des logiciens sur le moyen terme antinomique, nous saisissons sur le vif l'influence qu'exerça sur l'enseignement logique des Vaïṣeṣikas et des Naiyāyikas la doctrine bouddhique. Le moyen terme antinomique est établi par Dignāga, qui le classe parmi les termes douteux. D'après Praçaṣtapāda, le moyen terme antinomique, que 'd'autres' comptent parmi les moyens douteux, doit être exclu de cette classe."

Chapter IV contains an examination of the theory of fallacious theses and examples. It will suffice to give here the following quotations:

„Même dans le détail, notamment dans le classement des subdivisions de la thèse défectueuse, l'affinité des deux théories saute aux yeux."

„D'autre part, ni les Naiyāyikas, ni les Vaïṣeṣikas, à l'exception de Praçaṣtapāda, ni plus tard les deux écoles réunies, n'admettent ni la thèse défectueuse, ni l'exemple défectueux."

„Ici encore on a cru voir un emprunt effectué par les bouddhistes sinon à Praçaṣtapāda lui-même, du moins à l'un de ses successeurs. Mais, en réalité, ici encore Praçaṣtapāda emprunte une théorie qui appartient en propre au système bouddhique. Vācaspati-miṣra nous le dit clairement: 'il n'y a que le bouddhiste qui connaisse des thèses et des exemples défectueux'."

In chapter V we meet with a discussion of the distinction between *svārthanumāna* and *parārthanumāna*.

„Cette distinction se retrouve dans toutes les écoles modernes; mais elle est absente des traités anciens (GOTAMA, Kaṇāda) comme de tous ceux qui se conforment à leur doctrine (Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiṣra)."

„Dignāga, qui ne reconnaît que deux sources à notre savoir, a admis dans son système l'examen du 'raisonnement pour autrui', ou 'syllogisme', qui n'est que l'expression verbale du raisonnement."

„D'autre part, la théorie du 'raisonnement pour autrui' est dépouillée de sa signification dans le système de Praçaṣtapāda, parce que celui-ci reconnaît la parole empreinte d'autorité du Maître (*gāstra*, *āgama*) pour source de notre savoir."

Chapter VI deals with the theory of perception and is in argumentation parallel to the chapters just now analysed.

Chapter VII considers the form of exposition in the different

schools. The oldest form, used by Gotama and Kaᅇāda were sūtras. The Buddhists were the first to use a freer form of exposition.

The appendix contains notes: on the term *apohā*; on the classification of the fallacious probans: on quotations, occurring in Dignāga's writings, from the Vaīᅒeᅒika Darᅇana.

§ 4. *Criticism on De Stcherbatskoï's theory of the relation between Vaīᅒeᅒika and Buddhistic logic.*

I shall follow in this criticism the order of my exposé.

With reference to the introduction we have to notice:

1. the historical importance of the discovery — supposed it were true — that PRAᅒASTAPĀDA borrowed from DIGNĀGA, is by DE STCHERBATSKOÏ extremely exaggerated. Years and years before Dignāga and Praᅒastapāda lived, there must have existed a mutual intellectual influence of Brahmanism and Buddhism. When we look for instance at the different examples of *hetvābhāsas* and other *ābhāsas* which VIDYĀBHŪᅒAᅒA quotes from Dignāga's Nyāya-praveᅇa, then one circumstance strikes us immediately: nearly half of the examples have to do with the eternality or transiency of sound. We may safely conjecture that this was the regular topic of debate between orthodox Mīmāᅒsakas and Buddhists. Further we meet with an argumentation between a Mīmāᅒsaka and a Vaīᅒeᅒika, which serves for an example of 'non-erroneous contradiction'.

2. Moreover we must observe that Praᅒastapāda is still a naive realist; it is only ᅒRĪDHARA who defends realism against the attacks of the Buddhists.

3. The comparison between Dignāga's illusionism and Kantian criticism can scarcely be taken au sérieux.

With reference to chapter I. I should like to notice:

1. The classification of the relations between probans and probandum which is found in the Vaīᅒeᅒika Darᅇana, is simply an application of its division of relation in general. (Cf. here p. 145 § 7 sub 2). The classification, mentioned by DHARMAKĪRTI<sup>1)</sup>, is independent of this: it possesses great merits, but has remained without influence on the Vaīᅒeᅒika system. Praᅒastapāda felt the deficiency of KAᅇĀDA's classification — this point had been already alluded to in the Darᅇana<sup>2)</sup> itself — but has not tried to give another arrangement instead.

1) Muséon N S. V p. 144.

2) V.S. IX, 2, 2 and cf. here p. 298.

2. The existence of general propositions of empirical character, need not have been first discovered by illusionists and then borrowed from them by realists. The history of philosophy in Europe teaches otherwise. The difficulties for the illusionist are no smaller than for the realist, when he tries to explain the legitimacy and trustworthiness of general propositions.

3. That Vācaspatiᅒiçra mentions Dignāga in his polemics, does not satisfactorily prove that Dignāga was anterior to Praçastapāda. But for the Naiyāyikas the Vaiçᅒika system was authoritative: it was thus wiser for Vācaspatiᅒiçra to be silent about Praçastapāda.

With reference to chapter II, I should like to mention:

1. the theory of the three conditions of the *lāga* is the necessary, logical outcome of the conception, which Indian philosophy had from the beginning formed itself about inference. This was a synthesis of deduction and superficial induction. The second and third conditions would correspond to the methods of agreement and difference in modern European theory of induction.

2. The Buddhistie theory of *apoha* is nominalism, worked out with a consistency, or rather exaggeration, unknown in Europe.

With reference to chapter III, I want to state:

the theory of the *hetv-ābhāsa* is only partly based on that of the three conditions of the *lāga*. In book IV section IV table F sub *b* I have given a table of the kinds of *hetv-ābhāsa*, accepted by Praçastapāda and Dignāga (in his Nyāya-praveça).

Whereas Dignāga divides *hetv-ābhāsa* into three kinds (*asiddha*, *anaikāntika* and *ciruddha*), Praçastapāda accepts four species (*asiddha*, *sandigdha*, *anadhyavasita* and *ciruddha*). In Praçastapāda's system the three last *hetv-ābhāsas* are also forms of *apramā*: scil. *saᅒçaya* (or *sandeha*), *anadhyavasāya* and *viparyaya* (cf. Bhāᅒya book III chapter 2 ᅒ 16—18, p. 174—182). The polemics which Praçastapāda bestows on the 'non-erroneous contradiction' is not directed against Dignāga, but against those Vaiçᅒikas who interpret it as a form of *sandigdha*, whereas he himself accepts it as a special case of *anadhyavasita*. For Dignāga this question could not exist, because he only distinguishes *anaikāntika* (which embraces both *sandigdha* and *anadhyavasita*).

Under the title *asiddha* we meet in both authors with two kinds of fallacies: in the first place *asiddha* means „non-accepted” either by both or one of the disputants: in the second place *asiddha* means 'non-existent'. The formulation by Praçastapāda is here clearer

and perhaps more original than the expression used by Dignāga. At all events the *asiddha* — in the meaning of 'non-accepted' — does not result from the three conditions of the *hetu*, but is clearly a rule of debate.

In the discussion of the *sandigdha*, *anadhyavasita* and *viruddha* Praçastapāda is more concise than Dignāga. It seems difficult to draw any conclusion from this fact.

Praçastapāda gives one example of each species. We shall be better able to recognise the nature of each of the three fallacies, when we write them in the form of hypothetical syllogisms, a form with which the Indian *anumāna* — as far as its deductive part is concerned — is most cognate.

In this form then they may run as follows:

II. *Sandigdha*:

if an animal has horns, then it is a cow,  
this animal has horns,  
ergo it is a cow.

III. *Anadhyavasita*:

if a thing originates, then it is existent [before its origination],  
a product is a thing which originates,  
ergo a product is existent [before its origination].

IV. *Viruddha*:

if an animal has horns, then it is a horse,  
this animal has horns,  
ergo it is a horse.

In none of these three so called fallacies there is a mistake against deduction; in the form *sandigdha*, the hypothetical major cannot be accepted and should run: „if an animal has horns, then it *may* be a cow”; in the form *viruddha* the hypothetical major can neither be accepted and should run: ‘if an animal has horns, then it *cannot* be a horse’. In the form *sandigdha* thus a doubtful relation is put as certain; in the form *viruddha* the consequent in the hypothetical major is the opposite of the truth.

The fallacy *anadhyavasita* is of another nature than the *sandigdha* and *viruddha*. The error lies here in the minor proposition, which contains two synonymous terms, so that when the thesis to be proved is not accepted by an opponent, he will neither be convinced by the defendant's argument.

So there is a sufficient reason for separating the *anadhyavasita* from the other fallacies.

With reference to the ‘non-erroneous contradiction’ (or antinomy), which Dignāga accepts as a form of the general *anaiikāntika* and



Praçastapāda as a form of *anadhyavasita*, we must notice that it only expressed a circumstance which must often have occurred in Indian debates. If the Indian philosophers had analysed the case more carefully, they would have found the insufficiency of the their theory of *anumāna* in regard to its inductional character.

Our conclusion here may run: the priority of Dignāga to Praçastapāda is not proved by De Stecherbatz-koï. We can only state that these authors were either contemporaries or did not differ much in date and that they both used common traditions.

With reference to chapter IV, I should like to notice:

1. the authority of Vācaspatiniçra, as a historical source, is of small weight in this question;

2. the resemblance between Dignāga and Praçastapāda's distinctions of fallacious theses and examples, merely shows that these writers were contemporaries or nearly so.

3. in the theory of fallacious theses (see here book IV section IV table F sub *a*), the three first species belong together: Praçastapāda seems to give here the oldest form: 'public opinion' is substituted by the Buddhist instead of *çruti*, one of the three regular *pramāṇāni* in most of the Darçanas and also practically accepted by the Vaïṣeṣika.

The fallacies 4 and 5 form another set: they state inconsistencies of the speaker himself. The fallacies 6, 7 and 8 of the Buddhist are similarly rules of debate, demanding that a disputant should reckon with the doctrines and notions of his opponent. These fallacies 4—8 remind us of distinctions, made in the Nyāyadarçana, such as '*sarvotantrasiddhānta*, *pratitantrasiddhānta*, *viruddha* (= *siddhāntam abhyapekṣya tadvirodhī*, N. D. I, 2, 6).<sup>1)</sup>

The comparison of these fallacies neither allows any conclusion with reference to the chronology of the two authors: they have both borrowed from a common tradition.

4. in the theory of fallacious examples (here book IV section IV table F sub *c*) we can distinguish in both authors two common groups: *a*. the example is fallacious with reference to *sādhana* or *sādhya* or both; *b*. the example is either insufficient for proving or overthrows the supposed general relation between *sādhana* and *sādhya* (cf. the *sandigdha* and *viruddha* fallacies of the probans). Moreover Praçastapāda distinguishes a separate fallacy with reference to the abode, which reminds us of the *asiddha* in his theory of the fallacious probans.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here p. 314 sub letter *f*.

With reference to chapter V, I should like to mention:

The distinction, made by Praçastapāda and Dignāga, between *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*, is merely a combination of the doctrines taught in the Vaiṣeṣika and Nyāya Darśanas. The speculative argumentation, by De Stcherbatskoï, is not convincing; also the Vaiṣeṣikas did not accept *çabda* as a separate *pramāṇa*, at least not theoretically.

The rest of De Stcherbatskoï's article may be left indisscussed here. It would only have had force, if the foregoing chapters had been convincing.

§ 5. *The kevalānvayin and kevalavyatirekin probantia; and the anupasaṃhārin fallacy, in the more recent Vaiṣeṣika-Nyāya system.*

In De Stcherbatskoï's article, discussed above, we find on p. 152 an example of an inference, considered by Dharmakīrti as „moyen douteux”, by Praçastapāda as *anadhyavasita*. This inference, thus called by the two antagonists fallacious, runs as follows:

„les corps vivants ont une âme,  
parce qu'ils sont doués de respiration et d'autres  
fonctions animales.”

To this De Stcherbatskoï adds the following important annotation: „Ce raisonnement est *kevalavyatirekin* selon UDDYOTAKĀRA (p. 125 l. 5 et suiv.) et les Naiyāyikas modernes, *asādhārāṇanāikāntika* d'après les bouddhistes. . . Praçastapāda ne mentionne ni le *kevalānvayin*, ni le *kevalavyatirekin*, les tenant évidemment, avec les bouddhistes, pour des termes fautifs. ÇRĪDHARA, néanmoins, pense que le *kevalānvayin* et le *kevalavyatirekin* sont implicitement admis par Praçastapāda (p. 203 l. 15—p. 204 l. 22). Quant au second exemple,<sup>1)</sup> la Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā (p. 23 l. 6—7) considère la thèse comme un *asādhārāṇa*, de même que la première. . . A la page 239, 14—22 Praçastapāda discute, à ce qu'il paraît, sur un raisonnement qui aurait la forme suivante:

*çabdo guṇah,  
çrāvaṇatvāt.*

ou bien:

*çabda itarebhyo bhidyate,  
çrāvaṇatvāt.*

Il s'oppose à ce que l'on regarde ce raisonnement comme douteux. Selon les modernes il est *kevalavyatirekin*.”

To this I should like to add the following:

1) „le son est éternel, parce qu'il résonne”.

The passage Praçastapāda-bhāṣya p. 239 l. 14 &c. seems to have been misunderstood by De Steherbatskoï: see the complete translation of the passage, here p. 306 § 9. But I agree with the Russian scholar in admitting that Praçastapāda rejected the trustworthiness of the *kevalāncayin* and *kevalavyatirekin*.

In inserting here a few notes on these probantia in the later history of the Vaiçeṣika system, I wish to follow JACOBI's article on Indian logic.

We find here (p. 160) the following example of a trustworthy *kevalāncayin* probans:

the pot is capable of being nominated,  
because it is capable of being known.

Here the general proposition in its positive, hypothetical form wil run:  
whatever is capable of being known, is capable of being nominated,

and this general proposition in its inverse, negated form:

if something is not capable of being nominated, then it  
is not capable of being known:

an example on behalf of this negated proposition, however, cannot be adduced.

We find on the same page of the article quoted, the following trustworthy *kevalavyatirekin*:

living organisms possess a soul,  
because they have animal functions.

Here the general proposition in its positive form will run:

if something possesses animal functions, then it possesses  
a soul,

no examples, besides the living organisms, can be given for this proposition: on the other hand for the inverse, negated proposition:

if something does not possess a soul, it does not possess  
animal functions.

we can give as many examples as we like.

On page 472 of the same article we find the following example of an *asādharaṇa* fallacy:

the tone is eternal, because it is a sound.

Here the general proposition in its positive form runs:

if something is a sound, then it is eternal.

Different examples of what may be called sounds, can be given, yet none of them shows eternity. The general proposition in its negative form would run:

if something is not eternal, then it will never be a sound.

Different examples of what is transient can be given, but among these, sounds.

On page 473 we meet with the following example of the *anupasanhārin* fallacy:

everything is transient, because it is capable of being known.

The general proposition in its positive form will run:

if a thing is capable of being known, then it is transient; since the *pakṣa* is everything, we can adduce no examples besides this *pakṣa*. The negative proposition would run:

if something is not transient, then it is not capable of being known;

we need not examine this proposition, for the probans is already a fallacy because of the absence of examples for the positive proposition.

This whole theory of *kevalānvayin* and *kevalavyatirekin* probantia, and *asādharaṇa* and *anupasanhārin* fallacies, is from European standpoint almost worthless, in as far as it does not formulate in the proper way the process of proving.

For instance, the thesis: „whatever is capable of being known, is capable of being nominated,” is not proved by means of adducing things known, things unknown, &c. but it expresses the general experience: whenever man discovers a new object, he possesses the power of creating a new word for it, because language affords many means of word-derivation, but the discovery of new objects and the positing of new notions is very difficult.

In general: when we prove a thesis, we must first examine its nature. If it expresses a causal relation, it demands other means for proving than if it expresses e. g. geometrical relations. Indian science, however, has not sufficiently carried out its attempts in this direction.

## SECTION 5.

### APPRECIATION OF THE INDIAN THEORY OF THE PRAMĀṆĀNI FROM EUROPEAN STANDPOINT.

#### § 1. Introduction.

Judging from European standpoint we may call *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* the three main *pramāṇāni* of those, mentioned in

the Indian systems. Of these three subjects the first and last are treated in Europe mainly in a psychological, that is a descriptive and explanatory form; the second in a normative or prescriptive form.

We may agree with the Vaīᅒeᅒikas that *upamāna*, *arthāpatti*, *sambhava* and *abhāva* are to be discussed in connection with *anumāna*, and thus form subjects of the science of logic. On the other hand „word” or language, deserves a separate examination. And although the Mīmāᅒsakas have discussed the matter too much as theologians, yet we cannot deny that many of their thoughts about language will interest the European linguist.

The contributions which the older Vaīᅒeᅒika system has delivered to the psychology of perception and language are of a small importance. It is only in the Nyāya-kandali that these branches of research receive a fuller interest. Many of the fragments therefore, translated in the fourth book of the present work, bear on them. Here I shall limit myself to logic. In order to acquire a basis for my appreciations, I must devote several pages to the results, reached by logical research in Europe. For though very able European scholars have explained and appreciated Indian logic, yet it is evident from their writings that in spite of their having clearly understood their Indian sources, they lack the knowledge of the progress which European logic has made during the last century. Even BIERK, who in his interesting article on Indian *anumāna* quotes SIGWART'S *Logic* in reference to some points of details, has omitted showing how a better acquaintance of modern logic would lead to a more just appreciation of the Indian theory of syllogism.

The fact is that the development of scientific thought in Europe did not only oblige Western scholars to restrict themselves to a more limited scope of study, but also caused philosophy to lose its fundamental importance and to be considered as a kind of special study. This neglect of philosophy also showed itself in an utter indifference for logical questions, from which however we have to confess no harm has arisen, for logical thinking is not effected by the study of logic as such, but by intellectual training, methodical study and mutual criticism. Moreover a widely spread prejudice has favoured this contempt for logical research, since it was and is generally believed that logic was founded by ARISTOTLE as a consummated science. There is even a much quoted passage in KANT'S *Prolegomena* in which he blames some of his contemporaries for trying to surpass Aristotle and to add either psychological matter to this formal science (which should have the nature of mathematics) or information concerning the details of special scientific research.

The development of logical investigation has shown that Kant was wrong, his contemporaries right. First Lotze and Sigwart have proved: that the ordinary routine in which logic is taught, is far from infallible; then that the doctrine of the syllogism, propounded by Aristotle, has its importance in the Aristotelean metaphysics, but is unsatisfactory, when taken as an independent treatment of logic; that this study only becomes attractive and instructive, when brought into connection with the methods which are applied by the special student in his daily work. These three points: the insignificance of the school-logic, the importance of the Aristotelean theory of the syllogism as part of his metaphysics and the necessity of combining abstract logic with discussions on special research, might be considered, I think, to be settled. The relation, on the other hand, between logic and psychology remains a difficult question. We must acknowledge that concepts, conclusions, arguments are psychical facts, but we have to state that logic and psychology have different tasks, for logic gives norms, prescriptive rules possessing an absolute nature, i. e. demanding a universal and necessary acknowledgment, and psychology only explains, and does not appreciate. I am inclined to think that psychological and perhaps grammatical discussions cannot be avoided at the beginning of logic.

I shall follow this order in my exposition: first I shall describe logic (and specially the theory of syllogism) as explained by elementary academical textbooks, then I shall mention the criticism, brought forward by Lotze and Sigwart, after that I intend to make a few notes on induction and the obtaining of general propositions and finally I shall give in my conclusion my opinion on the value of the Vaiçeśika theory of *anumāna*.

## § 2. *Exposition of European school logic (deductive part).*

The exposition of logic in the current manuals is given in three chapters: the term, the proposition, inferences. The propositions are divided into four kinds according to their quantity and quality:

Universal Affirmative	All $X$ is $Y$ (called kind $A$ )
Universal Negative	No $X$ is $Y$ ( „ „ $E$ )
Particular Affirmative	Some $X$ is $Y$ ( „ „ $I$ )
Particular Negative	Some $X$ is not $Y$ ( „ „ $O$ )

Inferences are divided into deductive and inductive, the deductive inferences into immediate and mediate.

..An immediate inference may be formally defined as a combi-

nation of two propositions of which one is inferred from the other, the proposition inferred being virtually included in the proposition from which it is inferred. Of immediate inference the most important forms are oppositions, conversions, permutations."

A deductive mediate inference contains two propositions which have one term in common. The two propositions are called the major and the minor premise, the three terms the major, the middle and the minor term. The manuals, after having defined these technical terms proceed in examining „the possible, not the legitimate, forms of syllogism." „Here there are two circumstances to be taken into consideration: 1st, that syllogisms may vary according to the quantity and quality of the propositions (*A, E, I, O*) of which they are composed; 2nd, that they may vary according to the position of the terms in the premises. The first consideration gives us the number of possible *moods*, the second the number of possible *figures*. It is by combining these two sources of variation that we shall obtain the number of possible syllogisms. There are, if we take into consideration the conclusion, sixty-four possible arrangements of the propositions *A, E, I, O*, i. e. in technical language, sixty-four possible *moods*, viz. *AAA, AAE, AII, AAO, &c.*"

Then it is examined which of these sixty-four moods are legitimate. The result of the rather involved argumentation is often put in the mnemonic lines:

*Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque, prioris;*  
*Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroko, secundae;*  
*Tertia, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton,*  
*Bokardo, Ferison, habet: Quarta insuper addit*  
*Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison:*  
*Quinque Subalterni totidem Generalibus orti,*  
*Nomen habent nullum, nec si bene colligis, usum.*

„In the above lines, the initial consonants, *B, C, D, F*, shew that the mood in the second, third, or fourth figure to which they are prefixed is to be reduced to the mood correspondingly made in the first... The vowels shew the moods... The letter *s*, when it occurs after a vowel, shews that the proposition for which that vowel stands is to be converted simply... &c. &c.

We may say, if logical thinking really depended on all this scholastic nonsense, scarcely any human being would produce a logical train of thought and it would be quite a mystery how a child of fourteen might ever be able to study his geometrical textbook with so much success and profit.

After having treated simple syllogism, the manuals go on explain-

ing the complex (hypothetical) propositions and syllogisms, both of which are again divided into conjunctive and disjunctive forms.

§ 3. *The progress, made in deductive logic, by Lotze and Sigwart.*

The development of logical science is of interest for our purport in two respects: its new formulation of the theory of syllogism and its researches concerning the double problem: how do we arrive at our most general scientific laws and how do we get certainty about their legitimacy. The first problem has been promoted by LOTZE and SIGWART; the second by the general philosophies of HUME and KANT and became of greater interest by the greater expansion of physical science.

Even the traditional order of term, proposition, inference has been put aside by Sigwart in the composition of his book. He has divided his *Logic* into three parts, called the analytical, the normative, the technical. The concepts (*Vorstellungen*) and the general meaning of the words are treated in a short introductory section, the different forms of the judgment (*Urteil*) in the following sections of the analytical part; the norms which the notions and the conclusions have to obey, are settled in the second (normative) part; whilst the analysis and synthesis of the notions, the arriving at scientific propositions by means of deduction, observation and induction, are explained in the third (technical) part of the book.

We need not follow Sigwart's work closely and may limit ourselves to those questions having to do with the theory of inference. Thus the theory of notions may be left out. For notions may be considered as condensed propositions, and the question, how do we arrive at our general notions, is identical with the problem: how do we obtain our general propositions. Only then when the regular coexistence of certain attributes is proved, a general notion has a right of existence. Further the relation between notions find their expression in the different forms of propositions: disjunctive, subsumptive &c.

*a. The classification of the forms of judgment.*

The classification of the forms of judgment is then according to Sigwart — that is if one wishes to continue speaking of a classification — not a subdivision of the judgments into a number of coördinate classes. But what one gives here for a classification is more a sketch of the way in which human thought tries to find necessary judgments.



In many cases, a necessary judgment or decision is not arrived at, before, starting from a stage of simple guessing (possibility, question), one has proceeded through more or less intermediate stages. The result of doubt can on further examination be: either immediate rejection, or confirmation, or for example the insight that the possibility supposed at the beginning, is itself dependent, a necessary consequence of some other possibility; or the insight that the supposed possibility is one out of a limited number of possibilities.

Further examination is rendered superfluous by the first answer, the negative judgment. However in spite of this the result is by no means useless and may be of use in later decisions. By means of the two last mentioned answers: the hypothetical and the disjunctive judgment, means are supplied for perhaps afterwards arriving at a decisive answer to the original question.

Sigwart, *Logik* I p. 313. „By this we have justified why we may consider separately the negative, the hypothetical and the disjunctive judgment, not because they are special kinds of judgments in which the function of judgment is carried out in different ways, but because they are judgments concerning hypotheses and indicate the logical value and importance of these”.

Besides this meaning of the hypothetical judgment as a shifting of the problem, by means of which we substitute an easier question for the original one, the hypothetical judgment can have the signification of a „law of nature”.

p. 266: „The knowledge that something is as it is, happens as it happens, by exterior necessity, is always composed of two elements: the general law and the definite *datum*, to which this law is applicable. It is necessary that the planets move round the sun in ellipses, this knowledge is based partly on the knowledge of the general principles of mechanics and partly on the knowledge of the given mass of the sun and the planets, of their distances and the relation between tangential velocity and attraction; another relation would effect other courses. This empirical element can never be eliminated, and therefore our knowledge of necessity can only be given in hypothetical formulae which state that if this or that happens, something else will necessarily ensue”.

This second meaning of the hypothetical judgment as law of nature, is cognate with Sigwart's division of judgments into communicative (narrative) and explanatory judgments.

The communicative judgment is a judgment about individuals, and since individuals exist in time, such judgments are only avail-

able with reference to a certain time. The explanatory judgment is in its objective value independent of time.

This antithesis between the communicative and explanatory judgments is of importance for the explanation of that which is called the quantity of the judgment in school-logic. A plural judgment, taken as a communicative judgment, can be a final result; but taken as an explanatory judgment, it will have the significance of a special or particular judgment. (l.l., § 15 and 16).

p. 225: „When judgments of the form: „one  $A$  is  $B$ ” or „some  $A$  are  $B$ ” are communicative judgments of empirical origin, then they seem to have no other significance than that of attributing a certain predicate to one or more subjects which are not separately nominated, but only vaguely indicated; the plural judgment seems to have no other meaning than a series of single statements, for no stress is laid on the number.

„Yet in the judgment: „some people confuse red and green”, something else is indicated than in the copulative judgments: „John and Peter and Paul confuse red and green”. In as far they are indicated as „some people”, the individual definiteness is lost; yet by the indication with a general name, they are conceived in relation to the totality of mankind; and this relation instigates further comparison.

„Tradition, now, teaches that the particular judgment does not tend to the exclusion of the general judgment; „some  $A$  are  $B$ ” does not mean that „not all  $A$  are  $B$ ” . . . This characteristic shows that the plural judgment can either be a preparation for a general judgment or an exception with reference to it” (For examples, see Sigwart l. l., p. 226).

This distinction between the copulative and particular judgment will help us to understand the difference between the empirically-general judgment as a preparatory stage towards the necessarily-general judgment.

p. 220: „[School]-logic is not wont to distinguish between the judgments which are based on the notion, i. e. signification, of the subject-word and, whilst explaining this notion, attribute a priori a predicate to every object, denoted by the subject-word, and those judgments which pronounce a predicate about all things within our knowledge and bearing the same name because of similar properties.

„Thus this school-logic conceals that which is most important, namely the transition of an empirically-general judgment into a necessarily general judgment, the formation of notions and judgments from experience (For example, see Sigwart l. l.).

*b. The theory of inference.*

Again in the theory of inference we meet with Sigwart's conception of logic as a teleological science, and we can, according to him, formulate the problem: what value have the three Aristotelean figures for human thought, which strives to solve doubt and question, and thus to arrive at sure and generally valid decisions.

In the first place — as LOTZE has previously shown — Sigwart points out the great difference between the two first Aristotelean figures and the third figure <sup>1)</sup>. For by the application of this last-mentioned figure we can only infer the possibility of concomitance between qualities; this figure can only lead up to a problematical judgment, which in some cases may be the starting-point for the discovery of a categorical judgment.

The first two figures are closely connected with the principle of reason, respectively in its positive and negative formulation.

This reduction may be done as follows. The four moods of the first figure are:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. All $M$ is $P$<br>All $S$ is $M$<br>—<br>thus: all $S$ is $P$   | 2. No $M$ is $P$<br>All $S$ is $M$<br>—<br>thus: No $S$ is $P$        |
| 3. All $M$ is $P$<br>Some $S$ is $M$<br>—<br>thus: some $S$ is $P$ | 4. No $M$ is $P$<br>Some $S$ is $M$<br>—<br>thus: some $S$ is not $P$ |

Since the nature of the act of concluding is not effected by the quantity possessed by the subject of the minor premise, the four moods enumerated above, can be reduced to two:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. All $M$ is $P$<br>All $S$ , some $S$ , one $S$ is $M$<br>—<br>All $S$ , some $S$ , one $S$ is $P$ | 2. No $M$ is $P$<br>All $S$ , some $S$ , one $S$ is $M$<br>—<br>All $S$ , some $S$ , one $S$ is not $P$ . |
|--|---|

When we search in these two forms for the rule, governing our concluding, then we find for the first figure:

If something is  $B$ , then it is  $A$  (1st and 3d mood)

If something is  $B$ , then it is not  $A$  (2nd and 4th mood)

The minor runs:

certain subjects  $C$  are  $B$ .

Ergo: they are  $A$ , they are not  $A$ .

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. SIGWART I § 54 No. 5 with reference to the absurdity of accepting a fourth syllogistic figure: the figure of Galenus.

The four moods of the second figure may be reduced to the two following forms:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. No $P$ is $M$<br>All $S$ , some $S$ , one $S$ is $M$<br>All $S$ , some $S$ , one $S$ is not $P$ ; | 2. All $P$ is $M$<br>All $S$ , some $S$ , one $S$ is not $M$<br>All $S$ , some $S$ , one $S$ is not $P$ . |
|--|---|

Now the same two rules must be applicable for this figure as for the first one, since these two rules express the only possible conclusion to be drawn from simple relations between notions; with this difference that we now infer the non-validity of the reason because of the non-validity of the consequence.

If something is  $B$ , it is  $A$ .

Now  $C$  (all  $C$ , some  $C$ ) is not  $A$ ,

ergo: neither is it  $B$ .

If something is  $B$ , it is not  $A$ .

Now  $C$  (all  $C$ , some  $C$ ) is  $A$ ,

ergo it is not  $B$ .

Sigwart, Logik I p. 166: „The agreement as well as the difference between the two first figures lies in the fact that in the first figure we infer the validity of a (positive or negative) consequence from the validity of the reason; and that in the second we infer the non-validity of the reason from the non-validity of the (positive or negative) consequence.”

NOTE I. On the nature of the concluding in the third figure, see Sigwart Logik I § 54 n°. 7. „Streng genommen also ist die Regel, nach der geschlossen wird, und welche die Ableitung des Schlusssatzes aus den Prämissen begründet, gar nicht in diesen selbst ausgedrückt: der verschwiegene Obersatz zu den bejahenden Modis ist: Wenn zwei Prädicate demselben Subjekte zukommen, sind sie vereinbar, schliessen sie sich nicht notwendig aus; die beiden Prämissen bilden zusammen die Assumption zu dem verschwiegenen Obersatz. . . .”

NOTE II. The disjunctive syllogism is reduced to the hypothetical syllogism in the same way as in the elementary textbooks.

### *c. The immediate inferences.*

When the hypothetical inference is made the basis of logic, and no longer the categorical syllogism, then the consequence will be that also the chapter dealing with immediate inference, thus with oppositions, conversions and permutations will receive another form. So we may state the following rules for the hypothetical propositions:

RULE I. From the negation of the (original) consequens we may infer the negation of the antecedens:

Thus from the judgment: if something is  $A$ , then it is  $B$ ,  
 we may infer: if something is not  $B$ , then it is not  $A$ .  
 From the judgment: if something is  $A$ , then it is not  $B$ ,  
 we may infer: if something is  $B$ , then it is not  $A$ .  
 From the judgment: if something is not  $A$ , then it is  $B$ ,  
 we may infer: if something is not  $B$ , then it is  $A$ .  
 From the judgment: if something is not  $A$ , then it is not  $B$ ,  
 we may infer: if something is  $B$ , then it is  $A$ .

RULE II. From the original consequens we can draw no conclusion — neither positively, nor negatively — about the original antecedens.

Thus from the judgment: if something is  $A$ , then it is  $B$ ,  
 we cannot say: if something is  $B$ , whether it is or is not  $A$ .  
 in other words we may only infer that:  
 if something is  $B$ , it may be  $A$ .

RULE III. From the negation of the (original) antecedens we can draw no conclusion — neither positively, nor negatively — about the consequens:

Thus from the judgment: if something is  $A$ , then it is  $B$ ,  
 we cannot say: if something is not  $A$ , whether it is or is not  $B$ ,  
 in other words we can only infer:  
 that if something is not  $A$ , it may be  $B$ .

And from the judgment: if something is not  $A$ , then it is  $B$ ,  
 we can only infer that: if something is  $A$ , it may be  $B$ .

RULE IV. When two predicates are possible for one and the same thing, then we may express this in either of the two forms:

if something is  $A$ , then it may be  $B$ ,  
 if something is  $B$ , it may be  $A$ .

From these four rules the different prescripts for the conversions &c. of the categorical judgment can be found by means of substitution (cf. Sigwart *Logik* I, p. 450—452).

Further we may notice that the first rule expresses the principles according to which all inference takes place. On the other hand the three last rules are of secondary interest, they only allow us to infer problematical consequences from sure premises.

*d. Summary.*

1. It is proper to distinguish in logic between the negative, the hypothetical and the disjunctive judgment, they are judgments con-

cerning hypotheses and indicate the logical value and importance of these.

2. It is necessary to distinguish accurately the communicative and explanatory judgments, the empirically-general and necessarily-general judgments.

3. The categorical syllogism and the disjunctive syllogism may be considered as applications of the hypothetical.

4. There are two directions in which a conclusion can be drawn, either we infer the legitimacy of the (affirmative or negative) consequence from the legitimacy of the reason, or we infer the illegitimacy of the reason from the illegitimacy of the (affirmative or negative) consequence.

#### § 4. *How does science obtain its general propositions?*

Before entering upon the question: how does science acquire its general propositions (and concepts) we must remember that science finds its starting-point in the daily experience of ordinary man; science therefore accepts language and the experience, laid down in language, as long as new facts or a better observation of previously known facts do not forbid this. Thus we understand in the following by science not only knowledge, obtained by science in its more limited sense, but all knowledge, as far as it is not rejected by science.

The general proposition, then reached by science, are of three kinds: axioms, inductional theses, postulata. All knowledge which we possess, is dependent in its form on the receiving organism, especially on the functioning of our mind. Thus we perceive exterior things in space and time, interior phenomena in time, we form notions about them, which are subject to notional axioms. Thus all our experience obeys the axioms of mathematics and logic, and obeys our deductions which are nothing else than an application of our logical axioms.

In gathering experience from individual facts man forms general principles by which these facts can be understood, i. e. he guesses from the special cases general rules from which they could be deduced. Induction, thus, is the opposite of deduction, so as abstraction is the opposite of addition, division of multiplication &c. And whilst in deduction the consequences may possess the same certainty as the premises, by induction we can only arrive at results which possess a certain probability. This process of induction is however so fertile and proves so satisfactory, that soon there

arises in man, the wish and even a feeling of duty to apply this inductive process to as many facts of experience as are within his reach. And he begins to build up in himself an ideal of truth. In this scientific research, we may say, man is imitating with his limited power, God in one of his attributes, in his all-wisdom, and the ideal of science might be defined as the contents of a consciousness in which all facts of experience have entered according to trustworthy processes and are combined with each other completely and logically. So then man begins to foster a belief in the explicability of the world, in the uniformity of nature. The most general convictions, on which science rests, may be called postulate.

In the inductive process two notions are of predominant importance: causality and regular coexistence. According to the regular coexistence of certain attributes we may classify the objects of nature in their different classes and subclasses; by the notion of causality we learn to know the causal laws of nature.

The astronomer HERSCHTEL and the philosopher STUART MILL have formulated the exigencies which must be fulfilled in this investigation of the causal connection of facts. SIGWART enters upon a broad criticism of this formulation. For my purport it will be sufficient to quote the five canons of Mill's so as they are given in a much used English text-book on logic.

CANON I. (Method of agreement): If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one other circumstance in common, that circumstance may be regarded, with more or less of probability, as the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon, or at least, as connected with it through some fact of causation.

CANON II. (Method of difference): If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.

CANON III (Double method of agreement): If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one other circumstance in common, while two or more instances, falling within the same department of investigation, from which the phenomenon is absent, have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance; that circumstance is the effect, or the cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon. Moreover

(supposing the requirements of the method to be rigorously fulfilled) the circumstance proved by the method to be the cause, is the *only* cause of the phenomenon.

CANON IV. (Method of residues): Subtract from any phenomenon such part as is known to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.

CANON V. (Method of concomitant variations): Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.

When we now analyse these five canons and the examples, given for them in the text-books, we may notice that the two last rules refer to the application of mathematics to physical research. The three first canons have to do with causality in general. The second and third are based on the following, implicitly accepted argumentation.

If we know *all* the vicarious causes or sums of causes which give rise to a certain effect, then we can infer the absence of the effect from the absence of the causes. Thus e. g. when it is true that only if  $A$ , or  $B$ , or  $(C + D)$  takes place,  $P$  will take place, then it also holds true that:

if neither  $A$ , nor  $B$ , nor  $(C + D)$  takes place,  $P$  will remain absent.

Thus in the special case that a phenomenon is only due to one cause, or one set of causes, or when we may abstract from other possible causes because of their evident absence, then we are allowed to conclude:

if  $A$  takes place, then  $B$  will take place in subsequent time.

if  $A$  does not take place, then  $B$  will neither take place.

Thus the investigation of the causality of a phenomenon obliges us to examine its positive occurrences as well as the cases of its absence; for we may notice that the two formulae, just given, have both the form of a hypothetical judgment and both the same order of logical antecedens and consequens, but differ in logical position.

Perhaps we must acknowledge an instinctive feeling for the proper way in which causality is discovered, when we see that the Indian philosophers think it necessary to prove by means of examples the general proposition of their *anumāna* in its positive as well as negative formulation:

if  $A$  is, then  $B$  is;

if  $B$  is not, then  $A$  is not.

Yet the difference between the two methods will be clear.





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## CHAPTER VI.

### DHARMA, ADHARMA, THEOLOGY.

#### SECTION 1.

#### DHARMA & ADHARMA.

§ 1. *Sūtras bearing on dharma & adharma.*  
(Nanda Lal Sinha's translation)

- A. I, 1, 1 Now, therefore, we shall explain *dharma*.  
2 *Dharma* [is] that from which [results] the accomplishment of exaltation and of the surpreme Good.  
3 The authoritativeness of the Veda [arises from its] being the word of God [or being an exposition of *dharma*].  
4 The Supreme Good [results] from the knowledge, produced by a particular *dharma*, of the essence of the predicables, substance, attribute, action, genus, species and combination, by means of their resemblances and differences.

Or: the Supreme Good [results] from [the study of] this treatise or system, produced by a particular virtue, which teaches the knowledge &c.

- B. X, 2, 8 The performance of acts of observed utility and of acts the purpose whereof has been taught [in the sacred writings], is for the production of *adṛṣṭa* as [these teachings are authoritative, being the word of God in whom] [the defects] found [in ordinary speakers] do not exist.  
9 The authoritativeness of the Veda [follows] from its being the word of God.

- C. VI. 1. 1 In the Veda the composition of sentences has been preceded by understanding.
- 2 The distribution of names in the Brāhmaṇa (portion in the Veda) is a mark of knowledge [on the part of the framer of the names of the things named therein].
- 3 [Percepts enjoining] gifts [are] preceded by understanding.
- 4 The same is acceptance [of a gift].
- 5 [Result of action indicated by the cāstra accrues to the performer], because there is no causality of the attributes of one soul in [the attributes of] another soul.
- 6 That does not exist where the impure are entertained.
- 7 Impurity [lies] in killing.
- 8 Demerit results from association with him.
- 9 This does not accrue in the case of [entertaining] one who is not impure.
- 10 Preference [should be given] to a worthy recipient [who is available] afterwards.
- 11 Preference [should be given] to an equal, or to an inferior [if he is free from impurity or fault].
- 12 By this is explained reception of property from virtuous persons who are inferior, equal or superior [to oneself].
- 13 Likewise the making away with those who stand in the way, [is justified].
- 14 Making away with another [is not sinful], if [he is] inferior [to oneself].
- 15 In the case of an equal, either suicide or destruction of the other [may be resorted to].
- 16 In the case of a superior, self-destruction [is to be committed].
- D. VI. 2. 1 [Of actions] of which the motives are visible and invisible, the motive where no visible [motive] exists, [tends] to exaltation.
- 2 Ablution, fast, *brāhmacarya*, residence in the family of the preceptor, life of retirement in the forest, sacrifice, gift, oblation, directions, constellations, seasons and religious observances conduce to invisible fruit.
- 3 The observance of the four āśramas [has been already mentioned]. Misbeliefs and disbeliefs as well as beliefs are also (sources of *adṛṣṭa* or *dharma* & *adharma*).

- D. VI, 2, 4 *Upadhā* or impurity [denotes] impurity of emotion, (or of the soul); *anupadhā* [denotes] purity.
- 5 The pure is that which possesses prescribed colour, taste, smell and touch, and is sprinkled with water along with the recitation of sacred hymns, and also without it. (or is sprinkled with water with pronation and with supination).
- 6 Impure — such is the form of the negation of the pure.
- 7 [It is] also something else.
- 8 To the unrestrained, exaltation does not accrue from eating what is pure, inasmuch as there is an absence of self-restraint; and it accrues [where there is selfrestraint], inasmuch as self-restraint is a different thing [from eating].
- 9 [Self-restraint alone is not the cause of exaltation], for there is non-existence [of exaltation], where [the eating of pure food] does not exist.

§ 2. *Quotations from Nanda Lal Siṅha's Appendix B.*

A. NOTES on passage I, 1, 1 &c.

„Professor CANDRAKĀNTA observes under I, 1, 1: The classification of *dharma*, merit or meritorious acts, is not shown by *KANṬA*, as it does not fall within the scope of his philosophy; for he has undertaken the *gāstra* with the purpose of teaching *tattvajñāna*, knowledge of truth only.

„He comments on I, 1, 2: Wherefrom does the production of the Good and the Ultimate Good result? The production of the Good and the Ultimate Good, results from *pravṛtti*, activity or employment, that is (observed in the world as) exertion of speech, mind and the body. Therein, it is said, that a person cultivates *dharma* with the speech, by telling agreeable and wholesome truths and studying the sacred writings; with the mind, by showing compassion, contentment and faith; with the body, by practising charity and relieving the poor and the distressed and those who are in danger, ‘*Yajñena yajñam ayajanta devās tāni dharmāṇi*’. This text of the Veda also shows that *dharma* is the designate of the word ‘*yajati*’ to perform (sacrifices &c.).”

(For I, 1, 4 see here book II chapter II).

B & C. NOTES on the passages B and C are lacking.

D. NOTE on passage VI, 2, 1—9. (p. 5):

„Professor Candrakānta cuts off *vidyate vārthāntaratvād yamasya* from VI, 2, 8 and reads it as a separate aphorism.”

§ 3. Notes to the sūtras on *dharma* & *adharma*.

I have previously suggested the hypothesis that the Vaiṣeṣika system owes its origin to a theoretical attitude of mind. When, therefore, this Darṣana begins and finishes with sūtras on *dharma*, we must consider this due to the influence of surrounding Indian thought, and specially that of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. In the last case we have to do with a mutual relation since we have seen that the Jaiminiyā Mīmāṃsā itself has borrowed in its historical development many theoretical ideas from the Vaiṣeṣika.

A. To the separate sūtras of passage I. 1, 1—4 I should like to add the following remarks:

In sūtra 2 the compound *abhyudaya-niḥcreyasa* demands our attention. The second member of it occurs in I, 1, 4 where *niḥcreyasa* is called the result of true knowledge; the former in VI, 2, 1 where is stated that those actions the aim of which is not seen in this world, tend to *abhyudaya*. This distinction between *abhyudaya* (exaltation) and *niḥcreyasa* (summum bonum, i. e. *nirvāṇa*, *mokṣa*) seems to be due to Vedānta-influence.

Sūtra 3 gives the impression\* of being an insertion. We must trace its origin to the influence of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. „Because [Holy Tradition, i. e. the Veda] expounds it [i. e. *dharma*], therefore Holy Tradition possesses authority.” Still later *tad* was explained as indicating the *Īccara*: this interpretation existed already in PRAÇASTAPĀDA's time (see Bhāṣya p. 3, i. e. Book I chapter 1 § 3).

For the explanation of sūtra 4 see here p. 107.

B. The two sūtras with which the Darṣana closes are mere repetitions. X, 2, 5 is a wrong reading for VI, 2, 1 (the interpretation will be given under letter D) and X, 2, 9 is identical with I, 1, 3.

With reference to NANDA LAL SINHA's translation we may notice that it depends on the following gloss of the Upaskāra:

„*Dṛṣṭānām* = *pramāṇata upalabdhānām karmaṇām*;  
(*gṛahādānasnānādīnām*) *dṛṣṭaprayojanānām* = *dṛṣṭam (upadiṣṭam)*  
*prayojanam geṣām* . . .

. . . . *ata āha: dṛṣṭābhāva iti; 'dṛṣṭam' puruṣāntare 'smatādan*  
*bhramapramādaliṣṭādikam puruṣalūṣaṇam, tad-'abhāve' satity arthaḥ.*”

The gloss is again a specimen of the acuteness shown by Indian scholiasts in explaining bad redactions which are produced by insufficient, mechanical memorising.

C. The first four sūtras of VI, 1 are connected with sūtra I, 1, 3 in its recent interpretation (*tad* = *īccara*); two of them (1 and 2) are quoted in PRAÇASTAPĀDA's Bhāṣya (p. 213 i. e. book III chapter 2

§ 27). They polemise against the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas who hold the Veda to be eternal and thus not created by an *īcvara*, the existence of whom is not discussed in this theological system.

The translation of *siddhi* (in sūtra 2) by 'knowledge', as given by Nanda Lal Sinha, is in accordance with the Upaskāra (Bibl. Ind. p. 257), where *siddhi* is explained as synonymous with *buddhi* (in VI, 2, 1). Since *siddhi* has the meaning of 'skill, power', the interpretation, given here by ĆAMKARA MIĆRA, is not unlikely. For the sūtras II, 1, 18 &c., which are based on the present passage, see here p. 159 sub A.

Sūtra 4 is another expression for the same thought as given in the precedent sūtra. *Tathā pratigrahaḥ* stands here for: *tathā pratigraḥṇātīti*, i. e. „[the priest] accepts [the gift]”, this [expression too proves the intellect of the *īcvara* who composed the Veda].”

Sūtra 5 is quoted in Praçastapāda's Bhāṣya p. 70 l. 13 (i. e. book II chapter 2 § 10) and is commented upon by ĆRĪDHARA in the following way (Nyāya-kandalī p. 86 l. 10—16).

„Merit and demerit are proved by the [sūtra]: '*ātmanantaragūṇānām akāraṇatvāt*'. The Sūtrakṛt intends here to refute the doctrine, upheld by some one, 'that the merit of giving, abiding in the giver [cf. sūtra VI, 1, 3], causes a merit in the receiver', and thus he says: '*ātmanantaragūṇānām ātmantaragūṇeṣy akāraṇatvāt*'. The import of this is: Because the qualities (pleasure &c.) of one soul are not the cause of the qualities (pleasure &c.) of another soul; for the same reason it cannot be accepted that merit and demerit, residing in one thing [namely, in a material thing] should effect [a consequence] in another thing [namely in soul]. By this means merit and demerit are stated to be qualities of soul; otherwise [i. e. if residing elsewhere] they would not be capable of efficiency, according to the statement of their resemblance (*sādharmya*) with pleasure &c.”

It is clear that this never can have been the meaning of the sūtra quoted. We have to explain the origin of this interpretation thus: Praçastapāda considered KAṢṬAPA's sūtras as a supreme authority: therefore the fact alone of *dharma* and *adharma* being mentioned in the Darçana, was here for him a sufficient proof for their existence; Ćrīdhara, however, has tried to explain the quoted sūtra itself as such a proof. He was therefore obliged to ignore completely the context in which the sūtra originally occurs. He refers to sūtra VI, 1, 3 as if only the act of 'giving' was mentioned there and not the expression 'he gives' as a proof for the intellect of the Lord, who composed the Veda. And moreover, his whole argumentation is subtle and sophistic.



But at all events his attempt shows that in his time (10th century after Christ) no fixed tradition existed concerning the meaning of this sūtra.

Çaṅkara Miçra gives a long comments in the form of a dialogue. He considers the sūtra as referring to one of Jaimini's Darçana (Nanda Lal Sinha's translation p. 192): „Now in justification of the aphorism of JAIMINI (Pūrvamīmāṃsā-Sūtra) *‘çāstraśraddhātām phalam anuśthātari’* i. e. ‘result [of action], indicated by the çāstra, [accrues] to the performer’,<sup>1)</sup> he says...”. At the end of the dispute Çaṅkara Miçra quotes a certain Vrttikāra [we have seen formerly that this author is not identical with the Bhāradvāja-vrtti-kāra], who says (Nanda Lal Sinha p. 193: ‘Result [of action], indicated by the Çāstra’ &c., is really a rule without an exception. On the other hand, the fruit which accrues to the departed ancestor, &c. results from the influence of benedictory *mantras* pronounced by Brāhmaṇas entertained at the *Çrāddha* &c., the *mantras* in question being in the case of sacrifice for the departed ancestor: May thy *pitrs* have their objects fulfilled...”

In accordance with this explanation by the *Vrttikāra* one of the interpretations of sūtra 6 runs thus: „The meaning is that where at a *çrāddha* evil or impure Brāhmaṇas are entertained, there the fruit of benediction does not accrue to the departed ancestor...”.

To sūtra 7 the Upaskāra adds: ‘Here *himsāyām* is indicative of all prohibited acts whatever’ and to sūtra 8 „He [the Sūtrakāra] says that not only non-existence of fruit [i. e. according to the explanation of sūtra 6: non-existence of fruit of the pronounced benedictions] accrues [to the *yajamāna*]”. Further *samabhicçāhāra* is explained as ‘eating in the same row, sleeping in company, reading in company &c.’

We may notice that sūtras 7, 8 and 9 give the impression of being old comments on sūtra 6. In this case sūtra 8 would have been another expression for the contents of sūtra 6. And the two remaining sūtras 5 and 6 could be explained thus: „In general — thus not as a strict rule — a religious deed bears fruit for the performer, because &c. But there are exceptions. For instance, the *adharmā* of a priest, entertained at a sacrifice, can be a hindrance to the *adṛṣṭa* of the *yajamāna*. Cf. HILLEBRANDT, *Ritual-literatur*, p. 97 & 98.

The explanation of the following sūtras 10 — 16 is very uncertain. These sūtras are not alluded to by Praçastapāda.<sup>2)</sup>

1) I have not been able to identify the quoted P.M.-aphorism. Cf. Ny. Kandali p. 273 l. 18.

2) In the Berhampore edition the sūtra, treating *parasacchāra* does not occur, and the other sūtras are explained in a way totally different from the interpretation by Çaṅkara Miçra.

According to Ćaṃkara Miĉra the sūtras 10—11 refer to 'preference' [Nanda Lal Sinha's translation here of *pravṛtti*], given to different priests who offer themselves for the performing of a *śrāddha*. Further all the insertions which Nanda Lal Sinha has made in his translation, are based on Ćaṃkara Miĉra's glosses (see that translation p. 185—196). But what specially deserves our notice is that at the end of the comments on 11 *tyāga* is used as opposite in meaning to *pravṛtti*. „*Niśidhānām param tyāgo, na te aduṣṭānām sama-hīnānām apāli bhāvaḥ*” i. e. „The import is that persons prohibited are by all means to be rejected, but not the pure, whether they be equals or inferiors”.

Of sūtra 12 Ćaṃkara Miĉra gives two explanations. According to one *parascūdāna* is synonymous with *pratigraha*. So the meaning is „that *dharma* accrues from the reception of a gift of land &c. from a virtuous person, whether he be inferior, equal or superior, to oneself.” According to the other explanation *parascūdāna* means *parascagrahaṇa* („the taking away of another's property”). Thus the sūtra would refer to the different cases of need in which stealing respectively from persons of lower, equal or superior rank is allowed. In support of this interpretation the following quotation from the Ṛuti is given: *ṣādrāt saptaṃ, vaiṣyāt daṣaṃ, kṣatriyāt pañcadaye, brāhmaṇāt prāṇasaṃcaye*...

Of sūtra 13 only one explanation is given. *Tyāga* is paraphrased here by *vadha* (putting to death). So that the sūtra would sum up the different cases in which murder is allowed, in accordance with another authority, quoted by the commentator. Now it is true that we find elsewhere the expressions *ātmanah tyāgin* (Petrop. Dict. s. v. *tyāgin*: der sich selbst aufopfert, freiwillig in den Tod geht), *ātmatyāga* and *ātmatyāgin*, but although the verb *tyaj* in combination with *ātman* seems to mean 'to murder', it would be very risky to consider *tyāga* as in general synonymous with *vadha*<sup>1)</sup>. Moreover one would expect to find here two explanations, similarly as in the comments on sūtra 12. This second interpretation, now, is obtained by explaining *tyāga* as 'rejection', which meaning was met with at the end of the comments on 11. Then sūtra 13 'similarly the rejection of those who stand in the way [i. e. those who are a hindrance to one's sacrifice]', would correspond with sūtra 10. But on the other hand the interpretation of the following sutras 14—16 is quite impossible unless we accept the meaning 'murder' for *tyāga*. Now we see in philosophical treatises of the

<sup>1)</sup> We could only expect *tyāga* to mean „the forsaking in danger”.

Pūrva-mīmāṃsā as well as of the Vedānta that *karmāṇi* in the first place meant sacrificial acts; the whole book VI of our darśana has been composed under the influence of Mīmāṃsā ideas, we are therefore nearly forced to consider the sūtras 14, 15 and 16 as untrustworthy and recent insertions in which are laid down different jurisdictional notions of not the slightest philosophical importance.<sup>1)</sup>

D. The second āhnikā of book VI consists of two parts, the first of which (sūtras 1—9) bears on *dharma*, the second on the concatenation of psychical states. Here we shall only deal with the first section.

Although I agree with the literal rendering of sūtra 1, given by Nanda Lal Sinha, still I think a paraphrase of my own, would not be superfluous.

„There are actions with a visible motive [i. e. actions which, if successful, lead to a *result* in this world] and actions with an invisible motive [i. e. which do not lead to such a *result*]. When the visible motive is absent [i. e. in the case of the second kind of actions], the motive [or the *wish* which promotes the action] leads to exaltation [i. e. *śarṅga*]”.

There are two grammatical difficulties in this sūtra. In the first place the word *prayojana* has here two meanings; this stylistic mistake could be rectified by accepting the word *prayoga* (undertaking, deed) which occurs in the redaction, given in V. S. X, 2, 8; thus by reading: *dr̥ṣṭād̥r̥ṣṭaprayojanānām dr̥ṣṭābhāve prayogo 'bhyudāgāya* i. e. ‘...the deed leads to exaltation’.

In the second place the partitive genitive with which the sūtra begins, requires some explanation. We know from SEYER'S *Sanskrit Syntax* (§ 117) that a genitive is often used in this prolix way. For the rest, the import of this ideomatic turn, is sufficiently shown by my paraphrase. (Cf. the Praṇaṣṭapāda-bhāṣya p. 206 l. 4—5 and here p. 303).

Sūtra 2 sums up the different lines of conduct leading to an increase of our unseen quality [*adr̥ṣṭa*; in this case: of our *dharma*, merit]. This list is only ‘illustrative’. In this the following groups may be, more or less clearly, be distinguished:

- a. *abhiśecana*, *upavāsa*, *brahmacarya*.
- b. *gurukulavāsa*, *cānaprastha*.

<sup>1)</sup> Finally with reference to the comments, given by the Bhāradvaja-vaiṭṭibhāṣya I should like to notice that *pravṛtti* is accepted here in the ordinary technical sense which it has in the Vaiṣeṣika system, namely as signifying ‘the positive form of *prayatna*, thus: activity’, whereas *tyāga* is considered to be synonymous with *avṛtti*, i. e. ‘the negative form of *prayatna*, thus: withdrawal’; further the locatives *same*, *hīna*, *varṣa* are interpreted as neutra. and as referring to the act which one undertakes or omits, thus *same* = *saṃaphalavati* &c.

c. *yajña*, *dāna*, *prākṣaṇa*.

d. *diç*, *nakṣatra*, *mantra*, *kāla* (for the meaning of these terms see the *Upaskāra*, translation p. 200).

e. *niyama*.

The following sūtras are perhaps additions to sūtra 2. Thus in sūtra 3 *cāturācramya* might signify that *gurukulacāsa* and *vānaprastha* are only illustrative, so that the two other ācramas must be implied: *anupatthā* may be connected with *niyama* in sūtra 2.<sup>1)</sup> The sūtras 5—7 are an introduction to sūtra 8, which itself deals specially with *yama* (= *niyama* of sūtra 2).

Sūtra 5 gives a definition of *çuci*, sūtra 6 of *açuci*. „*açuci*” is the negation of *çuci*”; sūtra 7 (an old gloss?) paraphrases this: „[*açuci*, we may say] also, [is] something different from [*çuci*].” The meaning of the first clause of sūtra 5 is clear, the explanation of the second clause is more difficult; the gloss of Çamkara Miçra which inserts ‘*niyame sati*’ and adds to ‘*arthāntaratvād yamasya*’ the ablativus comparativus *bhojanāt*, does not rouse much confidence, although it also affords an explanation of the following sūtra (9). Further we may notice that in VI, 1, 6 *duṣṭabhojana* has the meaning of the causative verb *bhojayati* ‘to entertain, to feed’, whereas in VI, 2, 8 *çucibhojana* has the meaning of the original verb *bhukte*, ‘to eat’. This may be true, but still the coincidence does not favour much the idea of a trustworthy tradition.

#### § 4. References to the sūtras, of § 1, occurring in the *Praçastapādabhāṣya*.

References to sūtras I, 1, 1—4 and X, 2, 8—9 are met with in the *Bhāṣya* on p. 6 and 7 (book I, chapter 2 § 2 & 3), and on p. 213 (book III chapter 2 § 27). From these passages we learn that the interpretation of *tad* as *īçvara* goes as far back as the time of *Praçastapāda*’s.

The third passage, quoted here in § 1 under letter C (VI, 1, 1—16) is only partly referred to by *Praçastapāda*. Sūtra 1 and 3 are literally quoted on p. 213 (bk. III ch. 2 § 27), sūtra 5 on p. 70 l. 13 (bk. II ch. 2 § 10). The sūtras 6—16 are not referred to, unless we accept a vague reference for sūtras 7 and 8 (see here book IV section V). The references, mentioned for the sūtras 1, 3, 5, are all to a certain extent accidental; that is to say: they do not occur in a coherent passage which treats of the same subject-matter

<sup>1)</sup> Sūtra 4 is certainly an old comments on sūtra 3 and did not originally belong to the *mūla*.

as the sūtra. It may be therefore admitted that the whole adhyāya VI. 1. existed in Praṣastapāda's time, but was ignored by him.

He has treated the contents of adhyāya VI. 2 in a very independent way, as will be shown in the following paragraph.

§ 5. *The paragraphs in the Praṣastapādabhāṣya, dealing with merit and demerit* (book III chapter 2 § 55 and 56).

In Bhāṣya § 55 we first meet with some general statements about *dharma*: its nature as a quality of soul, its effects, origin and annihilation: its special forms with reference to *varṇas* and *āśramas*. Then the means towards *dharma* are classified (substances &c.) Next follows a more detailed discussion in which we can distinguish three parts: *a.* general means for merit (p. 272 l. 13—16); *b.* specification with reference to the different *varṇas* (l. 17—22); *c.* specification with reference to the four *āśramas* (p. 272 l. 22—p. 273 l. 15).

In passus *a*, dealing with the general means for merit we find a list of 16 virtues which lead to the possession of *dharma*. As will be seen, this list is very loosely connected with Vaiṣeṣika Sūtra VI. Its origin must be elsewhere. In order to prove that it is historically connected with the fivefold list of *gamas* of the Yoga Sūtra (II, 30) and the *daṇḍa* of Buddhism, I wish to insert here the following table.

Means for <i>dharma</i> Praṣ. Bh. III. 2 § 55.	Means for <i>adharma</i> Praṣ. Bh. III. 2 § 56.	<i>Yamas</i> accord- ing to Yoga Sūtra.	Daṇḍa of Buddhism <sup>1</sup> , containing i. a. the prohibition of:
1 dharme cāddhā			
2 ahimsā	hiṃsā	ahimsā	destruction of life
3 bhūta hitatva			
4 satyavacana	anṛta	satya	lying
5 asteya	steya <sup>2</sup>	asteya	theft
6 brahmacarya		brahmacarya	impurity
7 anupadhā			
8 krodhavarjana			
9 abhisecana			
10 caudrayasvana			
11 vicatohvatobhakti			
12 upavasa			
13 apramāda	pramāda		the use of intoxicating liquors
14 ūjvā			
15 adhyayana			
16 dana		aparigraha	the receiving of money

<sup>1</sup> See CHANDLER, Pali Dictionary s. v. *saṅgha*.

<sup>2</sup> In the text *steya* is followed by *adā* which seemingly refers to *adharma* *aparigraha*.

A comparison of the four columns shows: 1. that the four lists are, without doubt, historically connected with each other; 2. that the first list contains some additions.

The triplet *ijyā*, *adhyāyana*, *dāna*, which is separately added in the Bhāṣya and is there opposed to the specific priestly duties of *yājana*, *adhyāyana* and *prati-graha*, seems to have popular origin. We find it in the second fable of the Hitopadeśa as the three first components of the „eightfold path”. In the Bhagavadgītā (XI, 53) we find a fourfold list containing: 1. *Vedas* (cf. *adhyāyana*), 2. *tapas*, 3. *dāna* and 4. *ijyā*, and placed in value beneath *bhakti*.

The numbers 9—12 may be considered as another connected set: they all contain priestly virtues: moreover their insertion has caused a change in the meaning of the term *pramāda* (instead of „intoxication” it received the signification of „negligence”). This is evident from the definitions which are given in the Nyāya-kandālī, where we read: p. 276 l. 4:

*abhiśecanam* = *snānam*;

*ṣuśīdracyasecanam* = *ṣuśīnām tilādidracyaṇām kecit parvāṇi niyamena seranam*.<sup>1)</sup>

*cicīṣṭulecatābhaktiḥ* = *trayīsammatāyām* <sup>2)</sup> *devatāyām bhaktiḥ*.

*aparīkṣaḥ* = *ekādacy-ādi-bhojana-nivṛtti-sāṅkalpaḥ*.

*apramādaḥ* = *nitya-naimittikānām karmaṇām avacyambhāvena karaṇam*.

Thus we may conclude that the Vaiṣeṣika system of PRAÇASTAPĀDA has accepted its enumeration of virtues, not from its own darśana, but from adherents of the Yoga or of Buddhism.

## SECTION 2.

### BONDAGE AND LIBERATION.

#### § 1. *Sūtras bearing on saṃsāra and mokṣa.* (Nanda Lal Sinha's translation.)

A. V, 2, 15 Pleasure and pain [result] from contact of soul, sense, mind and object.

<sup>1)</sup> For *tila*, cf. HILLEBRANDT, *Ritualilexikon* p. 72 § 41.

<sup>2)</sup> *trayī* = Rigveda, Samaveda and Yajurveda.

- A. V. 2, 16* Non-origination of that [follows] on the mind becoming steady in the soul: [after it there is] non-existence of pain in the embodied soul. [This is] that *yoga*.
- 17 Egress and ingress [of life and mind, from and into body], conjunctions (i. e. assimilation) of food and drink, and conjunctions of other products, — these are caused by *adṛṣṭa*.
- 18 *Mokṣa* consists in the non-existence of conjunction with the body, when there is, at the same time, no potential body existing, and consequently, rebirth cannot take place.
- B. VI, 2, 10* From pleasure [arises] desire.
- 11 [Desire and aversion arise] also through habituation to that.
- 12 [Desire and aversion arise] from *adṛṣṭa* also.
- 13 [Desire and aversion arise] also from racial distinctions.
- 14 Application to *dharma* and *adharma* has for its antecedents desire and aversion.
- 15 Conjunction [of soul with body, sense and life], produced by them [i. e. *dharma* and *adharma*], is called birth; disjunction [of body and mind, produced by them, is called death].
- 16 (It has been) declared that the actions of the soul taking place, salvation [results].

§ 2. *Notes to these sūtras.*

The sūtras, quoted in 1 sub *A* are explained here p. 272 and those, quoted sub *B* p. 265. We have seen there that probably the sūtras V. 2, 15—18 referred originally to movements of the soul, in accordance with the etymological meaning of the term *samsāra*, and further that the concatenation of psychical facts in VI, 2, 10 &c. is cognate with the five last links of the Buddhistic *pratitya-samutpāda* and the theory about *samsāra* which we find in the Nyāya-sūtra (see here p. 82). These three theories have this in common that they combine experiences about the mostly occurring causal relations between the principle classes of psychical facts: desire and aversion, will and activity, pain and pleasure, intellectual states, with the popular notion of metempsychosis.

Whereas the other Indian systems have not bestowed any further attention on this classification, the Vaiṣeṣika with its more theoretical attitude, has built on it its systematical psychology, (see here p. 280).

§ 3. *The paragraphs on saṃsāra and mokṣa in the  
Pṛaṣastapādabhāṣya.*

*Saṃsāra* and *mokṣa* are discussed in Pṛaṣastapādabhāṣya, book III chapter 2 § 57 and 58. The paragraph 57 does not offer any difficulties nor information of much interest. Paragraph 58 consists of one long sentence: if we leave out the additions, we learn here:

... *viṣṇurthe kale jātasya...*  
*duḥkha-viṣamopāya-jijñāsoḥ...*, *ajñāna-nivṛttau vikalasya*,  
*rāga dveṣādhy-abhāvē, tajjagor*  
*dharmādharmanor anutpattau, pūrcasāñcitayoḥ copabhāgān nirodhe*,  
*...ṣarīrapanicheḍam cotpādya*  
*kevalo dharmah...* *nivartate.*"

Thus the paragraph follows in main lines Vaiṣeṣika Sūtra VI, 2, 10 &c. which passage mentions *sukha* [and *duḥkha*] in sūtra 10, *rāga* [and *dveṣa*] in sūtra 10 as their consequences, *dharma* and *adharma* in sūtra 14, and refers to *jāti* and *maraṇa* in sūtra 16.

On the other hand we find in the Nyāya-kandalī<sup>1)</sup> a passage which resembles the order of the Nyāya-sūtra. ĀRĪDHARA quotes here some authors who affirm that God lacks some of the qualities which belong to the human soul (cf. here book IV section IV table D). It runs as follows:

... *ato na...mithyājijñānam; mithyājijñānābhāve ca na tanmūlan*  
*rāga dveṣau; tayoḥ abhāvēn na tatpūrvikā praveṛttih; praveṛttyabhāve*  
*ca na tatsādhyau dharmādharman; tayoḥ abhāvēt tajjagor api sukha-*  
*duḥkhayor abhāvaḥ; sarvadaiva cānubhavasadbhāvēt smṛtisaṃskārā*  
*api nāsūte.*"<sup>2)</sup>

### SECTION 3.

### THEOLOGY.

#### § 1. *Sūtras explained in the Upaskāra, as bearing on the Lord.*

I, 1, 3 The authoritativeness of the Veda [arises from its] being  
word of God [or being an exposition of *dharma*].

II, 1, 17 Therefore the name 'air' is proved by the Veda.

<sup>1)</sup> p. 57 l. 20.

<sup>2)</sup> For translation see book III fragment 16.



- II, 1, 18 But name and effect are the mark [of the existence] of beings distinguished from ourselves.  
 19 Because name and effect follow from perception.  
 VI, 1, 1 In the Veda the composition of sentences has been preceded by understanding.  
 2 The distribution of names in the Brāhmaṇa [portion of the Veda] is a mark of knowledge [on the part of the framer of the names] of the things named [therein].  
 X, 2, 9 The authoritativeness of the Veda [follows] from its being the word of God.

§ 2. *Annotations to these sūtras.*

The four passages, quoted in § 1, have all been explained previously, (see respectively p. 345 sub A, p. 159, p. 346 sub C and p. 345 sub B).

In passage I, 1, 3 and X, 2, 9 *taḍ* need not be explained as *īcvara*, but can refer to *dharma* in I, 1, 2 and to the actions, mentioned in X, 2, 8. In the passage II, 1, 17—19 and VI, 1, 2 we are not obliged to think of a Lord: it is possible that only *prajāpatis* are meant (see here book III fragment 11). Very likely the system was originally atheistic.

§ 3. *References to the Icvara in the Praçastapādabhāṣya.*

References to the *Icvara* in the Praçastapādabhāṣya are rare; e. g. book I chapter 1 § 3 and book II chapter 2 § 6 (translated here p. 163).

The notion of the Lord, as given by the Nyāyakandalī<sup>1)</sup>, approaches the Epicurean idea, which is inconsistent with devotion.

1) See here book III fragment 16.

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#### Section 3.

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# BOOK III.

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ÇRĪDHARA'S NYĀYA-KANDALĪ.  
TRANSLATIONS.

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## PRELIMINARY NOTE TO THE TRANSLATIONS FROM THE NYĀYA-KANDALĪ.

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The Nyāyakandalī is a difficult book.

This is partly due to the inaccuracy of the tradition of the text; the deviations in the quotations specially show this. Moreover the editor might have offered more help; a fuller use of *daṇḍas*, a division of the text into more paragraphs and some more indexes would certainly have been useful.

Yet the difficulty is for the greatest part to be found in the composition and the exposition of the work itself. The works of the Indian scholiasts are for a great deal works of compilation; this method may be easy for the author, but never leads to unity or clearness of composition. Then these schoolmen are too prone to polemics and unfortunately these polemics are in the Kandalī directed against Buddhistic works of philosophy which we cannot consult any more in their original form.

Further the exposition approaches the form of a dialogue, without however fully accepting it. Thus the objections, raised in the course of an examination, need not always be attributed to one antagonistic school. And although the alternating objections and answers give a certain liveliness to the style, we never obtain a clear notion about the convictions of the opponents.

Another difficulty is the dialectical method which is applied. The *anumāna*, which is mostly used, is (as I have shown in book II chapter 5) a combination of inference and superficial induction. The general thesis is, in principle, expressed in a positive and a negative form; each form is supposed to be proved by one example. Then the antagonist gives counter-examples. After this the two parties try to find logical mistakes in each other's argumentations. Pages and pages are filled in this way and the result is never convincing.

My translation of fragments is principally meant as an effort to make the study of the Sanskrit text easier. For myself I am just as deeply convinced of the shortcomings of my work, as I am of the difficulty of the task which I have undertaken. I have added only a few annotations to my translation; for the rest I refer to book I chapter IV and book II chapter V which may be considered as an introduction to the following part of my book.

NOTE I am sorry I have not been able to consult the translation of the Nyāyakandali which appeared in the Pañḍit (cf. Colonel G. A. JACOB, *A handful of popular notions* I, 2d ed. Bombay 1907 p. VIII).

## TRANSLATIONS.

### I. *Sūtrā*.

Nyāya-kandali p. 12 l. 4<sup>1</sup>

[Pārvaṇakṣin]. Some say: the daily doings of people have to do with that which is proved by a *pramāṇa* a trustworthy means of knowledge: this does not take place in the opposite case: therefore, existence is only based upon such means of knowledge.

[Siddhāntin]. This is wrong. Because the unwished-for consequence would be the non-existence of an object before the arising of the *pramāṇa*, and the seizableness of a something non-existent, f. i. of a donkey's horn, does not exist; and because a mutual dependence of the two notions: existence and trustworthy means of knowledge would take place [in as far as trustworthy knowledge is such knowledge as teaches us what exists, and existence is that which is based on trustworthy knowledge]. And [finally] because, if an existent *pramāṇa* is the seizer and existence must be defined as the something seizable by *pramāṇa*, an endless regress takes place in as far as the seizer, the *pramāṇa*, itself, depends on another seizer &c.

[Pārvaṇakṣin]. But we do not assert the opinion: existence is relation with *pramāṇa*, but we mean: existence is the individual nature of the thing which is fit to enter into relation with *pramāṇa*. He who upholds the generality: existence, has to accept the individual nature of things (*padārthas*) as well, since existence cannot inhere in something non-existent, as f. i. a hare's horn. If this is so, let only this [individual nature] then exist; what is the use of existence [as a generality]? We may add to this, the individual natures of things (*padārthas*) are separate from one another, how then can a notion of one form (*ākāra*) and the use of one name arise in reference to them, for there is no seizing of any relation in [an] infinite [number of] things?

[Siddhāntin]. But we maintain that one reason [for such a single denotation] is existent in these [individual natures of the things].

1. Cf. here book IV Section VII Table E.

[Purvapakṣin: We answer:] though the cognition of a precedent form arises in reference to a second individual [cow] in [the mind of] him who has formerly seen a first individual cow; yet after having formerly seen a mountain, there is no appearance of a previous form in one's mind, when perceiving a mustardseed. How could there be the acceptance of a generality [...existence"] in this case?

[Siddhāntin]: Is there not a complete correspondence of form in a mountain [and a mustard-seed] &c., or is it not found partly? If the denial of a generality [...existence"] in these [individual things] is pronounced, because a complete correspondence of form is lacking, then the general notion: „cow“ has to be rejected just as well, because there is no community of qualities in every respect between a *ṣābaleya* and a *bāhuleya*. But if the correspondence of the individual natures is only partly lacking, then this [reasoning of yours] is wrong, because an appearance of correspondence [or equality] arises in reference to all these [individual things, mountains, mustard-seeds &c.], namely in their form as being different from non-existence. This, namely, is the difference [between the notions *sattā* & *gotrā*]: The notion of sameness in kind arises suddenly with regard to individual cows, as there is a correspondence of sameness in a greater number of parts. This notion arises slowly with regard to mountains &c., as the generality is not clearly manifested through the correspondence of sameness in a fewer number of parts, as f. i. [there is a slow arising of] the intellection: „notion of earth“ in reference to a pot after one's having seen a jewel. — By this [reasoning] [the definition of] existence as „that which causes practical efficiency“<sup>1)</sup> is rejected. For a non-existent cannot take the function of practical efficiency, and if the practical efficiency does exist, then, because such is existence, an endless regress comes in, namely in as far as the existence of something practically efficient presupposes another practical efficiency &c.; [from which logical fault of endless regress] the non-existence of everything would be the unwished-for consequence.

## 2. *The physical process of visual perception.*

Nyāya-kandālī, p. 23, l. 4:

Some say: The senses do not consist of material elements, because they are effective without having reached [the object]; for it is a property of the material elements, for instance a light, to be effective after reaching [the object].

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. Nyāya Kandālī p. 73 l. 19 &c., fragment 18 of translations.



[Siddhāntin]: This is not right. For one does not perceive [see — in the whole argumentation sight is the real topic] what is hidden. If the senses were effective without reaching, then they would grasp (perceive) a thing, hidden by a wall or something else; for there is no difference in respect to the absence of reaching.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: They do not grasp (perceive) a hidden thing, because fitness is wanting.

[Siddhāntin]: In the first place the fitness on the part of the senses is their capability of grasping an object, as in this case [when the senses are in a healthy condition and open for impressions] they grasp a not-hidden object. In the second place the fitness on the part of the object consists in its largeness [size, *mahattva*, as opposed to *aputva*], its being inherent in (i. e. component of) some [parts], its possession of a certain colour &c.; this fitness does not cease because a thing is hidden. The condition of straightness [the fact that we see the things along a straight line] too is of a similar nature [i. e. proves that eyebeams go out of the eyes and reach the object].

[Pūrvapakṣin]: But this is not what I mean. The non-existence of a covering is a cause of the percept of a thing, just as the not-being of conjunction is the cause of the action (movement) of falling. When there is a covering, then the not-being of the covering vanishes; therefore no percept arises, because the cause is absent.

[Siddhāntin]: This is not right, as we see that the hidden state really means the hindrance from reaching a tangible thing, f. i. an umbrella obstructs [the reaching] of the falling water and the sunshine; but it does not merely cause the not-being of itself to vanish [as you mean by saying: „when there is a covering, then the not-being of the covering vanishes”].

So then the inference (syllogism, *anumāna*) for my thesis can easily be understood:

The eye gives apparency to what it has reached,  
as it does not do so to a hidden object,  
so as a lamp:  
and as it is an external organ,  
like the skin, the organ of touch.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: But how then is the grasping of a remote object possible?

[Siddhāntin]: Because there is a contact between the eyebeams and the object. The eyebeams which have a latent colour and touch, after going far, grasp the thing which is. For the same reason one is wrong in making the objection: „how is it possible that the

organ consists of material elements, as it shows its power of manifestation [even] in reference to large things"; for this is brought about by its rays, as is the case with the rays of a lamp. And where the eyebeams with reference to the greater number of their parts come into contact with the whole of the thing and its parts, in that case the grasping is clear, since we perceive the thing, provided with all its properties; but where the contact only takes place with reference to a portion, there the perception is unclear, as it grasps the object only as characterised by its generality (general features).

[Pūrvapakṣin]: That which goes, reaches the near and remote objects successively, therefore how can a simultaneous perception of a tree and the moon take place?

[Siddhāntin]: Because the activity of the organ [of sight] takes place quickly just like the penetration through a hundred of leaves. This [simultaneous perception] is an illusion, caused by the non-perception of the succession, but the simultaneity does not exist really.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: But in the case of the theory of [manifestation after] reaching, the percept: „this is at a distance” would not occur.

[Siddhāntin]: You are not right; for this takes place in another way. Since the contact with the organ [of sight] cannot be seen itself, the impression of farness and nearness are not produced by the occurrence or non-occurrence of this [fore-mentioned contact], but by the occurrence or non-occurrence of the contact with the body. Where there is a perception of a thing, connected with the body, there the impression: „this is near” takes place; but where there is perception of a thing, not connected with this body, there we have the impression: „this is at a distance”.

### 3. *Uddeṣa, lakṣaṇa & parīkṣā.*

Nyāyakandalī p. 26 l. 15.

As long as the categories are not enunciated, their definitions are not possible, since they would have no reference; and no notion of truth can exist with regard to things undefined, since one of the factors which cause it, is lacking. Therefore, for him who undertakes the explanation of the categories, there is a twofold procedure in the doctrine: enunciation and definition; but there is a limited use of examination. In those cases where the truth is not ascertained in reference to the given definition, because another opinion forms an obstacle, an examination is instituted in order to refute the position, advanced by the other. But in such cases where the

truth is already ascertained by the sufficiency of the mere exposition of the definition, then this procedure, as being useless, is not required. He who requires a threefold procedure of the system, does not need an examination concerning the *prajñāna* usefulness or importance of a discussion<sup>1</sup> &c. Why is this? Because these [matters like *prajñāna*] are already known from the definition. If it were so, [i. e. if *prajñāna* &c. had to be examined], then the procedure would not be threefold, in compliance with the notion of the topics.

Enunciation is the mentioning of the categories by their names. Definition is a property of the defined [notion], which property excludes all notions belonging to any class other than its own. Examination is an investigation of the defined [notion] in reference to the way in which it is defined.

The division of what is defined, is not a separate, [a fourth] procedure, as it is included in the definition of enunciation. For [division] is only separately mentioned in order to settle [the statement] only these [genera belong to a certain category], and in order [to make it possible for us] to give definitions of the genera. These definitions of the genera of categories are given after the categories themselves have been subdivided; otherwise these definitions would have no reference. For instance the substances are enunciated in the formula: „substances, qualities & actions”; they are subdivided in the formula: „earth, water, fire”. Now a new section is begun in order to define the genera of this [substance].

#### 4. *Lakṣaṇasya prajñāna.*

Nyāya-kandālī p. 28 l. 21.

[CĪRṬHARA after having discussed PRACĀSTAPADA's definition of *prthivi*, continues thus]:

As has been said by UDDYOTAKARA: the aim of the definition is to exclude objects belonging to another class than its own class”. By this the following is also refuted:

[Objection quoted]: If the things are known, then they need not be defined; if not known, then still less, because [the defining is thus] impossible.

[Siddhāntin]: This is wrong, because definition either serves to teach us the particular use of language in reference to a thing of which the nature is known, or to give us particulars about a thing which is known in general.

<sup>1</sup>) Cf. Nyāya Sūtra I. 1. 1.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: in case this were true, then there would be a regressus ad infinitum, in as far as every time the defining [notion] is to be defined in the same way as was the [last]-defined notion.

[Siddhāntin]: No: because a definition is unavoidable when the notion is lacking; and because the notion is not lacking in every case [in other words: in our definitions we need go only back until we meet with notions immediately known]. Thus skilful people will bind the cows' heads to their forelegs, but they do not think [of binding] these [legs] to something else. But instruction is not meant for him who is ignorant in every respect, because we take such people just as little into consideration as we do infants or mutes.

### 5. *The explanation of variegated colour.*<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 30 l. 2:

[Siddhāntin]. Several colours inhere in one *genus* of earth owing to the difference between the individual specimina. Sometimes too, many kinds of colours inhere together in one individual thing, [namely] where the aggregate is formed by parts which have connection with [i. e. in which inhere] several colours.

[Opponent]: If I should ask: how is this?

[Siddhāntin]: In the same way as the aggregate is brought about by the parts, so will the colour in the aggregate be effected by the colours of the parts. And in the parts we do not find exclusively the colour white, nor the colour blue, but blue, white, yellow &c. And of these one certain colour alone is not effective, and neither are the others; that is the rule: for we see in other cases that all the colours of the parts, without exception, are capable [of producing the colour in the aggregate]. Neither are we allowed to say that all the colours are ineffective in consequence of mutual opposition. Because we have the notion of an aggregate with variegated colour and there is no perception of an object without colour. And it is not the colours of the parts, as a plurality, which are conceived in the notion „variegated”. If we should suppose that the aggregate becomes apparent only by this [perception of a plurality of colours], then because the same thing would necessarily happen in other cases, the putting aside of the colour of the aggregate would be the unwished-for consequence. Therefore [the colour of the aggregate] is effected by these [separated colours]

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book I p. 93.

through blending together. And this effect has for essence blue, white, yellow, in as far as it follows the nature of the several causes, and is called variegated.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: it is wrong that something that is one, could have the nature of several, because there is a contradiction (mutual opposition)? Moreover the saying of us, opponents, (*prācādhakas*) runs: „This [thing] here is one and is called „variegated” too, this [variegatedness] is more variegated than that [oneness]!”<sup>1)</sup>

[Siddhāntin]: What mutual opposition is there between blue &c.? This opposition is not of such a kind that one [colour] is the non-existence of the other, because they follow each the nature of being, and we should get entangled in a *circulus vitiosus*.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: This opposition is the being something else in particular nature.

[Siddhāntin]: You are right in so far. But there is nothing reprehensible in a colour characterised as variegated. For [this colour], equivalent to the capability of its different causes, exists according to the perception, relied upon by everybody.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the unwished-for consequence would be that we should perceive the variegated colour in the plain side of f. i. a piece of cloth in which this [variegated colour] inheres, because this piece of cloth is one”.

[Siddhāntin]: No, because the perception of variegated colour is effected by the seeing of several colours of parts, which is according to agreement and contrariety (*anvaya-vyatireka*) fit for that effect, and this does not take place on the other side [of the piece of cloth].

[Opponent]: So then we do not grasp the variegated colour in a substance, effected by double atoms<sup>2)</sup> which have different colours, since we do not grasp the colours of these parts.

[Siddhāntin]: Whoever would say „no” [to this question]? For the colour of an absolutely small object is not perceived discriminately<sup>3)</sup>, but we see the colours of the parts of that thing whose [colour is discriminately] grasped. Whoever thinks: „variegated colours, [as being] many, do not cover [the object]”, [is answered]: in this case no colour could arise in a double thread made of a blue and a yellow thread, since the colour of either part separately is not *the* effective factor. But our opinion is, that one colour: „varie-

<sup>1)</sup> The *śloka*, quoted, is placed after „iti cet”, as often happens in such a case.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. here p. 367, exposition of the atom theory.

<sup>3)</sup> Cf. SPEYER, *Sanskrit Syntax* § 381.

gated" is then produced by these two; and it will be thus in other cases as well, since there is no difference.

The variegated-coloured object, the existence of which was the topic of our dispute, is connected with one colour <sup>1)</sup>,

because it is an object,

so as another object.

The colour of this object is one.

because it is the colour of an aggregate,

so as the colour of another object which is an aggregate.

### 6. *Exposition of the atom-theory.*

Nyāya-kandalī, p. 31 l. 16:

What trustworthy means of knowledge assures us of the existence of earth in its atomical form?

[Siddhāntin]: The following syllogism (*anumāna*):

At a certain point the continuant series of smaller and still smaller extensions comes to an end;

because it is a continuant series of extensions;

like the continuant series of greater and still greater extensions.

The point where [the series] stops, that [extension] than which there is no smaller, is the atom (or infinitesimal part).

For this reason too it is eternal:

because it does not possess parts, whilst at the same time possessing substantiality;

just like (physical) space <sup>2)</sup>.

[Opponent]: But the atom possesses parts; and thus it is not infinitesimal, because the notion will occur to simple people that the extension of the parts [of this, your supposed, atom] is again smaller in comparison to the [atom, their] product.

[Siddhāntin]: Let then this part of that [which was at first considered to be an atom] be the atom.

[Opponent]: Neither will this be the case, because there will be again other parts.

[Siddhāntin]: So an endless regress would ensue; and consequently neither could the smaller and smaller [extensions] of aggregates exist in as far as the greatness or smallness of the number of the causes — [a greatness or smallness which is] the reason

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *ekarūpasambandha* I.e. the one colour, called „variegated“.

<sup>2)</sup> In physical space parts only exist by imagination, not in reality.

for the pre-eminence or inferiority of the extension — could not exist, since all things without exception would be produced from [an] endless [series of] causes. But this difference of extension [in the aggregates] *is*, ergo the atomical extension at a certain point does not allow a transgression. So the infinitesimal part is proved.

And this [atom] is one, and unproductive. For suppose, this one eternal to be productive, then an uninterrupted arising of the effect [i. e. of the aggregates] would take place, in as far as it, [the atom], would not be limited [in producing]. The indestructiveness [of everything] also would be a consequence: as neither an annihilation of the abode [i. e. of the atoms in which the aggregate „inheres”] nor a separation of the parts — [which annihilation or separation is] the cause of decay — would ever take place.

Neither can we attribute creative power to three atoms <sup>1)</sup>. For, with reference to the arising of „large” effect-substances we learn by experience that only an effect-substance which [possesses in an absolute sense „largeness”, *mahatva*, but] is of small extension compared with the extension of the thing in question [i. e. the product], is capable [of producing]. [To summarise this in a syllogistic form]:

The threefold atom is only produced by effect-substance[s];

because [this threefold atom] possesses „large” extension;  
like a pot.

Thus having rejected the productive power of three and one, we have proved: „that which is effected by two atoms, is the double atom”.

There is only effectuation by several [i. e. three or more] double atoms, (also this restriction must be made); but not by two pairs of atoms. For if things which have infinitesimal size, were effective, then this effectuation would be useless in as far as only infinitesimality would arise in accordance with the nature of the cause. <sup>2)</sup> There is, however, no restriction for higher numbers. Sometimes [an aggregate] is effected by three [double atoms], this is called a *tryaṇuka*, sometimes by four, sometimes by five, thus you may imagine as you wish [i. e. without limitation]. — And there is no uselessness in effect; for we obtain [this result]: the greater the

<sup>1)</sup> The following proof is based on the implied admission of *tryaṇuka* being a „*mahat-patramāṇa*”. This is only produced by *karyadātṛ-janī*, therefore the *tryaṇuka* must exist as a link between the *atoms* and the *tryaṇukas*.

<sup>2)</sup> Paraphrase of the argumentation given: a *tryaṇuka* is still infinitesimal; one *tryaṇuka*, added to one *tryaṇuka*, would remain infinitesimal; for „two” not being considered a sufficient number, does not bring about any change in the character of the *patramāṇa*. Thus the smallest aggregate, possessing „largeness” *mahatva*, consists of three pairs of atoms.

number of causes [i. e. constituent parts], the greater the degree of largeness. Neither, with matters standing thus, would the consequence be that a pot is effected by mere double atoms [without intermediate parts], for when a pot is broken, we see a separation of smaller and smallest parts and therefore we may conclude that the effectuation is correspondent to that.

1. *The body is not built up of five elements.*<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandālī p. 38 l. 5:

[From the standpoint] of those who have accepted the theory that an organic body originates from the five elements as inherential cause, the body would be without smell: because the smell of the causes [i. e. the constituent parts] would remain ineffective: and it would possess a variegated (mixed, *citra*) colour, taste and touch, because several colours, tastes and touches are possible in the [same] effects [i. e. aggregates]; but experience teaches us otherwise. Therefore the material of the body is not the five elements.

For the same reason it neither has earth and water, nor earth, water and wind for its material.

If the material were wind<sup>2)</sup> and (physical) space, then the body would be without smell and without taste. And you may continue thus for all possible combinations.

Moreover, if the five elements were the inherential cause [of the body], its oneness would never take place, because difference would result from the difference[s] in its nature. But:

The human body possesses [oneness, viz.] the nature of earth:  
because it has smell;

like earth in its atomical form.

If one should ask: how is it that we perceive here [in the human body] the qualities of water? — then we answer: in consequence of inherence in the conjunct [i. e. because these qualities inhere in something conjoined to the main material of the body].

Thus it is enough.

1) According to the Vaiṣeṣika system an organic body consists in its main formation only of one kind of atoms. For instance the human and the animal body inheres in [i. e. consists of] earthly atoms, to which other kinds of atoms are conjoined. Thus the atoms of the eye, being of the nature of light, are conjoined to the earthly atoms of the body.

The argumentation, given by Caṇḍakya, is based on the following admission: if the qualities of the constituent parts of an aggregate differ, then either they blend into one variegated, mixed quality, or they hinder one another, so that the aggregate is void of the correspondent quality. The first alternative is seen in the case of colour, taste and touch.

2) Read: *cajra-akāśat*.



8. *Proof for the thesis that the objective things are not yet included in their qualities (in other words: the thing is not merely its qualities).*<sup>1</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 41 l. 2:

[Opponent]: If I should answer: we do not accept such a thing as gold<sup>2</sup>, which has an undeveloped colour and touch, because there is nothing else besides the perceived colour and touch.

[Siddhāntin]: No: because we possess an idea of a total thing, characterised in the respective cases as: this is a pillar, this is a jar, though there is no difference in the particular nature of colour &c. in all these cases.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: with reference to the respective composition there is a difference in our ideas, caused by the differences in our *vāsanās* [*vāsanā* = impression of anything remaining latently in the mind].

[Siddhāntin]: Let us suppose that also the differences between our ideas of blue &c. are caused by the *vāsanās*. What avails [your accepting] differences such as [an objective] blue &c.?

[Opponent]: If I should answer: [we are obliged to accept] the hypothesis of [objective] differences such as blue &c., because, if no objectivity existed, there would be no reason why the ripening of our *vāsanās* — a ripening which would merely depend on the series of [these *vāsanās*] themselves — should happen at and during a certain time; nor why our ideas of blue &c., which [according to your objection] are caused only by those [*vāsanās*], should be at a definite time.

[Siddhāntin]: Neither can limitation in time be applicable to the different ideas „pillar” &c. which do not comply with external things. Therefore, we are obliged to suppose a particular totality in addition to [the qualities] colour &c., a totality, different [in each case], as being a cause of the awakening of a particular *vāsanā* in accordance with the composition [i. e. in accordance with the different manner in which the qualities in a thing are combined], and by this [existence of an objective totality] also our grasping of one thing by means of seeing and touch is rendered possible [i. e. our sensations of sight and touch can in some cases refer to one

<sup>1</sup> Cf. here book IV section VII letter C n°. 13.

<sup>2</sup> According to the Vaiᢢeᢢika system gold (and other metals) as known to us, are really a mixture of earthly matter and light. Light in its unmixed state possesses warm touch and lustre as qualities. The light forming a part of metals, has these qualities, however, in an undeveloped condition.

and the same object]; but if the objective thing was merely [its qualities] colour &c., then this would be impossible, because [these qualities: blue, white, hard, soft &c.] are grasped by their respective sense-organs exclusively.

9. *The existence of aggregates*<sup>1)</sup>.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 41 l. 12:

[Opponent]: Moreover, [those qualities as] colour &c. which are of an infinitesimal nature<sup>2)</sup>, transgress without exception the ken of the sense-organs; and an accumulation, independent of them, does not exist; therefore, what, according to your standpoint, is the object of sight and touch?

[Siddhāntin]: Though the atoms, [i. e. the infinitesimal qualities of colour &c., which you uphold] taken separately, transgress the ken of the sense-organs, yet they become attainable to sense, whenever they come forth fitly and the internal organs of sense &c. are present.

[Opponent]: No; for even on their fitly coming forth they do not abandon their innate nature of being ultimately subtle; moreover, when visibility is a mere consequence of the fitly coming forth, then both the internal and external organ of sense would be perceptible, since there is no difference [in this respect between the organs of sense and the external elements].

[Siddhāntin]: But if I should answer: my idea is this. Though the atoms, taken separately, are not gross (material, *sthūla*), yet heaped up together like a mass of hair, they get a gross appearance and become visible, and in as far as there are no interspaces between them, they are [collectively] apprehended under [the idea of] oneness.

[Opponent]: Does then a one and gross form originate in these many [atoms], or is this [one and gross form] not really formed, but only perceived in them in consequence of our [own mental] projection, as it is in the case [of the oneness] of hairs?

[Siddhāntin]: If it really originates, then we have what we call an aggregate; but if it is experienced, when not being, then it is a false impression (*bhrānta*): and a false impression has a correct impression for its counterpart (*pratigogin*); so then somewhere a

1) For an analysis of this passage see here Table of contents of the Nyaya Kandalī, in book IV. Cf. moreover book I p. 50 Appendix II. and book IV section VII letter E. (Nyaya Sūtra IV, 2, 4—17).

2) Cf. the passage Ny. Kand. p. 41 l. 2, translated here pag. 370.

one and gross [form] must be accepted as existing, and it is not true that its existence would only be in our cognition, because the idea: „I am something material” does not arise and because the unwished-for consequence would be that the fact of [a thing] being a common object of several perceivers could not exist. Therefore this one and gross [form] is the object, since it always appears in a definite form and exhibits practical efficiency. This then is the proof for [the existence of] the aggregate.

[Opponent]: No doubt, a notion is proved when no (logical) impediment *bādha* exists: in that case we use the expression: „so [it is]”. But a refuting argumentation exists with reference to the existence of aggregates. To wit: when the hand trembles, then the body of which this hand is a part, does not tremble, or if the foot trembles, then the body to which this foot belongs does not tremble. So then the consequence would be that one thing would possess contradicting qualities [scil. the body is at rest and at the same time in movement]. This is [logically] non-coherent: since no fixed rule exists for the body trembling necessarily whenever the hand trembles. But when a cause exists to make merely the hand move, then that only moves, and not the body, for [with reference to the latter] a cause is lacking; but when there is a cause for the movement of the body as well, then the body moves and has no rest. So where does contradiction come in, when the hand moves and not the body? Therefore there is *vyatāsiddhi* (relation of separability) between part and aggregate.

[Siddhāntin]: No: the relation of separability means an abiding in separate abodes. But movement and non-movement are no [examples for that], because, when a thing moves and its quality does not move [according to the general thesis that qualities do not possess action, i. e. do not move], then there is no relation of separability between this [thing and this quality]. The abiding in separate abodes is not seen in part and aggregate, even in the case when these two are separated from each other [f. i. when the hand is cut off from the body: in this case namely the former part begins to form an aggregate by itself]; so then there is no question of a relation of separability.

And the other point of refutation which is mentioned:

[Refutation]: When one part is hidden, then we do not perceive there the aggregate which inheres in that [part], but we perceive it so far as we perceive the parts uncovered; so then of one and the same thing a perception and non-perception at the same time ensues.

[Answer]: This is neither right. For when [only] one part is covered, then there is no concealment of the aggregate. For this, being one, abiding in many parts, is even perceived — though several parts are covered — by means of the perception of the many other, uncovered parts: because this [aggregate] is everywhere [i. e. over its whole extent] unremoted [i. e. present]. With reference to anything which is characterised by the perception of several parts [and not by the collective notion of oneness], the idea of grossness [gross = solid = *sthūla*] does not arise, because we do not perceive the accumulation of its several parts, whereas the perception would effect a notion [of ours] concerning an extensive dimension. But where a concealment of more parts and a perception of fewer parts take place, there the aggregate is not seized, f. i. when we see only the head of some one, submerged in water. When one part is painted, then the aggregate in that part is painted and in the other parts it is not painted: so then the consequence would be that the same thing is painted and not painted? With this we have no difficulty, because there is no inconsistency. The state of being painted means the conjunction with paint: and the state of not being painted is the non-existence of that [conjunction]. And both [states] are found in one [thing], since conjunction does not cover [the whole object: i. e. need only take place in a part of it].

[Opponent]: This again is another point of refutation: Does an aggregate abide only partially or totally in each of its several parts? — a third way namely is not possible. The abiding then does not take place partially, since the [aggregate] without [all its] parts would not exist in that one place. On the other hand, if the [aggregate] abides [in any of the parts] totally, then it could not abide in the other parts, because should the nature of the thing be defined by its blending (*samśarga*) with one part, then the other parts would be excluded and another *svarūpa* (individual existence) [of the aggregate] could not be admitted in addition to the *svarūpa*, just now described.

[Siddhāntin]: We may give the following answer: Do you state the thesis: „whatever exists, exists (*varlate*) either partially or totally”, as one upheld by yourself or as one defended by others? Certainly not as one upheld by your own [school]: no existence (abiding, *vytti*) of anything in any place is upheld by the Buddhists [i. e. they neither believe in the existence of aggregates nor of atoms]; and the abiding of a thing in an either partial or total respect, is not asserted by others, because the abiding is not of those two [of the whole and the parts] and because these two are

neither causes of the abiding. Whatever exists (or abides) in reality, exists in a form which we may define as the relation of the abode and the abiding. And the blending (*samśarga*) of one thing with several is not contradictory. For the blending with the *ākāra* „yellow” &c. is experienced in the cognition of variegated colour<sup>1)</sup> which is [also] characterised by the *ākāra* „blue”. And no differentiation of this [cognition] takes place according to [the manifoldness of] *ākāras*. If it were not possible for one [cognition] to arise from the seizing of several *ākāras*, then the absurd consequence would be that you could not possess the notion: „variegated”. Neither may the oneness of the *ākāras* be concluded from the unity of the cognition, since this is repugnant to [that which happens in the case of the] perception of variegated colour. And in the same way as [one objective phenomenon, f. i. one colour], enters [so to say], by our perception, into the other parts, *so that there arises* [literally: with reference to] the independent nature of one aggregate which is characterised by [or: in which dominates] one of the parts — similarly at the manifestation of one [thing] of a solid (*sthūla*) character, we become aware of a blending of several into one. And if [you refer to the case] where one abides in several, this does not make the slightest difference, in as far as in both cases equally the blending of one is particularised by several. So then we have refuted both absurd consequences [which you, our opponents, try to deduce from our premises], namely, [the thesis]: „whatever is one, abides in only one place, so as one colour or one aggregate” and [the other thesis]: „whatever abides in many [parts], is manifold, as f. i. the *tāla*-fruits which are divided into many portions or an aggregate which abides in many, [in a manifoldness]”. And the [two instances of] universal concomitance, [expressed in these two propositions] are refuted both from our own and from another’s [the opponent’s] standpoint. From our own standpoint, namely, [as follows]: one cognition abides in several [factors]: object, external sense-organ and internal sense-organ, in as far as it abides in them by causal relation, whilst it possesses one undivided, individual nature. And also for the other, [the opponent], one thread abides equally in several jewels in a form [which is called] conjunction. So then the aggregate will abide in its parts by the relation of inherence and will yet not be many. Moreover, whilst this whole argumentation [of yours], based on *prasaṅga*, destroys [the notion of] abode, it annihilates too itself

1) See Ny. Kand. p. 30 l. 2; here p. 365.

[i. e. makes all argumentation impossible]. For if no aggregate should exist and [consequently] the world [should consist] merely of atoms, then the notions [used in argumentations, such as] *dharmā* (characteristic), *dharmīn* (that which possesses the characteristic), *dr̥ṣṭānta* (example) &c. would become baseless; and [in accordance with this] no abiding (or existence) of a thing which has no abode could take place. Therefore, by that [argumentation of yours] the aggregate which is proved by perception, cannot be annihilated; for it [scil. argumentation] is of less weight than that [i. e. perception], in as far as [argumentation] is dependent on perception.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: perception is mistaken (illusory, *bhrānta*):

[Siddhāntin]: Why this?

[Opponent]: Because it is done away with by a refuting fact (*bādhaka*).

[Siddhāntin]: If perception is mistaken, then the refuting fact is proving; and if the refuting fact is proving, then perception is mistaken: so there arises [the logical fault of] mutual dependence [of propositions]. But no such rule exists in reference to perception, in as far as it is independent [of other sources of knowledge]. And it is not right to say that such a thing [as perception] which is in agreement with the practical efficiency [of objective existence], which is trusted in by everybody, and which possesses an immediate evidence, should be mistaken. For [should it be so], then the unwished-for consequence would be that even the perception of [such elementary *ākāras* as] blue &c. would be mistaken. So then your refuting fact has been put aside by us.

#### 10. *The existence of the atoms.*

Nyāya-kandālī p. 43 l. 17.

[Siddhāntin]: The atoms, [the existence of] which can be deduced from the [existence of the] aggregates, must be called existent.

[Opponent]: The conjunction of the atom simultaneously with a sixfold [i. e. with six surrounding atoms] leads us to accept [the idea] that the atoms possess six parts (sides), and [consequently] excludes the existence of atoms.<sup>1)</sup>

[Siddhāntin]: How is this simultaneous conjunction to be taken? Is it either a simultaneous origination of the one atom with six other atoms?<sup>2)</sup> Or is it conjunction [which takes place] simulta-

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book I p. 71 letter *h*.

<sup>2)</sup> Is the atom here supposed to have the form of a cube?

neously? If it is a simultaneous origination — of a thing without parts [together with six other similar things] — in consequence of the simultaneity of the causes, what difficulty [could be raised]? But if it is a simultaneous conjunction, then neither is this inconceivable. For conjunction of objects does not concern their parts, for it also takes place with reference to (physical) space, which is without parts.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: You are wrong; for, supposing that one portion [of the atom] were [identical with] the other, then conjunction [would remain] within the limits of one atom and we should get the unwished-for consequence that it [scil. the object or aggregate] could not be perceived; however it is an object in reality.

[Siddhāntin]: The being subject to several conjunctions is possible, if simultaneous causes exist, just as well in reference to one undivisible atom, as in reference to a thing consisting of parts. Thus [you are] not [capable of] refuting [the existence of the atoms].

11. *The use of language restored, at the time of creation,  
by the Prajāpatis.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 54 l. 3:

*mānasā iti*: in reference to the expression „spiritual”:

„The man, who possesses a body from the womb, does not remember anything of former births, for the impressions (*saṃskāras*) have disappeared owing to the miseries undergone during the stay in the womb &c. Ṛṣis, Prajāpatis and Manus, however, possessing unseen (qualities of soul) which are distinguished by bodies, not born from the womb, clearly perceive their *saṃskāras*, and remember the complete use of word and meaning, just like a man who awakens from sleep: they then, many as they are, having this remembrance, make use [of the words and meanings] when among each other: through their use [of language] the creatures who are contemporaneous with them, get proficient in it: and from their use [of language] others again: thus the proficiency in word and meaning originates by tradition of use. This is the meaning [of the expression: *mānasā iti*].

12. *The proof for the existence of the Lord.*

(Nyāya-kandalī p. 54 l. 10.)

But what is the proof for the existence of the Lord?

[Siddhāntin]: Sacred Tradition and Inference.

The quaternion of large elements is originated by a percipient being,

since it is a product.

Whatever is a product, is originated by a percipient being, as f. i. a pot.

The quaternion of large elements is a product:

therefore this too is originated by a percipient being.

[Opponent]: If I should say: that earth &c. are products is not proved, in as far as the *pūrvakotī* is not arrived at by a trustworthy means of knowledge. [i. e. Earth &c. are either products or not products. The truth of the first alternative is not sufficiently proved by you].

[Siddhāntin]: This does not hold good, since [the large elements] possess parts. That which possesses parts, is a product, as f. i. a pot: and earth &c. possess parts, therefore they too are products.

[Opponent]: We might object: we may use inference [only] after having grasped the universal concomitance (*vṛgyāpti*). This grasping of the universal concomitance cannot take place with reference to the [large elements] being products and to their being originated by a percipient being. Because at the moment when we form the idea of a maker in reference to pots &c., then we become aware of the non-existence [of such a maker] in the case of sprouts &c. when coming forth. And you cannot argue thus: sprouts &c. form part of our *pakṣa* [the object or objects in which the existence of the probandum is to be proved]. The division of what is *pakṣa* &c., taking the opponent into consideration, [should be made] at the time, when we begin inferring, after the universal concomitance has been ascertained. But here the grasping of the universal concomitance does not succeed since a contradictory notion always and constantly steps in: as has been said before.

[Siddhāntin]: This conclusion of yours is contradicted as follows. If it were so, then the grasping of the universal concomitance would always be lacking, in consequence of the non-perception of the two cases. Thus [f. i.] the inference by means of the general notion, [which inference is] given by the author of the *Mimāṃsā-bhāṣya*, in order to prove the movement of the sun, would fall short. For at the moment when we perceive Devadatta's arriving at another spot, preceded by his movement, then we observe in regard to stars [and other heavenly bodies] only their arriving at another spot [and not their previous movement as well]. However, in as far as the non-perception of their movement arises in consequence



of their remoteness in place, the reiterated-vision, taking place without *upādhis* and [as such] the cause of the grasping of the universal concomitance is not obstructed by this [non-perception], since [the two cases: Devadatta's reaching another place after going and the sun's obtainment of another spot by movement] counter-balance each other. If so, then though we do not perceive in reference to sprouts &c. a maker who is to be conceived as not possessing a body (for this lack of perception is due to remoteness in essence, in nature), yet by this the capability of the reiterated-vision, proceeding without *upādhis*, is not destroyed. [These two argumentations] are equal.

[Opponent]: Now then, is (the Lord) proved by this inference only as a maker, or as capable of the creation of earth &c.? Should he only be proved as a maker, then what was meant, is not proved: for not a maker as people like we are, is meant by you. For he could not, whilst looking downwards, create a product, such as earth &c. [i. e. if the Lord resembled man, the creation would be too tiring for him, since he had to bend during all that time]. On the other hand [the existence of] the Lord, as capable of the creation of earth &c. is not proved, because there is no [logical] agreement (*anvaya*), [required for such an inference]. Namely by means of *anvaya*. He is proved a maker similar to those, mentioned in the examples (*dṛṣṭāntas*).

[Siddhāntin]: This consequence does not follow [from what I have said]. Since one particular kind of maker is not proved? When we have proved by the force of universal concomitance the general notion, i. e. the fact that an intelligent being precedes [the product], then also is proved the particular species [of the general notion], having for qualification its fitness for creating earth &c. because it is impossible to prove a general notion, devoid of particular species.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: I fear that the general notion is not proved.

[Siddhāntin]: No. For you do not contradict the universal concomitance [of a product with a precedent intellectual being] together with the fact that [the earth &c. are] products. Because [1 ly] if the pervaded [object f. i. earth &c. as products, or the smoke] is not proved, then the general notion of fire would not be proved from the smoke. Because [2 ly] we do not prove a particular kind of fire, for which no logical agreement (*anvaya*) exists, and because generality, devoid of particularities, cannot exist. But this is meant: inference has a double character: the universal pervasion and the fact of the [probans] being a quality of the *pakṣa*. In this the

general notion is proved by the sufficiency of the universal concomitance. By force of the *pakṣadharmatā* is proved the wished-for particular nature which may be illustrated by the fire as characterised by the mountain &c. Otherwise what connection <sup>1)</sup> would there be between the *pakṣadharmatā* and the convincing character (*prāmāṇya*) of an inference in which the proving factors are acknowledged? If so, the case is similar to the inference concerning the Lord, as we apply [the same rule] in other cases.

[Opponent]: But my idea is: in an inference the particular nature is proved too, when there is no difficulty owing to [other] trustworthy means of knowledge. So how could there be any illegitimacy in our conclusion from smoke: that there is a particular fire, [nam. such a fire] which dwells on the ridge of the mountain. For difference in place, time &c. is noticed in individual things. But in the inference, [given for the existence] of the Lord, this particular nature is not proved, since other trustworthy sources of knowledge form an obstacle. To wit, we have not to prove that [earth &c.] are preceded by a [person possessing a] body. For if [the Lord] possessed a body, then his makership would not be possible, in as far as necessarily [the possession of a body is accompanied with] the reaching [of objects] by organs of sense and the incapability of power and knowledge concerning factors such as material, implements, &c. which surpass the sense-organs. Neither can you prove that [earth &c] are preceded by [the Lord as possessing] no body. Every maker first (1) determines accurately the character of the factors [or ingredients for the action], then he (2) wishes „I will perform this by that”, then he (3) exerts himself (psychically), after that he (4) sets his body in motion; then he directs the instruments and finally he (5) makes. But without (1) determination [of the character of the factors], without (2) wish, without (3) exertion [i. e. resolution], without (4) setting the body in motion, one cannot make; so then it is proved by agreement and contrariety (*anvaya-vyatiरेका*) that the body of the intelligent being is a means for the arising of the product. When we have grasped all the *upādhis* by means of a trustworthy test [or: source of knowledge] which teaches us a universal concomitance, then we are not allowed to ignore the facts thus ascertained. For instance in an inference, [deduced from the presence] of smoke, we may not ignore the fact that fire possesses the property of consuming the fuel. And if we omit such [ascertained facts], then intellect might be put aside [in

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. SPEYER, *Syntac* § 410 R.

our argumentation concerning the Lord as creator of earth &c.], for He, the Lord, will create without intellect, just as well as without a body, because he is all-powerful.

[Siddhāntin]: If I should answer: he could not create, if he were ignorant of the properties of the material, implements, &c.?

[Opponent]: Why do you say so?

[Siddhāntin]: If I should answer: because this is never observed?

[Opponent]: Now my tree of wishes has also brought fruit, since [observation teaches us that wish, separated from psychical exertion i. e. not developed into resolution] is not so important for the arising of a product, as the body from which the motion is not separated [i. e. the body in moving state]. So then what is the fate of your generality „the being preceded by an intelligent maker”? Total failure, since both its forms, with and without possession of body, cannot be upheld. And because a general notion, void of particular species cannot exist <sup>1)</sup>. [If you ask:] What is this fault in inference to me? [then I answer:] just as little as we shall meet with any one striking a sharpened ax against (physical) space that cannot be split, so just as little is any one likely to be found using a probans in reference to a generality which is unfit to be proved, which resembles a hare's horn, [i. e. which is as impossible as a hare's horn], because it lacks particular species. And without [my proving] the fault in your argumentation you would not be satisfied. So then this argumentation [of yours, for the proposition] that [earth &c.] are preceded by a bodyless [being], is refuted by *kālātjaya* [i. e. the trespassing of the moment], in as far as it is obstructed by right means of knowledge, which teach us universal concomitances. — (1) That which is obtained by means of universal concomitance, obstructing the particular species, [i. e. the fact] of possessing no body, (2) [the general notion] debarred from particular species, and therefore (3) the obstructed subdivision — these are the epitome of the *pūrcapakṣa* [prima facie view, or view of the opponent].

[Siddhāntin]: The answer [literally: the correction, remedy] of this [is as follows]: Is the generality „makership” equivalent to the generality „possession of a body” or to the generality „employment of those factors the sufficiency of which is ascertained?” In the first place „makership” is not „possession of body”, since the unwished-for consequence would be that a man, fully asleep or inert, would still be making (acting). But [makership is indeed] „employment

1) Proposition previously referred to by the siddhāntin, in the passage beginning 35,7.

of those factors the sufficiency of which is ascertained". In this case, in as far as products arise, this [notion of makership] also applies to a bodyless [Being] in the same way as it applies to the soul in reference to its power of setting its own body in motion.

[Opponent]: Also in this [case we meet with that] which the soul has earned by its [former] actions: just this [result of former actions] is our body.

[Siddhāntin]: You are right [in so far], but [the body] is not the factor of causation of movements: as it would contradict [the fact that] the actions [inhere] in the soul.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: [the body] is [such a factor], in as far as it is the thing to be set in movement.

[Siddhāntin]: Similarly the atom is the thing to be set in movement by the Lord.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: Because the causation of movements in one's own body arises from wish and volition, and because wish and volition [in their turn] take place when there is a body, and do not take place when there is no body, — [for these reasons] the body possesses a [necessary] function in the causation of its own movements, by means of giving rise to wish and volition.

[Siddhāntin]: No: since this [body] is only a cause of a secondary arising of wish and volition; but at the time when wish and volition, having their own [i. e. original] nature, incite actions, then the body is not a factor in their arising, since it is that which suffers the action. Thus there is an exception to the rule [which you intended to lay down]. Namely we may notice that consciousness, only accompanied by wish and volition, without requiring bodily movements, is sometimes able to act upon things void of consciousness. But the general notion „product" is bound to an intelligent being [as precedent factor]. Thus the existence of the Lord is proved.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: In the arising of wish and volition the body is an indispensable factor.

[Siddhāntin]. When [wish and volition] are dependent [upon the body], then they are only adventitious: but when they retain their innate nature, then their dependence upon the [body] is superfluous. Thus the existence of the Lord is proved.

### 13. *The eternity of the divine cognition, wish & volition.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 56 l. 22.

And there is no objection against the eternity of cognition, wish

and volition. For a double character, a transient and a eternal nature, is also seen in colour and suchlike qualities according to the abode in which they inhere. And such is the case with intellect &c.

14. *The individual souls cannot direct the atoms at the time of world-origination.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 56 l. 26.

Here is finished the discussion between defendant and opponent on the proof of [the existence of] the Lord. What follows now, is an elaboration of a detail.

[Opponent]: Let me ask: Do not the atoms [at the time of every world-origination] come into action, whilst being directed by the [individual] souls, [and not by one particular form of soul: the Divine Soul or Lord].

[Siddhāntin]: No; because these [individual] souls, whose consciousness depends on a set of sense-organs, earned by their own [previous] actions, are deprived of knowledge concerning all objects, before the coming into existence of the body.

[Opponent]: The [individual] souls too possess an innate spirituality (*caitanya*) which penetrates all objects.

[Siddhāntin]: It is not innate in [those souls] which rely on the connection with a body. For what is it [according to you] that confuses [the soul] so that it always manifests [the things] as if occurring without a precedent?

[Opponent]: This confusion is laid upon the soul through the interposition of the concealment of the body; but it [i. e. the appearance of all things as previously not known] is not objective [i. e. does correspond to the real state of things].

[Siddhāntin]: But how can you prove this theory of interposition (*tirobhāna*), taking into consideration that soul is [all]-penetrating, that its connection with the things is never cut off, that it is eternal and that its essential properties of manifesting objects will not cease?

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the interposition (obscuration) of spirituality is [effected by] the impediment of its functions (*vyūhi*).

[Siddhāntin]: How then do the body-possessors [i. e. the individual souls] perceive the objects?

[Opponent]: If I should answer: Sometimes their functions (*vyūhis*) are not obstructed?

[Siddhāntin]: Whence this difference?

[Opponent]: From the alternative of nearness [or remoteness] of the sense-organs.

[Siddhāntin]: If so, then whether the spirituality [of the soul] uses [or does not use] its functions, that would depend on the sense-organs and not merely on the nearness [of the soul to the objects], because the functions do not always take place, notwithstanding that [the soul] is all-penetrating and because, [supposing that nearness of the soul to the objects were a sufficient fact] the unwished-for consequence would be that the sense-organs were superfluous. It was well said.

..Souls without the support of a body do not possess knowledge about objects”

And others have said thus:

..Svayambhu bored the holes [of our body] in an outward direction: therefore the soul looks outward and not inward”.

And if the souls do not possess knowledge, then they cannot direct [the atoms]: thus we must acknowledge [the existence of] a directing soul, who is different from these [individual souls], who possesses an innate knowledge perceiving all objects, and who is by nature a Doer: because inanimate objects cannot move without a directing spirituality.

### 15. *Is there one Lord or more?*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 57 l. 15:

Is this Lord one or more?

We say: He is one. Because if there were many and they were not omniscient, then they would be just as little capable [of creation] as we are. If we suppose them to be omniscient, then one would be sufficient and the others would be superfluous. Neither is there a reason why there should be unanimity among more [creators] possessing equal power: consequently the thing which was to be done, would sometimes be omitted. And suppose: all should act in compliance with the wish of one, then Lordship would belong to that one, and not to the others; so as we see in the councils of monasteries. If nobody should oppose the carrying out of the work which was to be done, then Lordship would belong to none of them singly.

### 16. *The qualities of the Lord.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 57 l. 20:

So then because this particular Maker, proved from the particular

character of the product, is omniscient. He will grasp the differences (*vibhāṣas*), between things without exception. Therefore in Him there is no false intellection, based on this [non-perception of differences]; and owing to the non-being of false intellection, love and hatred (which spring from it) will not be in Him; and owing to the non-being of these two, activity (which arises from them) will not take place; and since there is no activity, there is non-existence of pleasure and pain, born from it; and because His direct perception refers to always [i. e. because everything, past and future, is present before His perception], remembrance and impression [caused by perception] do not belong to Him. So then the Holy Lord is the abode of eight qualities — This is the opinion of some people.

Others, however, who affirm: „Only His wisdom is free from refutation, but his capability of acting is open to it”, and who neither accept his wish and volition, say thus: „He is an abode of six qualities”.<sup>1)</sup>

#### 17. *Is the Lord a bound or liberated soul?*

Nyāya-kandah p. 57 l. 26:

Is He bound or liberated?

He is certainly not bound, because *kṛcchā* (affliction, &c., which are acknowledged as a binding and are the cause of bondage, do not exist in Him. Neither is He liberated, since liberation is a synonym of „breaking of the bondage”. He is an eternally-liberated soul, so as the honourable PATAÑJALI has said: „the Lord is a particular kind of soul, which is untouched by afflictions, ripening of actions and stock of actions.”<sup>2)</sup>

#### 18. *Discussion of the Kṣaṇabhāṅga-vāda.*<sup>3)</sup>

A. General refutation of the thesis of momentary destruction.

Nyāya-kandah p. 73 l. 19:

[Buddhist]: All this [i. e. this argumentation for the existence of soul] is not coherent. Because the relation of that which abides and the abode does not exist, on account of the momentariness

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book IV section IV table D.

<sup>2)</sup> Yoga Sūtra I. 24.

<sup>3)</sup> See detailed analysis, here book IV section IX table A and book IV section VII table E.

[of everything existing]. To wit: existence has for definition: *arthakriyā-kāritea*', <sup>1)</sup> and this is contained under succession and simultaneity, since no medium is possible between succession and non-succession (or simultaneity). <sup>2)</sup> For succession is the belonging to several times (or moments) of several *arthakriyās*; simultaneity is the belonging to one time. And there is no third alternative, besides one and many; since the denial of one of two reciprocally contradictory [statements] means necessarily the affirmation of the other. But succession is not possible in the permanent, since the thing, capable [for an act], cannot put this off, and since the thing, not capable [for an action], will neither at another moment transgress its own nature, [consisting in] unproductivity.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the [permanent], by assuming successively subsidiaries (*sahakārin*) accomplishes successively [its actions].

[Buddhist]: They answer to this: If the subsidiaries do not afford an additament (*atiśaya*) to the [permanent] existence, then they are not required, for they do not do anything. If they afford [such an additament], is then [the latter] distinct or not [from the existence]? On the alternative that it is distinct, the effect arises [or does not arise] owing to [the occurrence or non-occurrence of] this adscititious additament, in accordance with agreement and contrariety (*anvaya-vyatireka*). And so the non-momentary [entity] is not the cause, since in spite of its presence [the effect] does not exist.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: The [entity] produces its effects, whilst it is accompanied by the additament (*atiśaya*) which is effected by the subsidiaries (*sahakārin*).

[Buddhist]: If the additament, [afforded by the subsidiaries], does not give rise to [another] additament, how can there be companionship [between the entity and the additament, since a second additament which would serve as a link, would be lacking]. And if [the additament] gives rise [to another additament], what will then prevent an endless regress? — [So then] <sup>3)</sup> it is not well said: that an additament is effected by the subsidiaries and belongs to the permanent, for no connection can exist between that which cannot be helped and that which cannot help. [For] neither does it hold good, that an additament, identical with the entity, is

1) Cf. Nyayakandali p. 12 l. 23: here p. 361.

2) Read: *kṛtānākrantānūtmahosaṁ*.

3) Read: *na sahbhāṣitam*.



effected by the subsidiaries, because an entity which has previously originated, will not originate anew.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: The previous entity, that minus the additament, is no more, and a new entity, identical with the additament, comes into being?

[Buddhist]: [In this way] the theory of momentariness has been proved [even by you who intended to polemise against it].

[Opponent]: Of what use are the subsidiaries to the Momentary?

[Buddhist]: Of none whatever.

[Opponent]: <sup>1)</sup> Why are they then wanted?

[Buddhist]: But, whoever has said that they are wanted? For the *kṣaṇas*, which are the last *avasthā* [i. e. the last point to which an analysis of the world can go back] are quite fit by themselves [independently of each other] to produce any effect. For what mutual dependence [exists] between them? As for their collecting together at a certain time, this [happens] in consequence of the strict necessity of the cause for this approaching of theirs to one another; but there does not exist a fixed rule for the causes of the coming together [of these *kṣaṇas*] at a certain time in order that they should unitedly effectuate an effect. The causes, being each by themselves capable of bringing about the effect, will do so each by themselves.

[Opponent]: How is it that the many accomplish the one?

[Buddhist]: In this case you must examine the causes of those [things] which, [as one], foster [the many, the causes], not inclined to perform a thing each by themselves. But we, who simply explain the innate nature of reality as it is seen, do not deserve any further cross-questioning.

[Opponent, not taking notice of the last request]: If I should say: an effect is accomplished by one cause, what do the other [causes] accomplish?

[Buddhist]: They do not accomplish what has been accomplished; but the other [causes] likewise accomplish what is being accomplished by the one.

[Opponent]: If I should ask: what is the use of other [causes] there where one is sufficient?

[Buddhist]: That is true; but they — [the causes] — do not act deliberately so as to remain inactive on such considerations [as you have brought forward].

[Opponent]: Stil the fact that one effect originates from several

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *te cāpekṣyante*.

[causes] remains a difficulty [for you], because a differentiation in the cause is the reason for a differentiation in the effect.

[Buddhist]: It is not [quite] so. For the differentiation in the effect results from a differentiation in the effecting complex (*sāmagrī*), but not from a differentiation in the subsidiary. To be a subsidiary (*sahakārin*), that means: to be a producer of one effect.

Therefore from the standpoint of momentariness, it is logical that an effect is brought about by the succession of existences, succeeding one another.

Also [the supposition that the Permanent] produces [all its consequences] simultaneously, presents difficulties, for the innate nature [of a thing], capable of producing its effects, will not be inactive at another time.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: there is no effecting of that which has been already effected, nor is there anything which is still to be effected by the [thing], as the complete bundle of effects have been produced together. Therefore, it does not act at another time (*kṣaṇa*).

[Buddhist]: But so this [thing] would then [i. e. at that other moment] be non-existent, since it is void of all *arthakriyās*. Ergo: existence is excluded from the Non-momentary, since we do not see [in the Non-momentary] succession and simultaneity, which are *vyāpaka* [in reference to existence, i. e. which, either one or the other, in all cases where we meet with existence, are present]; consequently existence is proved to abide in the momentary (transient).

Whilst such is the case, the inference for the Momentary can easily be understood:

Whatever is existent, is transient,

And the twelve *āyatana*s<sup>1)</sup> are existent.

[Opponent]: To this we answer: The proof for momentariness from [the notion] „existence” does not hold good, in as far as we do not see that it [scil. existence] is excluded from the *vipakṣa* [i. e. all cases in which momentariness is lacking]<sup>2)</sup>.

[Buddhist]: If I should answer:

That which is void of succession & simultaneity,  
is not-existent,

like the horn of a horse,  
and the non-momentary (the permanent) is void of  
succession & simultaneity.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. *Musōn* N. S. II p. 206 n. 167.

<sup>2)</sup> The argumentation is based on the admission that a „*kevalānucayī hetuḥ*” is fallacious. See here book II p. 323 § 5.

By this refuting argument the notion that existence is excluded [from the *vyākṣep*] becomes based on the fact that succession and simultaneousness are distinct from the non-momentary.

[Opponent]: No: for, if [you are right and] we cannot form for ourselves a notion of the non-momentary, then we cannot arrive at the notion that existence is distinct from it. For in the same way as one, when having perceived water, becomes aware in respect to this [water] that fire [the probandum] and smoke [the probans] are lacking there — so after the perceiving of the non-momentary we should be assured of the lacking of existence [*satteṅbhāva*, as probandum] from the lacking of succession and simultaneity [*kramayanyaparyābhāva*, as probans]. But according to you there is nowhere a non-momentary.

[Buddhist]: If I should answer: Just as we feel sure in reference to a spirit (though he is not seen) that something else is different from him, f. i. „a spirit is not a trunk”, so will it be in our case.

[Opponent]: No: since distinction (exclusion, *vyāvṛtti*) is equivalent to the trustworthy source of knowledge, called „non-perception”. Because this non-perception has for its definition: the perception of a thing other than the thing distinguished by it [*tadvivikta* i. e. to which it refers] and because there can be no [trustworthy „non-perception”] without the perception of the counter-entity (*pratiggin*). But, in as far as a spirit by its innate nature falls beyond [the ken of our perception], the notion of the *piṣāca* being distinct [from the trunk] will not arise.

[Buddhist]: If I should raise the objection: but how then can we possess the notion: the spirit is not a trunk.<sup>1)</sup>

[Opponent]: This is not a *samsarga-pratiṣedha* (a synthetic negative thesis), but a *tādātmya-pratiṣedha* (an analytic negative thesis). This latter results from our knowledge that the *piṣāca* would be perceptible, if its notion were to be subordinated to the notion „trunk” [in other words, if an analytic judgment were to exist: a *piṣāca* is a trunk]; but [the notion: the spirit is not a trunk does] not [arise] in another way. So as it has been said: „every negation which rests on the principle of identity, is formed by our assuredness that the property of perceptibility would necessarily arise. In our case the notion of trunk, only determined by its having the nature of trunk, is the reason for excluding all that has not got that nature. If a spirit were a trunk, then it too would be known by itself (*ātmanā*). But knowledge does not seize

1) Cf. SPEYER, *Sanskrit-Syntax* § 16 n<sup>o</sup>. 2.

[directly] the „spirit“, so as it seizes the trunk. Ergo a spirit is not that [i. e. is not a trunk].

[Buddhist]: But it is not my intention: let there be a non-momentary or a momentary apart from [the phenomena] such as blue. But a *kṣaṇa* [a momentary object of human knowledge] such as blue which was known by a previous cognition and is imagined (*āropyate*) to be identical with a *kṣaṇa* of blue which is known by a present cognition, is called the non-momentary. But a *kṣaṇa* which is established [by us] as distinct [from all other *kṣaṇas*], is called the momentary. With reference only to these [*kṣaṇas*] such as blue, [we have mentioned] the idea of the non-being of existence on ground of [the non-momentary] being distinct both from succession and simultaneity; if the same *kṣaṇa* (or object of a momentary cognition) belonging to a previous perception is again perceived, then [this *kṣaṇa*] would have done its present *arthakriyā* (act) formerly, or its former *arthakriyā* just now, but it would not do its [two *arthakriyās*] in succession [one previously and the other now], since it is contradictory that one and the same thing is free to do or not to do [an act]. But neither could it have done everything formerly, because the absurd consequence would be that [the *kṣaṇa*, existing at the present moment] would not exist now, deprived as it is of practical efficiency (*arthakriyā*).

[Opponent]: Even then, [we may again ask] have you shown a really existing *vipakṣa* of „existence“ as a probans, or a *vipakṣa* which is a creation of our imagination (*kalpanā-samāropita*)? In the first place it is not really existing, because the non-momentary [as defined now by you], blue &c. is not real. [Yet] any one who wishes to arrive at a real conclusion by means of inference, must first always show the reality of *pakṣa* &c., a reality known by trustworthy means of knowledge, in the same way as is done in the argumentation concerning smoke [and fire], for only then is the threefold <sup>1)</sup> character of the probans settled. But the non-momentary [according to you] is not of this nature: thus the exclusion [of the probans from the *vipakṣa*] cannot be proved; and when this remains unproved, then there is no proof for the agreement (*anvaya*), because the latter proof depends on the former; thus the fallacy, called the *asādhāraṇatvam hetoh*, takes place. — But perhaps the exclusion of existence from the non-momentary [as you have intimated before] is proved by a refuting argument (*bādhaka*)? By what means then is proved the agreement (*anvaya*) of momentariness and being? For

1) (Cf. here book II p. 316 & 317)

the character of probans cannot be upheld merely by its exclusion from the *vipakṣa*, because the unwished-for consequence would be that the probans were *asādhāraṇa* (too special). And an inference only based on exclusion (*kevalavyatireky anumānam*) is in itself not desirable.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: since we have settled that existence is not in the non-momentary, then as a matter of course (*arthāt*)<sup>1)</sup>, existence is the abode of the momentary, and thus [we arrive at] a proof for the agreement (*anvaya*).

[Opponent]: The consideration (*parāmarṣa*) of existence as a probans does not arise as a „matter of course”; for even then this, the agreement (*anvaya*) of which has not been proved, would afford a probans. But the refuting argument — whether possessing both functions<sup>2)</sup> or whether affording another trustworthy means of knowledge — still in as far as it proves a universal concomitance, does this only with reference to the twelve *āyatana*s, because a universal concomitance without a correspondent object cannot be conceived, and because no object except those twelve *āyatana*s, exists. If we have understood the positive rule [of a notion] with reference to the twelve *āyatana*s — [i. e. if we have understood: „we have to do with one of the twelve *āyatana*s, in those cases where we meet with a certain object X”] — then we understand also its concomitance with momentariness, in as far as the notion of the relation results immediately from the notion of that which bears the relation. Thus the notion of existence is superfluous [as a middle term].

[Buddhist]: If I should say: one only grasps the concomitance by means of a generality with reference to the *pakṣa*; but existence is the probans for its particular form.

[Opponent]: No; because one cannot conceive a generality void of particular nature<sup>3)</sup>. When the general notions of momentariness and existence, have been understood as abiding in particular [objects], then it is understood that momentariness abides in blue &c., as it has been justly said. Therefore [the notion of] existence is superfluous [as a middle term].

[Buddhist]: If I should say: by means of the refuting argument (*bādhaka*) we arrive at the concomitance between the exclusion from non-momentariness and the exclusion from non-existence; but by

1) Compare the technical term „*arthāpatti*”.

2) I. e. the functions of perception and inference?

3) Cf. Ny. Kandali p. 56, l. 6 & p. 56 l. 4.

means of [the notion of] existence we understand the momentariness in its form of an [individual] object?

[Opponent]: No, [you are wrong], because exclusions (*vyācrtis*) which are supposed to differ, in consequence of the difference (*bheda*) of the excludenda (*vyāvartya*)<sup>1</sup>), cannot be identical (*tādātmyābhāva*).

[Buddhist]: If I should answer: Identity is called a member of syllogistic argumentation. The identity of momentariness and existence, realised in a particular object, gives rise to an identity of the exclusions (*vyācrtis*) which are laid down because [the latter identity] is identical [with the former identity].

[Opponent]: No, [you are wrong], because the identity of the positive notions (*vastu*) cannot be proved from anything else; or if this were possible, then the refuting argument (*bādhaka*) would be superfluous. Neither, in case you should ascertain mutual obstruction of the two exclusions, would there be a proof for the positive notion (*vastu*), because there is difference and lack of relation between a thing (*vastu*) and a not-thing. — And with reference to that which has been said by DHARMOTTARA:

After having proved the universal concomitance [of momentariness and existence] in a pot by means of a refuting argument (*bādhaka*), we prove the momentariness in sound by means of [the notion of] existence;

we may give the same answer: since nothing impedes us from applying the refuting argument (*bādhaka*) also to sound, the searching for another form of proof is useless. Thus.

[Opponent]: And it is not true that practical efficiency is incompatible with the non-momentary. Namely in the case when there is a subsidiary. For existence has for innate nature the effectuation of effects, but has not got the innate characteristic of a factor independent [of anything else]. Thus the arising of the effect takes place in accordance with the way in which the subsidiaries, whose fitness is ascertained by positive agreement and exclusion, (*anvaya-vyatirekan*), join together. Also the unchangeable is effective in succession, because it is impossible for an effect, dependent on several factors, to arise from one [factor]. Neither is it right to say: „An effect, when dependent on a subsidiary, arises from the additament brought forward by [that subsidiary], and the existing thing [in question] does not effectuate”. Because we have seen that this arising of the effect is in accordance with the innate characteristic of existence. For if [the existing thing in question] were not pro-

1) Cf. Ny. Kandali p. 208 l. 9.

ductive, then a rice-sprout would come forth out of a barley-seed, earth and water being present; for the effectuation would not take place according to any rule (*nigama*). Neither do the subsidiaries supply an additament to the innate characteristic of the existent thing; but they are merely subsidiaries [i. e. they do not want an intervening link]. But [what you call] the additament, is nothing but the being accompanied by these subsidiaries; and similarly the lack of an additament means the not being accompanied by them. For when the subsidiary exists, then the effect exists, and when it does not exist, then neither does the effect.

The acceptance of a difference in the *kṣaṇas*, some of which should be productive and others unproductive, is refuted by perception, which everywhere grasps [cases of] permanence.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: this mistaken perception (*bhrama*) of permanence is the result of not perceiving the difference of *kṣaṇas* (momentary forms of existence) which closely resemble each other and are originated one after the other without any interruption.

[Opponent]: If the momentary were proved, then the fallacious character (*bhrāntatā*) of perception would ensue; and if this fallaciousness were proved, then the momentariness would be ascertained; thus there is mutual dependence [of propositions].

And neither, when the cause of the origination of it [i. e. of a *kṣaṇa*, of any existing thing] and the cause of its annihilation are found by means of positive agreement and exclusion, is the supposition allowed, that when (respectively) the former or latter cause is lacking, still its origination or annihilation takes place. And it is also a false thesis (*asiddha*), that annihilation is without any cause, and that the seed [of this moment] is the cause of the seed [of the next moment]; [for]:

The seed, produced by the seed [thus the seed of the second moment, a seed which is supposed not to undergo the influence of surrounding subsidiaries, such as water and earth] does not produce a sprout;

because it is a seed;

like the seed which still stays at the top of the stalk of the rice-plant.

[If one argues:] „The thing is not divisible. The two parts, given to one thing, by attributing to it efficiency and inefficiency, are not allowable” — [then this reasoning is] of no importance [to us]. [For] fire possesses efficiency with reference to burning, but inefficiency with reference to swimming. And neither does a differentiation of the innate character [of fire] result from these two parts, and

similarly one existent thing can be productive in consequence of the existence of a subsidiary, but unproductive in the case of its non-existence.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: how is it that, when one thing is present, another thing acquires efficiency? And even if we may accept the [fact of this] efficiency, why is it of only one thing, and not of everything?

[Opponent]: In this respect you must examine the innate nature of the objects. But we do not deserve any reproach, when we attribute the function of an effecting complex (*sāmagrī*) to certain things in a certain respect, after having found the fitness of these things in this respect, by means of positive agreement and exclusion. And even from your standpoint, only earth, water and seed are the subsidiaries (*sahakārīn*) towards the origination of the sprout; and no other things are such. According to you, what other cause than the innate nature of things exists?

[Buddhist]: If I should say: seed &c. are capable [of producing] each by themselves; they are not the subsidiaries of one another?

[Opponent]: Why then does the husbandman throw seed into soil which has been prepared, and then flood it?

[Buddhist]: If I should say: he uses the means in order to effectuate, in consequence of their mutual supremacy (*ādhipatya*)<sup>1</sup>, a moment (*kṣaṇa*) fit for the production of the sprout?

[Opponent]: But if the seed by its own causes has become capable of producing a moment fit for the production of a sprout, what is then the use of earth and water? And if it has not become so [by its series of causes], then the proximity of these two will not make any difference, because earth and water will not abandon their innate nature.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: the power of beginning a *kṣaṇa* of any other kind than the incapable *kṣaṇas* — which power resides in the [moment]-series of the seed — is frustrated?

[Opponent]: Let us grant that there exists an origination of [a series of] unfit *kṣaṇas*; but the origination of a fit *kṣaṇa* is difficult to comprehend, for a cause is lacking. Neither can a power which forms the innate nature [*svabhāva*, of a thing] be frustrated, because the absurd consequence would be that existence (*bhāva*) is frustrated. And that annihilation possesses its cause, is also in force; for we cannot attribute to the seed the power to produce a *kṣaṇa* different [from the former *kṣaṇas*]; because of momentariness [i. e. because

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Museon* N. S. II p. 193 n. 122.



everything consists of loose, unconnected, momentary forms of existence and because consequently surrounding earth or water cannot bring about a change in the nature of the seed]: namely in the case when it originates a power not distinct from innate nature, the absurd consequence would be that it originates what has already been originated. Thus you are placed before the dilemma: either there takes place no action of a [*kṣāṇa* which] is unfit and possesses origination; or there is activity of a [*kṣāṇa* which is] fit, but an activity not differing from origination; [so that in neither case does annihilation come in]: but that [*kṣāṇa*] is not active, when another thing is concomitant, because [this supposition] is not allowed [from your standpoint]. [Our] opinion, however, is: fitness is [to be attributed] to concomitant things, because an effect does not originate from one [cause] and because we see that it originates from several. How then can you still stumble before us, who say thus? Therefore in as far as practical efficiency is possible for the non-momentary, the probans [quoted by you] is undecisive (*anaikāntika*).

[Let us now consider the following argumentation] which has also been given [by the Buddhists].

[Buddhistic argumentation]: The annihilation of produced things is inevitable, and from this fact the momentariness [of everything] can be proved. As follows:

That [property] which is constant in certain things, is not based on any other cause with reference to those things,  
as is e. g. the case with [the property of] ironness  
with reference to arrows, swords &c.:  
and annihilation is a constant property of produced things.

And similarly an inference refutes the dependence of annihilation: those properties which are based on other causes [than the thing itself] are not constant [in that thing],  
like e. g. paint &c. to a garment.

Thus if an existent thing should require for its annihilation another cause than its own causes, then it might happen that this produced thing would not decay, namely in the case when this [required] other cause was obstructed or incomplete. On the other hand things which are born with an innate nature apt to decay by their own causes, will be annihilated immediately after their origination. Thus momentariness is proved.

Moreover:

suppose an existent thing to possess an innate nature of imperishableness,

then its annihilation is without a possible cause [i. e. no circumstance can cause its annihilation].

like the coldness of fire.

But:

if [the existent thing] possesses an innate nature apt to decay, then no [extraneous] causes are required.

And further:

an annihilation which is non-different from existence [i. e. an annihilation which is the quintessence of existence], is not brought about by an other [i. e. extraneous] cause,

because difference [which would exist between cause and perishing thing] would effectuate difference in the effect [whereas we have admitted that the „annihilation” is „non-different” from existence].

On the other hand:

suppose that a [thing], different [from the perishing thing] were to originate from the other [i. e. extraneous] cause.

then the unwished-for consequence would be that we should perceive &c. a [new] existent [thing]; because one thing [e. g. the pot] does not transgress its nature [i. e. does not become another thing]. when another thing [scil. „non-existence”] is originated. For the expression „the pot has been destroyed”, in which an existent thing is the [grammatical] agents, would not exist, but we should say: „an non-existence has originated”. And on the same supposition, when any one asks: „was there a pot?” an answer, mentioning the annihilation of the pot, would be no answer.

So then annihilation is the nature of existence.

[Opponent]: To this we answer: does the originating existent [thing] remain in one moment, or does it remain in a second moment as well? If we accept the alternative that [it remains] a second moment. then momentariness is given up; in as far as [one thing] has several time-[moment]s. But if [the thing] lasts one moment, then there is non-existence of the abiding in the second moment; and so there is no oneness of existence and non-existence [as you would like to uphold], because of difference of time.

[Buddhist]: But we do not uphold the opinion: „existence is non-existence of itself”, but: the second *kṣāṇa* is the non-existence of the first *kṣāṇa*.

[Opponent]: That neither holds good. Because the anterior and posterior moments are individual forms of existence (*vyakti*) and thus there is no contradiction (mutual negation) in their innate characteristics. Just as a pot exists together with another pot which

abides in a [moment-]series different [from the moment-series of the first pot], similarly could [the „second *kṣāṇa*“] exist together with a [kṣāṇa] abiding in the one moment-series, because the one trustworthy means of knowledge which grasps the „second *kṣāṇa*“ and which knowledge is positive *vidh*, with reference to the innate nature [of this *kṣāṇa*] and successful [i. e. of acknowledged value], does not afford reliable knowledge with reference to the negation (*pratiṣedha*) of the first *kṣāṇa*. Non-existence, however, may be defined as the negation of existence, because it arises from [such] a notion [as]: „the pot does not exist“, so then the arising of this [non-existence] means the cessation of existence; the continuation of this [non-existence] means the discontinuation of existence; the perception of this [non-existence] means the non-perception of existence; so it is right, because they are the contradiction to each other. And if so, there is no momentariness of existence. Because [if this theory of yours were right], there would be no fixed rule for the close connection (*ānantarya*) between existence and its non-existence, which comes after it and which requires another [i. e. extraneous] cause. And this is confirmed through the destruction (by means of a hammer) of an originated pot a long time afterwards.

[Buddhist]: The destruction of the pot forms the quintessence of its existence, but the origination of the [moment-]series of the shards is caused by the blow of the hammer.

[Opponent]: That neither holds good. For as long as the power of the originating of similar [*kṣāṇas*], located in a [certain moment-]series, is not obstructed, a series of dissimilar [*kṣāṇas*] cannot arise. And when [you accept] the obstruction of this [power] through the blow of the hammer, why are you hostile to the obstruction of existence? — Neither, if we accept [non-existence] to be effectuated by a cause, would the consequence be that also non-existence is a thing: because perception &c. prove that its innate nature is [to be] negation of a thing. Its innate characteristic, namely, is as follows: although produced, it does not perish, as existence does: because we do not perceive that which is destroyed. [In other words: although existence and non-existence agree with each other in having a cause, yet they do not agree in all respects; for instance the one will be destroyed, the other will be eternal; the one is perceptible, the other is no object of perception; thus you may not infer from their agreement in one point agreement in other points]. Suppose that the innate nature of a thing — which nature is ascertained by a trustworthy means of knowledge — were without shape, because of

the similarity of its properties to something else [i. e. because it possesses e. g. *kāraᅒakāraᅒatra*, fitness of being produced by causes, just like non-existence], then the manifoldness of the world would also be without shape <sup>1)</sup>.

Neither may the question „how is it that one thing transgresses its nature, when another is originated?” be used against us as an attack; for we have here to do with the innate nature of things; moreover the expression „the pot has been destroyed”, [speaks for our opinion]; and because non-existence arises by a process which begins with the movements of the portions of the thing [and goes on through the different stages summed up in the Vaigēśika system]. Therefore *this* non-existence is of *this* [existence] and is not of every [existence]. And there is no inherential cause of it, [i. e. of this non-existence], because it [the non-existent thing] is not. Neither has it a non-inherential cause, for where do we meet with an effect [of such a cause], which has no abode? This, namely, is seen: the non-existence [of the pot] does not inhere in the pot, as this does not exist; neither does it inhere in the floor, because [this non-existence] is a property of something else [namely of the pot].

[Buddhist]: But how then is it explained as located in a certain place?

[Opponent]: Because it is in accordance with its counter-entity (*pratigōᅒin*). This, namely, is the innate nature of it [of non-existence], that in case of negation of the conjunct, it appears like the conjunct; that in case of negation of the thing inhered in, it appears like the thing inhered in; and similarly particularisation [borrows its character from the relation on which it bears]. But conjunction [of non-existence with a thing] or inherence [of it in a thing] do not exist, because they are properties of existing things. Thus we have proved that non-existence is the contradiction to existence, the object of the notion: „is not”. With reference to the contradiction, made [i. e. accepted by man] between fire and snow, „there is non-existence of fire in snow, there is non-existence of snow in fire”, — the contradiction of these two is not due to their innate characteristics, because there is no contradiction between one positivity (*viᅒᅒi*) and another positivity. — And as to your saying: „non-existence, in as far as it is the constant [property of things], is not dependent on another cause”, this is [shown to be an] undecisive [argumentation] by referring to the rising and setting of the sun; because if these [two movements of the sun which are

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *nirakaraᅒatram*.

constant in it] were independent [of certain intervals], then no distinction of time would exist; [thus properties can be constant in a thing and still depend on other causes].

Also [your argumentation, based on the fact] that one [particular] effecting complex may be obstructed, is open to a similar objection. Because the cause of the paint in the garment [which you gave as an example of an inconstant property] is still regulated [by the course of circumstances], and its time too is defined, and only as long as that time has not yet approached, does the origination of the colour not take place; the causes now of annihilation are unlimited [in number] and similarly their fixed times; because it is impossible for all [causes] always to be frustrated; one [cause], therefore, whatever it may be, is effective, and being effective at another time [than might be excepted at first] will destroy the thing immediately. So then with reference to produced things, it holds good that annihilation is constant in them.

*B.* Momentary destruction is repugned by the fact of human recognition.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 50 l. 7:

[Vaiṣeṣika]: This complete argumentation for the momentary destruction is refuted by *kālātṛaya*, for by „recognition-perception” (recognitive perception) we cognise again what was cognised before.

[Buddhist]: But this cognition (*pratyaya*) cannot inform us about the condition [of any thing] in a previous and posterior time. For this is not one act of knowledge, since there is no cause for this. The sense-organ embraces [literally: plunges into] a near object, but not that which existed in a past time. And similarly the memory-impression, originated by a former experience and limited to the object of that [experience], does not bear upon a later time. Neither can we find any thing that, being one, distinct from both and [at the same time containing] the object of both, could bring into existence such an intellection. So then this one intellection does not exist, since [we have to do here with] a manifoldness by nature. For perceptibility is „this”, and what transgresses [through belonging to the past] our sense-organs, is „that”. Moreover, perceptibility and imperceptibility, being mutually contradictory, cannot unite in one spot.<sup>1)</sup> Therefore, these two forms of consciousness (*samvitti*), namely seizing and remembrance, have separate objects.

<sup>1)</sup> Read *naikatva*.

[Vaigēśika]: We answer to this: One real object, characterised by the fact that it belongs to a past and present time, is indeed cognised by such an intellection. Moreover the opinion „that its object does not exist” is opposed to [what is taught by] our consciousness. The seizing and the remembrance, [considered separately] are not based on the same object; just for this reason we must accept [the existence of] this intellection which has both for objects, in as far as [this intellection, which I have previously called the recognitive perception] is capable of that notion [namely of the identification of the object of the perception with that of the remembrance]. Intelligent people will surmise even an unseen cause for the origination of a seen effect; but never will they ignore an evident effect, because they do not perceive the cause. For [if this were allowed], the unwished-for consequence would be that one could ignore even the manifold nature of the world. Therefore, although sense-organ and memory-impression, taken separately, are insufficient; yet this one effect, namely recognition, can be produced by them when combined; and it will have the [same] object as both [functions], since they both [when united] possess a sufficient causality, and it will fall under perceptibility, in as far as it follows the capability of the sense-organ by which the object [is perceived], [i. e. we recognise the objects either by sight, by ear &c., we can therefore, distinguish visual, auditive recognition &c.; so then recognition possesses a perceptive character]. And [the opinion] does not hold good: „wherever the factors, taken one by one, are insufficient, there they must be powerless even when united”; for we see that earth, water and seed, though ineffective when separated, produce a sprout &c., when they are brought into each other’s neighbourhood. Where the totality of causes is manifold, there is the result likewise manifold; so it has been well understood. Therefore, perceptibility and imperceptibility, having respectively a near and remote object as characteristic, will not obstruct each other. For the same reason even where no contact with the sense-organ is met with, the [remembrance of a] past time possesses a perceptible character, since it concerns an object of sensorial knowledge and since perceptibility only means the concordance with that [object of sensorial knowledge] alone. The sense-organ, though embracing what is remote, yet only embraces the past time, but not the future; because of the absence of the memory-impressions as an auxiliary in this case. And nothing impedes one [state of consciousness] from bearing sometimes on two times, by which [empediment] the embracing of two times by one conscious state would be a

mere fancy. For a relation between one [as the thing to be distinguished] and several distinguishing attributes is a fact of experience; for instance that between Caitra and his umbrella and book. And there is not the slightest difference [in this respect] between the co-temporal relation towards the umbrella and book, and the relation of two times in successive arrangement; because in both cases we have to do with the notion of a particularisation of one [object] by means of both distinguishing attributes [or sets of attributes]. Similarly recognition, in as far as it ascertains one objective thing, subject to different conditions of place and time, puts aside the momentary origination and destruction of existent things. Thus.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: this notion is illusionary.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: No, because there is no sublative cognition (*bādhaka*).

[Buddhist]: If I should say: „the proof for the momentary nature [of everything] is the sublative cognition which sublates it [i. e. the trustworthiness of recognition].”

[Vaiṣeṣika]: The inference [i. e. the sublative cognition, alluded to by you] will arise, when [the trustworthiness of cognitive] perception is refuted, because then the objects [of your argumentation] are not refuted; and perception will be refuted when this argumentation arises; thus there is mutual dependence [of propositions]. But this rule [of dependence] does not exist for perception, because it is an independent [means of knowledge]. And since perception has the particular and inference has the general for an object with reference to fires &c. [the things of the surrounding world], and since there is no mutual obstruction [between these two facts], therefore the arising of inference will not be hindered by perception. This may be enough.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: If any one should assert too boldly: „momentary destruction is a fact of perception”, then we answer him: such a perception (*anubhava*, fact of knowledge not due to memory) does not exist. For what we are conscious of, is: „this is blue”, but not „this is momentary”.

[Buddhist]: Momentariness is not separated from blueness, because it does not possess separately practical efficiency. Therefore whenever blueness is grasped, momentariness likewise is grasped. But since we do not grasp the difference between closely resembling *kṣaṇas*, no apprehension of this sensation takes place.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: O greatest excess of wisdom, that somebody who first mentions perception (*anubhava*) [as a reason for his accepting the *kṣaṇabhāṅga*], should put forward [the formula]: „that which is not apprehended [i. e. the *kṣaṇikatva*] is the same as that which is

grasped [i. e. the *nīlatva*]. This is a wrong doubling of the notion [literally: a mirage of the desert] on your part; because you [as a Vijnānavādin] do not accept, besides the apprehension which originates owing to perception, something else which is the basis (*nibandhana*) of the different forms in which an object is seen by perception. Moreover the identification of two things [*kṣaṇikatva* and *nīlatva*], one of which is as a rule not apprehended whilst the other is, seems just as nonsensical, as to say that blue and yellow are identical.

[Buddhist]: Perceptual knowledge, [in itself] momentary, embraces the existence of a thing, as far as this abides in the same time as [the perception] itself; excludes whatever is not bound to that time; also excludes the relation between the thing, completely existing in that time, and all other times; and consequently grasps the momentariness, i. e. the remaining [of a thing] during that one *kṣaṇa*. [Bare perception thus bears merely on the thing; apprehension on the co-temporal relation of thing and momentary act of consciousness].

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Now you support one absurdity by another. For a cognition is not grasped by itself, how then could it grasp the sameness of time of a thing with itself? But let us grant that it does so, then this perception in which we realise: „the object did not exist before and will not exist afterwards” is a dreamlike [i. e. an incoherent] perception, because we do not grasp in it either a past or a future time. When the perception embraces the present time, its exclusion of any other time [past or future] is fit, because existence [present time] and non-existence [past or future] are contradictory to each other, but not so the exclusion of the relation towards another time, because the relation between one and several — so as that between a string and the jewels — is not self-contradictory.

This topic has been treated at length by us in the *Tattvaprabodha* and the *Tattva-saṃvādinī*; therefore we need not dwell on it here any longer.

C. The notion „saṃsāra” is incompatible with the Buddhistic theory of universal momentariness.

Nyāya-kandālī p. 82 l. 2:

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Moreover, who would be subject to *saṃsāra*, if we accept the momentariness of everything being?

[Buddhist]: If I should answer: the series of intellections?

[Vaiṣeṣika]: No, because there cannot be a series independent of [a substratum] which possesses the series.



[Buddhist]: But my idea is: the *samsāra* is not the conjunction of one [being] with several bodies &c. What is it then? The non-interruption of the series of intellections, and this is not incompatible with the theory of momentariness.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: This neither avails: because there is no proof that the intellection f. i. of an embryo is effected by a precedent intellection. Neither does a thing originate exclusively from another thing of its own class, since we see that smoke originates from fire which is not of the same class.

[Buddhist]. If a thing (A) regulates its presence and absence, and its accompanying surplus (*atiśaya*) after another thing (B), then the latter (B) is the material (*upādāna*) of the other and belongs to the same class as this. This is certain. And knowledge possesses for its accompanying surplus the state of consciousness, and this is not found in elementary matter such as earth: therefore, which thing (B) has the accompanying surplus of another thing (A), this thing (B) is the material cause of that other thing (A) and belongs to the same class. If we consider this as ascertained, then it follows that the intellection of the embryo must have another intellection for a precedent. For if there were an exception with reference to the cause, then the unwished-for consequence would be that the effect would lack a wherefore.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: This neither holds good. For we see that fire which has burning (consuming) for an accompanying surplus arises f. i. from the rubbing of wood, which process has not got the burning for its intrinsic nature: similarly the accompanying surplus (*atiśaya*), the state of consciousness, can arise from the eye &c., which do not possess a conscious nature: so then we are not obliged to surmise a cause which is of a conscious nature; therefore, the proof for the birth out of a precedent intellection will fail. Neither will a following birth be proved. Because there is no proof for the thesis that at the time of death another intellection is to be originated by the last intellection.

[Buddhist]: If I should answer: there is such a proof. If a thing (A) has reached the complete condition of cause in reference to another (B), then it produces this thing (B). F. i. a seed is in a complete condition of origination with reference to the sprout. Similarly the last intellection [of the dying man] is in a complete condition of origination.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: No; because we see an exception [to the rule which you try to lay down] in the last moment of a flame &c. [i. e. we

do not experience that the last glow of an extinguishing flame arises somewhere else in the form of a new flame].

[Buddhist]: If I should answer: there is not the [required] completeness in the last moment of a flame, since there is incompleteness in the condition of the causes, of oil, wick &c.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Neither is the completeness in the causal conditions proved for the last intellection [of a dying man], an intellection which suffers by the suffering of death. Thus it has rightly been said: in the theory of momentariness there is no room for the existence of another world. Here then we may stop.

### 19. *The difference between sentiment &c. and cognition.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 90 l. 22:

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I should say: pleasures have the nature of cognitions [literally: of something known], because they, [pleasure &c. and cognition], have the same cause; moreover the manifestation of pleasure is not seized by another organ. <sup>1)</sup>

[Siddhāntin]: No; because if pleasure and pain were in nature cognitions, then the unwished-for consequence would be, that they could not differ from each other. And if they differ, then a cognitional character cannot be attributed to them, for, although both have in common the being forms of consciousness (*bodha*), yet they exclude each other mutually [i. e. pleasure is not pain, nor is pain pleasure]. Neither are both, [pleasure and pain], born from the same cause as cognition is; since cognition arises from the form of the object, whereas pleasure and pain arise from this [cognition], assisted by [our] *vāsanās*. Otherwise the unwished-for consequence would be the impossibility of *upekṣāñāna*, (the conclusion that we must be indifferent towards certain objects).

### 20. *Discussion of intellection and reflection.* <sup>2)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 90 l. 27.

[Siddhāntin]: Neither is the assertion „intellection is consciousness of self [i. e. in every intellection we become aware immediately of the intellection as such]” proved. For you can find no example of one thing being simultaneously: act, agent &c. <sup>3)</sup>

<sup>1)</sup> *karāṇa* instead of *karāṇa*.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. GAṄGAṆĀTHA JIṬṬ, *The Prabhākara-school of Purva-mīmāṃsā* p. 26 & 27, & Sādhulāl Lectures p. 93 infra.

<sup>3)</sup> Cf. here book IV section VII table C n°. 15.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I should say: a lamp illuminates itself: thus there is an example.

[Siddhāntin]: Also this lamp is seen by man: and is brought to his cognition by the eye, the knowing of it is the act: but it is not itself and instrument and agent and object and activity.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I should say: just as the ātmavādins i. e. the Vedāntins assert soul<sup>1</sup> to be simultaneously object and agent in self-cognition, so do we contend that intellection is instrument &c.

[Siddhāntin]: No, because there is no difficulty in the Vedānta-theory]. To be the „*kāraṇa*“ means to be the object (*viśaya*) of the activity of knowing: in this [activity] the soul is the agent by its independence, and there is no contradiction between [the soul's] independence and its being an object (*viśaya*). But to be the instrument (*kāraṇa*) and the activity (*krīgā*), is mutually opposed in consequence of one thing functioning as *siddha* (that which exists; and *sādhya* (that which must be effected): for oneness does not exist in instrument and effect.<sup>2</sup>) Similarly to be an instrument means to be fit for somebody else's use, but to be the agent means to be not used by somebody else, [thus to be independent]: ergo there is contradiction between these two [notions], in as far as they are related to each other as position and negation. Therefore this state [of being simultaneously instrument &c.] cannot occur in one thing.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: My idea, however, is: the meaning of *svasamvedana* (reflection as necessary part of every intellection) is not the non-existence of [the four functions, above-mentioned], instrument &c. in intellection: but the arising of that [cognition] which has self-illumination as innate nature.

[Siddhāntin]: With reference to this we may notice: is this then an illumination of the object or of [the intellection] itself? If it is an illumination of the object, then the cognition would be about the object in consequence of this origin, but not about the [the cognition] itself: and so the fallacious result would be that it [i. e. cognition] would be non-cognisable. But, if on the other hand it is an illumination of [the cognition] itself, then the illumination and the thing to be illuminated would be the same; and thus oneness of activity and instrument would reside in it. Neither is there an instance (*ādhāryana*) for your [implicit] assertion that the origination of [a thing] itself is an activity [of the thing] with

<sup>1</sup>) Read *ātman*.

<sup>2</sup>) Read *kāraṇaṭhāraṇa*?

reference to itself. And as to the proof, given for the ascertainment of the *śrotra-samuccāra* (reflection as necessary part of intellection):

if [of two things] the one receives the illumination inherent in the other, then the former will shine forth, every time when the latter does so;

like a pot which receives the illumination inherent in the lamp;

and colour &c. receive the illumination inherent in intellection;

[I should like to make the following annotations]: If only intellection is meant as the illumination of the objects, then the thesis that colour &c. receive the illumination inherent in that [cognition], is unproved and is *anaiikāntika* [i. e. contains a predicate which is „not limited to one side“], because of the sense-organ [which also shares the rôle of an illuminating factor]. And if the illumination of the object [is upheld as] born from intellection, and not as [identical with] intellection, then you cannot quote any instance (*apstānta*), because it is not a lamp, as producer of intellection, which illuminates objects. By this we have also refuted the thought [expressed in the following half-śloka]:

„A seeing of the object by means of an apprehension (*upa-lambha*) which itself is not perceptible (*apratyakṣa*), cannot take place“.

For the seeing of the object is not the perceptibility of the intellection, but the origination of the intellection; for then, even if the intellection is not reflected upon, the cognition about the object takes place merely by the origination of that [cognition].

[Pūrvapakṣin]. If I should say: how is the origination of one thing the cognition of the other thing?

[Siddhāntin]: What have we to do with this? For it is the innate nature of the object. And if it is this, then no intellection [takes place at one time] of everything: because it [the intellection, results] from the total complex of its causes, and because it originates as having the consciousness (*saṃvitti*) about defined object for innate nature and as being cognisable by a defined perceiver.

## 21. *Refutation of the tripakṣi-pratyakṣatā*<sup>1)</sup> and the self-illumination of intellection and soul.

Nyāya-kandaḥ p. 91 l. 23.

Others, however, say: when the object becomes apparent by

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. GANANATHA JIY, *The Prabhakara School* p. 32.

contact with intellection, then consciousness (*cijñāna*) becomes apparent, because it has apparency (or illumination) as innate nature, like a lamp; and also the soul<sup>1)</sup> becomes apparent, because it is the abode of the illumination, like the wick of the lamp. Thus perception contains a triplex [of factors].

[Vaiçeśika]: Also this is not true. For when it is conceived „this is a pot”, we do not [necessarily] become conscious of the knower and the act of knowing. But when these two [last-mentioned factors] appear and the knowledge [expressed in the words]: ‘I apprehend the pot’ arises, then we have to do with *mānasa-pratyakṣa* [i. e. perception in which the internal organ assists] of an object, characterised by [its relation towards] knower and knowing<sup>2)</sup>. But no appearance of knower and knowing takes place in the [merely-]ocular perception, because otherwise the unwished-for consequence would be that these two [factors] were of an ocular nature.

## 22. Knowledge in general.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 96 l. 21:

Some [the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas] think. „Knowledge is to be proved by inference and is not grasped (perceived) by the internal organ”<sup>3)</sup>.

[Siddhāntin]: This is not right, as a mark (probans) is lacking. First, the object itself is not a mark (probans) of the intellection, as there is no fixed rule here [i. e. it is possible that things exist around us and yet we have no knowledge of them].

[A Pūrvamīmāṃsaka as opponent]: If I answer: the object known is a mark (probans)?

[Siddhāntin]: The *jñātātā*<sup>4)</sup>, the being known [of the object], is a connection between [this object and] our knowledge. This state of being the object of our knowledge is not experienced, when the knowledge is not experienced, as the experience of the connection is dependent on the experience of that which is connected. How then can a thing, having this as a characteristic, be a mark (probans)? Just as in the case of the mark [in general], so must the characterised mark be known, before it can be the cause of an inference. Perhaps you mean:

<sup>1)</sup> Prabh. School p. 40 n. 5; p. 79 n. 9.

<sup>2)</sup> Sādhvala Lectures p. 93 intra.

<sup>3)</sup> Prabh. School p. 26.

<sup>4)</sup> Cf. Nyāyakosa, s. v.

[Supposed answer of the Pūrvamīmāṃsaka as an opponent]: By [our own] intellection, immediately after its own production, a certain state, called the *jñātātā* (the being known) originates in the thing, like the *pakvatā* (the being cooked) of the rice in consequence of cooking. This state is perceived at the same time with the thing, as it is a property of this thing.

[Siddhāntin]: This is not right either. For the *jñātātā* of the thing is not perceived in the same way as the *pakvatā* of rice: its condition of pulse. For the state of the object being within the reach of perception, and its fitness for our lines of conduct like avoiding, [seeking and indifference] is a connection between [it and] our intellection, and not a new property. Moreover, in the same way as one *jñātātā* exists in reference to the object known, so there would be again another *jñātātā* in reference to this first *jñātātā*, [and so on]; therefore [the fault of] an endless regress would ensue.

[Pūrvamīmāṃsaka as opponent]: But some people say: Here the self-illumination<sup>1)</sup> in regard to knowledge comes in. What objection [have you against this notion]? Besides, the object which really is characterised by three times [by the fact that it is either in past, present or future], when known by an intellection, is perceived as characterised by the present [in as far as I now know the thing]. And this condition of a three-temporal thing as characterised by the present, is what we call its *jñātātā*. And because [this *jñātātā*] is produced by knowledge, therefore this *jñātātā* is a mark (probans) of our knowledge.

[Siddhāntin]. Neither does this hold good in any way. The being characterised by the present means the being defined by the present time. And this characterisation is not made an innate property of the thing by our knowledge, but it is only an experience [of ours]. For he who upholds knowledge to be inferable from the *saṃvedana*<sup>2)</sup> of the object [i. e. from the manifestation of the form of the object in our soul], must be further questioned by us: Does this *saṃvedana* of the object inhere in our soul or in the object? Certainly not in the object, as this repugns the nature of spirituality. But if it inheres in the soul, is then the intellection, which [according to you] is to be inferred from it, something else than this *saṃvedana*?

[Pūrvamīmāṃsaka]: If I should answer: „[this intellection], the

<sup>1)</sup> *Intuitus sui sapientiae*. Prabh. School p. 22 no. 1.

<sup>2)</sup> Prabh. School p. 23.

cause of this [manifestation], lies in the activity of the knower?

[Siddhāntin]: Is this cause eternal or transient? If transient, then the cause for its origination must be mentioned.

[Purvaṃmīmāṃsaka]: If I should answer: The conjunction between the knower and his internal organ, promoted by the object, the senses &c. as auxiliaries, is the cause of this?

[Siddhāntin]: Let these, [soul, internal organ, object & sense-organs] then be the totality of causes necessary for the arising of the manifestation of the object; why [do you adopt] such a useless notion? — But if [you accept] the supposition: „this intellection is eternal and, having an accidental meeting between object, sense-organ &c. as its auxiliary, causes an accidental (or transient) manifestation of the object, then there is superfluity of hypothesis with regard to this [notion of intellection], in as far as there would be an arising of a manifestation of the object, merely by the aggregation of accidental causes. For it is certain that the perception of things and consequently practical conduct [or language in reference to things: *vyavahāra*] are brought about only by the manifestation of the objects.

[Purvaṃmīmāṃsaka]. If it is said. How can intellection, which is born from object, sense-organ &c. be inherent in soul, if the soul is not to consist of innate intellection,<sup>1)</sup> for in case soul is supposed to be an unspiritual entity, the inherence could also take place in the sense-organs &c. in as far as there would be no difference anymore in their causality?

[Siddhāntin]: This is wrong. Because the limitation follows from the limitation of the nature of things. Just as the threads, it is true, are not yet a cloth, but still in consequence of the limitation of the general notion of „threadness” the cloth inheres in them, and not in the shuttle and the other [implements of weaving], in the same way though the soul is an unspiritual entity, yet in consequence of the limitation of the general nature of „soulness” a limitation will appear with respect to the inherence of knowledge [in other words: knowledge only inheres in the soul and not in the sense-organs &c.]

By this we have refuted a dogma, held by some [of the Purva-Mīmāṃsakas]: „Self-consciousness is the inborn spirituality of soul.” For then the appearance of this [self-consciousness] would take place in the state of transmigration [whereas man only learns to know the real nature of soul when he is getting liberated].

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. Prabhakara School p. 78 n°. 8, p. 79 n°. 9 and here book I p. 67 Ved.S. II, 3. 18.

[Pūrvamīmāṃsaka]: If one should answer: an obscuration of this [self-consciousness] is possible by ignorance?

[Siddhāntin]: Is ignorance [to be attributed] to Brahman and how, if an eternal self-consciousness exists [in Brahman], can you give a proof for your theory of obscuration?<sup>1)</sup> But if this [self-consciousness of Brahman] is obscured, then no intelligence of others exists; because the Holy Writ says: „All this is resplendent by His Lustre”.<sup>2)</sup> If it [viz. the self-consciousness, the spiritual nature of Brahman] does shine, then every soul gets liberated, since ignorance perishes, when knowledge breaks forth. But this ignorance [of everybody's soul] does not perish, nor does knowledge, this cause of its annihilation, come forth. Thus there is no liberation of the (humane) universe; but the intellectual dawning here and there cannot be doubted.

23. *Thing and quality are not identical.*<sup>3)</sup>

Nyāya-kandali p. 104 l. 24:

Those who, desirous of [proving] the identity of colour and substance, bring forward the argument: the cause of the substance is also the cause of the colour, may be asked as follows: Does the colour of an atom originate another colour (*A*), or does it not (*B*); and when originating [another colour], does it originate this in its own self (*Aa*), or in its abode, the atom (*Ab*)? — If it does not originate [this other colour] (*B*), or originates it in its own self (*Aa*) or in its abode (*Ab*), then no colour would arise in the double atom, and consequently the world, which is based on these [double atoms], would be colourless.

But, on the other hand, if it originates [another colour] in the double atom, then — for it is unfit that something non-existent should be the abode of anything particular — after the origination of the double atoms the origination of the colour will take place in them. This one must necessarily acknowledge, because an effect cannot arise without an abode. And if so, how could there be identity [between substance and quality], as a relation of priority and anteriority exists [between them]?

Moreover in a pot which itself continues [existing], colour &c. will vanish by conjunction with fire, and if so, then they also have an origination; this must be acknowledged by you. Now if

<sup>1)</sup> Here the argumentations are directed against a Vedāntin.

<sup>2)</sup> Kath. Upan. 5, 15, Āy. Upan. 6, 11, Muṇḍ. Upan. 2, 2, 10

<sup>3)</sup> Cf. Nyāyakandali p. 41 l. 2; here p. 370.



two things are so related to each other, that the one does not arise or disappear when the other respectively arises or disappears, then there is no identity of these things: this is the rule.

Neither, although [thing and quality] are entirely different, will the consequence be that they are perceived separately, because colour is always abiding in a substance. Why so? Because this is the nature *svābhāvya*, of things. Thus all disputes against our Masters come to an end.

#### 24. *Qualities in earth, caused by fire.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 109 l. 6.

The atoms do not possess pores<sup>1</sup>, because they have no parts. And if the double atoms were porous, then they could not originate, because there is no conjunction between the [simple] atoms. But even if the two [component atoms] were conjoined [and not, as they are, united by the Lord's *apekṣābuddhi*<sup>2</sup>], they would have no inter-space, because only the conjunction of two things, composed of parts, possesses interspace, since in one portion the conjunction takes place and in another it is lacking. But this rule is not applicable to two things, void of parts. And in gross bodies, which we perceive, the pore does not appear. Now to suppose: „the pore occurs merely in the threefold atoms, but is not seen there, because the threefold atoms does not permit perception“, is making matters unnecessarily difficult (*gorei kalpanā*). Thus pots &c. are not porous. And no entrance of fire-atoms into them takes place, as long as the earthly atoms are not completely separated. For one body, possessing touch, wards off another body of a similar nature. But if the parts are being separated, then according to the process of action (movement), disjunction &c. [as described by PRAÇASTAPĀDA<sup>3</sup>], the annihilation of the conjunction, originative of the substance, will necessarily cause the annihilation of the substance; thus how could this be manifested by the entrance of the [fire-]atoms? The disappearance of colour &c. in effect-substances, is only seen in consequence of the disappearance of the abode; and, on the other hand, their origination is seen merely as a consequence of the qualities of the causes [i. e. of the component parts]. Therefore the origination and anni-

<sup>1</sup>, Read: *sanīta* etc.

<sup>2</sup>, Cf. here book II p. 147 § 3.

<sup>3</sup>, Cf. here book II p. 165.

hilation of colour &c. cannot be the result of the conjunction between the pot [as an aggregate] and the fire. [Namely]:

The colour &c. of the pot only disappear through the disappearance of the abode:

because they are colours, tastes, smells, touches belonging to an effect-substance:

like the colour &c. of a pot, which is destroyed by the blow of a hammer.

And similarly:

The colour &c. of the pot originate from the qualities of the causes [i. e. the constituent parts]:

because they are colour &c. of effect-substances:

like the colour of a piece of cloth.

Moreover formerly [i. e. before the influence of the fire], there existed looseness between the parts, but now hardness is perceived. And looseness and hardness cannot enter one abode, just as little as *nodana* and *abhighāta*, because they are mutually opposed; therefore when the previous aggregate is dissolved, then another aggregate is born. If so, the annihilation of the old substance [takes place] owing to the annihilation of its causes, and the origination of the new substance owing to the existence of its causes: thus there is continuation (*avatiṣṭhate*); and the recognition [of the baked pot as similar to the pot of clay] has the general notion for its object, as is also the case with reference to a fire [through which a regular current of sparks goes on] &c. Also the perception of every continuation (*avasthā*) takes place in consequence of the gradual disappearance of an effect which really disappears: for a pot is not brought about by a direct gathering of atoms: so that on the separation of the atoms [the pot] would disappear immediately, but it is brought about by the intermediance of double atoms &c. And as long as [the aggregate] which is slowly being annihilated successively through the annihilation of double, three-fold &c. atoms, yea particles of innumerable parts — all that time our perception goes still on. In one part the old portions are decaying; in another, new portions are being originated in their place [in the place of such old portions] by atoms already possessing [qualities] originated by burning, and this through the series of double atoms &c. Consequently we see baked and unbaked portions: and when by the annihilation of other portions the former aggregate enters into a state of decay (*vinasyattā*), then in the next moment owing to the origination of new portions the origination of the new aggregate will take place together with the

annihilation of the old aggregate, thus there would be a streamlike process *ādhāra-bhāva* and accurate determination *pramāṇarūpa*. As many parts as there were in the old pot, so many will there be to effectuate the new one; and the same extension and multitude will be preserved.

[For the passage which follows next and which for its absurdity is not worth translating, cf. a parallel passus in the Vaiśeṣika Upaskāra on VII, 1, 6 transl. p. 218, and here the explanation of the similar *dehita*-theory p. 201].

25. *Number, compared with qualities as colour &c.*

Nyāya-kandaḥ p. 113 l. 22:

[Purvapakṣin]: This notion [sc. number] has colour &c. as its object.

[Siddhāntin]: No, because there is a dissimilarity in these notions. For [if you were right], this notion [of number], having the colour [of the object] as its cause, would be [expressed by words as] blue, yellow &c. and not [by] one, two &c.

[Purvapakṣin]: Let us then say: it is without object, because there is no other object (objective existence) than colour<sup>1</sup>) etc.

[Siddhāntin]: From what does this peculiar from „one, two, three &c.” [which exists] in it [in that objective existence], originate?

[Purvapakṣin]: If I answer, from the ripening of the *cāsanūṣ*-impressions, fixed in the *ālagarījīvina*.<sup>2</sup>

[Siddhāntin]: Then forms [of existence] as blueness must have the same origin. For there is no difference whatever, caused by [perceptual] impression, of this [blueness], when brought under the reach of knowledge, and the form „number”: by which [difference] we could decide that one is born from the object and the other is not.

[Purvapakṣin]: But if I should answer: this difference exists, for the *ākāra* blueness<sup>3</sup>) is not mistaken, and the *ākāra* number is untrustworthy.

[Siddhāntin]: This is without value. For there is no proof in this

1. I.e. than the contents of our momentary impressions (*lagana*). Cf. the Buddhistic theory often mentioned that a thing is merely the series of its qualities, i.e. here p. 370 and p. 409.

2) Magazine-like consciousness; cf. D. LA VAILLE-POISSON, *Bouddhisme, Opinions* p. 201.

3) With reference to the term *ākāra* (contents, originally: form, of a percept cf. here book I p. 92 sub 3).

case [namely on the basis of your theory of *vāsānās* and *ālayavijñāna*] that the *ākāra* blueness is not mistaken. There is no confirmation anywhere in this respect, because these [*ākāras*] are defined as single intellections and are momentary. For this reason neither is *arthakriyā* (practical efficiency) possible. Nor can there arise a similarity of the *ākāras* subsisting in former and later intellections, in as far as all intellections without exception have only to do with their respective *ākāras*; and only such [a similarity] could establish a confirmation, since this requires the perception of a series of *ākāras* similar to the one [in question]. Moreover, since sometimes the perception of dissimilar *ākāras* must arise, we cannot always have the perception of similar *ākāras*. — Neither is the trustworthiness of the *ākāra* blueness proved by its origination from the object. Because, if the object is not cognised [i. e. in case you consistently accept the *vijñānavāda*], then it is not allowed to affirm that it, [the *ākāra*], is effected [by the object]; and because, on the other hand, if the object is [accepted to be] cognised by another source [than by your *ākāras*, namely by direct perception], then the hypothesis of *ākāras* becomes useless. [In other words], on the basis of the theory that the object is proved by the manifestation of the *ākāras*, the object is proved by the manifestation of a trustworthy *ākāra*; and in case [you accept the existence of] the object as immediately certain, the trustworthiness of the *ākāras* is proved by ascertaining that this [*ākāra*] is effected [by that]. In this way [the two proofs] suppose each other (*anyonyapekṣitvam*). Similarly as in the case of the *ākāra*: blueness, so we cannot contradict the *ākāra*: number, which falls within the reach of knowledge [i. e. in as far as it is of a subjective nature]. Nor is it possible to refute it by going [with our perception] into the thing [itself]; likewise such a penetration would be difficult in the case of blueness &c., since these [objective facts] are separated [from our soul] by their innate nature [i. e. all our knowledge of things is relative and never absolutely adequate]; therefore the manifestation of mere *ākāras* governs all [our knowledge]; otherwise sometimes it would not be born from an object, and sometimes it would be; and so there would be no proof for [facts such as] blue &c.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I should answer: in the case of the not-being of an external object, we cannot logically expect that the ripening of *vāsānās*, which [ripening] depends for its origin merely on the series (*santāna*) of these [*vāsānās*], would take place at and during a certain time — therefore since such a temporal character is not

possible for an *ākāra* blueness, &c. which originates only from that *santāna*, [we may accept] the supposition that blueness and such-like facts [exist independently from us].

[Siddhāntin]. An arising at and during a certain time would neither take place for *ākāras* such as one, two, three, unless they were based on external things, therefore similarly an objective number must be accepted, since the way of occurrence is the same in both cases.

## 26. *Vicēṣāna and Vicēṣya*

(an eggression in the discussion of *deitva*).

Nyāya-kandalī p. 116 l. 23.

The intellection „two objects” must be preceded by the intellection concerning *vicēṣāna* (characteriser):

because it is a characterised (*vicīṣṭa*) intellection:

like the intellection about [a man] carrying a stick.

And thus when the intellection concerning the quality [„two”] is proved, then the precedence of the intellection about the *vicēṣāna* [sc. about „twoness”] may be inferred from the fact that [the intellection concerning the quality] is an intellection about a *vicīṣṭa*.

Those, however, who proclaim the characteriser and the thing characterised to be contained in one intellection, will find a difficulty with [the notion] „fragrant sandal”, for the eye has not the smell for object, nor does the olfactory sense comprehend the object. Therefore the grasping of the relation does not take place by these two, since the grasping of the relation is dependent on the grasping of that which bears the relation, by means of both [sense-organs].

[Objection]: Some people propose the following: „Just as recognitive perception, born from latent impression (*samskāra*) and sense-organ, has the anterior and the posterior for objects, since these two factors are capable of that, so will this [notion: „fragrant sandal”], born from eye and olfactory sense when united, be the object of both, since these two factors are capable of that.

[Siddhāntin]: This is not any better, as [the notion „fragrant sandal”] is indivisible. If the intellection were to possess parts, then one portion would be originated by the olfactory organ, the other by the eye, this distinction would be logical. But if the notion in question, effected by both [organs] as one and indivisible, grasps both the smell and the object, then the smell would appertain to the eye, and the object (thus would be the absurd consequence) would be an object of the olfactory organ; since to be

grasped by a certain <sup>2</sup>sense-organ means to be the object of the intellection produced by it. Neither can the internal organ, infinitesimal as it is, abide in both organs at the same time.

Thus after the smell being comprehended by the olfactory organ, the eye, assisted by this comprehension, originates the intellection concerning the *viçeṣya*, [an intellection] which has merely the *viçeṣya* for its objective base. This must be acknowledged by you, even against your wish. And if this is so, then the following argumentation has force for other intellections concerning things characterised:

That intellection concerning the *viçeṣya* (which is the topic of our dispute), has merely the *viçeṣya* for its objective base;

because it is an intellection concerning a *viçeṣya*, whilst at the same time it is a perceptual [notion]:

like the intellection „fragrant”.

[The addition] „whilst at the same time it is perceptual”, is made for the purport of distinguishing it (*vyavaccheda*) from probantial intellection (*laiṅgikam jñānam*).

[Opponent]: But if the innate nature of the substance were the objective base of the intellection concerning the *viçeṣya*, then this notion would also arise, when a *viçeṣaṇa* is lacking. But since the *viçeṣaṇa* gives rise [to this notion], so, when the *viçeṣaṇa* is lacking, no intellection about a *viçeṣya* can arise. The notion which would arise, namely, would not differ from the notion of the innate nature of the object, because another kind of intellection will not arise without another kind of object.

[Siddhāntin]: No, [you are wrong], for we agree [with that which you adduce, but not with your conclusion]. We do not assert the innate nature of the object as such to be the base of the intellection concerning the *viçeṣya*, but the characterised [innate nature]. That condition of being characterised, surpassing the innate nature qua talis, which manifests itself in the intellection „[this man] carrying a stick”, is not simply the notion of the man as such; and neither of the possession of conjunction with the stick. Namely in the notion: „[the man] with the stick” we become conscious of a man who is different from other [men]; and this attributeness of the stick is that which differences. Therefore it is taught: *viçeṣaṇam vyavacchedakam*, i. e. the characteriser is a factor of distinction. The stick, namely, whilst causing the assigning of its attributeness with reference to the man, distinguishes him from another.

The following is the difference [between a *viçeṣaṇa* and an]

*upalakṣaṇa* <sup>1)</sup>. The *upalakṣaṇa* distinguishes, but does not give rise to the notion of its being an *upasarjana* (an attribute, or something subsidiary), for whereas in the expression „*daṇḍin*” the stick is conceived as an *upasarjana* to the man, we do not conceive „the twisted locks of hair” as an *upasarjana* with reference to the ascetic, in an expression as „the ascetic with the twisted hairs (*jaṭābhis tūpśulā*). The stick, in the first instance, is secondary, and the man primary, in accordance with the surplus or non-surplus of enjoyment in the practical efficiency.

[Opponent]: But is then this relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* not of a reflective kind (*āpekṣika*) and therefore unreal?

[Siddhāntin]: But do you not see that verbal usage with reference to doer, act, &c. is both reflective and real? This has been extensively explained in the gloss on the *Samgraha*.

## 27. General proof for duality.<sup>2)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 122 l. 22:

[Vijñānavādin]: Why! This whole explanation of the originating &c. of duality is wrong, as there is no proof for the existence [of duality].

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the intellection: „two” is a proof?

[Vijñānavādin]: No, it is not; as a quality of „seizable”-ness does not exist. For an object, which would be seizable by knowledge, is either originating or not originating. In both cases an impossibility arises, as the non-originating thing is not, and the originating thing does not possess continuance.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the past thing is seizable by knowledge, because it causes this [knowledge]?

[Vijñānavādin]: No, since the fact that the thing appears as present refutes it; moreover, the unwished-for consequence (*prasaṅga*) would be that the organs of sense are seizable as well [and according to general opinion the sense-organ itself is *atindriya*, beyond the reach of sense].

[Opponent]: If I should answer: The innate nature of a thing,

1. CRIDHARA'S explanation here of the difference in the notions *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* is not quite clear. Perhaps we must understand it as follows: Ascetics, at least Īvaite-ascetic — and here we must remember that Crīdhara himself was a Īvaite — wore twisted locks of hair. An expression therefore, like „an ascetic with twisted locks of hair” could be compared with „white snow” in as far as it expresses explicitly that which is already contained in the main notion.

2) Cf. here book IV section VII tables A, B & E.

[which nature is] brought about by the totality of its causes, is such, that it alone is seizable, though there is no dissimilarity in respect to causation [between the things and the sense-organs]; but that the sense-organs &c. are not seizable. Further the appearance of present time has reference to the immediately following moment [i. e. the interval in time between the acting of the object upon us and our perception of the object is only one moment; and thus, being so short may be neglected].

[Vijñānavādin]: But again, what do you understand by the seizableness of a thing.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: Its being the cause of knowledge?

[Vijñānavādin]: Again the consequence would be the seizableness of the sense-organ as well. For there is no dissimilarity between this [and the object] in reference to mere causation.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the self-manifestation of knowledge means the seizableness of the other, [of the thing]?

[Vijñānavādin]: The manifestation of the essential nature of the one, is the seizableness of the other! Truly this is more than clear!

[Opponent]: No, it is clear; for we must not examine any further the innate nature [of things]. Knowledge then possesses as its essential nature the grasping of the object. Therefore, the manifestation of its essential nature is the seizing of the object. And that [particular knowledge] which is born from a thing, is the seizing of this selfsame thing, and not of any thing indefinitely: therefore, no *atiprasaṅga* (to wide an applicability) takes place.

[Vijñānavādin]: No; because they are one thing. The being born, namely, from an object is the originating from an object-of-knowledge. And this [originating] is one, and it is not a quality of the knowledge and of the thing. So it will not determine the object. Knowledge, now, is not [a quality] of the object, since it is the quality of something else. And the differentiated relation of the one as the seizer towards the other as the thing seizable, is established, because it [i. e. the above-mentioned originating of the knowledge from the object-of-knowledge] determines both, and because it does not determine one of the two members of the relation. Neither does causality with reference to knowledge exist in past or future things, because they are not [now].

[Opponent]: If I should answer; the establishing of the relation between seizable and seizer results from the establishing of the relation between object and experiencer of the object?

[Vijñānavādin]: No, [you are wrong], because there is no difference [between the *viśaya-viśayi-bhāva* and the *grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva*].



[Inserted remark by the author]: Since the [opponent] is requested to mention the cause particularising both [*grāhya* and *grāhaka*], the wish of giving this for answer, clearly lies in each of the following answers.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the essential nature of knowledge is the state of seizing a particular object.

[Vijñānavādin]: But when this essential nature of it [i. e. of knowledge] is again without a reason, then particularisation does not ensue.

[Opponent]: But let it be said so [i. e. let us use the term *svabhāva*], for the purport of having a reason [to which we may refer].

[Vijñānavādin]: But why should we talk about such a *svabhāva* (innate nature); I do not see that it is different from *tadutpatti* (causal relation).

[Opponent]: But it is said: that which effects knowledge, gives its own form to this knowledge; this [thing] is the perceivable of that; and nothing else. The form of the object is of necessity to be found again in the knowledge, because otherwise the mere intellection, void of form, would be equally related to all objects; and because, if the distinctions: „this [intellection relates] to a blue [object], that [intellection relates] to a yellow [object]” are not [allowed], the conception of different objects would not exist. For this reason one says that trustworthy knowledge [*pramāṇa*] has the form of the object. And this [form of the object] which is of a particular nature, brings the knowledge into connection with the particular object; but the sense-organs &c. which are [the] common [basis of all experiences] do not possess this rôle. Therefore it is said:

„[The form] moulds it [i. e. the *buddhi*, intellection] after the object, without losing its character as form of the object,

„trustworthy knowledge, therefore, is the possessing the form of the thing to be known, in consequence of the thing's penetration [into consciousness].”

And elsewhere it is said:

„The being conscious of it [of the thing] cannot be a mere state of our consciousness; for [consciousness] remains the same with reference to everything; but similarity of form<sup>1)</sup> penetrating it [i. e. intellection], will cause it to correspond [with the object].”

[The problem of the *ākāra* formulated and examined by the Vijñānavādin]: We answer to this as follows: Is either the object

<sup>1)</sup> Read *sārūpaṇat*, *ind*.

perceived by means of this form-possessing knowledge, or its form, or both?

[Refutation of the last point]: To begin with the third point: not both, because we always become conscious of only one form: „this blue”.

[Discussion of the first point]: The hypothesis that the object is perceived by knowledge, is not allowable, because the knowledge [about a thing] does not arise at the time of the existence of the individual nature of the thing, and because it is not fit that the past should appear in our knowledge as if it were the present. And if you would answer: „the *kṣāṇa*, if helped by subsidiaries of intellection, always appears as the present”, then you show too great a confidence in the maxims of a school, because that [i. e. the thing which has acted on consciousness] cannot be grasped by this [i. e. the present act of consciousness. — What is here the reason, that discriminative knowledge reveals to us one particular object, and not every one? Because there does not exist identity (*tādātmya*) between both [knowledge and object]; and neither is causal relation (*tadutpatti*) the reason for discrimination (*vṛjavasthā*), [i. e. it does not show the difference between object and sense-organ], as has been said.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the fact of having a certain form is the reason for this fixation.

[Vijñānavādin]: Why then does the one blue-moment [i. e. the momentary state of consciousness, containing the notion of blue] not grasp another blueness which has the same form as well?

[Opponent]: If I should say: the function of grasper (*grāhaka*) is the innate nature of knowledge only, but not of the thing?

[Vijñānavādin]: Even then one intellection „blue” would bear on all moments of blue, because [these *kṣāṇas*] do not differ from one another as to this form.

[Opponent]: The function of the grasped only belongs to the thing-moment (*artha-kṣāṇa*), which causes itself [i. e. its correspondent notion in the mind] to arise by means of causality (*tadutpatti*) and similarity of form (*sārūpya*).

[Vijñānavādin]: Then also the perceivableness (*grāhyatva*) of sense-organ and of the *samanantara-pratyaya* [i. e. the immediately precedent contents of consciousness] would come in, as knowledge arises also through them. And indeed this rightly bears a similarity of form [to these two], scil.: [1] the being particularly directed towards the grasping of an object, and [2] the possessing of the character of consciousness (*bodha*).

[Opponent]: But we mean: The two similarities [which you mention]: that between intellection and sense-organ, namely their being directed particularly towards the grasping of an object, and [2] that between an intellection and the *samanantara-pratyaya*,<sup>1)</sup> namely their character of consciousness, are common to all cognitions. But the similarity in form to the object is special [for one cognition], because the form of blue occurs in the intellection „blue” which itself has arisen from [the objective] blue. And the property which is special, is determinating, and in consequence of this distinction it happens that the cognition grasps the object, and does not grasp the sense-organ and the *samanantara-pratyaya*.

[Vijñānavādin]: Neither does this hold good, because the unwished-for consequence would be that [intellection] would grasp the *samanantara-pratyaya* which has the same object.

[Opponent]: That which causes the form of blueness &c. to arise in the cognition, is the perceivable of this [cognition], but the form of blueness &c. does not originate, in the streamlike cognition, from the *samanantara-pratyaya*; but from the object. For we find the adequateness of this in all cases where it [the „form of blueness” in the mind] arises, according to agreement and contrariety.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: [I believe the *samanantara-pratyaya* to be the cause of the intellection], because consciousness (*bodha*) is found to be adequate, wherever the form of „conscious” arises.

[Opponent]: The seizable is that which projects the form of blue &c. [on the mind]; therefore „this” [the form in the mind] is the indication of „that” [the object],<sup>2)</sup> and not of anything ad libitum. The restricted innate nature of the seizableness is that which determinates it. If so, the determination results from the determinated character of the innate nature. Knowledge, namely, when originating, can be described as the becoming conscious of an object determinated by its effecting complex. And similarly the object is subjected to this becoming conscious (*vedyatva*) by the determinated character of its innate nature of *vedyatva*, but sense-organs are not such.

[Vijñānavādin]: Then the form (*ākāra*) is no factor. For the act of cutting has not the form of the tree, by which [form] this [act] would get connected with the tree and not with the axe; but the innate nature of the [act of cutting] and the tree are such

1) Cf. *Muséon* N S. II p. 193 n. 122.

2) Read: *tasya*.

that it [the cutting] is determinated there, and not elsewhere. „This” is the act of being conscious of „that”, also this discrimination (*vyavasthā*) has only the appearance as condition; therefore the *ākāra* is not required.

[Discussion of the second point: *Vijñānavādin*]: But, [perhaps you may suggest]: „we do not become conscious of the object, but only of its form, by means of form-possessing cognition?” Then the existence of the object cannot be proved; neither is there a seizing (*grahana*) of the object, nor an apprehension [of its perception] (*adhyavasāya*). Reflection (*vikalpa*), namely, is quite out of the question; for although reflection really has the comparison [of two aims, of two desires &c.] for its function, it abandons this original function in those cases where sensation takes place, because of its immediate following after this perception; then on receiving the activity of an[other] factor [as an auxiliary], it makes the object manifested. But where sensation does not take place, there reflection is powerless, because the factor is lacking.

[Opponent]: If I should say: The form of the intellection, which ascertains a cause resembling itself, is a proof for the existence of the thing?

[*Vijñānavādin*]: How then does an exterior object, project a material form [on our mind]? What does this word tend to? Therefore [let us concede:] no material semblance [*ābhāsa*, i. e. *ākāra*, form] of itself is effected by the object in the cognition. And where it is thus obstructed in one respect, [namely with reference to materiality], it is neither possible in several respects. But the [mental] form, not originated from an object, exists now and again by some cause or other [in our mind], it is truly experienced, [although] not existing; similarly another [mental] form will exist and will be truly experienced, [although] not existing. Neither is in your theory of *ākāras* the distinction between truth and falsity of the cognition-forms easy; this has been pretty well found out. Moreover, the form of consciousness frames then a resembling object as the cause, when it is understood that the cause is of such <sup>1)</sup> a form as belongs to consciousness. But even when an object gets to be known <sup>2)</sup>, such a notion [of similarity between our sensation and the exterior object] does not arise, because the ascertainment of causality and similarity would depend on the grasping of both. Thus the proof for the existence of the object does not arise from

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *tādṛcam eva*.

<sup>2)</sup> Read: *arthasya samvedyatve*.

the [mental] form, and consequently neither does the [proof for the] causality. So then causality cannot be a definition of seizableness (*grāhyatva*). Neither is the [thing's] causality capable of projecting its form [on our mind]. Therefore it is well said: „there is nothing else which can be experienced [by us] than intellection, because seizableness cannot be defined. For the same reason an object, apart from cognition, does not exist.

[Opponent]: And if the solid [object] does not reveal itself, then neither do we become conscious of something else which reveals it, because we always become conscious of only one form [such as „this blue”].

[Vijñānavādin]: But there is such a revealer, and this, if not apparent itself, would not reveal an object which possesses a not-revealing innate nature.

That which has an unapparent manifestation, is itself unapparent:

like an object hidden by a hut &c.;

and the exterior object has a manifestation unapparent to another.

Similarly: that which reveals [something] to another, does not want another exemplar of its class in order to reveal itself;

like a lamp;

and knowledge reveals [things] to another [scil. to human soul].

Therefore only consciousness (*bodha*) which becomes apparent itself, reveals objects: so we do not wander from sound reasoning.

If so, then there would be identity of the thing known and the knower, as between the omniscient and that which is not omniscient, because of the regular occurrence of simultaneous perception. The not regular, [only accidental] occurrence of simultaneous perception is the pervader (*vyāpaka*) of difference (non-identity):

because a regular occurrence of perception at the same time does not take place with reference to blue and yellow;

and the regular occurrence of simultaneous perception is repugnant to the only accidental occurrence of simultaneous perception.

Ergo: the regular occurrence — which is excluded from the only accidental occurrence and consequently from [the existence of] difference, because we meet here with a contradiction to the pervader — rests upon identity. Thus we have here a *pratibandha-siddhi* (an inference by means of „obstruction”).

And you may not argue: the word *saha* (in *sahopalambha*) means comradeship as well as simultaneity; and in consequence of the

difference of these two [word-meanings], the fallacy, called *vyāpyatrād viruddha*, creeps in; because we have to accept [in both premises] „illusory co-existence” as the differencer of the probans. For also in the case of the double moon, [which is] one of [our common] examples, the co-existence is illusory, and not real, since there is only one moon.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the consciousness-moment of omniscience perceives all living being simultaneously with its own self; still they are non-identical with the omniscience-cognition. So the fallacy, called *anaikāntika*, creeps in.

[Vijñānavādin]: No, because this is not the rule. When the simultaneous perception of two facts takes place in respect to *kᅒaᅒas*, then this [simultaneous perception] follows the rule [which I mean], because two *kᅒaᅒas* cannot be perceived again apart from each other. But I do not mean a rule for simultaneous perception with reference to [moment-]series.<sup>1)</sup> And there is not a perception at the same time, of the omniscient-series with another conscience-series, since the omniscient may abide at a certain moment only in its own self. And then the omniscient does not become [by that] a non-omniscient, because his capability still exists, just as a cook [remains a cook], although he is not cooking.

That which is cognised by a cognition, does not differ from this cognition;

as the „self” of a cognition [i. e. as the self-cognition which is attached to any cognition], does not differ [from this cognition];  
and blue &c. are cognised [by cognitions].

For suppose that there was non-identity, then it [the object] could not be known by the cognition, because identity, which is the reason for the constant relation, would not exist, and causal relation cannot fix such a relation, in as far as too wide an applicability (*atiprasāᅒga*) would creep in, scil. that one thing, not connected with another, would still be cognisable by this. Therefore since we do not become aware of the pervading (*vyāpaka*) relation (reason for the constant rule) in the case of difference, cognisability, excluded from difference (as *vipakᅒa*), will be [logically]-pervaded by non-difference. Thus runs the proof by means of „obstruction” for the probans. By this [argumentation] we have also shown the identity of the [cognition-]form „Ego” and cognition. And as for the appearance of the seizable, the seizer and the act of consciousness,

<sup>1)</sup> A moment-series in Buddhistic terminology corresponds with the *ātman* in Vaiᅒeᅒika expression.

as separate, [on which you base your theory], this is [simply] an illusion like the appearance of twoness in one moon. Also here the cause is: the *vāsanā* [i. e. an impression in the mind which is given over by one moment to the next moment, like odour from one thing to another] of difference, a *vāsanā* without beginning and with an uninterrupted course. — As has been said [by DHARMAKĪRTI]:

„Multiplicity is [merely] perceived by erroneous cognition, as in the moon which is exempt of duality.”

[Opponent]: But granted that the exterior [object] does not exist, what then is the cause of the intellection which [often] arises and possesses the form „blue” &c. As has been said: „[There is] an intellection about the thing, it possesses the form of this; this [intellection] now, having the form for differencer, does it take its origin from the exterior [thing] or from elsewhere? This question deserves examination.”

[Vijñānavādin]: [I in my turn ask:] granted that the exterior [thing] exists, what then is the cause of this [cognition]?

[Opponent]: If I should say: the object, such as blue &c.

[Vijñānavādin]: But this is not seen, because the object transcends the senses.

[Opponent]: If I should say: it must be inferred from the manifoldness of the effects.

[Vijñānavādin]: Let us accept then a manifoldness of power in the *samanantara-pratyaya* which is seen [in opposition to the object which is really not seen]. Also the manifoldness of form (*ākāra*) in our consciousness during sleep, is in accordance with this; because here is no question of a capability of objects, located at different places and times, in as far as they do not exist.

[Opponent]: Then the notion of variegatedness (manifoldness) would not exist; because from the oneness of intellection would ensue the oneness of that which is not differentiated from it; and because, if the intellections differed from one another in respect to their forms, each of these intellections would be fixed only by its own form; and because a seizer of their forms, apart from those [intellections], would not exist.

[Vijñānavādin]: We answer to this: in the first place, it cannot be said that the variegated colour does not appear; for this is contradicted by consciousness. But the material (*jadā*) is unfit to become manifested. Therefore this [variegated] colour has cognition as its essence. And no multiplicity in the intellection [originates] here from the multiplicity in the forms, because the variegated

colour, which is one, does not possess a multiplicity of „forms”. And so as there is one form of blue, which has „blue” for its innate nature, so the one variegatedness has a form which has „variegatedness” for its innate nature. And the intellection, active with reference to this [variegatedness], which is identical with [the intellection] itself, is active or not active with reference to the entire [variegatedness], but is not active [or inactive] with reference to a part of it, because it is without parts. For those parts which seem to be different from each other, are not the variegated colour. So there is not the slightest difficulty.

[Opponent]: The form „material” (*sthūla* = *jadā*) may be proved in a similar way.

[Vijñānavādin]: An aggregate which is one and of a material nature, does not exist,<sup>1)</sup> because plurality would be the consequence of its consisting of several parts.

Some say: the form of the intellection, as occurring in one intellection, is one and of a material nature, thus the contradiction between the movement [of the part] and the [simultaneous] rest [of the whole] may be rejected [with reference to transcendental nature] [as being merely] a contradiction in human consciousness.<sup>2)</sup>

Others, however, say: the form of the intellection, appearing in consequence of a beginningless *vāsanā*, does not allow any examination; truth (reality) is falsity. Namely:

that which is *pratyaya* (notion) does not possess an exterior foundation:

like the notions in sleep and suchlike [conditions of consciousness].<sup>3)</sup>

This *pratyaya* of the waking man, is a pillar &c. Their lack of foundation is seen in sleep &c., for there they are connected with notional nature; the innate nature of the notion of the waking man is also notional. And if it would abandon its baselessness (*nirālambanatva*), then it would give up its innate nature likewise.

[Opponent]: But suppose that all notions were [objectively] baseless, then the notions [occurring in our argumentations], such as the *dharmin* (or *pakṣa*), the probans, the example &c. would be baseless, and in consequence of the non-existence of the *dharmin*, the probans &c., we could not go in for inference. But on the other hand, when they possess an [objective] basis, then we can make use of these [notions] for this purport.

1) Cf. Nyaya-kandali p. 41 l. 12 &c.

2) ibidem p. 41 l. 24 &c.

3) Cf. here book IV section VII table A, first passage.



[Vijñānavādin]: Not thus. Because these [notions], which have no external foundation, are causes for our inferences, simply in as far as they are acts of consciousness. For we see that knowledge arises from not-knowledge, as for instance the understanding of words from the written characters.

[Opponent]: But the lines &c. [which form the written characters and] which make the words known to us, are existing according to their innate nature.

[Vijñānavādin]: Indeed they are; but they are not informative by this characteristic [as being existent], but they are such in consequence of the projection (*adhyāropa* = *upaplava*) of the form „*ka*, [*kha*, *ga*]” &c. and for this reason they are not unfit for the effect [scil. for information].

— Thus the short exposition of the *pūrvapakṣa*.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: That which has been said [by you] „duality of seizer and seizable does not exist], because no definition of the seizable can be given”<sup>1)</sup> — this is not sufficient for proving the non-existence of objects. For the exterior object would not be seizable, and neither its non-existence, in as far as non-existence of seizing takes place in consequence of a debarment [from our perception] by innate nature, as in the case of a spirit &c.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: [the difference, made between the existence and non-existence of a thing, is reasonable; for:] non-existence is proved by not-seizing, should [the object, if existent,] have allowed our seizing.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: But how, again, is the *yogyatā* (the fitness for being seized) of the thing, ascertained? For its seizing has never taken place. And if it had, then the seizable would no longer be indefinable. Moreover the [act of] seizing is based on the seizer and the seizing intellection is founded in its own self; and merely from this follows the seizableness<sup>2)</sup> of that which is different from [i. e. exterior to] it; and to say: „this not grasping follows from the non-existing of the seizable”, is a *sādhyāviṣiṣṭa* (= *sādhyasama*)<sup>3)</sup>. Moreover I beg you to answer the following question: what seizableness belongs to the form of the intellection? For [1ly] [this form] is not the cause of the intellection; because it is not separated from, [i. e. because in a certain way it is identical with] the intellection. Neither [2ly] does this form foundate an[other] form,

1) Cf. Ny. Kand. 122, 24.

2) Read: *tad anyasya grāhyatā*.

3) Cf. Gaut. Sūtra I, 2, 8.

because we do not experience such a duplicate of forms. Neither [3ly] supposing that [the form is] the essence of the intellection, [do we get a definition of] seizableness, because we do not seize [this form] during the state of deep sleep, although, if being identical with intellection [i. e. with „state of consciousness” in general], it would also go on then, like the series of intellections; [during sleep, namely, the series of intellections goes on, but deprived of form, whilst the intellections of our waking state possess form].

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: the state of apparition in general is the seizableness of the form?

[Vaigēśika]: But what is this apparition of the form?

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should answer: the arising of the possibility of different conduct: abandoning, [taking up, and being indifferent], [which conduct is] based on intellection?

[Vaigēśika]: But this possibility is just that to which the exterior object gives rise. Namely, when people have a notion harmonising [with the object], then they accept, reject or are indifferent <sup>1)</sup> with reference to this exterior object, but not with reference to anything else: to a mental form (*ākāra*). Thus your proposition, that the seizable cannot be defined, is unproved.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should ask: how is the possibility of the conduct of one thing [namely, of the human person], brought about by the arising of another thing [namely, of the exterior thing]?

[Vaigēśika]: Because [the latter thing] shows an innate nature which corresponds to a certain conduct towards that object, in accordance with the complex of causes of its innate nature. Thus your objection is not of much importance (*iti yat kiṃ cit*). — By this we have also refuted [your argumentation which has to do with] cognisability (*vedyatva*).<sup>2)</sup> For also when difference exists [between the cogniser and the cognisable], the cognisability will arise according to the fixed rule which is supplied by the complex of causes of the innate nature of cognition, because [in your argumentation] the exclusion [of the probans] from the *vipakṣa* is uncertain. — Also your thesis that the material<sup>3)</sup> is not capable of manifestation, [cannot be accepted; for it] is either a proof of that which does not want a proof (*siddhasādhana*), namely in the case when you define [the material] as that which does not possess manifestation as its nature; or it is not admissable, namely in the

<sup>1)</sup> Read *upakṣāte*.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. Ny. Kand. 126, 12.

<sup>3)</sup> Cf. Ny. Kand. 125, 16 and 127, 2.

case when you understand [the manifestation] as a contact [between soul and object]. For such a royal edict: „there shall be no manifestation-contact of the material [and the soul]”, nowhere exists. [As for the saying]: „The act of knowing stands and falls with the object to be known, as the act of cutting with the object to be cut”<sup>1)</sup>; also [here] the exclusion of the constant rule of the simultaneous perception [as the probans] from the *vipakᅒᅒa* is doubtful; because a constant rule of the simultaneous grasping of blue and the notion of blue, may be the result of the fact that [cognition] itself and its counterpart [i. e. the object] are both cognisable by [one] intellection.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: since the exterior [thing] does not exist, knowledge is not the cogniser of something else.

[Vaīᅒeᅒika]: When it is proved that the exterior [thing] does not exist, then the exclusion of the probans from the *vipakᅒᅒa* is proved; and when this [exclusion] is proved, then this may serve as a probans for the non-existence of the *vipakᅒᅒa*, thus there is a mutual dependence [of propositions].

[Vijñānavādin]: Let it be so, what does it matter?

[Vaīᅒeᅒika]: Also the constancy of the simultaneous perception is not proved, for when we perceive an object as exterior [and express this by the words:] „this is blue”, then we do not [always] perceive the [mental] perception [itself] which is different [from the object]; [in other words: when we perceive an object, we do not always reflect on our perception].

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: when it is proved that knowledge cognises itself, then the constant rule of simultaneous perception will be proved.

[Vaīᅒeᅒika]: But how do you prove this self-cognition [of intellection]?

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say:<sup>2)</sup>

that which makes apparent [other things], does not need  
any help for its own manifestation;  
like a lamp.

[Vaīᅒeᅒika]: The use of a lamp lies in its warding off the darkness which abides in its place; this work is done by itself [without any help]; for that purport it does not require anything else, for such [an auxiliary] would be useless; but in view of its perception, it requires the eye [and the other factors of perception]; thus the example is unsufficient for [proving] the probandum.

1) Cf. Ny. Kand. 125, 24.

2) The same argument has been used Ny. Kand. 125, 21.

[Vijñānavādin]: But I take the notion „intellection” in the sense of „power which manifests”, therefore it does not need anything else.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Then the fallacy, called *asādhārāṇo hetuḥ*, creeps in. — As to your argumentation: <sup>1)</sup>

that which has an unapparent manifestation, is itself unapparent,

like a hidden object;

here takes place non-apparency, non-manifestation, of the hidden object; but not <sup>2)</sup> in consequence of the non-apparency of the manifestation, but simply of the non-existence of [the manifestation] itself. Thus [we meet here with the fallacy, called *vyāpty-asiddha*.

Also your argument: „because it [scil. the notion of blue &c.] is a notion”,<sup>3)</sup> does not hold good: in as far as the example is fallacious. For also the notional states such as sleep, have, although created by imagination, [indirectly] an objective base, and are not confined [in their origination] to the soul, in as far as objects, enjoyed during waking state, appear to us then, owing to their latent impression (*saṃskāra*), otherwise we could not explain the constancy of the arising of those [dream-notions] with reference to objects, seen, heard, experienced.

Moreover, when the exterior thing does not exist, how can we ever get a perception with defined form [and expressed in the words:] „this is blue”.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: this is a form of our consciousness (*vijñāna*).

[Vaiṣeṣika]: No, [you are mistaken], because we have a cognition of something existing outside our intellection. For should it be a mere form of our intellection, then the notion would be [expressed by the words:] „I am something blue”, but not [by] „this is blue”.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: since the intellections differ one from another, the notion „I” will belong to one, and the notion „this blue” to another.

- [Vaiṣeṣika]: [No], because the form (*ākāra*) „Ego” is not constituted so as the forms „blue” &c. are. Namely, that which is understood by one, as the Ego, is considered by another as the Tu.

[Vijñānavādin]: The occurring of [the notion] „Ego” to the mind, takes place in the cognition of the self by the self.

1) Ny. Kand. 125, 18

2) Read: *aparakāṣa na sevayam*.

3) Cf. Ny. Kand. 127, 12.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Is then perhaps the cognition about another a cognition about one's own innate characteristic?

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: the notion of difference (non-identity) results from error (*bhrānti*).

[Vaiṣeṣika]: The difference, ascertained by perception, is real.

[Vijñānavādin]: No, it is not.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Why?

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should answer: perception is erroneous, as has been said.

[As to] that portion [i. e. the exterior world] which is located outside the other portion [i. e. outside the soul], the apparition of difference in intellection which is really undivided, forsooth, is a subjective illusion (*upaplava*).

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Why this?

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: because we can prove this identity by inference.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Inference receives its own nature, because its topics (*viśaya*) are not refuted (*abūdhita*), whilst perception is erroneous; and on the other hand when inference has received its own nature, then the erroneousness of perception is the logical consequence, thus there is the fault of mutual dependence [of propositions]. But let us grant that difference is a subjective illusion (*upaplava*), what gives rise to the notion of an object, located in a fixed place? For there is [in your theory] no [room for a] cause of the restriction: „here this [illusion] shall be projected, and nowhere else.”

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: the limitation in this projection ensues from the limitation in the *vāsanās*.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: No, [this is not possible], because this [*vāsanā*] can neither be the cause of this limitation in space. But when the existence of the objects is [accepted], then the perception will take place in that spot where the object is situated, and the latent impression [*vāsanā*, here = *samśkāra*], originated from this [perception] will refer to that [same] spot. But when the exterior objects do not exist, there is no cause which could limit the *vāsanā* to a certain spot. Moreover differentiation in the effect is not possible without differentiation in the cause.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: the exterior object does not exist. Therefore the manifoldness<sup>1)</sup> of the *vāsanās* [exists and is the cause of the manifoldness of our experience, of the *kāryaviśeṣa*

1) Cf. Ny. Kand. 127, 3.

which you have just mentioned]: and the origination of this manifoldness [of *vāsanās*] springs from the manifoldness of [other *vāsanās* which are] their causes and so without a beginning.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: If the manifoldness of the *vāsanās* is the same as the forms of our intellections, how then do the *vāsanās* differ from one another? And if it is different [from these forms], what objection have you against [the existence of] the objects; [an objection on your side] which puts aside the conception of everybody? And by what factor is the [mental] form projected?

[Vijñānavādin]: By our intellection?

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Is this projection (*bahirāropa*) the becoming conscious by means of it [i. e. by our intellection] of the form in our own soul, or is it something else? [1] In the first alternative the result will be that the true notion of this [intellection] and the false notion are the same; because the seizing of the form is true through its being simply a contents of an intellection; and because the conception of exteriority does not correspond with reality. But [2] if [the projection is] something else, then [*a*] there is no existence successively, because the cognition, [which is supposed to be] the cause of this [projection], only exists momentarily [and therefore cannot exist one moment as cognition, and another moment as projection], and neither [*b*] can we conceive simultaneously one thing [as cognition] to be true and [as projection] to be false; and finally [*c*] we cannot conceive, besides succession and simultaneity, a third modus, so that knowledge, subject to this, would grasp the form in one's own soul and project it. Moreover, if an object, such as blue &c. were a form of intellection, then only he who conceives the form, would perceive [the object]; but no one else would see it; yet the one object is perceived by several; because all at the same time are active with reference to it, because one understands: the [object] which is seen by you, is also seen by me. So then this object is not a mere form of intellection. — But when you, in contradiction to [what is taught by] our intellection-form, proclaim: „blue &c. appear to us, as merely false”,<sup>1)</sup> then no limitation of origination out of limited causes, nor a practical efficiency is possible; when there is no object, then no causal influence whatever belongs to anything; or every [causal influence] can be attributed] to everything; neither is there a harmony of practical efficiency of everything, nor disharmony, because all differentiation does not exist. As has been said by the Gurus:

1) Ny. Kand, 127, 11.

The taste, the *vīrya* (sensitive power) and the digestion of those who take imaginary pills and those take real pills, would be the same.

[Vijñānavādin]: It I should say: this difference results from a difference in the *vāsanās*.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: If this [*vāsanā*] were the cause of the different practical efficiency of [what we call] the exterior things, [what then]? [According to you] „object” and „*vāsanā*” are merely different names [but really identical]: and it [the *vāsanā*] has intellection as nature: and if now the [exterior] object does not exist, then a differentiation of this [*vāsanā*] is without foundation, because mere intellection as a cause (*apādāna*) never varies; and because, if we were to accept both an intellection-form and a difference (variation), different [from that form], then the unwished-for consequence would be that we should have to accept the existence of objects, as has been said. — Neither, on the basis of this alternative, would there be any occasionality of the notion „blue” &c., because the moment-series,<sup>1)</sup> fit for its production, always goes on, and because if it were to stop, then this notion would neither arise at another [previous] time, in as far as there does not exist besides that [notion „blue”] itself, something else on which it could depend [for its origination].

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: „the occasionality (*kādācitkatva*) of that effect results from the occasionality of the ripening of the cause.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: The ripening of the cause must be effected, [i. e.] its inclination towards the production of the effect. But even this [ripening] cannot be occasional, exclusively dependent as it is on the act of cognition performed by [the moment-series to which] itself [belongs]. Yet the appearance [of the thing] in our perception is occasional; and this [perceptual appearance], ascertaining the object of our notion as exterior object defined in place, time, cause and innate nature, refutes any proof for the non-existence of the object; thus [you are guilty of] the fallacy, called *kālātayāpadiṣṭa* of reasons.

Now we stop; the [paragraph on] number has been completely explained.

1) Cf. Nyāya-kandālī p. 126 l. 6.

28. *Relative value of perception and inference.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 15S l. 6.

Some say with reference to this topic: in as far as we become aware of a simultaneous existence of the two disjunctions, taking place in the hand and in the body with reference to a spot in a wall &c., there the accepting of a causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) between these two [disjunctions] is refuted by perception.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: This does not hold good, because at the time when the disjunction of the hand takes place, there [would] not be a cause for the origination of the disjunction of the body; and when the cause is lacking, there is no arising of the effect; and the movement of the hand, as has been said, is not the cause. Consequently the notion of their simultaneity is erroneous.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the succession (*kramabhāva*) is arrived at by inference, and the simultaneity is proved by perception. And when perception stands in the way, then no inference will arise, because the condition that its object should not be obstructed, is not fulfilled. How then [do you arrive at] erroneousness of perception in agreement with that [i. e. with inference]?

[Vaiṣeṣika]: How then is inference applied in the case of a hundred leaves, although in disaccordance with perception? And if it is upheld:

[Supposed objection]: Inference does not arise through disaccordance with perception in such cases where the refutation (*bādha*) of the object is settled by it [i. e. by perception]; here, however, this [refutation] is doubtful, as it is possible that perception, grasping the simultaneity, arises in consequence of the quick process of the piercing through one hundred leaves. Moreover, the [following] means of trustworthy knowledge, containing a universal concomitance (*vyāptigrāhaka*) is more than strongly evident to every body, namely: a needle which is unobstructed, will pierce through, but not one which is obstructed; therefore by the sufficiency of this [*pramāṇa*] the arising of an inference takes place, although a [contradictory] perception already exists.

[Vaiṣeṣika, answering to this objection]: If this were true, then in our case [i. e. in the case of the two disjunctions of hand and body from wall] there exists a trustworthy source of knowledge, containing a universal concomitance, scil.: an action inherent in another abode [for instance in the hand, and not in the body] does not effectuate a disjunction [e. g. in the body]; and in consequence of its strong evidence perception will erroneously (*anyathā*)



arise, and therefore the inference for succession is well-founded. For the same reason [we meet here with] a refutation of perception by that [i. e. by inference]; for this [inference] bears upon an object; but the perception is [really] without an object, as it only arises in consequence of the quickness of the process; and that which possesses an object, has force, because it obtains the accompaniment of the object which abides in the state of being thus [as expressed by the *pramāṇa*], on the other hand that which has no object, lacks force, because it has not got this accompaniment. Thus the refutation of perception by inference, is really a refutation by a previous perception grasping the general concomitance. Similarly in the case of people confused about [the perception of] the quarters of the compass, inference has power; according to the opinion of the former teachers, when saying: „forsooth inference is stronger than perception.” On the other hand there is no worthless arising of perception, such as grasps the heat of fire, so then when by this the refutation of a [supposed] object is settled, there is no arising of an inference.

29. *Annulment of an intellection.*<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandālī p. 159 l. 1.

[Opponent]: But why do you accept the relation of sublating (*bādhaka*) and sublated (*bādhya*) between two intellections.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Because they contradict each other with reference to the same object. One intellection teaches us: „this thing — whatsoever — is silver” and the other: „this thing is mother of pearl”; but this being silver and this being mother of pearl cannot exist in the same place; because we always perceive these two in the condition of excluding each other. Thus whereas the contradiction between the objects gives rise to a contradiction between their respective intellections, [we arrive at] the laying down of the relation between *bādhya* and *bādhaka*.

[Opponent]: What is annulment (*bādha*)?

[Vaiṣeṣika]: The removal of the object.

[Opponent]: So then, will the object in question (*dharmin*) which has been apparent in the intellection of silver, appear as existent in the same state, after the origination of another intellection, and the silverness is not; — or is it removed?

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. the discussion on *viparyaya* Ny. kandālī p. 180 l. 7.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: [It is removed], in as far as this removal means the separation from connection.

[Opponent]: If I should say: but it, [the impression of silver], is still apparent in our intellection?

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Truly, it is apparent, but apparency does not allow removal, since it is [so]; neither does an apparent object become unapparent, because it is objective. But silver, although not existent, is shown in a certain place as if existent by an intellection; the separation [from connection] now consists in the propounding of that to which the intellection gave rise as clearly contradictory [to real facts].

[Opponent]: What hindrance is there for the intellection of silver, when the non-existence of silver has been realised? For this [intellection of silver] is not active in causing the permanence of silver, but merely in making it manifest. And this [manifestation] has been brought about by that [intellection], when arising. This is settled. But how does it become refuted (*bādhyate*)?

[Vaiṣeṣika]: When we realise the non-existence of the silver, then the real nature of this intellection about the silver, namely its untrustworthiness, is realised; and so there is an obstruction of it.

[Opponent]: But *bādha* is then the removal of results (fruit, *phala*), for when the non-equivalence of an intellection is realised, then it forms no more a part of practical behaviour (*vyavahāra*).

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Do not [say] thus. For the removal of the object causes immediately the removal of its *phala*, but intellection does not in every case relate to results, for when it, dependent [as it is] on man's desires, does not produce [results], then it comes to an end in *upekṣā-samvitti* (i. e. a state of consciousness, consisting in indifference). But also there, where a wish for result exists, (since the fruit is directly bound to the object, and the object to the knowledge) the removal of the object — and not the removal of the *phala* — will amount to the annulment of an intellection, because [this annulment] follows immediately on the removal of the object.

This has been extensively explained in the Saṃgraha-tīkā.

30. *Refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine upholding that buddhi is a separate organ whose states (vṛttis) relate to the objects.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 172 l. 3.

In order to refute the Sāṃkhya doctrine, [PRAṢASTAPĀDA] says:

„*buddhir*” &c., i. e. *buddhi* is that of which the given [termini *upalabdhi*, *pratyaya*, *jñāna*] are synonyms.

As to the exposition, given [by the Sāṃkhya], we must reject it, because it is not based on experience (*pratityabhāvāt*). The [stream of states of consciousness] which has origination and annihilation for qualities in accordance with either acceptance or rejection of objects, is one, — the abode of this [stream] is the second, by the causality of which activity or non-activity arise; — these two are experienced; but no third form [such as an intellect-organ besides soul].

And as to [your notion]: „a function of *buddhi*”, is this something else than *buddhi*, or is it identical? — It is not something else, because [you] accept the absolute identity (*tādātmya*) between function and that which functions.<sup>1)</sup> And if it be not different, then since [every function] is one with *buddhi* and consequently its functions which have the forms of the objects are mutually one, the notions „three, four &c.” would be difficult to obtain, because no consciousness which distinguishes one from the other, would exist about any form and because the *puruṣa* knows the forms only so as they are offered to the *buddhi*.

As has been said [by a previous opponent of the Sāṃkhya doctrine]: „the *puruṣa* experiences the *buddhi*, thus when there is manifoldness of functions, there is manifoldness of *buddhi*, and its oneness is rejected; [in other words: *buddhi* is not one organ, but it is the manifoldness of internal experiences]”. — Thus the refutation must be carried out.

### 31. *Tarka and Prasāṅga*.<sup>2)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 173 l. 22.

But if you do not accept *tarka* (conjecture; reduction to absurdity), then you should neither make use of *prasāṅga*, i. e. [the argumentation] showing something not wished-for by the opponent. For this [*prasāṅga*] really does not differ from *tarka*. And also the Vaiṣeṣikas apply *prasāṅga*.

[Opponent]: *Prasāṅga* is not a *hetu* (reason, probans), because it would give rise to such fallacies as *āśrayāsiddha* &c.

[Siddhāntin]: We answer to this: Is *tarka* the insight into the non-existence [i. e. the falsity] of the opponent's opinion (*parapakṣa*),

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book IV section VII table C n°. 13 and 14.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. Nyāya-kandalī p. 197 l. 16.

or is it the founding of one's own opinion (*svapakṣa*)? In the first case (A) the argumentation is as follows:

If the intellection [which may be expressed in the words]:

„if the knower [i. e. the soul] were not eternal,

then could neither *saṃsāra* nor liberation exist”

were untrustworthy (*apramāṇa*), then no ascertaining of the non-existence [or falsity] of the opponent's opinion [which defends the transiency of soul] would take place: because the ascertainment of anything by means of an untrustworthy source of knowledge is unfit. And this [*tarka*] would not be applied at all in this case, because no distinction of objects takes place. But on the other hand, if the non-existence of the opponent's opinion (*vipakṣa* = *parapakṣa*) results from it, then [*tarka*] is a *pramāṇa* and must be classified under [the trustworthy means of knowledge such as] perception and the rest. This must be acknowledged by you, even against your wish.

*Prasāṅga* also is the announcement of a contradiction, that is to say: the exposition of some contradictory argument which is more powerful [than the one adduced by the opponent]. And what is *tarka* else than such a contradictory argumentation and the formula expressing it?

In the second case (B) when *tarka* is considered as a notion which contains the foundation of one's own opinion, [I lay down the question]: What is the cause of its arising? Not the argumentation [directly] proving one's own opinion, for this is [when we talk of a *tarka*] not applied. For only after the subject has been discriminated by means of *tarka*, the proof for one's own opinion can commence; and if this should be the cause of that, then we clearly get entangled in *anyonācraiyatva* (mutual dependence of propositions).

[Opponent]: If I should say: After the non-existence of the adversary's opinion being proved, the founding of one's own opinion arises; thus the notion of the non-existence of the *vipakṣa* is its cause?

[Siddhāntin]: Then it would be an argumentation with the non-existence of the opponent's opinion as a probans; because when two opinions are mutually opposed, then the contradiction of the one will necessarily lead to the affirmation of the other. And this indeed takes place, in those cases where it [i. e. the *tarka*] decides about an object „this is just so”, but [as an rule] it only allows one of two qualities, but does not decide. Neither is [*tarka*] doubt, because there is no clinging to both alternatives. So then also in daily life

people will say: „So I surmise”, in consequence of their upholding a fitness [of the object]. Where the *vipakṣa* [i. e. the opponent's opinion] is non-existent, there arises the other of the two opinions: - but where the *vipakṣa* is existent, there the other opinion will not come forward: thus the *tarka* (reduction to absurdity) showing the positive agreement and the exclusion, demonstrating the non-existence of the *vipakṣa*, is a trustworthy means of knowledge in the matter, previously quoted, and gives us the certainty: „this [knower, the soul] will have non-origination [or eternity] for its property”, „this matter is [to use our other expression] ‘fit’ for the ascertainment of that”; it makes us apperceive the fitness for trustworthiness (*pramāṇayogyatva*) of the object; therefore it [*tarka*] is an inference. So then it fosters inference, because it contains the notion of fitness [with reference to *anumāna*], because it is a cause for using a trustworthy source of knowledge. But otherwise, [scil.] when considered as a founding [of one's own opinion] it is useless and in itself untrustworthy, because it does not form a part of ascertainment or of perception, in as far as the analysis of an object is done by this refuting argument [*bādhakapramāṇa*] which shows the non-existence of the *vipakṣa*.

### 32. Discussion of *Viparyaya* (illusion).<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 180 l. 7.

[Opponent]: Some say with reference to this topic: wrong intellection (*viparyaya*) does not exist, because its cause is lacking; and again this absence [of the cause] [results] from the fact that the innate nature of the sense-organ lies in producing equivalent knowledge.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: If I should say: the sense-organs also produce un-equivalent knowledge, in consequence of a disturbance of the organic humours (*doṣa*).

[Opponent]: No, [you are wrong], because the disturbance of the humours only causes the destruction of power (*śakti*). And a sense-organ, conjoined to mother of pearl, and having its power obstructed by the humours, does not grasp the generality: mother of pearl; but neither does it make manifest silver which is not in our vicinity; for the unwished-for consequence would be that the disturbed humours possessed the character of latent impressions. Moreover, if the eye perceives an object, which is not perceptible,

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. GAṆGĀNĀTHA JIḤ, *The Prābhākara School* p. 28 &c. *Saṅgholāl Lectures* p. 51 &c.

[like the silver which is not in our neighbourhood], then nothing would prevent anybody from perceiving anything. That the intellection: „this is silver”, would have the mother of pearl for its objective foundation, is contradictory to consciousness. For that object which becomes apparent in a certain intellection, is the objective foundation of that intellection and in the intellection about silver it is silver which becomes manifest, and not mother of pearl; and in the case of somebody who has never comprehended silver, its erroneous perception instead of mother of pearl does not occur, therefore the act of consciousness has the mother of pearl for its object. [And in the expression: „this is silver”], „silver” is caused by the organic humours, and arises merely from latent impressions awakened by the becoming aware of something that is similar; it is a remembrance of silver in which the component part „that” [*tad* = expression of the past] is frustrated. Therefore these two contents of consciousness [this and silver] have different objects.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: To this we answer: if the intellection about silver has not the mother of pearl for its object, but if it is a remembrance of silver, then during that intellection the man desirous of silver, would act with reference to previously existing silver, but not in relation to the mother of pearl, because [it is a general rule that] remembrance makes us act in the place where the perception took place. And if you uphold the idea:

[Supposed opinion of the opponent]: The colour, [inherent] in the mother of pearl and common to silver, is grasped by the sense-organs; but not the special characteristic, scil. the generality ‘mother of pearl’. And by the remembrance of silver, [a remembrance] void of the designation ‘that’ [*tad* = belonging to the past] we only settle silver qua talis, not specified in spot of space. So then in consequence of the similarity between the things comprehended and remembered, between the comprehension and the remembrance, and in consequence of the not-grasping of difference one does not determinate this difference and begins to act in the place of the mother of pearl, thus accepting that mother of pearl and silver possess a common abode in the words: „this is silver”, -

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Neither is this fit, because we do not grasp the identity (*aviveka*). The grasping of the non-difference from silver is the cause of action for the man desirous of silver with reference to the mother of pearl; and not their similarity. On the other hand the grasping of difference [would be] the cause for abstaining from it. And when both [i. e. the grasping of the non-difference and the grasping of the difference] are lacking, then he neither

proceeds nor abstains; so it would be; but he does not necessarily enter into action, because the special nature [of the object] is lacking. And so then there would not be identity of abode, because the not-grasping of the non-difference [= identity] comes in as a cause (reason) for distinctness of abodes. Moreover the refuting notion, [expressed in the words]: 'this is not silver', and which arises at a time after the action, has [on your supposition] no force: [for] neither is the difference of mother of pearl and silver grasped, nor was there identity [previously] ascertained, so that it [now] can be negated.

[Opponent]: If I should say: this negation refers to the language-expression 'silver' with reference to mother of pearl, [an expression] called for by the not-grasping of difference.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: No, [you are wrong], because in consequence of the not-grasping of non-difference there is also possible an action towards a thing not having that designation. Moreover the action of the man, desirous of silver, happens in the spot of the mother of pearl. And [the notion, expressed in the words:] 'this is silver', is a notion [of which the objects] possess a common abode; and further the refuting notion aims at the denial of silverness of the thing which still bears this-ness (*idantā*). Therefore I understand it as follows: the sense-organ, conjoined with the mother of pearl, accompanied by the organic humours (*doṣa*) as an auxiliary and assisted by the latent impression of silver, follows the similarity and effectuates [in our mind] the apprehension of silver, which [apprehension] has the mother of pearl for its object. And as to what has been said:

[Quotation of a thesis, previously laid down by the opponent]: [The idea] that the mother of pearl is the objective foundation, is contradictory to experience (*anubhava*).

[Vaiṣeṣika]: This too is unfit, because also the piece of mother of pearl appears to us as an abode of a [certain spot of] place which is limited by this-ness (*idantā*), and as characterised by lustre (*cākyacakya*); the meaning of an objective foundation comes to this: that a thing is fit for practical conduct, such as abandoning &c.; and this [practical conduct] is possible in this case. Moreover also [that philosopher] who accepts practical procedure towards the designation (*vyavahāra*) of silver in the case of mother of pearl, in consequence of the non-grasping of difference — he also must accept wrong notion (*viparyaya*), because the practical procedure towards the designation of 'this' (*tad*) for a non-this (*atat*) is a form of wrong notion. And as to that [which you have said]:

[Quotation of a proposition, previously brought forward by the opponent]: disturbances of the organic humours are the cause of the obstruction of power.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Neither does this mean anything, because we see that the humours (*dhātus*), vitiated by a disturbance of organic wind, &c. cause other diseases [than optical illusion]. — And as for [your argument concerning] „the omniscience of anybody about anything”, this is excluded by the limited power of the organic disturbances. — And neither because intellection falls short now and again with reference to an object, will there be nowhere a recovering of breath, because we do not see that the disturbances of humours remain being causes of obstructions (*bādhā*) in the case of those who examine with exertion, and because, when the non-existence [of the thing supposed] has been proved and the non-existence [i. e. non-reliability] of the illusion has been settled, we arrive at acquiescence.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: And if you do not accept ‘wrong notion’, what have you to say about the intellection of two moons?

[Opponent]: This appearance of twoness [belongs] to a couple of intellections, originating from particles of eye-rays, which, coexistent with the disturbances of the humours, fall on the moon after separating from each other.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: No, [you are wrong], because we do not grasp with our eye [twoness as] a quality of intellection. And if you accept:

[Supposed proposition of the opponent]: A quality of an intellection, grasped as referring to a knowable (*jñeya*), is grasped by the sense-organ which grasps the knowable,

[Vaiṣeṣika]: then illusion (*bhrānti*) would be required by you, because there takes place the grasping of the quality of a certain thing [A] in another thing [B].

Now enough of such furious Ćrotriya-brahmans as these; let us stop here.

On the basis of the theory of those who deny the existence of illusion, by arguing:

[Opponent]: when the notion of silver arises with reference to mother of pearl, then an objective transcendental (*alaukika*) silver is perceived,

[Vaiṣeṣika]: there would be no practical procedure (*pracṛtti*) in the case of such intellection, as we do not become aware of any transcendental [object] which is the cause of an act (*arthakriyā*).



33. Concrete and vague perception.<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 189 l. 13:

Some declare perception to be only concrete (*savikalpaka* i. e. not vague), because by its character of determinateness (*vyavasāya*) every one is capable of acting, and also because animals, although unable to utter words, are active owing to the distinction [in their perception] of objects.

Against those people [PRAṢASTAPĀDA] says „*svārūpalocanamātram*”, i. e. [perception] which only contains the perceiving of the innate nature. This means nearly as follows: „mere perception void of distinction, mere grasping.” For when the grasping of the innate nature of the object by means of vague perception (*nirvikalpaka*) is not accepted, then neither can concrete perception exist, for there would be no remembrance of the word which denotates [the innate nature of the object]. Therefore any one who upholds concrete perception, must necessarily accept vague [perception].

And this [concrete perception] does not only grasp the generality, because also difference becomes manifest in it; neither only the individual nature, because also the form (*ākāra*) of the generality becomes an object of consciousness and because recollection takes place at the sight of another individual [object]. But it grasps both: generality and difference. For if, on the other hand, one does not become conscious [of a thing] whilst at the same time distinguishing „this is the generality, and that the difference (peculiarity)”, it would not be possible to examine it in comparison with another object; the generality, namely, is distinguished by perceiving the concordance with other individual things; the difference by perceiving the disagreement; this is the distinction.

In the case of vague perception the two [described] qualities: concordance and disagreement with reference to generality and peculiarity, are not grasped, because an examination in comparison with other individual objects does not take place, and since these two qualities are not grasped, no distinctive comprehension (*vicīcya grahaṇam*) takes place. [This vague perception] is the grasping of the innate nature, because this [grasping] is not dependent [on other psychical factors]. So then this vague perception does not enter upon the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* between generality, peculiarity and individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*); since this relation is based on the notion of difference (*bheda*), whereas vague perception does

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book IV section VII table E.

not contain any conception (*adhyavasāya*) of mutual difference between generality &c. But concrete perception embraces the characterisation (*rūpatā*) [of the object] by generality and peculiarity, for such notions occur, owing to the [activity of the] sense-organs and to the soul which reflects on other things, [similar to the one perceived] and which becomes conscious of the two qualities: „concordance” and „disagreement”.

The Saugatas, however, say:

[Buddhist]: The vague perception (*nirvikalpaka*) with reference to the objects is an appearance [before the mind] which affords concordance and disagreement in respect to the individual objects (*svalakṣaṇa*); therefore this is merely perception, and *savikalpaka* is not perception, because this [*savikalpaka*] which owes its birth to latent impressions (*vāsanās*) and does not possess an appearance obeying the object, is illusionary (*bhrānta*) with reference to the object, just like the intellection about hairs [which seem to move before our eyes] &c....<sup>1)</sup>

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Why do you say that concrete perception is no trustworthy source of knowledge about an object? For in the intellection „this is a pot”, we become conscious of an object (*padārtha*), well defined, characterised by its „shell-neck”, and different from all other things.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: distinctness (*vikalpa*) is a mental appearance which is not originated from the object; therefore the conception (*adhyavasāya*) of the object is illusionary. As has been said:

Distinction, since it does not harmonise with the [immediate] impression made by the object, is an [illusionary] projection.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: No, because there is harmony [between this *savikalpaka* and our later impressions], when we are going to act.

[Buddhist]: Why, distinction (*vikalpa*) which originates from the first impression (*anubhava*) and whose own appearance is projected in accordance with the nature of the object, conceals the difference between the individual nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) [of the object] and its own phenomenality, and thus directs man towards the spot of the individual thing; and in this way causes harmony (*saṃvāda*) to arise, in as far as we reach the object by its indirectly being connected with the object, so as the knowledge of the jewel is [connected with the jewel], when the lustre of the jewel shines forth [and is recognised by the expert].

<sup>1)</sup> Here is left out the translation of 190, 8—15, containing a gloss on the Bhāṣya.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: But when distinction is not in touch with the object, how is it then that it projects its own appearance in accordance with the nature (*ātmatā*) of that [object]? For as long as the bundle of rays of light which are reflected by [the air resting on] the soil of the desert is not perceived, we do not see the projection of water, localised in that [spot]. Distinction, now, which follows in the steps of perception, makes the object manifest to us; otherwise a man, wishing for the practical efficiency [of an object], could not act according to its distinctive intellection (*vikalpa*). Ergo [*vikalpa*] is a trustworthy means of knowledge with reference to the object, since it is the cause of a harmonising notion. And if you would uphold:

[Supposed objection of the Buddhist]: that *kṣāṇa* which is grasped by the perception, is not conceived (*adhyavasita*) by the distinctive intellection (*vikalpa*); and that *kṣāṇa* which is conceived by the distinctive intellection, is not striven for by the activity:

[Vaiṣeṣika]: [then we answer, whilst accepting for the sake of dispute your theory of *kṣāṇas*, as follows]: there is no harmony (or mutual confirmation) with reference to the *kṣāṇas*, because they possess a momentary existence. But such a *kṣāṇa* as was grasped by perception, such a one is conceived by *vikalpa*; and such a *kṣāṇa* as was conceived by *vikalpa*, such a one is striven for by activity; thus if we abstract from the non-identity, there is a mutual confirmation with reference to an object A, excluded as it is from the non-A.

[Buddhist]: Even then *vikalpa* is an untrustworthy source of knowledge, because we grasp that which has already been grasped (*gr̥hitagrahitrād*), because an object, as described, is grasped merely by perception.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: But *vikalpa* owes its origin to a probantial mark (*lūga*) and it is a trustworthy means of knowledge, because it causes us to obtain the individual object which [it is true] was already obtained by another trustworthy means of knowledge.

[Buddhist]: Just as little does this hold good. For neither is there exclusion of a *kṣāṇa* from something else, nor do we grasp by means of perception a common form of it — [scil. a form A, common to *kṣāṇa* a1, *kṣāṇa* a2 &c.] which is objectively unreal and merely projected — in regard to its exclusion from something else which may be called its non-existence. The comprehensible (*gr̥h̥ya*), namely, may be defined by its being a cause [of our first perception]; and that which is objectively unreal, is void of any practical efficiency. But the *kṣāṇa* which is absolutely existent,

is the object of our perception, because it is capable of practical efficiency; and also, as I have already said, it does not exist any more at the time of the distinctive intellection. How then can there be oneness of the object [in the case of the *kṣāṇa*, perceived, conceived and striven for]?

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Let us, however, accept that there is one single object of perception and distinctive intellection, an object possessing a form (not to be considered now) and allowing confirmation in the course of activity; in that case also distinctive intellection does not transgress the limits of a trustworthy means of knowledge, because in the circumscription of the object it is not dependent on the precedent [intellections], just as [little as] this is the case with streamlike intellection [*dhārācāhikabuddhi*, i. e. a series of intellections, all referring to one object and arising when our attention remains fixed upon a certain object for a certain time], and because it is able to direct us towards the object, conceived (*adhyavasita*). And whilst its trustworthiness remains, it would be simply perception through the non-existence of the probantial mark &c. [Further it is a trustworthy source of knowledge], because it brings about a concordance and disagreement dependent on object and sense-organ. As for the fact that this [*savikalpaka*], although born from the object, does not arise from the mere approach of the sense-organs [towards the objects], this [must be explained] from the fact that the remembrance of the denoting word, which is the auxiliary of sense-organ and object, is lacking [in the case of *nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam*].

[Buddhist]: If I should say: distinctive intellection, immediately following on remembrance, is born from remembrance and not from sense-organ and object, because these are both concealed (frustrated) by the remembrance.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: How, dear sir, the auxiliary of an existent thing frustrates the power of the [thing's] innate nature! But how [can you then explain] the importance of the seed, frustrated as it is by earth and water, for the arising of the sprout?

[Buddhist]: If I should say: what help can sense-organ and object receive from the remembrance of the word, and even in such a way that the latter becomes the auxiliary of the two former?

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Just as the distinctive intellection, in its origination follows positively and negatively object and sense-organ, so does it with reference to remembrance; and consequently remembrance is an auxiliary for sense-organ and object in this way that these two, apart, do not produce an effect, but do so by taking remem-

brance as an auxiliary. For on the occasion of our refuting the *kṣaṇabhāṅga* we rejected the theory that auxiliaries do not add any surplus to the innate nature [of a thing].

[Buddhist]: Let us leave this alone. — Perception is void of fiction (*kalpanā*). Concrete perception (*sarvikalpaka*), now, is a fictive intellection, and therefore not a trustworthy means of knowledge with reference to an object. And what is this fiction? (A) One [form of it] is the intellectual act consisting in the addition of the word [to the first object-impression]; and (B) the second consisting in the addition of an object[ive fact], is the fiction which grasps [the object] as *viśiṣṭa* (characterised).

This [*kalpanā-jñāna*, fictive intellection] is not allowable, because distinctive intellection (*vikalpa*) may not be admitted.

(A) Does the intellectual act consisting in the addition of the word [to the first object-impression] cause a conjunction between the word and the object (I), or is this [intellectual act] conjoined itself with the word [II]? And if it brings about a conjunction between word and object, does it then give to the object the nature of the word (Ia), or does it grasp the [object] coloured as it were by the *ākāra* of the word (Ib), or finally does it denotate [the object] by means of the word (Ic).

In the first place (Ia) the intellectual act (or: notion, *pratiti*) does not give to the object the nature of the word, because the object appears also to distinctive intellection in its own innate form which was grasped by *nirvikalpaka*, and because it [still] affords practical efficiency; otherwise it would be impossible for [two men], the expert [whose intellection is distinctive] and the unexperienced, to simultaneously apply their exertions to the same object.

But (Ib) does [the intellectual act] grasp the object, coloured by the *ākāra* of the word? Neither does this hold good, because we do not become aware of that. When the object is grasped by vague perception, then the word which denotates it and which itself was formerly perceived, is remembered, because one understands its correspondance (*pratīyogitva*) [with the object]; and this [word], brought to consciousness (*rūḍha*) by remembrance and having the [object] for its meaning, delimits the object; but we do not comprehend the object coloured by the *ākāra* of the word, like a crystal coloured blue [by reflecting a flower placed in its vicinity]; because the word is not visible [like the object, but audible], and because only the object [in distinctive intellection] appears under the aspect of this-ness as vague intellection does [whereas the remembered word shows to us the aspect of that-ness]. And when a denotation is remem-

bered, then the word [used for it] does not destroy the innate nature [of the thing], so that this, in spite of its conjunction with the sense-organ, does not obtain perceptibility. As has been said:

„The denotation, when remembered, does not annihilate the perceptibility; for it stands on the „shore” [on the side] of the person using the denotation [and not on the side of the object], and is not capable of hiding the form [of the object].”

And neither (II) can we be satisfied with the opinion, that the intellectual act (*pratīti*), combined with the word, points out the object. For the soul is a conscious being; it possesses, namely, the power of arranging [the impressions given]; and [this soul] remembering the denotating word, experienced at the time of *saṃketa* [i. e. at the time when a certain word was chosen for a certain thing], points out the object by means of it, scil. [in the formula]: „this is a pot” — [the soul does all this], but not the intellectual act, because this lacks the power of arranging [the psychological impressions]. Thus [in concluding] we may state in the first place that the intellectual act does not cause any conjunction of the word [with the object]. But secondly [II] this [act] itself is not conjoined with the word, because it is not possible that an intellection and its unseparable form, — momentary and without general properties and consequently without any possible *saṃketa* as they both are — could be connected with a word; and also because a word which denotates an [external] object, does not denotate an intellection which itself refers to an object and is distinguished from this. And if you think:

[Opinion, attributed by the Buddhist to his opponent]: The distinctive intellection has for its object the thing, combined with the word [Ic]; and the thing, after being thus combined, is denotated by the word.

[Buddhist]: [Then we answer]: for whichever thing the *saṃketa* (conventional choice) of the word [was made], [merely] for that thing the *saṃketa* of the word [is available]; [namely] for that which is non-momentary and general and is not of an individual character. The thought, truly, has the individual thing for its object; and the form which has the thought for its contents, is general and non-momentary. And the [supposed] externality of the thought-form (*bodhākāra*) is nothing else than the thought-form and is not common [to two sides: to object and thought]; neither is generality objective, because it does not admit of examination (*vicāra*). Thus whilst the forms belonging [to our ideas] have been projected under the aspect of externality by our distinctive intel-

lections in the different cases, and <sup>1)</sup> whilst we conceive the mutual differences by which [one thing] is excluded from the other, the *saṃketa* of the word [takes place] with reference to this projected oneness. This result has been obtained inevitably by the aid of trustworthy means of knowledge. Thus distinctive intellection (*vikalpa*), in as far as proceeding with reference to something that is false and connected with words, gives rise to the fancy (*vikalpayati*) of a non-existent object. This now is *kalpanājñāna* (fictive intellection). As has been said:

That form which appears in it [scil. in fiction, *kalpanā*],  
as exterior, as one, as excluded from another, — it is  
without truth, since it does not make part of [i. e. since it  
does not allow] examination.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: To this we answer: If [you understand by] the term *kalpanā* (fictive intellection) the fact that we grasp [an object] characterised by generality, whilst [at the same time] objective generality does not exist, then *kalpanā* is really a reference to a non-existent thing, but it is not the grasping of an object, combined with a word. In this case if we could be taught [the objective existence of] generality by means of a *pramāṇa*, then distinctive intellection, which has this [generality] for its object — whilst it also grasps [the object] combined with the word — would be merely perception, because it is born from sense-organ and object.

That which gives an impression of immediateness (*aparokṣābhāsi*), is perception,

like indistinctive (vague) perception,

and also distinctive intellection gives the impression of immediateness.

Here the *parokṣatva* (the non-immediateness, the character of being secondary) of intellections is pervaded (*vyāpta*) by the not being born from the sense-organs and objects as in inference, but the being born from the sense-organs and objects, as contradictory to the not being from sense-organs and objects, is perceived in vague intellection, because it is of a suchlike essence. Thus there is an experience about a fact contradictory to the pervader (*vyāpaka*) in negative instances (*vipakṣa*).

[Buddhist]: If I should say:

That which is based on remembrance, is non-perception;

like the intellection in inference;

and distinctive intellection is based on remembrance.

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *bheda-bhūy*. Cf. Ny.-kand. p. 193 l. 1 & 2.

Thus there also exists an inference in behalf of your opponent's view (*pratipakṣānumāna*).

[Vaiṣeṣika]: If it is somewhere ascertained that [as I have said in my inference, *aparokṣatva* proves] *pratyakṣatva*, then there is no denial of this with reference to distinctive intellection, because [your] denial was preceded by [my] affirmation. And this [*pratyakṣatva*] is seen [somewhere, scil.] in vague perception.

[Buddhist]: How is it seen?

[Vaiṣeṣika]: If I should say: by the inference stating that sense-organs and objects are of such an essence.

[Buddhist]: Then, whilst trustworthiness is accepted for the inference, [mentioning] the having such an essence and [which is supposed] to prove the *pratyakṣatva* (perceptual character), then also the inference for the denial of *pratyakṣatva* receives force, [an inference] which resides in that which is contradictory to [your thesis]; and this is refuted by it, so as [there is contradiction in the expression]: a soundless sound.

Thus the distinctive intellection is not an intellectual act which is defined by a conjoining [of object or intellectual act itself] with word. And whilst thus fictive intellection (*kalpanā*) is defined by conjoining with an object, yet it does not grasp [the object] as characterised<sup>1)</sup> [B], since the *viśeṣaṇa* (characteriser), the *viśeṣya* (the thing to be characterised) and their relation — a relation [namely] as that between *vyavacchedaka* (the circumlimiting) and *vyavacchedya* (the circumlimited) — are not objective.<sup>2)</sup> Intellection grasps the object and [this takes place] owing to the contact between object and sense-organ; the [intellection] arises such as the object is: but it is not active after an examination with reference to the object.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: The intellection [concerning an object] as characterised, is [that which we call] examination; [it may be formulated]: „this is the characteriser (*viśeṣaṇa*), this the thing to be characterised (*viśeṣya*), this the relation between both of them.” And in daily life, when we talk of „the man with the stick” and do not talk of „the stick with the man”, this is what happens: first we examine them separately, then we combine [these two ideas] into one, and grasp it: „the man with the stick”.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: If the state of the thing as characterised be objective, then the characterised intellection (*viśiṣṭajñāna*)

1) Cf. Ny.-kāṇḍaḥ p. 191 l. 24 and here p. 447.

2) Read: *avāstavyatā*.



would arise at first. But if this be not the case, then the [object's] state as characterised is not in accordance with the innate nature, but it is formed by „*apāhīś*”.<sup>1)</sup> This characterised intellection is fictive intellection.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: The following is difficult for you to refute. The soul, namely, after having grasped the particularities &c. one by one, arranges them and thus understands the characterised state [of the object] with the aid of the sense-organs, but the intellection, which lacks consciousness, does not do this, because it has no power of putting [facts] together and is no longer active after once having stopped. The object is characterised (*vaiśiṣṭa*) on account of its relation towards the characteriser. And at first it is not grasped by the sense-organ as such, because the grasping of the particularities &c. which should be the auxiliary, is lacking; but when once these particularities &c. are grasped, then [the characterised nature of the object] is grasped. Thus characterised intellection is merely born from the object and the sense-organs. And it is difficult to admit that perception does not exist in consequence of a fault, to wit, on account of its being characterised intellection. — Thus we may stop.

#### 34. *Pratyakṣa śarmapratyakṣa*.<sup>2)</sup>

Nyāya-kandālī p. 194 l. 13.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: We do not admit that there is perception of action (movement): for nothing save conjunction and separation is perceived in a moving object. The notion: „this is moving” has reference to (is based on) an action which is inferred from conjunction and separation.

[Siddhāntin]: This is without value. If action is imperceptible and is to be inferred from conjunction and separation, then action is inferred in reference to both seats [of inherence] in as far as separation and conjunction are located in both. When, however, a monkey goes from the root to the bough and from the bough to the root, the notion: „this goes” does not arise in the tree as well, though it is a substrate of continual conjunctions and separations. And if the theory is put forward:

„The inference of activity in the tree is not made, because it is impossible for the conjunctions of the monkey with [different

1) Cf. the use of the term in the Sāṃkhya system.

2) G. S. ANANDA JAY, *The Prabhākara School* p. 91.

spots of] (physical) space &c. to arise from a movement which inheres in the tree",

then [I answer: we have to admit that] a second action exists in the monkey, which action causes the conjunctions with other spots; but the acceptance of movement in the tree does not succeed; because of the general rule: in the thing in which the effect inheres, in that thing the cause inheres. If we should allow an exception to this rule in one case, where have we to stop in others?

[Purvapakṣin]: If I should answer: the admittance of the two movements [in the monkey] is not allowable, because through the inferred action, inhering in the monkey, there arise the separation and conjunction of the monkey both in regard to the tree and to different spots?

[Siddhāntin]: This is not so. For where a probans (*līṅga*) is observed to be impeded, there it obliges us to accept the [existence of the] impediment: [in other words: the absurd consequence of the stationary tree moving refutes your theory]. For the whole drift of inference comes to this: no violation of this could ever occur by things going otherwise, just as [little as in the case of] *arthāpatti*. Nor is the [probans, used by you] — so as man is — a conscious principle which could act according to a motive [and circumstances]. [In other words: human will is free, but reasoning follows strict canons]. When you adduce conjunctions and disjunctions with one spot of (physical) space as reasons for inferring movement, then [I answer]: it is not possible to adduce [such reasons], since the separations and conjunctions of things abiding in the supersensuous (physical) space are not perceptible. If the movement is to be inferred from a series of separations and conjunctions with one spot of the earth, then the movement of a bird flying in the air would surpass human notion. If one would adduce as reasons for the movement the series of conjunctions and disjunctions with the multitude of lightbeams expanded in (physical) space, then no foundation would exist for the sensation of movement which sometimes in darkness is suddenly and involuntarily experienced by some one through the influence of wind [i. e. wind as one of the humours of the body], whilst his limbs tremble and he himself makes the statement: „my hand is moving, my eyebrow contracts“, a sensation which arises in the sense-organ of skin, subject to [the action of] the internal organ and the unseen [quality of soul]. And how could you explain the notion of „movement“ with reference to a flash of lightning, abiding only for one moment, at night, amidst the darkness of great clouds?

35. *Polemics against an opponent who denies a special perception of yogins.*

Nyāya-kandālī p. 197 l. 9.

[Siddhāntin]: With reference to that which has been said:

[Quotation of the opponent's view]: The yogins do not behold objects which surpass the limits of our senses,  
because they are living beings,  
as we and others;

[Siddhāntin]: this inference is *siddhasādhana* (an unnecessary trial for proving something which is already known), if it is upheld with regard to ordinary men (*paraśamātra*). — An extraordinary man is denied by one of the two parties (*paraśyāsiddhaḥ*).<sup>1)</sup> — And if [such a special species of man] were known, then your inference would be refuted (*viruddha*) by a *pramāṇa* which embraces the *dharmin* (the object of which the quality is to be proven). [Thus your inference is at all events a fallacy, either a *siddhasādhana*, or a *paraśyāsiddhaḥ*, or a *viruddhaḥ*].

[Opponent]: To this we answer: this [argumentation of yours] proceeds by *prasaṅga*<sup>2)</sup> [i. e. by supposition, specially a supposition leading to absurd consequences]. Now a proof by means of *prasaṅga* does not tend the proving of one's own view, but only at the reaching some result, not desired by the antagonist. This result (*paraśyāniṣṭaṃ*) can be obtained by means of qualities which necessarily ensue from the [opponent's] admission (*abhyaṅgama*). But in this process of investigation we must not reflect on our own view. For one [of two disputants] may not debate in this way: „These qualities &c. of yours are unproven (*asiddha*), but I neither enter [positively] upon those which I myself accept (*svasiddha*).”

[Defendent]: To this I answer: is a *prasaṅgānumāna* an inference (*anumāna*) or something else? If it is something else [than the forms of inference which are known], its inclusion in [the general form of] *pramāṇa* should be described or any other definition should be given. But if it is a mere *anumāna*, then it proceeds on the basis of one's own opinion, since every *parārthānumāna* aims at effecting a conviction (*niścaya*) in others, as it exists in ourselves. Otherwise such a [fallacious] inference as:

The lotus, grown in the sky, is fragrant,  
because it is a lotus,  
as the lotus, grown in the pleasure-pond;

1) Cf. here book IV section IV table F sub b n°. 1, 2.

2) Cf. Ny. Kandālī p. 173 l. 22 here p. 436.

would be trustworthy, if it were *siddhācraṇa*<sup>1)</sup> by consent of our antagonist, [but our own logical conscience prohibits its *siddhācraṇa*].

[Let us now return to the inference, originally upheld by you: „*yogino 'tindriṅārthadrasṭāro na bhavanti*” &c.]: [your probantia], such as the possession of life, possess an uncertain pervasion [*saṇḍigdhaḥyāptayaḥ*].<sup>2)</sup> What objection can be raised, if an extraordinary man, whose existence is the object of our investigation, were to possess life &c. as well as omniscience? For no contradiction is seen between these two qualities, in as far as omniscience is no object of any other means of knowledge [than of itself (?) or than of the inference, given formerly by me, cf. Ny. kandalī 196, 18]. The [necessary] concomitance of *prāṇitva* and non-omniscience is, however, uncertain. For we cannot settle the dilemma: is non-omniscience dependent on *prāṇitva* &c. of people like us, or is it effectuated by the non-existence of merit, born from *yoga*. [a merit] which is acknowledged to be the cause of omniscience. Therefore the *prāṇitva* &c. [given by you as a probans], since its pervasion is uncertain, is not fit for an inference.

[Remark]: „Merit, born from *yoga*, is a cause of knowledge which surpasses the sense-organs”, this is uncertain? Why, because of its absence [in ourselves]....

### 36. *Prakaraṇasama* ḡ *Kālātyayāpadīṣṭa*.<sup>3)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 202 l. 14.

[The two fallacies, termed] *prakaraṇasama* and *kālātyayāpadīṣṭa* are included in the *anaikāntika* (or more-sided fallacy). For the *prakaraṇasama* takes place in a *sādhya*dharmīn [i. e. an object, a quality of which remains to be proved], whilst the *vipakṣa* is uncertain [i. e. whilst the probans, may or may not occur in counter-examples],<sup>4)</sup> and the *kālātyayāpadīṣṭa* in a *sādhya*dharmīn, whilst the *vipakṣa* is ascertained [i. e. although the quality, considered to be the probans, occurs in the counter-examples].

The following is [the definition, given by Nyāya Sūtra I, 4, 47, of the] *prakaraṇasama*:

„That [reason] which is employed with the view of determining

1) Cf. here book IV section IV table F sub b n°. 1. 4.

2) ibidem sub b n°. II, 1.

3) Cf. here book II p. 311 letter *f* and p. 314 letter *g*.

4) Cf. book IV section IV table F sub b II.

[the state of the case], [but] from which a question arises concerning the *prakaraṇa*, is a *prakaraṇasama*."

[We may comment upon this as follows]:

*prakṛigale* = *prastūgale* (is made a topic of dispute). So then:

*prakaraṇa* = *pakṣa-pratipakṣa* (i. e. topic = views of defendant and opponent).

*taṇor cātā* = *cicārah* (question).

That [reason] now which gives rise to this question, [although employed with the view of determining the state of the case], is not fit for ascertaining one or the other of the two views, in consequence of the equality of these two views — [and this uncertainty remains] as long as the topic is thus equally balanced.

For instance:

[I] Sound is eternal,

because no transient quality is perceived in it.

[II] Sound is transient,

because no eternal quality is perceived in it.

Thus since there is doubt about the eternality or transiency of sound, in consequence of the non-perception of its eternal or transient quality, an open question on this point will exist: for if we could grasp one or the other of the two qualities, the truth would be settled and there would be no room left for any question. Here the non-perception of a transient quality, brought forward in order to ascertain the eternality [of sound] — not overcoming the opponent's view which is based on the non-perception of an eternal quality — is not sufficient for determination, because the [other view is an] obstacle. And this [reason, quoted by the defendant], residing in a *dharmīn* with a possible *pratipakṣa*, is a form of *anaikāntika*, in accordance with [the definition of this last fallacy]: „the [matter] is not decidedly placed on one side or the other."

Similarly the *kālātyagāpadīṣṭa* is a form of *anaikāntika*, for the [alleged reason]: 'the being a product' resides in the *vipakṣa*, whilst fire [i. e. the *dharmīn*] is proved to be warm by perception.<sup>1)</sup>

<sup>1)</sup> The inference, here referred to, runs thus:

*agṇiḥ anuśaṭh,*

*h, tatkaṭat,*

In this inference the thesis is already fallacious (cf. here book IV section IV table F sub a1). Leaving this out of sight, we may consider the argumentation to be based on:

I *gat kṛtakaṃ, tad anuṣṭam*

II *gat anuṣṭam, tad na kṛtakaṃ,*

[Opponent]: Your argumentation does not hold good. For when a probans is a factor leading to knowledge (*gamaka*) on this condition: 'that whilst penetrating the *pakṣa*, it exists in the *sapakṣa* and is excluded from the *vipakṣa*', then still the admission of a contrary view (*pratipakṣa*) with reference to the *sādhya**dharma* [i. e. the object the quality of which remains to be proved] is allowed; and similarly the probandum could be proved by a *prakarana**sama* [i. e. the defendant's argumentation against which an opponent brings in a reasoning of equal force], for in itself it is sufficient. But the [probandum] cannot be proved thus, for the doubt, suggested by the opponent's view, comes in. Consequently *gamakatva* [i. e. the sufficiency of the probans for leading to convincing knowledge] does not merely depend on the threefold character [of the probans. 1) its *pakṣavyāpakatva*, 2) its *sapakṣe bhāvaḥ*, 3) its *vipakṣād vyācchittiḥ*]. But the circumstance that there is no contradictory view must be posited as a fourth condition, because the probantial nature [of the probans] exists, when there is no *pratipakṣa*, and it does not exist, when there is.

Similar restrictions are to be made about the *kālātgyayāpalīṣa*. If the probantiality only should depend on the threefold character [of the probans], how would there be undecisiveness [in this argumentation]:

Lack of heat exists in fire,

because of its being a product.

But although fire is a product, still the lack of heat does not take place in it, for the ascertainment of heat originates from perception. Thus the arriving [at trustworthy knowledge] takes place, when there is no contradiction by perception, but when this occurs, then it does not. Thus the *abādhitaviśaya**tva* [i. e. the circumstance that the object is not refuted by perception] must again be accepted as a condition. Therefore it is said in other words:

A synonym of *pakṣa* [or *dharma*] is *sādhya* [i. e. probandum]; and a *sādhya* is to be defined as that which allows proof, but an object of which a *pratipakṣa* can be conceived, does not allow proof, in as far as a matter does not allow twofold aspect [scil. a negative and a positive aspect; — in other words: since the principle of the *tertium exclusum* has force].

[Defendant]: But here [we touch upon] a quality of an *apakṣa*

The latter hypothetical proposition, however, is not true: or as CĀNDĀRA says: 'the being a product, resides in the *apakṣa*'.

[i. e. a thing different from that whose quality remains to be proved]; and so, that which allows contradiction by perception &c. is not a *pakṣa*, because it is not possible to prove in one form [*rūpa*, e. g. in a form, arrived at by inference] that which has already been settled in another form [scil. a form, ascertained by perception].

So then these [two fallacies]: *prakaragrasana* and *kalūṭyagapādīṣṭa* are excluded by the total formula [of our text] *yaś cānuvācyeṇa sambaddham* [Praj. Bh. p. 200 l. 19], because they both rest on a fallacy of the *anuvācya*.<sup>1</sup>

### 37. *The exclusively positive probans 'anuvācī līṅga'*.<sup>2</sup>

Nyāya-kandālī p. 203 l. 15.

But is not this [definition of *līṅga*, given by PRAÇASTAPĀDA] wrong, in as far as it does not include all [legitimate forms of probantia]? The probans, namely, can be threefold: exclusively positive, exclusively negative, and positive-negative.

An [example of the] positive probans is the following:

Difference is expressible,  
because it is knowable,  
like generality.

For everything besides the *pakṣa* of this [positive probans] is *sapakṣa*, divided into existent and non-existent things: for, taking knowledge in general of any knower in general, there is nothing but which is expressible and knowable. And that which is unexpressible and unknowable for the [ordinary] man, is the non-existent, like the horn of a horse: and this [non-existent] would neither be *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*, because it is without innate nature. But that which is existent, is without exception *sapakṣa*, therefore the part of the definition: *adabdhāreṇa nāsty eva* (Praj. Bhāṣya p. 200 l. 20) is not applicable here, because *vyaṭireka* (exclusion) does not take place.

[Opponent]: If I should say, this [exclusively positive] probans is 'not leading to convincing knowledge' (*agamaka*)?

[Defendent]: No, [you are wrong], because no deviation from the positive agreement takes place. The positive agreement [which can be expressed in the words]: 'the existence of the one results from the existence of the other', is here a cause [of trustworthy knowledge]; and the notion of its deviation [in any case] is refuted

1. According to Nyāya-kandālī p. 200 l. 22, *anuvācya* = *dharma*. Thus *anuvācya* = *dharma* = *pakṣa*. Cf. Vidyabhūṣaṇa, Med. School p. 90 § 52.

2. Cf. here book II p. 323 &c. § 5.

as unadvisable <sup>1)</sup> [by our logical conscience]. First: there is positive agreement between *prameyatva* (knowableness) and *abhidheya* (expressibleness), because we experience *abhidheya* in all cases of *prameyatva*. And neither does a deviation occur, nor does [anybody] feel a doubt, for any object which a man brings into the region of his intellection, making it subject to his distinctions, and about which he wants to inform somebody else, falls under the region of *prameyatva* and *abhidheya*, and all things are in this respect equal to each other: for when there is no *vipakṣa* <sup>2)</sup>, non-deviation is a factor [required for right inference]; ergo not by the formula *vipakṣābhāvāt* does the *prameyatva* prove the *abhidheya*.

38. *The exclusively negative probans (vyatireki liṅgam).* <sup>3)</sup>

Nyāya-kandālī p. 204 l. 1.

An [example of the] exclusively negative probans is the following:

The living body possesses a soul,

because it possesses breath &c.

For everything besides the *pakṣa* of this [negative probans] is a *vipakṣa*. And still it is a correct probans, because the reserved [i. e. negative] relation holds good without exception.

In pots &c. we realise the universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) of absence of soul with absence of breath &c.; but in the living body it is perceived that absence of breath comes to an end: and through this <sup>4)</sup> insight [we arrive at] the inference concerning the extermination of the absence of soul — an absence which is pervaded by the insight [about the absence of breath &c.].

And if you reason as follows:

[Supposed argumentation of the opponent]: when an object is itself not perceived, then its exclusion [from anything] can neither be perceived, because a negation (*pratiṣedha*) must bear upon a positive fact (*sidhi*). Soul, now, is nowhere perceived, how then could we become aware of its exclusion from pots &c.?

[Defendent]: this is not fit. The exclusion [i. e. non-occurrence] of soul from [resp.: in] pots &c. is certain for the adversary (*para*) who upholds the absence of soul to be a common property of all things; and as for my self (*svaya*), after I have proved the causal relation (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*) of the soul in my living body with reference to its effects, such as intellections &c., I infer from the

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *aparatata*?

<sup>2)</sup> Read: *vipakṣa satya*.

<sup>3)</sup> Cf. here book II p. 523 &c. § 5.

<sup>4)</sup> *atpratitya*, in double construction with *vyāptasya* & *anumanam*.



absence of intellections &c. in pots &c. the non-existence [in these pots] of a relation with a particular soul, [a relation] which would be capable of producing the [mental states, indicated before], just as, when there is an absence of smoke somewhere, we may infer the absence of fire which is capable of its production. And if so, then soul is proved in [all] living bodies, because the notion of a relation is not possible without the notion about that which bears the relation.

[Opponent]: But then the argumentation by means of a negative [probans] is useless, because we fall into a procedure of applying a means to an action the result of which has been obtained.

[Defendent]: It is not thus; because soul, being proved as far as I am concerned, but not yet for another, remains still to be proved [for the sake of that adversary]. And there is no reason for this limitation: „a positive necessary concomitance is informative, but a negative necessary concomitance has no force.” So then also the [*vyatireki līṅgam*] may serve as a probans. Ergo the formula *prasiddham ca tadavivarte* (Praç. Bhāṣya p. 200 l. 19) is too narrow.

### 39. Conclusion to the passages on *anvayavi* & *vyatireki līṅgam*.

With reference to these difficulties some say: the exclusively positive and exclusively negative [probans] are included, because they are taught in [other writings of] the same school.

But others say: the definition [given by PRAÇASTAPĀDA] is to be explained as *vyasta-samasta* [i. e. first the parts of the definition must be taken separately as definitions, and finally the complete formula must be taken as such]. „*Anumeyena sambaddham, prasiddham ca tadavivarte*”, this is the definition of the *anvayavi* [*līṅgam*]. „*Anumeyena sambaddham, tadavivarte* [= *talabdhāre*, in Praçastapāda’s text] *ca nāsty eva*”, this is the definition of the *vyatireki* [*līṅgam*]. The total formula is a definition of the *anvayavi-vyatireki* [*līṅgam*]. The being a means for proving the probans, is a common characteristic for these three [probantia]: so as the common characteristic of trustworthy means of knowledge is their circumlimitation [of the objects] as they are.

### 10. *Avinābhāva*.<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandali p. 206 l. 17:

Well then, what is this non-deviation *avagabhicāra*, called necessary concomitance *avinābhāva*? What is it caused by?

1) Cf. here book IV section VII table E and *Museon* N.S. V. 1. 141.

The [Buddhists] answer: by identity and by causality. An accidental act can just as well take place as not take place: there is no cause for any limitation. Even when perception [of the *sādhya*] takes place in homogeneous instances, and non-perception in heterogeneous instances, no non-deviation can be known, because we cannot banish the doubt whether [the *sādhya*] may still reside in [some of the] heterogeneous instances.

But when we can settle the causal relation (*tādātmapatya*), then doubt is dispelled, as it is not possible to take hold of the nature of the effect without its cause. This determination of causality<sup>1)</sup> between effect and cause proceeds by means of five perceptions or non-perceptions of our sense-organ: (1) the non-perception of the effect before the arising [of the cause]; after (2) the perception of the cause (3) the perception [of the effect]; and, later on, this perceived [effect] — after (4) the non-perception of the cause — (5) is itself subject to non-perception; thus there are two non-perceptions [ $n^{\circ}$ . 1 & 5] and one perception [ $n^{\circ}$ . 3] of the effect; and there is one perception [ $n^{\circ}$ . 2] and one non-perception [ $n^{\circ}$ . 4] of the cause. Thus by means of these five perceptions and non-perceptions it is settled: 'only when there is fire, existence of smoke; when there is no fire, non-existence'. For this is the essence of effect: that it is, when a certain other thing is; and that it is not, when this is lacking. Also by the notion of identity this necessary concomitance is proved. Existence does not go astray from its own innate nature, otherwise the unwished-for consequence would be that there is no such innate nature. The ascertainment of identity (*tādātmya*) takes place by this circumstance that a refuting argument (*bādha*) in heterogeneous instances (*vipakṣa*) acts as trustworthy means of knowledge. But when this refuting argument does not come forward, then nobody, even on seeing [two facts] together for the hundredth time, would be capable of preventing this doubt: perhaps somewhere [the *sādhya*] will occur in a *vipakṣa*. Therefore it is said:

A rule for necessary concomitance either results from the relation between effect and cause, or from innate nature as a determining factor, and not from non-perception [in the *vipakṣa*] [and not] from perception [in the *sapakṣa*].

That is to say: a strict rule for necessary concomitance follows from *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* as a *nigāmaka*, or from *svabhāva* as a *nigāmaka*,

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. SIGWART, *Logic* II § 3. And p. 484 and notes.

but not from perception [of the *sādhya*] in the *sapakṣa* and non-perception in the *vipakṣa*.

[Vaigēśika]: To this we answer: [Must we] either say: wherever there is identity and causality, there is necessary concomitance; or, wherever there is necessary concomitance, there is identity and causality?

To begin with the first alternative, this does not hold good. For [if necessary concomitance takes place], whilst there is causality, then the quality of smoke, such as earthness &c. is still lacking in fire; and whilst there is identity, then the tree-ness [as a generality] does not fall together with the species [*śiṃṣapātva*].

But [must we then say]: wherever there is necessary concomitance, there is identity and causality? Then in the case of the existence of necessary concomitance these two will function as *gamakas* (factors leading to conviction). If so, let the necessary concomitance be the *gamaka*, for what do we want identity and causality? For neither does an effect lead us to the insight: '[this is] an effect', nor innate nature to the insight: '[this is] innate nature'. Why then should *acṛyabhicāra* be the cause of our being led to the insight: 'this has *acṛyabhicāra*'. Neither are identity and causality [causes of this insight], for there would be *vyabhicāra* [i. e. deviation from a rule].

Neither does [your argumentation] obtain fitness in the following way: "smoke is effectuated by fire, but not its [i. e. smoke's] qualities 'earthness' &c."; because a substance cannot be split up [in this manner]. Neither can this be accepted: „the *śiṃṣapā* has the tree as self, but the tree has not the *śiṃṣapā* as self, because [the generality 'tree'] is common to the *dhava*, *khadira* &c."; for there is no difference between these two [propositions, both expounding the same identity]. And when the treeness, common to the *dhava* &c. is not the *śiṃṣapātva*, then there is no oneness of these two, because difference characterises the difference in innate nature. But if identity is accepted, then just as treeness is common to all trees, so would be *śiṃṣapātva*. Further, when there is identity, [between treeness and *śiṃṣapātva*], and consequently non-existence of *gamya* (notion to be arrived at) and *gamaka* (notion leading to the ascertainment of the *gamya*), no diathesis [between these two] can be accepted, as this [diathesis] must rest on difference. If, on the grasping of *śiṃṣapātva*, tree-ness is not grasped, how [could we talk of] identity? And if this [tree-ness] is grasped, why [should we take refuge in] inference? But it is said: (1) the object in question (*dharmīn*) as described, (2) the *śiṃṣapātva* and (3) the tree-ness,

these three are one, and when the object in question is grasped, then also *çimṣapātva* and tree-ness are grasped. As has been said:

So then, when a form of existence is seen, its complete qualities are seen. What other portion then would be unseen and [must therefore] be realised by means of [other] sources of knowledge?

[Buddhist]: As to the fact that in this way a distinctive intellection (*vikalpa*) of a *çimṣapā* originates, and not such an intellection of a tree; this ensues from a shortcoming [of ours, scil.:] the non-existence of the remembrance of the word 'tree'. The distinctive intellection of a *çimṣapā* — which owes its birth to the awakening of the latent impression of the word *çimṣapā* and which amounts to exclusion of [everything which is] not-*çimṣapā* — does not lead to the exclusion of not-tree, because the unwished-for consequence would be that all distinctive intellections were synonymous with each other. The relation of *gamaka* (intellection leading to insight) and *gamyā* (intellection to be arrived at) exists only between two exclusions (*vyāvṛttis*) and not between two positive agreements of the object[ive world], because there does not exist a positive agreement in this.<sup>1)</sup> The exclusion of the not-tree and the exclusion of the not-*çimṣapā* are mutually different, because there is a difference between the [two] excludenda<sup>2)</sup> [scil. the *çimṣapā* and the tree].

[Vaiṣeṣika]: O wonderful cleverness on the part of scholars, in so arranging the precedent and the consequent. Identity is the germ of inference; and yet there is a mutual difference between the two exclusions, functioning as probandum and probans. What does this hocus-pocus mean?

[Buddhist]: If I should say: There is identity between tree and *çimṣapā*; and although difference [must be admitted] between the exclusion of not-tree and the exclusion of not-*çimṣapā* — which exclusions appear as identical — yet there is identity as far as *adhyavasāya* (final conclusion) is concerned.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: When the identity [between tree and *çimṣapā*] is proved, then the exclusion of the not-tree can be finally ascertained — with reference to the topic in question — by means of the exclusion of the not-*çimṣapā*; and when the exclusion of the not-tree is finally ascertained here, then the settling of the identity, as far as the final conclusion is concerned, takes place. Thus the fault of mutual dependence [of propositions, comes in].

<sup>1)</sup> According to the Buddhistic *apoha*-theory

<sup>2)</sup> *vyāvṛtya* cf. Ny.-kand. 76, 14.

[Buddhist]: At the moment of the grasping of the universal concomitance, there exists identity between the two exclusions, which have been proved to have one nature.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: The identity of these two exclusions<sup>1</sup> thus ascertained, is a matter of fancy (*kalpanika*). And when inference could take place by transmitting [the matter] to fancy, then no fallacious reason whatever could exist, for also identity would be possible between *prameyātva* (the being object of trustworthy knowledge) and *anityātva* (transiency), being finally accepted as having one nature in as far as the final ascertainment is concerned.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: there is non-existence of identity of *prameyātva* with transiency, because exclusion from the *vipakṣa* does not exist.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: That is true. There is no real identity, but there is an identity projected [over them] by fancy (*kalpanā*). And you have wished this as a condition for the arising of inference. Thus the non-existence of the exclusion from the *vipakṣa* is equal to something non-existent [i. e. is nonsense]. Moreover:

If<sup>1</sup> somebody believes that the notion about identity or causality ensues from the notion of the non-existence of the probans in the *vipakṣa*, then the notion about the non-existence of this [identity or causality] is a non-perception<sup>2</sup> of something which allows perception, and — since non-perception is included in inference — proceeds from the notion about identity or from the notion about causality together with [i. e. just as well as] the non-existence of the probans in the *vipakṣa* [a non-existence] which must also be proved by him [i. e. by this somebody to whom I refer] and again the ascertainment of identity or causality in this [last-mentioned notion]<sup>3</sup> ensues from the notion of the non-existence of inherence in the *vipakṣa*; and the notion of this non-existence is dependent on another non-perception, because this is accepted: „whatever may be the negation, it always bears upon a non-perception”. Thus, since endless regress comes in, we cannot prove exclusion *vijātreka*, and therefore neither can innate nature nor effect be [what we call] the probans.

Moreover although there is neither identity nor causality, yet we notice the relation of *gamyā* and *gamaka* between the rising of the asterism *Kṛttikā* and the setting of the asterism *Rohini*.

<sup>1</sup> *apāśat* = *apāśa* *kāśat* *ca*.

<sup>2</sup> Read: *avijānatpaleśa*.

<sup>3</sup> Omitted in this translation: *śaśvathapant*.

Thus it is a statement, unsufficiently thought out, to say: restriction either ensues from causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) or from innate nature.

For the relation of one thing with another thing by means of innate nature is definite, because it is exempt from conditions (*upādhi*). A relation, brought about by conditions, namely, ceases on account of the cessation of these [conditions], but a relation by innate nature (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*) does not. If the relation of smoke towards fire was effectuated by conditions, then these would have been perceived, as is the instruction [which is being given], [as a condition] for the being together of pupil and teacher. For there is not the slightest reason for our not perceiving these conditions, when fire and smoke are perceived several times, and neither are the conditions of a perceived [object] necessarily imperceptible. For when these [conditions] were dependent on the innate nature [of the object], then the necessary concomitance would be proved, in as far as a relation, brought about by this [innate nature], would last as long as the object [exists]. But if they were adventitious, then their causes would also be perceived. And to say: „the conditions and their causes transgress the senses without exception”, this is too complicated a supposition (*gurū kalpanā*). That fact, [e. g.] smoke, for which there are no conditions [required], would be sometimes perceived [in its] independent [nature], so as fire (or heat) whose relation towards smoke is effectuated by [wet] fuel as a condition, is met with as smokeless, when dry fuel has the predominance (*ādhipatyā*). But never in this way is fireless smoke found by any other act of consciousness [i. e. by any other perception]. So then:

when we have conceived the non-existence [of *upādhis*], because we never perceived such *upādhis* which [according to their nature] would have possessed the property of [being open to our] perception;

whilst we have settled the non-probational character (*ahetutva*) of the perceived different states of the fuel according to<sup>1)</sup> place and time, on reason of the irregular concomitance in reiterated perception;<sup>2)</sup>

then there is no fault in the perception of the non-existence of *upādhis* by referring to all particular cases of place and time.

So then after having settled, that the coexistence of the generality ‘smoke’ with the generality ‘fire’ is merely bound on the innate

1) Read: *deśakāla*.

2) Omitted: *upalabdhitānām anupalambhād*.

nature [of things] — by the last perception, of which every counter-view is rejected, and which is supported by a latent impression, originated from the seeing of simultaneous existence — one realises the strict rule: „this is strictly bound to that”.

Although at the first perception the coexistence is grasped, yet we do not grasp the strict rule. For the strict rule does not follow from the mere coexistence, but from a coexistence void of conditions. And the voidness of conditions is the final conclusion of the application of reiterated perception. Thus it [i. e. the strict rule] is settled by a concrete perception which has got force by the reiterated grasping of coexistence. By this we have also refuted:

[Quoted opinion of an opponent]: „How is the grasping of a strict rule possible with reference to individuals belonging to past and future, for the perception by means of the sense-organs refers to something which is [now] existent?”

[Defendent]: For we do not teach the grasping of universal concomitance (which abides in special forms) in respect to generality with disregard to the special forms, but in this grasping of the universal concomitance, the notion is without doubt everywhere, because it has everywhere one form.

[Opponent]: Why then have not the individual forms entered into the universal concomitance?

[Defendent]: But who says that they have not? But only under the aspect of generality and not of difference have they done so. Therefore we think of fire qua talis through our notion of smoke: it [i. e. fire] has regard to that<sup>1)</sup> [notion of smoke], and has no reference to difference [i. e. is not considered in its own differentiated forms].

[Opponent]: If I should say: But when (although the strict rule is ascertained everywhere by generality) doubt has originated owing to factors which lack trustworthiness, then also from your standpoint (when individual fires and smokes have been seen by means of perception, and their causal relation grasped) nobody can prevent the not happening there of inference in consequence of a doubt which was ‘put between’ by [lapse of time and [difference of] place.

But we say, the relation of effect and cause is ascertained by reiterated perception, because the doubt as to whether [the connection which seems to be of a causal character] is due to its *upādhis*, is not solved by one single perception. And the reiterated perception

<sup>1</sup> Read: *tam*.

refers to the generality, because there is no reiterated perception of momentary individuals. Therefore the relation of effect and cause — which refers to generalities and exists between that which is excluded from the non-fire and that which is excluded from the non-smoke <sup>1)</sup> — is ascertained for all cases after it has been ascertained for one case, for there is oneness in the generality.

[Defendent]: Why does not [the notion of] *niyama* (strict rule) please you — [a notion] which is similarly settled for all cases by us? Moreover, from your standpoint, two generalities which transgress the reach of the sense-organs, do not allow the relation of effect and cause, because they are not objective (*avastutvāt*). But the individuals are of such a nature; and everything is grasped by perception in [the form of] individuals. And you may not argue as follows:

[Argumentation attributed to the opponent]: There is a holding together in the mind of past and future individuals.

[Defendent]: for if the mind were independent with reference to an exterior object, the unwished-for consequence would be that there would be no blind or deaf person, [for his mind would form shapes, forms and sounds, although the exterior objects do not act on it]. Causal relation and *adhyavasāya* (ascertainment) exist for perceived individuals, and origination of inference does not take place with reference to unperceived individuals, because it is otherwise than this. Neither can the relation of probans and probandum be accepted for individuals, for they are totally apart from each other.

#### 41. *Verbal authority a form of inference.* <sup>2)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 214 l. 6.

[Opponent]: In an inference we conceive a *dharmīn* (an object in question) determined by the quality to be proved; but what is this *dharmīn* in an inference concerning a matter by means of word? No object, certainly, because this is then [at the time of the mere mentioning of the word] not perceived.

[Defendent]: If I should say: the word is the object in question?

[Opponent]: What is its probandum?

[Defendent]: If I should say: its reference to an object?

[Opponent]: [You are wrong, because] differently from mountain

<sup>1)</sup> According to the *apohavāda*.

<sup>2)</sup> The passage is a polemic against the Purva Mimamsakas who uphold *śabda* to be an independent source of knowledge. Cf. GANGANĀTHA JAI, *the Purva-Mīmāṃsā School* p. 52 &c.



&c. with reference to fire &c., no relation of word with object — either a conjunction, or an inherence &c. — is perceived, which would allow that this [word] can be proved as determined by the object. For the relation of these two is merely that of the *pratipādyā* (nominandum) and the *pratipāḍaka* (nominans); and this [relation], dating from the time after the cognition of the object, is not possible before the showing of the object. Neither does there — as is the case with fire and smoke — exist a regular necessary coexistence (*avinābhāva*) of word and object, because of their [possible mutual] deviation in space and time. And [the occurrence of] this deviation is proved by

a) the fact that the word Yudhiṣṭhira is used in the Kali-period, although Yudhiṣṭhira does not live anymore;

b) the fact that the word Lāṅkā is heard in Jambudvīpa, although [this island] Lāṅkā is not present. Consequently word is not a form of inference, because the whole set of conditions, necessary for inference, is not present: for [the word] is not strictly combined with [lit., deviates from] the object, according to varieties of place. Nowhere does smoke deviate from fire [i. e. wherever there is smoke, there must be fire]; but on the other hand word deviates from its object. Namely:

[The word] *caṇṇa* has for the inhabitants of the Dekhan the meaning of „lover”; but for the people of Āryāvartī it means „thief”.

And if word were a form of inference, then the ascertainment of its trustworthiness would depend on the notion of the threefold qualities (*trairūpya*) [which are required in the probans], and not on the notion of its being spoken by a competent person. But since its trustworthiness is settled by this notion, it differs from inference, for it is dissimilar in this respect.

[Defendent]: We answer to this: When the forefinger is raised, the inference of the number „ten” is made with reference to objects, distant from us in space and time. Here now it is not number which is the object in question (*dharmīn*), because it is not taken as such. Neither is the position of the forefinger the *dharmīn*, because there would exist no other relation of this [position of the forefinger] with the number „ten”, which is expressed by it<sup>1</sup>, and because it would not be fit that this expressing [of this number] should be determined by it [i. e. by this position]. And neither do these two occur in the same place, nor at the same time. How then

1) Read: *pratipadyamānasya*.

does the inference take place? — In consequence of the perception of the custom, prevalent among merchants, when engaged in buying and selling, to raise the forefinger, as we have said; and which is intended to suggest to us the idea of the number „ten”. How is this? — This [gesticulation] is the cause of the notion of the number „ten” by means of the understanding of the intention to inform us about that. If so, then<sup>1)</sup> it is with word as follows: first by the uttered word ‘cow’, [the hearer] becomes aware of the speaker’s wish to express an object to which belong [the respective speechsounds] *ka*, *ku*, &c. — for he also perceives in the stream of his own consciousness (*svasantāna*) the fact that the wish for indicating a cow precedes the uttering of the word ‘cow’, and from this wish to express a certain object, [the hearer] infers the object. The formal inference may here be given thus:

This man — the *dharma*n [in our inference] — possesses the wish to express an object to which belong [the respective speechsounds] *ka*, *ku* &c.:

because he is the agent of the utterance of the word ‘cow’:

so as I [am on certain occasions].

[Opponent]: If I should say: the ascertainment of the object does not follow from this wish for indication, because we perceive this wish for indication also in incompetent persons, although the object does not exist.

[Defendent]: [You ask me]: How does the [untrustworthy] proof for the [object] by means of word take place here? [I answer]: by error (*bhrānti*), or by the intention to deceive. [or] by the use of a word, void of sense.

[Opponent]: If I should say then: the notion of an object arises from a word, uttered by a trustworthy person?

[Defendent]: We might just as well say: the understanding of the object follows [as a result] from the intention (*abhiprāya*) of the competent person. — And as to the (occasional) deviation of word from object in particular places, although its probantial nature still exists — a deviation which does not occur in the case of smoke [and fire] — here the following argumentation has force:

Smoke is a probans for fire by a relation, founded on the nature of things (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*); but word, which like gesticulation, functions through convention (*saṅketa*), formed by the wish of man, is a probans with the aid of the understanding of the

<sup>1)</sup> Note the construction of *evam* with genitive.

speaker's wish in relation to that object for which man has made the convention. And further for the same reason, just as gesticulation is fit for the ascertainment of objects, when used by competent men, so undeviating relation<sup>1)</sup> will occur between thing and word, provided that this latter is uttered by a competent person — [in this way there is analogy with the regular concomitance of fire and] smoke characterised by such qualities as continuance, rising upwards &c.

[Opponent]: Why have you not laid down the fact that the denotation of object by word takes place through the original meaning (*mukhyaṁ vṛttiḥ*) of the word?

[Defendent]: Because there is not a [real] relation [between word and thing; — i. e. this relation is only a matter of convention], and if anything, quite unrelated, could be a factor, leading to insight (*gamaka*), then there would be too wide an applicability (*atiprasaṅga*).

[Opponent]: If I should say: there is a natural (*svābhāvika*) relation [between word and object]?

[Defendent]: No, because one word is used for several objects in accordance with variety of place.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the denotative power of the word relates to that thing for which it is used by the Āryas, but in other cases the probantial nature of the word, when used, agrees with convention?

[Defendent]: No, because the word *caura* is [active in] the same [way], either effectuating the notion 'thief' or the notion 'lover'. And there is no reason for any distinction, so that it would have denotativeness (*vācakatva*) with reference to thief, and probantiality with reference to lover. — For:

also in the case of the Āryas the notion of the object, arising in consequence of the word *caura*, supposes a probans;

because the obtainment of this [notion] is born from the word *caura*;

just as the obtainment [of the respective notion] is born from the word *caura*, when used by an inhabitant of the Dekhan and agreed upon by both parties [speaker and hearer].

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<sup>1)</sup> Read: *sambhavadh*.

42. *Is there a svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ between word and object?*<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī, p. 215, l. 19 :

[Vaiṣeṣika]: And there is no proof for the existence of a natural relation. By your school it is said:

[Opinion held by opponents]: [This] relation consists in the natural power of the word as a denotator — a power which [also] resides in the denotandum — because thus is a foot placed on either side. According to the saying:

The power, forsooth, is the relation.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: If the power of word were to stay in the denotandum according to the nature of things (*svābhāva*), then the inexperienced man [i. e. he who does not know the language] would understand the object through the word, like the experienced man, because [in both cases] there would be a word, an object, and their relation.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the relation, when known, is the cause of the notion of the thing: and not [the relation], merely by the fact of its existing. As has been said:

[This] relation, because it is a factor leading to knowledge (*jñāpaka*), stands in need of an intellection about itself, therefore this [relation], although existent, is not manifest, when not grasped.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Of what kind is the intellection about this relation?

[Opponent]: If I should say: this [intellection] is of the following kind: this object is the denotandum of that word.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: And from where does it arise?

[Opponent]: From the usage of old people [which is perceived by children when growing up].

[Vaiṣeṣika]: Let the intellection about the objective fundament of denotation and denotandum — [an intellection], brought about by grown up people, when dealing mutually, [in the soul] of a boy in their presence, and which is called convention (*saṅketa*) and proficiency in language (*vyatpatti*) — be the cause of the notion of the thing, through the intermediance of latent impression! Why do we want another kind of relation?

For the innate fitness of the word is its wordness; and the adventitious fitness is its *saṅketa*; and this order is peculiar; and from these two forms of fitness ensues the origination of the notion of a certain thing. And it is unnecessary to surmise another kind of relation.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. Vaiç. Sūtra VII, 2, 14—20 & GAṢṢĀNĀTHA JUḤ, *The Prābhākara School*, p. 229 § 3.

43. *Śrutah-prāmāṇya of word specially and of knowledge in general.*<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandālī p. 217 l. 23.

‘Opponent’: Here some people say: The trustworthiness of word does not depend on its being spoken by a competent person, because all sources of knowledge are trustworthy by themselves.

‘Vaiçeṣika’: The following question may be put to these people: What do you understand by trustworthiness of knowledge, either (A) the non-deviation from the object, or (B) the circumlimitation [of the object] just as it is.

To begin with (A), it is not the non-deviation from [i. e. regular concomitance with] the object: because, although fire is regularly connected with smoke, yet trustworthiness of knowledge can be lacking [for instance, in the case] of somebody, inattentive, in whose mind the intellection about fire does not arise, owing to any cause whatever; and [secondly] because the knowledge [given by the eye] is trustworthy, since it [in general] produces knowledge equivalent to the object, although in special cases the eye may err with reference to blue, yellow &c.

And (B) if trustworthiness of knowledge means the circumlimitation [of objects] just as they are, [then we may ask]: (a) is this knowledge known by itself: (b) or is it born from itself? (c) or is it merely occupied with itself?

If (Ba) this self-trustworthiness [were brought about] by knowledge, then there would arise by itself the intellection: „I am circumlimitating<sup>2)</sup> the things as they are”; consequently with reference to a means of knowledge would there never be the doubt: is this [which I now conceive] like the object or not like the object?: neither would there be practical behaviour on account of erroneous knowledge. But in consequence of the absence of action with reference to one’s own self, intellection, not grasping the self, does neither grasp the self’s circumlimitation [of objects] just as they are: so then something else is required in order to circumlimitate this, because there is no knowledge about a thing to be proven (*prameya*) without a proof (*pramāṇa*) and because trustworthiness, when itself in the condition of being proved, becomes a *prameya*. Thus trustworthiness ensues from an exterior [fact].

1) The self-sufficiency of the knowledge-sources and specially of the (sacred) verbal authority is an important dogma of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, cf. GAṆAŚAKHA JHA, *The Prabhakara School* p. 22 § 4.

2) Read: *paricchakāham*.

[Opponent]: If I should say: when the trustworthiness [of a knowledge-source] is known by means of something else, then the trustworthiness of this latter must again be proved by something else, and so on; and consequently the fault of endless regress would come in.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: There is no endless regress here, because the wish for knowledge does not exist for every source of knowledge. For a proof circumluminates an object by the mere fact of its arising; and [this task does] not [belong to] its understood trustworthiness. Now it can sometimes happen, that, after an object is circumluminated by a proof, there arises by some cause or other a doubt: „is this a trustworthy or an untrustworthy source of knowledge?“ and that man abstains from activity through this uncertainty about this object of his knowledge (*viśaya*): [then afterwards it may happen] that man's wish to get more knowledge with reference to this trustworthiness by means of another instrument arises, in order that he may proceed to activity: for as long as the trustworthiness is not settled, the doubt will not be sublated. But where, either by the skill [afforded] by perpetual application or by the grasping of all particularities without exception, the proof, with all its stains of doubt wiped off, comes forward, there by the mere arising of the [proof] the object is ascertained and the person who realises the proof (*pramātar*), feels no more any further [intellectual] desire, since he does not stand in any need of it; consequently there is no further research for other proofs. And he who would try to raise a doubt here, would fail in this attempt, since [this doubt] is refuted by the ascertainment of that object. As has been said by MAṆḌANA in his *Brahmasiddhi*:

„When [the object] is known, the doubt [lit. the not breathing freely] is removed by knowledge.”

[Opponent]: If [you maintain that] the wish to understand the trustworthiness of knowledge is felt on behalf of activity, then [I raise the following objection]: when a man who had not settled this trustworthiness was active [for a certain object], impelled by his doubt concerning that object, then after that he has become satisfied by the reaching of that object, [he will] no more [feel] this wish to understand the trustworthiness. How then does fitness for activity prove that a trustworthy means of knowledge possesses [i. e. bears upon] a real object? For his activity does not take place with reference to this [reached object], in order to examine the trustworthiness of the knowledge, so as the husbandman

proceeds in order to examine the seed. For his wish only bears on that [object, and not on the knowledge-source].

[Defendent]: When a man was first in doubt about an object, in consequence of his doubt on the trustworthiness of his knowledge, and has been active in order to grasp the object, then he will, by obtaining his aim through the reaching of the object, arrive at the ascertainment of the trustworthiness of his knowledge, although not striven for, whilst the object proves to be fit [for activity]. The fitness for activity, namely, never goes astray (*vya-bhicarati*) from the trustworthiness of the knowledge-source. Thus the trustworthiness of knowledge is neither known by itself (*Ba*), nor is it born from itself (*Bb*).

If an intellection, after having first risen, produces (*janayati*) in the own self (*sca*) [*Bb*] a condition of circumlimitating [the objects] as they are, then we could understand the *svataḥ-pramāṇatā* of this [intellection]. But on seeing that the origination of this [circumlimitation, *pariccheda*] — having for its innate nature, the realising of things as they are — is due to a cause, we also become aware of the fact that its trustworthiness depends on something else.

But if you think:

[Opinion, attributed to the opponent]: We do not define *svataḥ-pramāṇatva* thus: „a proof itself produces its own trustworthiness”; but we understand *svataḥpramāṇya* in the following sense: „a proof does not require, for the effectuating of its trustworthiness, anything else besides the bundle of the causes which produced [the proof itself].” (*Bc*)

[Defendent]: Then does neither this hold good. For when the complete bundle of conditions which produce the intellection, and nothing more or less, is the cause for its trustworthiness, how does erroneous knowledge then originate?

[Opponent]: If I should say: the innate nature of these causes is, to produce an intellection equivalent to the objects. But when it is disturbed by faults (*doṣas*), then they produce an intellection which is not as the things are. But when the faults, causes of the disturbance of the innate nature, are lacking, then this innate nature, scil. the production of an equivalent intellection, appears.

[Defendent]: Is then the origination of equivalence (*yathārthatā*) with reference to a verbal information based on the intellection of the speaker, merely due to this intellection? If so, then every verbal information would be trustworthy. But if the origination of equivalence with reference to word is due to an intellection,

concerning a trustworthy means of knowledge, then this trustworthiness is not merely due to the innate nature of the cause, but to its qualities. The intellection about the object is the cause of the word; its [good] quality, of the equivalence; its faults, of the non-equivalence [of the word]. So then, whilst the equivalence [of the word] is the cause for its trustworthiness as a proof, its trustworthiness is effectuated by the [good] quality of the cause, and not by the mere innate nature [of the cause]. And if the trustworthiness of word as a proof depends on its [good] quality, then <sup>1)</sup> it will be the same case with the other kinds of intellections:

The intellections in question, as proofs, possess trustworthiness in consequence of the [good] quality of their causes; because they are intellections about a trustworthy means of knowledge;

so as an intellection (about a trustworthy source of knowledge) which is dependent on the verbal information [heard].

[Opponent]: If I should say: the activity (*vyāpāra*) of the [good] quality of the cause bears — also with regard to word — on the non-existence of the fault, but not on the origination of the trustworthiness of the intellection.

[Defendent]: No, <sup>2)</sup> for let us admit that no origination of non-equivalence (which is an effect of faults) takes place, in consequence of the fact that faults are frustrated by good qualities; whence, however, should arise the origination of the equivalence? For the non-existence of the effect takes place when the cause is lacking, but not the existence of the [state of things] opposed to [this effect].

[Opponent]: If I should say: [the origination of the equivalence] is due merely to the innate nature of the intellection?

[Defendent]: No, [you are wrong], because there are no differences [in this innate nature qua talis]. For the connection with objects forms the differentiation in the intellections. And if this [connection with the objects] is no factor in the origination of this equivalence, (owing to the fact that this [equivalence] only depends on the sublation of faults),- then in consequence of the identity in the innate nature, word will not be fixed with reference to the different objects, because there is no proof for such a differentiation.

But if an intellection referring to a certain object produces a

<sup>1)</sup> Notice the construction of *asti tathā* cum genetivo.

<sup>2)</sup> Read: *doṣa-pratibandhād doṣa-kāryasya* &c.



verbal information about that object, then the equivalence of the intellection [in comparison with the object] is the cause of the equivalence of the word, and the fact that [the word] possesses the form of a mental state (*bodha*) [is] not [such a cause]. So then we have proved that its trustworthiness as a knowledge-source is only due to the good quality [of its cause, i. e. of the effectuating intellection].

But even let us admit that the activity of the good quality bears on the non-existence of the faults, even then *paratahprāmāṇya* (the extraneousness of the factor on which the trustworthiness depends) is not forsaken; because we can settle by means of agreement and contrariety the fitness of the non-existence of faults, [a non-existence] which is different from the innate nature of the cause in every case of the origination of this [*prāmāṇya*].<sup>1)</sup>

[Opponent]: If I should say: the non-existence of the wrong notion follows from the non-existence of faults, but trustworthiness of cognition is merely dependent on the innate nature of the sense-organs &c.

[Defendent]: Why do you not accept: the origination of trustworthiness of cognition is obstructed by faults, but the wrong notion is dependent on the innate nature of the sense-organs &c.?

[Opponent]: If I should say: such an admission is not possible, because the wrong notion follows [in its apparition] the agreement and contrariety of the faults.

[Defendent]: [We could] just as well [say]: the admission of that [hypothesis of yours] is not possible, because we see that trustworthiness follows [in its apparition] the agreement and contrariety of the non-existence of the faults. For that which does not take in account the prior or posterior non-existence of faults, is not a trustworthy means of knowledge. Thus also the activity of *pramāṇa* which has to do with the production of effects such as positive behaviour &c., is directed outwardly,<sup>2)</sup> and is not exclusively limited to itself, because [intellection] in as far as dependent on expedients, obstacles &c. produces effects such as positive behaviour.

1) The explanation of *tad* = *prāmāṇya* is suggested by the preceding *paratahprāmāṇya*.

2) See *Bc*, Ny.-Kandali p. 218 l. 2.

44. *Upamāna* (indication by means of comparison) a form of *anumāna*.<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 220 l. 21:

When a competent person — e. g. a man who has travelled through woods and knows the *gacaya* — is asked by a citizen who has no knowledge about this animal: „what does the *gacaya* look like?” and when he informs him by means of the similarity of a *gacaya* with a cow, [then we have to do with a form of] inference.

The words: „the *gacaya* is such as the cow is”, are the *āptavacana* (words of the competent person = *śabda*). And this *āptavacana* is also an inference, because the notion [that the case is] thus, follows from the trustworthiness of the [knowledge, given by the] speaker. Therefore *upamāna* is no separate [source of knowledge] apart from inference.

[Here we must make the following distinction]:

(A). The inference is of the kind as we have described, in the case of those Pūrvamīmāṃsakas who term the words of the wood-traveller the *upamāna*. (B). The pupils of ĆABARA-SVĀMIN, however, declare *upamāna* to be the intellection about the similarity with a [previously] perceived particular cow — [an intellection], which arises after the seeing of a *gacaya* in the wood and together with the remembering of the cow and which can be expressed in the words: ‘my cow is similar to this [animal]’. [If we now accept this definition], then *upamāna* is [a form of] remembrance. For similarity, like generality, obtains individuality every time in one object; and it does not like conjunction, adhere to two objects. For the notion: „this is similar to a cow”, arises with reference to an individual *gacaya* in a wood, even although an individual cow is not seen. As has been said by the Mīmāṃsaka-teachers, [Ćlokavārttika p. 444 n°. 35, cf. GAṆGĀNĀTHA JHĀ’s transl. p. 227]:

„Like generality, similarity obtains reality in one abode; because it is experienced, even where the *pratīyogin* [i. e. the object on which the relation bears] is not seen.”

Discussion of the notion *upamāna*,  
according to the Ćabara-svāmin-definition.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 221 l. 8.

And whilst similarity every time obtains its full reality in one

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. *Prābhakara School* p. 68 and 69. The Ćabara-svāmin-definition, also accepted by Prābhakara, is given there § 1. The „other definition” in § 3.

Read in the text of Praç. Bhāṣya p. 220 l. 16 *aprasaddhagacayasya*.

object, so, although this notion, bearing upon cow and [expressed in the words]: „this is similar to a *gavaya*”, did not exist previously in consequence of the not grasping of a *gavaya*, yet the notion of similarity consists rightly in the mere conjunction [of the sense-organ] with its [one] abode. In the same way, although in consequence of the not having grasped of the (other) *pratigogin* the notion: „this is long or short in comparison to that [= a previously not perceived object]” does not arise, yet the grasping of extension qua talis takes place on our merely approaching its abode. How otherwise could anybody, when arrived at another spot, after having seen a *pratigogin*, decide: „this is long or short in comparison to that [= an absent object].” If similarity which formerly was not seen in the cow by the mere meeting with the sense-organ, neither were now [i. e. in the wood, where no cow in present] seen in the *gavaya*, then the fixed relation of these two [*pratigogins*], [to be expressed in the words]: „the remembrance takes place with reference to the cow, after the perceiving of the *gavaya*” would not exist; because there would be no difference [in this respect].

[Opponent]: The determination of the remembrance is effected by the perception of so many generalities: hoofs, hairy tail &c. as were perceived in the cow.

[Defendent]: [You are right, but then it follows that]: the generalities inherent in several parts form the similarity, in consequence of their inherence in both [abodes]. And when these [generalities] are grasped in one special case in consequence of the grasping of the abode, then the similarity is grasped. Therefore the notion of similarity, based on the individual cow which is not present and [arising] when a *gavaya* is perceived, is a remembrance which originates from the latent impression, awakened by the seeing of something similar, and it is not a separate source of knowledge. And we may also notice that remembrance may have for an object something which is grasped by vague perception (*avikalpaka*); because somebody unexperienced (*avyutpanna*) recognises — on perceiving a second individual object — a generality which was vague (*avikalpita*) at first in his perception of one [i. e. the first] specimen.

Discussion of the notion *upamāna*  
according to the other Purva-Mīmāṃsā-definition.

Nyāya-kandālī p. 221 l. 21.

[Let us now consider the definition, given by the other Purva-Mīmāṃsakas. They explain *upamāna* as follows]: When a man has

heard the *atideṣavākya* [i. e. a sentence wherein occurs a statement transferring the form of one object to another, such as *yathā gaus, tathā gavayaḥ*], then on seeing a *gavaya* and noticing its similarity to a cow, [he will take] the word *gavaya* as a name for that animal]. This notion, now, of the relation between the name and the object bearing the name, is the *upamāna*.

In this theory [the formula]: *yathā gaur gavayas tathā*, belongs to [the source of knowledge, termed] word [*vākya* or *ṣabda*]: and the intellection of ordinary people, originated by it and [to be expressed in the words]: „that which is called ‘*gavaya*’, is something similar to a cow”, is merely *āgama* [i. e. tradition or word].

As to the intellection: „that which is similar to a cow, must be called *gavaya*” this is [a form of] inference, because this word is used for that. [Or to express it more formally]:

If a certain word is consistently used for a certain object by people who are well versed in it, then it is the name for this thing;

the word *gavaya*, now, is consistently used by the wood-inhabitant for [an animal] like a cow;

ergo this animal [which I now see] is to be termed a *gavaya*.

[Here we have to do with] a knowledge by means of a generality, or: inference.

The egression on *upamāna*, concluded.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 222 l. 3.

With reference to this perceptible *gavaya* the fruit (*phala*) of the perception is: (1) the knowledge of the similarity, and (2) the intellection about an individual, different [from anything else] in the three worlds.

• And as to the application (*anusandhāna*) of the relation ‘name and thing bearing name’ as bearing upon this [particular case], this again is [a form of] remembrance;

because it is originated from a latent impression, which itself was produced by an intellection [containing the statement]: that something similar to a cow, must be called by the word *gavaya* — [an intellection] which starts from a generality, manifested by the grasping of similarity and previously originated;

like the application of the *vācya* by means of a certain word to another specimen of the same kind as

object — [a *vāgavātra*] effected by a latent impression which is born from an intellection about a convention (*saṃketa*), relating to [lit.: having as object] a generality originated in [previous] particular cases.

#### 45. *Arthāpatti*.<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandali p. 222 l. 9.

„An object (matter), either seen or heard of, is not possible in another way”, here the supposition of something else [than that which is originally grasped] is an *arthāpatti*.<sup>2)</sup> It is useful to mention separately the perceiving of [words] heard. *Arthāpatti* [in general, is brought about] by [the supposing of an] other [state of things] which puts matters right. This rightly arranging matters is carried out in two ways in the *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* and the *śrutārthāpatti*.

When a state of things, otherwise being impossible, suggests another state of things, then [we have to do with] a *dṛṣṭārthāpatti*. For instance:

„Caitra lives, but he is not in his house”. Here the non-existence of Caitra is ascertained by means of the [source of knowledge, termed]: *abhāva*; but from the verbal information: „he lives”, his staying there is ascertained, in as far as we experience that a living man stays in his house. But it is not possible that one [thing] simultaneously is and is not in one place; because the existence of these two [conditions] together is contradictory. Therefore this ascertained non-existence and this heard-of information: „he lives” do not agree, unless he is out-of-doors. So then one will surmise such [a fact] by the existence of which an other [fact], [first] being impossible, becomes possible. If he is not out-of-doors, then there is contradiction [of his non-existence in the house] with [the fact] that lives, and a contradiction cannot exist. But when Caitra's being out-of-doors is accepted, then this [difficulty] is solved: „Caitra lives and he is not in the house, because he is out-of-doors.”

1) Cf. GAṆGĀDĀRYA JHĪ, *The Prabhākara School* p. 244 &c., where we find in § 2 a reference to the „śrutārthapatti”.

2) I should like to propose the following hypothesis on the original meaning of the term *arthāpatti*. It was a notion due to the exigencies of exegesis. Where a literal explanation of the text was not possible, one „had to go back” *vāpadyate* to the „meaning”, or „intention” of the speaker *artha*. *Arthapatti* thus signified as much as „reading between the lines”. Later on, *arthapatti* got a wider meaning; only the *śrutārthapatti* was a remnant of the old use of the term.

For if there is a contradiction between two means of knowledge, one of which leaves room [for further suppositions], whilst the other is not of this kind — it is likely that there exists another object of the *sāvakāñṣam* [*pramāṇam*], on account of the unfitness of the *niravakāñṣam* [*pramāṇam*]. That now which puts right the contradiction between these two [*pramāṇas*] is the *arthāpatti*. The intellection which arises [in a man's mind] after his having seen an object which stands in a certain relation [to other objects] and is limited in place &c., and in consequence of his remembering the relation — this intellection, now, containing another object which stands in a certain relation, is a [form of] inference. The difference between these two [means of knowledge, i. e. between inference in general, and *arthāpatti* specially] ensues from a difference of the manner in which intellections arise. As has been said:

In inference we can distinguish one form in which [the inference] owes its birth to agreement. But the other form, [termed] *arthāpatti*, proceeds from exclusion (*vyatireka*).<sup>1)</sup>

Similarly the auditive *arthāpatti* suggests [to us] an other word, where a certain word is illogical [at first impression]. For instance: after [having heard] the information: „This fat man does not eat in the day-time”, we surmise as a complement to this information: „[but] he eats at night”.

#### 46. Discussion of *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* in detail.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 223 l. 6.

[Opponent]: When the non-existence [of Caitra's] in the house suggests the idea of his being out-of-doors, only because of the unfitness [of a contradiction], then it could just as well suggest any other fact, because a determining cause is lacking.

[Defendent]: If I should say: the non-existence in the house suggests another fact in order to effect its own fitness; and this fitness is not [brought about], when another fact [than this being out-of-doors] is supposed.

[Opponent]: By whom is it upheld that its fitness arises on account of his being out-of-doors? We, on our side, affirm that,

<sup>1)</sup> Yet *arthāpatti* is clearly distinguished from *vyatireky anumānam*. This latter term has reference to the inductive part of the Indian syllogism, it means such general propositions, for which we can only find instances, if we read them in their negative form. An *arthāpatti* has reference to the deductive process and contains i. a. the following argumentation: when we know 1. „if A is not, then is B not”; 2. „B is”; then we must conclude: „A is”.

even when there is existence out-of-doors, still the non-existence in the house remains unfit.

[Defendent]: This is noticed:

A non-omnipresent object is in one place, and is not somewhere else;

so as the sun is perceived in one place between east and west and nowhere else, — as is ascertained with the aid of perception;

so then the non-existence of a living man in his house is fit, when his existence out-of-doors takes place, but not otherwise.

But then the comprehension of this fitness is only based on the comprehension of agreement. And so *arthūpatti* would be the same as inference, since it owes its birth to agreement. As to the fact that it arises when there is a contradiction, this is merely a specification. And in this way we obtain the formal syllogism (*prayoga*):

Devadatta is out-of-doors;

because he is not perceived in the house, whilst at the same time he is connected with life;

as it is [often the case with] me.

#### 47. *Discussion of śrutārthūpatti in detail.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 223 l. 17.

After one has heard the information: „the fat [man] does not eat in the day-time”, the supposition of his eating at night is an inference by means of [a fact, itself] inferred. Because the fatness [of the man] is inferred from the [speaker's] word which functions as a probans; and [from this fatness] we infer its cause: the eating at night.

That is to say: The not informing us about its matter is the unfitness of a source of knowledge. The information: „he does not eat in the day-time” informs us about its own object; and so there is no question of its unfitness. But the fatness, as an effect of eating, is not fit, whilst there is not-eating in the day-time; for the cause is then lacking; and as a consequence of the unfitness [of this supposed fatness], the information (*vākya*, word) is also unfit, for the objects are not coherent.

And if so, then the unfitness of the word is identical with the unfitness of the objects, and the fitness of the one is the fitness of the other. But the fitness and the unfitness [of the word] is not of an independent nature (*na svarūpeṇa*). The state of things,

characterised by the fatness of him who does not eat in the day-time, in as far as it is a result of eating, becomes fit by a state of things which consists in the eating at night; but [does not become so] by the word „eating”. Because the unfitness belongs to the object, therefore the object, as cause also for the fitness of its respective word, must be sought for; and not the word, because this would not lead to fitness. And one object is understood as made fit by [another] object, because fatness, excluded from [i. e. not met together with] eating during day-time, is necessarily the effect of eating at night; ergo the [proof called] *arthāpatti* does not refer to the words.

[Opponent]:<sup>1)</sup> But I do not mean: „the object is brought to fitness by [another] object; and thus by its fitness the fitness of the respective word arises; but [my idea is]: the object of our language-expression is made fit by [another] object of language-expression; because there is no coexistence between a [real object] comprehended by another source of knowledge and it [i. e. the object of language-expression]. For when the verb-form „he cooks” is uttered, then<sup>2)</sup> there is no fitness without an object of the action; but one is satisfied [in this logical desire] by the perception of the pulse which is being cooked; for the *ākāṃkṣā* (the desire for completion of a sentence), [expressed in this case by the words]: „what does he cook?”, is satisfied [lit. ‘complies’], when this [pulse] is present. And also when the object of the action is adduced by verbal information [in forms such as]: „he cooks greens, he cooks pulse” &c., this notion is settled without doubt. Similarly such an unfitness of the objects (contents) of word exists in [the sentence]: „this fat man does not eat in the day-time.” Therefore in this case too satisfaction will arise with the aid of an object (or: contents) of language-expression; and thus in the first place through *arthāpatti* we must search for a word which expresses the eating at night; for otherwise there is no agreement of eating at night with the object of the word „during day-time”.

[Defendent]: But if *arthāpatti* is restricted to the boundary of words, then the eating at night, as an objective fact, does not become the object (contents, *viśaya*) of *arthāpatti*, because this [fact] falls outside<sup>3)</sup> the verbal information.

Neither is this [which you mention] simply word, because there is no immediate proximity (*pratyāsatti*) between the word „during

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *na matam*.

<sup>2)</sup> Read: *vinopapattih*.

<sup>3)</sup> Read: *apagatāt*.



day-time" or its object with the word „night"; neither is this effected by means of these two [words]. For word is brought into proximity [towards another] with the aid of the proximity between objects.

[Opponent]: But unlike inference, *arthāpatti* does not require<sup>1)</sup> *pratyāsatti*; because it only proceeds from (grammatical) unfitness. Therefore it has been said:

„But this (*A*) which is required by [one] object (*B*) is not a second object: for it (*A*) is excluded from this [nature] by the fact that it must be grasped by concrete intellection [i. e. by an intellection in which the notion of the object is accompanied by its name].

„One understands fitness (*sāmānārya* = *upapatti*), after having conceived other words:<sup>2)</sup>

„Therefore this [*arthāpatti*] refers decidedly in the first place to words, and hence word will inform us about contents of words, as it relates to that.”

[Defendent]: To this we answer: the separate words (*padāni*) are used to inform us about the contents of the sentence (*vākya*). These [words] are separately unable to teach us the contents of the sentence — which requires the meeting together of the word-meanings — because their function has not yet reached its aim [in their separate use]; so then they want other word-meanings [each of which apart] effectuates [the notion of] one object [in our mind]. But when the contents of the sentence is taught by them, [used in continuation], then they do not want another word more, because their function has reached its aim.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the object, as taught [by these combined words], is [logically] not fit?

[Defendent]: It is fit,<sup>3)</sup> for the levelling of a contradiction in the object is not the function of word (*śabda*); but this only aims at information; and this is carried out by it, even when the word „at night" is not near. For we learn the not eating of the fat man from the verbal information about his not eating in the day-time. This knowledge, [up to so far] is undoubted and un mistaken, otherwise there would be no occasion at all for the procedure of *arthāpatti*.

For only the unfitness of the not eating during day-time, as proved by trustworthy means of knowledge, in the case of a fat

1) Read: *apeksyate*.

2) Read: *śābdāntaraṅga buddhā*.

3) Read: *sopapatti*.

man [whose existence is] ascertained, is not allowed. For if these [two facts] were uncertain or settled as being wrong ideas, why should we posit another state of things? And for what would *npapatti* be wanted? But <sup>1)</sup> the mutual contradiction exists between the two states of things. Therefore the notion of these two [states] is a non-notion. Conclusively the verbal information is put straight by the comprehension of the object, but does not require another word; for there is no other way to regulate matters. Thus then the object, declared by means of the [word], is [logically] unfit without another object: and, when in pursuit of a [right] notion, it is searching for its own fitness.

#### 48. *Non-existence.* <sup>2)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 225 l. 16.

Some assert a sixth source of trustworthy intellection, called *abhāva*, [i. e. proof for] non-existence, because the five other means — perception &c. <sup>3)</sup> — which grasp [forms of] existence, are unfit with respect to the notion of the non-existence of a knowable (*prameya*).

PRAṢASTAPĀDA refutes this [in the words]: „*abhāvo 'py anumānam eva* i. e. [proof for] non-existence is merely [a form of] inference”. And in order to answer the question: „how?” he adds *yathotpannam* &c. i. e. „just as the originated effect is a probans for the existence of the cause, so is the not originated effect the probans for the non-existence of the cause.”

Even for him who accepts *abhāva* as a [separate] means of knowledge, does not the knowledge of the non-existence of the knowable arise merely through the non-existence of an intellection; for the unwished-for consequence would be that the comprehension of non-existence would exist with reference to an object, beyond our perception by its innate nature. But when the causes for the intellection are present, then the not arising of intellection in regard to an object capable of being known, is a cause for the comprehension of non-existence. But there is no difference — in itself — of the non-perception of a perceptible [lit. fit] object from the non-perception of an imperceptible object. Therefore this [non-perception], unlike our sense-organs, is not a factor of instruction through its own power. But the non-perception of the perceptible object

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *Kim ca*.

<sup>2)</sup> „Non-existence” is accepted as an independent source of knowledge by Kumārila, but rejected as such by Prabhākara. — *The Prabhākara School* p. 71.

<sup>3)</sup> Perception, inference, *cabdu*, *anumāna* & *arthāpatti*.

does not deviate from [i. e. is constantly accompanied by] the non-existence of the knowable; the non-perception of the imperceptible (or unfit) object, does not show such a regularity, in as far as [non-perception] sometimes takes place although the object exists. By such an important difference the non-perception of the fit object is informative, and the other [i. e. the non-perception of the unfit object is] not so.

If so, non-existence will simply be a probans (*liṅga*); for it depends on the grasping of a necessary concomitance; but if it were independent of this, then we could with difficulty avoid the unwished-for consequence that this non-existence [of intellection] would [always] without distinction teach us the [objective] non-existence.

[Opponent]: But the intellection about non-existence also takes place with reference to the perceived [spot of the] floor in consequence of the connection with the sense-organs; why should we not accept, in this [intellection, expressed in the words; „this spot of the] floor is without a pot”, a perception of the non-existence just as well as a perception of the floor?

[Defendent]: If I should answer: the connection of the sense-organs takes place with regard to the positive part [i. e. the floor and not the non-existence], because of its fitness (perceptibility)?

[Opponent]: This is not right, as not being made convictive. For fitness (*yogyatā*) must be deduced from the effect, and just as in existence the effect is seen to comply with the agreement and contrariety of the sense-organ, thus too in non-existence. And like existence, so is non-existence fit for the grasping through the sense-organs, and also here from the seeing of the effect a certain connection of the sense-organs must be posited.

[Defendent]: But our idea [is otherwise]. No form of non-existence is conceived unless as supported by a certain abode [*adhi-karana*, object to which it refers, place where the non-existence is located]; for we see that practical behaviour and inactivity take place with reference to defined spots &c. The activity of the sense-organs now deals with the perception of that [object] which is conceived as the *adhi-karana* of the [non-existence, in question]. Somebody, namely, who has seen e. g. a temple, so as it is, and who, having gone to another place, is asked by somebody else: „Is Devadatta in that temple or is he not?” will — after having learnt the other man’s wish for information — realise in himself this non-existence [to be formulated in the words]: „is not”; and will [consequently] answer [with these words]: „[Devadatta] is not [in the temple].”

And one should not say:

[Supposed contradiction by an opponent]: The non-existence of Devadatta was formerly grasped, at the moment of the grasping of the temple by vague perception: and at the present moment it becomes remembered.

[Defendent]: The grasping by vague perception, in consequence of a connection with the sense-organs, is possible for pots &c., because things like these do not depend in their innate nature on something else. But the innate nature of non-existence, having negation as innate character, is dependent on that whose negation it is. Therefore — [scil.] since there is no other innate nature of non-existence than that of its being the negation of the [positive entity in question] — no determining of it is possible without the determining of the innate nature of its *pratiyogin* (correlative object). This, namely, is the difference between existence and non-existence: that the grasping of the one takes place in a positive form, the grasping of the other in the form of a negation of something else. As has been said by the author of the Nyāya-vārttika:

There is a difference, because the cause of perception and non-perception, is [respectively] independent [and] dependent.

The existent is independent, being the [objective] foundation of the trustworthy means of knowledge.

The non-existent is dependent, through the intermediance of the negation of something else.

But if the grasping of the non-existent were also independent, then it would no more differ from existence. So then there is no grasping of non-existence by means of vague perception. And as to your dilemma:

[Opponent]: Was there formerly a notion of the temple as connected with [the presence of] Devadatta, or as free from this? If [the temple] was grasped as connected, there will be no remembrance of the temple simply as such; but if [the temple] was grasped as free [from that presence of Devadatta's], the non-existence, then grasped, will afterwards be remembered. This [argumentation] is valid.

[Defendent]: This does not hold good, for we grasp the temple in its innate nature, even if the existence or non-existence is not grasped. Therefore there was previously no grasping of non-existence, and as a consequence of this non-existence [of this grasping] there is now no remembrance. And neither does here appear a new kind of *pramāṇa*.

[Opponent]: From this [we conclude that] there is a source of trustworthy knowledge which differs<sup>1)</sup> from the five [generally] accepted sources: perception &c., [and which aims] at the grasping of non-existence with reference to [an object whose] *pratyogin* is not in our neighborhood, but is an object of remembrance. And when we have proved in one case, that [objective] non-existence must be determined by [the means of knowledge, called] non-existence, then this will also be admissible in other cases. So then we have proved that non-existence is a new kind of *pramāṇa*.

[Defendent]: To this we answer: (A) Must we say that the person who had gone to another spot and was questioned by somebody else, possesses a presential (*idāntina*) non-perception of Devadatta in the temple and thus states a presential non-existence [to be expressed in the words]: „is not now”; or (B) that he by means of a praeterital (*prāktana*) non-perception states a praeterital non-existence [which may be paraphrased as]: „he was not at the time of the grasping of the temple?”

(A). A presential non-perception — [that is to say] a non-perception of something which allows [perception] — cannot be upheld; for the non-existence of Devadatta [in the temple] at this moment is dubious, because of separation in place, since it is possible for him to have gone up there.

(B). But a praeterital non-perception [which would be] capable<sup>2)</sup> of determining a praeterital non-existence is not of force for the present moment, because it has entered into another stage [i. e. from a presential non-perception it has become a praeterital non-perception].

And a [now] not-existing notion<sup>3)</sup> cannot function as a cause, and neither is a notion, object of remembrance, active, because it was not known of before. Neither can non-perception be proved by another means of knowledge, because it has itself the form of non-existence; and if, [on the other hand], it should depend on another non-perception, then there would be an endless regress. Therefore this non-perception [upheld by you as a separate source of knowledge and] which is supposed to circumscribute the objects as the sense-organs do, is never grasped. This is the right view (*śūddhānta*). If so, how could there ever be a remembrance of it; for it itself is never experienced.

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *cyāreṭṭhi vā*.

<sup>2)</sup> Read: *°gajja ta*.

<sup>3)</sup> Read: *°prattitthi*.

[Opponent]: But my idea [is as follows]: The non-perception of Devadatta in the temple is brought to an end by the perception of Devadatta, but this [last-mentioned] perception does not arise in him who has gone to another spot. Therefore only his non-perception exists.

And if [you bring forward the objection]: „this non-perception has reached another stage <sup>1)</sup>; and whilst there is a transition of stage [in the non-perception], there is no transition [of stage] in the objective world”, then [I answer]: let it be here so [as you admit]. But there where formerly no non-existence of the object was grasped [i.e. made conscious], because the remembrance of the *pratyogin* was lacking, there afterwards, after the grasping of the object, will arise an intellection about praeterital non-existence, [to be expressed in the words]: „here it was not [up to] now”. What objection <sup>2)</sup> can there be against this?

[Defendent]: [There is such an objection]: for the non-perception of a certain object comes to an end by its perception. And a non-perception, [to be expressed in the words: „the non-existence] was before”, and not being known of before, cannot be the cause of a notion; because the unwished-for consequence would be that also somebody who has lost his sense-organs, would grasp objects (*viśaya*).

[Opponent]: If I should say: the presential non-perception of a certain object (= *tasya*) is brought to an end by a presential perception; but the praeterital non-perception still remains and by this [praeterital non-perception], capable of circumlimitating the praeterital non-existence, this praeterital non-existence is circumlimitated.

[Defendent]: O scholarship, o cleverness! — Non-perception is a non-existence previous to perception, and this [non-existence], limited by the origination of the object, and being one, is not split by a differentiation of past and present. And as for [your defense]: „in such a case the presential non-perception is destroyed, but the praeterital [non-perception] is not destroyed”, who else then, except somebody gifted with an intellect sharp as the point of Kuṣa grass, can realise this over-subtle distinction. So then, we [in our simplicity] do not understand [your thesis]: the [objective] non-existence is circumlimitated by a [notional] non-existence”. How then [you may ask] does it happen, that somebody, after having grasped only

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. p. 227 l. 10.

<sup>2)</sup> Read: *pratikārah*.

[an object's] innate nature and having gone to another place, obtains the notion of non-existence, whilst the *pratiyogin* is remembered? By inference. For [when two objects possess such a nature that] if one (*A*) is remembered, the other (*B*) is capable of being remembered, and when this latter object (*B*) is not remembered, although the wish for its remembrance exists, then [we conclude]: „this object (*B*) did not exist at the time of the grasping of the other (*A*)”.

Unlike a pot which possesses an existence formerly ascertained, and which is remembered after that only its place is remembered, is Devadatta, although a fit object for remembrance, not remembered, even if the temple is remembered and the wish for remembrance exists. Hence we draw from this non-existence of remembrance the inference: „Devadatta was not [in the temple] at the time of the grasping of the temple”.

[Opponent]: If I should say: sometimes it is found that two objects are simultaneously perceived, but that [afterwards] by a lack of clearness in the latent impressions we remember one thing, and do not remember the other; e.g. when we remember one *pada* of a memorised *çloka*, but do not remember another *pada*. How then could we infer in this case the non-existence [of the forgotten or lacking *pada*] from its non-remembrance, accompanied by the remembrance of the other? [Such an inference would be impossible], because of the manysidedness (*anaikāntikatva*) of the probans.

[Defendent]: [You could just as well ask]: sometimes by some cause or other, one of two things, placed together, is perceived, and the other is not; how then is the non-existence of the not perceived pot proved by the perception of the floor? But my intention is:

When one of two objects, both connected with one intellection, is perceived, then the non-perception of the other is a proof for its non-existence. But not every non-perception [is of that kind]. Namely by the same intellection by which the floor is grasped, the pot connected with that floor, is grasped. The same bundle of conditions necessary for the grasping of the floor is necessary for the [grasping of the] pot. If the pot were on the floor, then it would be known, whenever the floor is known, for [both intellections] depend on the same bundle of conditions. But it is not known, therefore it neither exists, because its non-perception is not possible in any other way.

And if so, then also:

when one of two objects, both connected with one intellection

of ours, is remembered, then the non-remembrance of the other is a proof for its non-existence. [Namely] the same bundle of conditions necessary for the grasping of the temple, is also necessary for the [grasping of] Devadatta, conjoined to it. And that bundle of conditions necessary for the grasping — which is [at the same time] the bundle necessary for the remembrance of the temple — is also the bundle of conditions necessary for the remembrance of Devadatta, because [both remembrances] are connected with the one [original] intellection about those [two objects]. If Devadatta had been [in the temple] at the time when the temple was grasped, then he <sup>1)</sup> would also be remembered; because the [two] bundles of conditions are equal for these [two objects]. But he is not remembered; therefore Devadatta was not [there]; since the not remembering him is not possible in any other way.

Thus [the two cases] are similar.

But the *padas* of a *śloka* are recited successively in accordance with the utterance, and are not connected with one intellection. That *pada*, now, of those [belonging to one *śloka*] of which a stronger latent impression is born, is remembered, and not the other. So there is no unfitness.

Similarly the intellection about anterior non-existence of an object which is now perceived — an intellection [to be expressed in the words]: „this was not here before” — is an inference from the non-existence of the remembrance of its existence, whilst, [namely, at the same time] we remember the previous existence (*astitva*) of its *pratīyogin* [i. e. the positive state of things of which it is the negation].

As for those who accept the non-existence of remembrance as the source of knowledge, called „non-existence”, they are refuted by ĆABARASVĀMIN’S *Bhāṣya* in the words: „non-existence is a non-existence of a source of knowledge” [i. e. takes place when no other source of knowledge is present] and by the Vārttika <sup>2)</sup> in the words: „when the five trustworthy means of knowledge do not arise with reference to a particular object &c.” Thus enough.

#### 49. *Non-existence as a separate category.*

But to those who say thus: „the consideration of it [i. e. non-existence] as a trustworthy means of knowledge is not fit, because

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *āsmariṣyate*.

<sup>2)</sup> Ćlokavārttika p. 473 cl. 1.



a 'knowable', possessing the form of non-existence, does not exist" this question may be asked:

What is the objective foundation for the contents of consciousness, [to be expressed in the words]: „there is not". If it is answered: „nothing", then a helping hand is offered to the Mahāvānikas who maintain that intellection lacks any objective foundation. But if it is answered: the earth is the objective foundation [of the non-existence e. g. of the pot], then also a surface of earth, covered with thorns, would give rise to the notion: „there are no thorns", and the activity which has the form of going and coming and which supposes [this lack of thorns] would — no doubt — with difficulty be kept off.

[Opponent]: If I should say: The contents of consciousness, [expressed in the words]: „there is not" has for its object the earth as such [without any surplus]; and this *kaivalya* (state of being void of additions) is checked by the presence of thorns; for this reason both the notion [of non-existence of thorns] and activity are absent.

[Defendent]: Is this *kaivalya* (perfect isolation) of earth its innate nature or a separate quality? In the first place, the innate nature is not disturbed by our being conscious of thorns &c.; and so then the not stopping of notion and activity would arise in this case too as a difficulty; but if on the other hand we accept [*kaivalya* as] a separate quality, we arrive at an entity besides [the existent thing, similarly as we uphold non-existence to be a category next to existence].

But if you think:

[Opinion, attributed to the opponent]: Existence allows a double state either it is single or accompanied (*sadvitiya*). [Of these two forms] the single existence is the innate nature; and this is likewise indicated by [the word]: *kevala* (merely, pure). The perception, now, of the [ground] as such, whilst we wish to perceive a pot which is the perceptible correlative object (*pratiyogin*) — [of the *ghaṭābhāva*] — leads to the [rather incorrect] language-expression „the non-existence" <sup>1)</sup> of the pot" &c.

[Defendent]: To this we answer: Whilst you [try to] separate the [notion] „ground" from [the notion] „non-existence of pot", which object do you accept [to be indicated] by the word „single", [an object] which is the objective foundation of the negative proposition: „there is not". For without a differentiation in the objects

1) Read: *ghaṭābhāvah*.

neither can a differentiated intellection arise, nor is a differentiation of language-expression possible.

[Opponent]: If I should say: The innate oneness of existence is this singleness (*ekākitva*):

[Defendent]: What is this oneness? The being devoid of a correlation (*pratīyogin*) or the number „one”? The number „one”, in as far as it remains the same time with its abode, also undergoes the accompanied state of the existent thing. But if the innate oneness is the condition of being void of the correlation (*pratīyogin*), then another ‘knowable’, [namely: „non-existence’] is proved.

[Opponent]: But even in the case of him who accepts non-existence [as a separate category], is the comprehending of the ground the cause of the notion of non-existence; for if the ground were not conceived, the notion of non-existence with reference to a spot [of that ground] would not be fit.

[Defendent]: In the first place the notion: „there are no thorns”; does not arise, when we perceive the ground, covered with thorns, &c. But whilst the comprehension of the ground, characterised by non-existence, is the cause of the notion „non-existence” with reference to non-existence [in general], so with reference to non-existence of a certain object the comprehension of the ground, characterised by the non-existence of this object [functions as a cause]. Thus the comprehension of non-existence arises from a perception which concerns the ground and is characterised by the non-existence of a certain object; consequently [this non-existence] would be understood as being itself the cause of itself [i. e. as being independent of another object].

[Opponent]: Then you just as well [as I] would have to accept the [ground’s] condition of being single, a condition different from „non-existence” and excluding the connection with the *pratīyogin* [*pratīyogin* = the opposite of the „non-existence” in question]. And this condition, the notion of which is the same as the notion of non-existence, gives rise to our language-expression „there is not”.

[Defendent]: Neither is this fit. For the notion „non-existence” is the cause of the exclusively grasping of the innate nature of an existent thing. And when we grasp [the object as] accompanied, then there is no occasion for the arising of this notion. Just as in the case of the comprehension of the ground, so does the contract between the sense-organ and the non-existence form the complete set of conditions, necessary (*sāmagrī*) for the grasping of the non-existence. But even where the comprehension of the ground takes

place, the notion of non-existence does not arise; for eye, light &c. are not the cause of the perception [of non-existence], but where something does not exist, there is this [non-existence of it] perceived. So then non-existence [as an objective category] is proved.

50. *Discussion of the anvitābhīdhānavāda and the abhīhitāncayavāda.*<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 231 l. 24.

[Introduction]: After we have found in our own selves the general rule: „he who uses certain words together, has the intention of informing us about the coherence of the meanings of these words”, [we arrive] at the inference which settles the meaning of a [heard] sentence from the [separate] words by means of the insight in the speaker's wish of teaching us the coherence of the meanings of such and such words, since he uses a collection of words. [This inference bases itself on the heard words]: but the understanding of it is not based on the objects, corresponding to the words (*padārthas*). For there is no separate knowledge-source to be accepted for the word-meanings, as [some] Mīmāṃsakas have taught.<sup>2)</sup> Neither does any power (*śakti*) for informing us about the sentence-meaning, appear in the „word-objects” (*padārthas*) which successively are denoted by the separate words [used] on behalf of communicating to us the sentence-meaning. For a knowledge-source [e. g. the words heard] has only the task of making us understand its *prameya* (i. e. its own contents), but is not the abode for a power of the *prameya*. Therefore if the word-objects were teaching us the sentence-fact, they would do this either by a probantial mark, or by an *anyathānananupatti* (reductio ad absurdum); in both cases the sentence-meaning would be something independent of the words (*aśābda*).

[Problem]: Do the words, one by one, inform us about their meanings as a probantial mark for the sentence-meaning, or do they, [as first] related (*anvita*) to each other, express their own meaning?

[Exposition of the *anvitābhīdhānavāda*]:<sup>3)</sup> Some answer this question as follows: The information of the signification by means of words is based on *vyutpatti* (language-knowledge). And this *vyutpatti* refers — with reference to expressions, used by old people

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. GAṆGANĀTHA JHA, *The Prābhakara School* p. 62.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. SPEYER, *Syntax* § 113 R. — Read: *padārthānām pramāṇāntaram*.

<sup>3)</sup> The term is derived from *anvitābhīhita*. Cf. SPEYER, *Syntax* § 209, 2.

[and heard by the growing up youth] like: „bring the cow, bind the cow” &c. — to the factors connected with the action or to the action connected with the factors, but not to the object in abstracto (*svarūpamātra*). Thus the word-objects, only as far as connected with each other, are indicated by the words.

[Opponent]: We answer to this: If in an expression such as „the cow, bring it hither”, the word „cow” already denotes the object of the word „bring”, in as far as these two word-objects are connected with each other, then the word „bring” would be superfluous, since its object has been mentioned before.

[Anvitābhīdhānavādin]: If I should say: whilst the objective [fact of] bringing is denoted by the word „bring”, so the word „cow” denotes its own object as related to this objective „bringing”; therefore this word „bring” is not superfluous.

[Opponent]: Then it would be proved that the single word „bring”, indicating its own object, is denotative without first being connected (*anavitābhīdhānin*): and as this word has an object [represented as] not connected, so will the case be with any other word. — So I have brought my handful of water to [the Manes of] your *avitābhīdhānavāda*.

When the word „bring” denotes its own object as connected with the object which is denoted by a precedent word, then so long as the precedent word does not denote its object, so long does neither the subsequent word denote its object as connected with the object of the precedent word, and so long as the subsequent word does not denote its object, so long does neither the precedent word denote its object as connected with the object of the subsequent word; thus [we meet here with the fault, called] mutual dependence.

And if you maintain:

[Opinion, attributed to the defendant]: First the words merely remind us of the word-meanings [or word-objects]; next each of them denotes its own object as connected with the object which was brought to memory by the others. Thus there is no mutual dependence.

[Opponent]: This does not hold good. For we always observe — with reference to the words — their concomitance with a connected (*anvita*) word-object; but they are not capable of bringing to our memory an isolated word-object in abstracto which is unconnected; for remembrance will proceed in accordance with the first direct impression. In the language-expressions, now, of old people a strict rule will be perceived, by means of agreement and

contrariety, between the word „cow” and an object possessed of a hump &c.; but not [between this word and] factors of an action; for we see the word „cow” used with deviations [i. e. sometimes used and sometimes not used] in the separate cases of these factors of an action. Therefore this word „cow”, when heard, will in consequence of constant application, bring to our memory simply an object which possesses a hump &c. and whose concomitance [with the word „cow”] does not admit an exception; but it will not bring to our memory the factors necessary for an action.

[Anvitābhīdhānavādin]: In this case the same mistake [which you reproach in the *anvitābhīdhānavāda*] would be common to your *anavitābhīdhānavāda*, namely: „when a fixed rule of concomitance is perceived between a certain object and word, then that word would only be the denotator of that object and of nothing else.”

[Opponent]: But neither is it well understood: that remembrance only proceeds in accordance with a strict rule of concomitance so as inference does. For [remembrance], which is simply based on latent impressions, arises also by the seeing merely of an [object], correlative [with the original object]. For instance by the sight of smoke we remember just as well the fire [which logically „pervades” smoke] as the kitchen [which is only accidentally concomitant with smoke]. Therefore if the word „cow” brings before our memory the objective cow, in consequence of the notion of concomitance, so it would remind us of [different] objects (*padārthas*) which are correlative with the objective cow. But exclusively reminding us of the objective cow as its contents, it is based on *vācaka* (denotative power) [and not on mere remembrance], because only on this supposition there is a strict rule possible.

Moreover, so as you uphold the *anvitābhīdhānavāda* for the words in a sentence, so you accept this *anvitābhīdhānavāda* for the root and the formatives (affixes and suffixes) within the word. But if each of these elements denotes its own object as connected with the object of the other, how does there exist besides these any word-object which is brought to memory by the [total] word?

Now this discussion which has fallen upon the opinions of the Nagnāṭikas,<sup>1)</sup> may end.

1) Cf. *Ālokavārttika*, transl. GAṆGĀDĀYANA JHĀ, p. 511 cl. 154 & footnote, and p. 427 cl. 107—108 (materiality and tangibility of sounds, upheld by the Jains).

51. *Proof for the trustworthiness of inference.*<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 255 1. 5 :

[Vaīᅒeᅒika]: But to those who do not accept inference as a trustworthy means of knowledge and merely accept perception as such, the following question may be put:

[Do you take as such] only one act on behalf of knowledge (*pramāᅒa*) i. e. one perception, so as it is conceived in its individual existence, or all perceptions? Certainly not only one *pramāᅒa*, because there cannot be untrustworthiness in another such *pramāᅒa* which possesses the same totality of conditions. But every *pramāᅒa*, i. e. [on your standpoint] every perception, past as well as future, [a perception arising in yourself and] also a perception arising in somebody else, is such. How is this ascertained?

[Opponent]: If I should say: because [all perceptions] are of the same kind (*sajāᅒiᅒa*) as the individual perception which is experienced?

[Vaīᅒeᅒika]: [By this answer] you have accepted the trustworthiness of *svabhāvaᅒumāna* (inference based on identity). Thus the proving force of inference is to be called *vikalpa* (determinate perception).<sup>2)</sup> — Who is to be informed [by you] about perception as a trustworthy means of knowledge? Not, you yourself, because you are the person who informs. If another then? Is it a well-informed person, who is to be informed, or a dissentient person? Not somebody well-informed; because information, given to somebody well-informed, is superfluous. And if [the person to be informed, is] somebody, dissentient, then this opposition of his, is not known [by you] with the aid of perception.

[Opponent]: If I should say: with the aid of the probans, afforded by words?

[Vaīᅒeᅒika]: [By this answer] you accept the trustworthiness of *kāryāᅒumāna* [i. e. inference based on the relation of effect to cause]. By what means would you prove [your original proposition]: „inference is not a *pramāᅒa*”<sup>3)</sup> [and implicitly how would you prove the notion „non-existence”], for perception has for object a positive entity (*vidhi*) and is not capable of negating anything else.

[Opponent]: If I should say: [this result] is reached by non-perception (*anupalabdhi*).

1) The argumentation is based on Buddhistic suppositions and therefore copied from a Buddhistic writing. Cf. here book IV section VII table E.

2) *vikalpavācyam*. Cf. SPEYER *Syntax* § 214.

3) Add *na* in Sanskrit text.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: So [you would have accepted] the existence of *anupalabdhi-līṅgākam anuvānam* (inference, based on non-perception as a probans). And this has been said by the Buddhists:

„The inclusion [of inference] in the trustworthy means of knowledge follows from (1) the fact that [one *pramāṇa*] belongs to the same class as other *pramāṇas*, (2) the fact that the opinion [to be refuted] is found in somebody else's [mind], (3) the fact that something can be denied.”

The meaning of this gloss (*vārttika*) is: (1) from the establishing of the generality of the *pramāṇa* and its non-existence(?), (2) from the acceptance of [the existence of] somebody else's thought, (3) from the denial of something, follows: the existence of inference, which is another *pramāṇa* than perception and which has for probans either innate nature, or effect, or non-perception.

## 52. *Sphoṭa*.<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 268 l. 24.

But here it must be noticed: when knowledge is being acquired by repetition [of the clauses in which it is expressed], — is then the sense of these [clauses] given by the clauses themselves or by *sphoṭa*? Why is there a doubt here? Because there is difference of opinion [about this point]. Some say: *sphoṭa* imparts the meaning to us, but others teach that the clause is the informer. Therefore, we may agree about the legitimacy of the doubt: whether, first, *sphoṭa* informs us about the meaning.

[Defendent of the *sphoṭa*-theory]: If the word is nothing else besides the speechsounds and if the clause is nothing else besides the words, then there would not exist any notion of the meaning. To wit: the speechsounds, taken one by one, do not awake in us any thought which has the meaning as its contents, for [if the single letter did so] the other speechsounds would be useless: and an aggregate of these does neither exist, because the preceding sounds have already ceased to exist at the moment of the perception of the final sound.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: such an aggregate does exist, because of the eternity of sounds?

[Defendent]: Even then the apprehension of them would not follow: for if that which is not apprehended, still causes apprehension,

<sup>1)</sup> See here book IV section IX table C. For a modern European treatment of the difficulties which gave rise to the *sphoṭa*-theory, see W. WITKOR *Völkerpsychologie*, Ier Band, *Die Sprache*, Ier Theil, 5tes Capitel I. Psychophysische Bedingungen der Wortbildung, 2. Psychologie der Wortvorstellungen.

then the unwished-for consequence would be that objects are always apprehended. For there is no difference [in this respect] between objects not apprehended after having first been so, and objects, not apprehended at all.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the speechsounds, first perceived and then deposited in the memory, are causes of the apprehension?

[Defendent]: If remembrance follows the [original] order, then there is no co-existence of sounds in this case either, for at the time, when the third sound is seized [by recollection], the remembrance of the first sound is destroyed. On the other hand, a simultaneous arising of the remembrances cannot be thought of, as the simultaneity of intellections is excluded<sup>1)</sup> [according to the generally accepted doctrine]. But if you would take refuge in [the following argumentation]:

[Supposed argumentation of the opponent]: First takes place the intellection of the first speechsound, after that is formed the impression [deposited in the memory], then arises the intellection of the third(?) sound, the last memory-impression [i. e. the impression of the last-mentioned or third sound-intellection] is determined by the first memory-impression, so in this way at last a memory-impression which has all the speechsounds as its contents, effects one single remembrance in one moment.

[Defendent]: [If we should accept this view], order would be done away with. Order, namely, means relation between preceding and following; this may be based either on (mathematical) space or on time. Neither form [of order] takes place in the [objective, physical] sounds; because they are omnipresent and eternal. Let the order of the sounds then be based on the order of the intellections! — even then the order of these [speechsounds], which would abide in one remembrance-intellection, would come to nought; thus the potency of manifestation would belong to [sounds] which lack order. In consequence of this, there would be no understanding of the difference in meaning which we notice in words as: *sara, rasa, vana, nava, dina, nadi* &c.; since the speechsounds do not differ from one another, and the order does not form part of the intellection. — Yet in fact this difference of meaning exists; and this difference which does not lie in the speechsounds themselves, proves the existence of another special cause; so then the theory of *spṛṣṭa* is proved.

[Opponent]: *Spṛṣṭa*, as long as it is not manifest, does not teach

1) See here book I p. 92 n°. 4.



us the meaning, otherwise the unwished-for consequence would be that we should always perceive meanings [of words]. But its manifestation cannot take place through the speechsounds! For these arising one after the other, are not fit for that, for similar reasons [as you have brought forward against me]: therefore the understanding by *sphoṭa* is likewise inconceivable.

[Defendent]: In respect to this [some people] say: the noises in the air, which differ according to the exertion [of utterance], in as far as they respectively form the essence of the speechsounds, reveal first the *sphoṭa* in an *asphoṭa*, indistinct manner, and finally by receiving the accompaniment of the *saṃskāras*, [impressions] which the objects have formerly left [in our soul], those [noises or sounds] make the *sphoṭa* apparent. Thus at the end, the right meaning, clear, and one, and without parts, is experienced, in the same way as handwriting in which the differences of all speechsounds have disappeared. For if only the speechsounds were the word, then this could not be perceived in one act of intellect, and so this intellection, as having no basis, comes to an end: nor does then the statement hold: „from the word we learn the meaning”: therefore there is something different from the sounds, [an entity] from which the meaning bursts forth.

[Opponent]: If things are thus conceived, we answer: When [compound] words are pronounced as *gṛṇaratnābhāraṇaḥ*, *kūyastha-kulatilakāḥ*, *pāṇḍudāsah*, then only the sounds which follow in order are perceived, but there is no manifestation of any matter beyond these sounds. For, if this manifestation is first apprehended in the form of sounds, and finally appears in its true form, then the falsity of the former cognition is obtained, just as [the falsity of] the intellection concerning silver [gets apparent] on the realising [the existence of] the mother of pearl. But we do not make this observation: „these are indeed no speechsounds, but this is *sphoṭa*”. On the contrary, this intellection, which also refers to one object, does not give rise to a second [representation of the] object, but just like the notion of the wood,<sup>1)</sup> [the unity of the word] has only for basis the collection of the speechsounds, and people use the expression: „we learn the thing from the word”, in as far as they admit the collection of the speechsounds. And [the word-meaning, if] not learnt by the aid of perception [and recollection], cannot be arrived at through any other means of knowledge, for such an expedient is lacking.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book I p. 58 & Chakravartika transl. p. 329 &c.

[Defendent]: If I should answer: [the wordmeaning] cannot arise in another way [i. e. unless we accept *sphoṭa*], therefore [this *sphoṭa*] is the expedient.

[Opponent]: Is then this *sphoṭa* accepted by you as the cause of the becoming aware of the wordmeaning, whilst it itself is unperceived, or whilst it is perceived? If it should be so whilst unperceived, then the unwished-for consequence would be that we should always have intellections of wordmeanings. On the other hand a perception of the *sphoṭa* neither takes place, as I have said formerly. The understanding of the meaning [follows], is dependent on, the intrinsic nature of the speechsounds only. Therefore, which expedient could be accepted with more right, with reference to the communication of meanings, than the pursuit of the originating of these [sounds]? — But moreover the supposition of [a *sphoṭa*] which is not perceived, is not allowable, just as little as [the supposition of] a sky-flower. And you cannot say:

[Supposed answer of the defendant]: If the speechsounds should reveal the wordmeaning, then the unwished-for consequence would be that the wordmeaning would arise, even when the order [of the sounds] were different, when there were different agents (i. e. speakers, each of whom uttered separate sounds], or when there were intervals [between the sounds].

[Opponent]: [You cannot say so], for the speechsounds, having transverted order, or proceeding from different speakers, or separated from each other in place or time, are not the cause of a thought concerning the meaning [in the hearer's soul]. For the efficiency of things must be deduced from their effects; just as their effects are, so must their efficiencies be considered. As has been said by the Honourable [KUMĀRILA]:

(Çlokavārttika, sūtra V, section 12 çl. 69, edition p, 527, cf. GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ's transl. p. 272): „Speechsounds are denotative of a meaning, only when occurring in proper number, of proper quality, and in reference to such a meaning for the information of which they are known to be fit.”

Order of speechsounds exists, since they are omnipresent and eternal. Therefore, the meanings differ in words as *nadi*, *dīna*, because the order [of the sounds] differs.

[Defendent]: If I should answer: no order exists in the speechsounds. How then can this order of theirs be an auxiliary?

[Opponent]: No; [you are wrong; such an auxiliary exists], since the relation of *ante* & *post*, [which relation is] effected by place

and time, is to be acknowledged between these [speechsounds] which enjoy origination and are [qualities of physical space] which do not cover the whole [of their substratum]. And as to your saying: „These [speechsounds], arising successively, are not fit [for producing one wordmeaning in the hearer's soul]”, neither can this be considered to be other people's opinion. For though the speechsounds are not lasting, yet the impressions [in the soul], relating to them and occurring in order, when united, effect the thought of the wordsense. Or to express myself otherwise, the last speechsound, either supported by impressions or by the remembrance of the former speechsounds, affords the meaning: and that many impressions, after becoming united, effect a remembrance, this has been shown in our treatment of twoness.<sup>1)</sup> And if you mean:

[Supposed answer of the defendent]: The understanding of the meaning, owing to an impression, which has a speechsound for contents, cannot be admitted: for impressions are only capable of producing a remembrance of that which first as object caused the birth of its perception, and [cannot originate] another effect. So as MAṆḌANA has said in his *Proof of Sphoṭa*:

„The impressions, undoubtedly, make the effect ripen only in reference to those objects, colours, appearances, by which they have been themselves produced.”

[Opponent]: This neither is correct. For the impressions which have the speechsounds for contents, by being deposited one after the other by the perceptions with a tendency towards the understanding of the wordmeaning, are thus deposited as possessing a power different from the impressions which are [merely] causes of remembrance, since we may infer their being so from their effects. Or otherwise, let the impressions (*samskāras*) have the [full] character of impressions (*bhāvanās*) [i. e. unchanged repetitions of former perceptions], even then a power of teaching us the wordmeaning belongs to them, because they are of such a nature. For he who assumes *sphoṭa*, is also obliged to assume for the *sphoṭa* the power to make wordmeanings apparent. And hence a needless multiplication of suppositions. When, however, only the fitness of the *samskāra* (a notion common to both parties) is accepted, then there is simplicity [of suppositions]; therefore only this [theory, given by me] should be assumed. As has been said by the Nyāya-vādin [Kumārila]:

(Ālokavārttika sūtra V, section 12 śloka 102, edition p. 536,

<sup>1)</sup> Praç. Bhāṣya book III chapter II § 7 and here book II p. 202 § 5.

Gaigānātha Jhā's translation p. 207): „Though it is an acknowledged fact that *saṃskāra* is the cause of remembrance, yet that does not preclude its applicability to other purposes.”

### 53. *The eternity of generality.*<sup>1)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 315 l. 5:

Because generality differs from the substances &c., therefore it is eternal. If generality did not differ from substance &c., then it would perish at the moment when substance &c. perish, and its origination would take place at the time of their origination; but since there is difference, this rule is not met with.

[Opponent]: To this some say: the intellection which persists in different objects, foundates generality; and this [intellection] does not bring before us two objects, to wit generality and difference which are individually independent of each other, like a stick and a man, and neither [does it show to us] the relation of characteriser and thing to be characterised, since the notion „this has a cow-nature” (*gotvin, gotcavant*) does not arise. But this notion, [to be formulated]: „this is a cow”, grasps identity (*tādātmya*), because it reflects on the essence of one [thing], for when the two, [the individual cow and the generality „cow”] are abstracted from each other, then there is no other innate nature [left]. For agreement — as in the case of *gotva* — is the innate nature (*svarūpa*) of every generality; and deviation (difference) — as in the case of the individual cow — is the innate nature (*svabhāva*) of all other individuals; but the innate nature of *gotva* is differentiated from all other generalities; and the differentiation from other individuals is the innate nature of the individual cow: but one of them [either the cow or the *gotva*] cannot be defined without their mutual identity. And it is not right to say: „the one is the innate nature of this [identity], and the other is that which bears the relation”, for no relation is possible for a thing which has no innate nature [i. e. your distribution of *svabhāva* and *sambandha* to two separate entities cannot be upheld]; therefore the mutual identity of genus (*jāti*) and individual is the truth. And we have proved the theory which accepts both difference and non-difference [of individual and generality]. For we conceive [the notion] „the *bāhuleya* is a cow”

1) The eternality of *jāt*, also accepted by the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā; *The Prābhākara School* p. 100.

just as well as „the *çāvaleya* is a cow”. And the objection (*bādha*). „merely the *çāvaleya* is a cow and the *bāhuleya* is not”, does not hold good: but all people agree about this: „the one is a cow, and the other is a cow”. And whilst here the identity of *gotva* — which is also identical with the *çāvaleya* — with the *bāhuleya* is sure on the ground of the notion, yet the difference [of the *gotva*] from the *çāvaleya* is also certain. This, namely, is the difference between individual and generality: that the generality also possesses identity with the second individual. And this is just the essence of generality that it possesses identity with both.

[Defendent]: If I should say: difference and non-difference of one [and the same thing] is self-contradictory?

[Opponent]: No, it is not, and it does not become you who know the means [of right argumentation] to give this answer. That is contradictory where the intellection falls short, but with reference to that which is always known by a trustworthy means of knowledge to be the same, the mere allusion to a contradiction, by way of answer, is contradictory.

[Defendent]: If I should say: such a thing [scil. that difference and non-difference apply to one and the same object] is seen nowhere else?

[Opponent]: But perception, no less than inference, follows the seen [object], therefore this [that you mention] is put aside by *anavasthā* [by the failure of an endless regress]. But this [that I uphold] owes its origin to its own capability; and when a certain object shows a certain [quality] in a certain way, then it does so in that way. But it does not admit of refutation by [the mentioning] that is not experienced elsewhere; for the unwished-for consequence would be that every [form of] existence could be refuted. So then generality, which [in some objects] arises and perishes in accordance with the arising and perishing of these individuals, and which [in other objects] remains since these individuals remain, is eternal and non-eternal, but not merely eternal.

[Defendent]: Whilst this is arrived at, we answer: does the notion of genus and individual grasp one form (*ākāra*) which has no difference for both,<sup>1)</sup> or does it grasp two forms which differ from each other? On the first alternative there would be only one object; and no oneness of two objects, for we have to do with identity (*abheda*) when something is known by an intellection which contains a form without differences (*avilakṣākāra*). On the second

<sup>1)</sup> Leave out. „*ata* to *pr*: *abhedaṃ grhṇati*”.

alternative a contradiction arises; for the becoming conscious of different forms means a becoming conscious of difference (*bheda*), and when this takes place, there is no room for an identity [of two objects]; how then do you lay down a non-difference of two different [things], and how, consequently, could a notion of identity be applied here? In no way, according to our opinion. [Thus], if one form (*ākāra*) is realised, the notion relates to only one object, and not to two; but if two forms are realised, the arising of this notion [of identity] is not possible. The fact that the contents of consciousness, [to be expressed in the words]: „this is a cow” is indivisible, follows from the force of inherence. When there is conjunction (*samyoga*) of two things, then connection (*samsarga*) shows itself; but this is the importance of inherence that the two [things] possessing relation, are perceived closely united like the piece of iron and the heat [which pervades it]; yet the genus is not the innate nature of the individual; although therefore there exists difference between them, yet the innate nature of the individual cannot be torn apart from the genus, so as the Badara-shrub, belonging to a hedge, [can be torn out of this]. However, perception [of one of them] is possible, whilst the other is omitted, for it is possible for somebody to comprehend the individual, although the comprehension of the generality *gotva* is far, <sup>1)</sup> and for somebody to comprehend the *gotva* in a second species, although the first specimen is absent; thus generality is essentially separated from the individual, according to the authority of the logicians (*tārṅhikas*).

#### 54. *The denial of generality by the Buddhist.*<sup>2)</sup>

Nyāya-kandalī p. 317 l. 24:

[Buddhist]: To this the Buddhists say: No generality exists, because we do not perceive one form in the perceived differences, so as a string on which the pearls are fastened.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: This is not fit, for the notion of the form (*ākāra*) of generality arises, after we have perceived several individuals such as cows &c., a generality which is distinct from such individuals as horses &c. If there were not one point of concordance in *çāvaleḡas* &c., which are mutually distinct, then the individual cows would be observed to be as dissimilar to each other, as individual cows, horses &c. are, or [on the other hand] so as the

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *gotva-grahatya*.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. here book IV section VII table E.

individual cows are perceived as similar, so also individual cows and horses would show themselves as similar]; for there would be no difference in the two cases. But exclusively the individual cows, which are perceived as similar (*sarūpa*), foundate a single form (*rūpa*) which is common to their own set and distinct from horses &c.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: the oneness in the individual cows ensues from the fact that [these cows] give rise to one form of *arthakriyā* (practical efficiency) and are consequences of the same cause?

[Vaiṣeṣika]: If no generality exists, then there cannot arise oneness of the causes of the individuals nor of the effects which are mutually distinct, just as little as [oneness] of the individuals themselves. Moreover if oneness should depend on the origination from one cause, then no oneness would exist in individuals which originate from different causes, and yet difference of causes is seen of [effects] which have identical natures: so, for instance, fire owes its origination to the rubbing of wood or to the burning-glass hit by the sunbeams. And if [you maintain that] oneness results from oneness of effect, then [I uphold that] oneness is met with [as effect, i. e. as a quality] of heterogeneous things; so, for instance, the act of drawing, giving milk &c. is seen in the individual buffaloes, just as well as in the individual cows: and that cow which is not milked or which is not used for drawing, would not be a cow. — Moreover, if there were no generality, which object could bear the relation of the word to it? In the first place (*A*) it could not be the object in its individual appearance (*śālakṣaṇa*), because that which is momentary and in every respect discrete, cannot be the object of word-convention. Neither (*B*) could distinct apperception (*vikalpa*) be the word-meaning, because this [too would] be momentary and not-general (*asādhāraṇa*). Is then (*C*) the form of the distinct apperception (*vikalpākāra*) the word-meaning? [We may make here two distinctions]: Either the form of the distinctive apperception is different from the apperception itself (*Cu*) or it is not different from it (*Cb*). If it differs from it, is it then common to every distinctive apperception<sup>1</sup>) or does it vary with every distinctive apperception? If it is common, then this [form of distinctive apperception] does not differ from [that which we call] generality; if perhaps [you raise the objection that] it is a quality of intellection for you and a quality of the object for us, then [I

<sup>1</sup> Read: *sarūpavikalpa*.

concede that] there is some difference, because [my generality] is perceived as objective. — If the form of distinctive apperception, [accepted as] different [from this apperception], varies with every apperception, or when it is not different from [i. e. identical with] the intellection (*Cb*), in both cases a relation towards the words is not fit, because word-convention is not possible [for such varying *vikalpākāras*] just as little as for the intellections.

[Buddhists]: If I should say: Distinctive apperception projects continually its own form under the aspect of externality, owing to a series of causality and thus builds up the imaginations (*vikalpayati*) [which the naive man calls the objective world]. On this the relation of the word bears.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: The form of the distinctive apperception which is projected under the aspect of externality, is admitted as originated, when the distinctive apperception itself originates, and as perishing when this apperception perishes, and thus appears to vary according to the distinctive apperception. But word-convention cannot arise towards something subject to difference, as has been said (p. 318 l. 13 & 14).

And if you say:

[Argumentation, attributed to the Buddhist]: When one distinctive apperception<sup>1)</sup> of a cow has projected, under the aspect of externality, a certain resemblance of itself, then again another distinctive apperception of a cow will project a similar [resemblance]. — And the distinctive apperceptions, which separately merely comprehend their own forms (*ākāras*), are not capable of comprehending the difference of these forms which are projected over one another, because this [comprehending of difference] would depend on the comprehension of the two [*ākāras*]. And in consequence of this not comprehending, one of the *ākāras* (after having projected a oneness of the *ākāras* which themselves were projected by their respective apperceptions) is called the object. Therefore generality — (1) which has the character of non-existence, in as far as ultimate difference from other *vikalpākāras*, projected [by *vikalpas*], does not exist, and (2) which is called, the half of the fifth *ākāra* that is to be completed with<sup>2)</sup> its four auxiliaries, projected by the specific individual, the intellection and their *ākāras*, and (3) which possesses a projected externality, and (4) which can be denoted by word — is the object which bears the relation of the word

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *govikalpo*.

<sup>2)</sup> Read: *sahakāribhūḥ* or *sahāyāḥ*.



[to it]. — The definite apperception of it [i. e. of generality] is [at the same time] the definite apperception of the specific individual, because it [i. e. the apperception] projects [its object] as having for essence the [generality]. And it [i. e. generality] has for innate nature the exclusion from [anything] else; and is common to existence as well as non-existence, since [both expressions] are used „the cow is” „it is not”. If it had [merely] for innate nature existence, then the use [of the language-expression]: „the cow is” would be impossible, for it would be a tautology (*panaraktatva*); neither [would] [the expression]: „[the cow] is not”, be fit, because it would be contradictory. Similarly if the [generality] had [merely] for innate nature non-existence, then the expression „is not” would be a tautology, and the expression „it is” would be contradictory. As has been said:

„One should not say: „the pot is”, because the pot is merely being; neither should it be said: „it is not”, because existence and non-existence are contradictory to each other.”

For the same reason [i. e. because generality is based on the not grasping of difference], the oneness of individuals comes forward. For this [generality, as described by us] is the [common] object of all distinct apperceptions, because it is one; the oneness of the distinct apperceptions (*vikalpānām ekatvam*) results from the oneness of these [generalities] and there is also oneness of the vague intellections (*nīrvikalpānām ekatvam*) which are the cause of the distinct apperceptions and exist in accordance with their respective material bodies; and we understand the oneness of the individuals (*vyaktīnām ekatvam*) which are the causes of these *nīrvikalpas*, from the oneness of the *nīrvikalpakas*. As has been said:

The thought does not possess difference, because it is the cause of the reflection on „one”; also there is identity (*abhinnatā*) in the individuals, because they are the cause of the one thought.

[Vaiṣeṣika]: This is not fit, because the [notion of] *vikalpa* is not admissible [here]. As to what the Buddhists say: „the generality is a oneness which is projected in consequence of the not grasping of the *vikalpākāras*”, [I ask]: Is this projection of non-difference (identity) the not grasping of difference of the *ākāras*, or is it the grasping of their non-difference? Now, the first alternative does not hold good, for the unwished-for consequence would be that also difference would be projected. For not only is the difference of *vikalpākāras* not grasped, but neither is their non-difference grasped, and whilst there would be occasion for the

projection of difference owing to the not grasping of non-difference, — in the same way as the projection of non-difference takes place owing to the not grasping of difference — the language-expression of *abheda* (non-difference) in its usual sense could never be applied. Neither is right the second alternative: „the projection of identity is the grasping of the non-difference”. Because this does not take place. For one [reflective soul] which perceives several objects, states their difference and identity, but in your theory which denies the *ātman* (the one soul) there is not such a one person who perceives the several objects, because the distinct apperceptions are each exclusively bound to their own *ākāras*. But even supposing there is such a single person who perceives several objects, then neither will the grasping of identity in the different *ākāras* take place without one occasional cause; or even, if taking place, this grasping of identity will proceed with reference to the *ākāras*: cow, horse, buffalo &c. [without distinction], because there is no differentiation.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: the exclusion of the non-cow, which is not the individual cow, is this one occasional cause?

[Vaiᅒeᅒika]: What then are these non-cows, by the exclusion of which the oneness is projected over the cow-*ākāras*.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: those [objects] which are not cows. they are the non-cows?

[Vaiᅒeᅒika]: What then are the cows?

[Buddhist]: If I should say: [those things] which are not non-cows?

[Vaiᅒeᅒika]: After that the innate nature of the cows is defined, the innate nature of the non-cows is defined by excluding them [from the cows]; and after the innate nature of the non-cows is defined, [you give] the definition of the innate nature of cows by excluding them [from the non-cows]. Thus since the one cannot be understood when the other is not excluded, both will not be understood. As the Honourable [Teacher KUMĀRILA has said]:

(Ālokavārttika p. 587 cl. 83 & 85, cf. transl. p. 311):

„It is an established [entity], the cow, which is negated by the *apoha*, and this [*apoha*] is only the negation of the cow. Here the cow, which is negated by the particle *na* [by which also the praefix *a-*, *an* is understood, according to Pāᅇini VI, 3, 73 & 74], must be explained... And in the absence of [an idea of] the cow, as an established [entity], there can be no [idea of] non-cow, and as such how [could you explain] the idea of the cow to be based upon the idea of the non-cow?”

[Vaiçesika]: But if you think:

[Opinion attributed to the Buddhist]: The word-meaning, which has no projected externality<sup>1)</sup> [i. e. which remains an internal fact] contains the *apoha* of everything else.

[Vaiçesika]: Then we say: what then is this *apoha*? Is the *apoha*, [expressed in the formula]: „non-cow” an existence [*A*] or a non-existence [*B*]? If it is an existence, is it then the innate nature of the individual cow [*Aa*] or has it the individual non-cow for self [*Ab*]? If [*Aa*] it is the individual cow, then this [*apoha*] would not be common [to all cows], and word is not used with reference to an object which is not of a general nature, as has been said. And [*Ab*] if it is the individual non-cow, the same fault arises and moreover there is this shortcoming that the object „cow” of the word „cow” [so as now defined] is not right [i. e. is just the opposite to that which we mean].

And if [*B*] *apoha* is defined as having non-existence for innate nature, because it aims at excluding something else, then it would never be comprehended as a notion, because the thing to be comprehended can be defined as that which produces an intellection, and because non-existence can be defined as the absence of every practical efficiency. And neither is there a comprehension of word-convention with reference to an object which is not grasped by perception, and neither will word be applied to a non-existence; nor, suppose it to be understood, would an act of the hearer take place towards the object, because existence and non-existence are different from each other and without connection.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: when non-existence is understood to be the specific individual, then there will be practical efficiency towards this individual without discrimination.

[Vaiçesika]: That which you contend, namely, „the observing of those who observe arises, after their having confounded the [thing so as] seen and [the thing so as] imagined by *vikalpa*, from these objects, over which *atat* (properties which they have not got) is projected by illusion”, is mistaken. Because it does not hold good that one projects non-existence as if it were objective [literally: in the form of „that”] over a thing which is perceived. And neither would then an observing of the hearer arise towards this object, because word would then bear on an object with imposed qualities (*atadviṣaya*) and because there would be no other trustworthy means of knowledge. However, we see man proceed towards

1) Read: *anaropabāhgyatvāḥ*.

an object on account of word; and thus the word-meaning does not bear on a non-existence. And [according to you] there is no other occasional cause [which could explain the trustworthiness of language], because everything objective is excluded from anything else, and momentary without precedent. And that which is taken hold of as being without any precedent, cannot be known with the aid of word. And neither could that which is not perceived by perception, be an object of avoiding or accepting, because [only] <sup>1)</sup> that which is well known, is fit for that. However, there is both activity, based on verbal information, and human conduct, aiming at reaching and avoiding that which is good and bad, [a conduct] which complies with the wants of the living being, and is based on perception. And this conduct also ascertains [the existence of] one generality in the different individual objects, for the practical man acts in view of a certain object which he had not seen before, provided he has ascertained its usefulness for practical efficiency, because it belongs to a certain class of objects, the notion of which is obtained by word.

„The intellection of accordant form (*ākāra*) in the different [objects] is the condition of the genus. And if this intellection is absent, then neither the practical man will exert himself.”

<sup>1)</sup> Read: *bharet, pari°*.

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# BOOK IV.

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MATERIAL FOR REFERENCE.

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## SECTION 1.

### BIBLIOGRAPHICAL LISTS.

In the first place the following notes are arranged thematically, in the second place chronologically. I thought it useless to give completeness to the lists by copying out information, found in current manuals, and have limited myself to those books of which I have made use during my preparatory study.

I have not repeated in these lists the titles of the books on European philosophy, quoted in the text; that I have limited myself there to German authors, is not due to prejudice, but to the former direction of my studies.

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## SECTION 3.

GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE  
PRAÇASTAPĀDA-BHĀṢYA.

The *Bhāṣya* is divided by the Indian editor into six *granthas* (books) according to the number of categories. The introduction, the general enumeration of categories and the discussion of substance are considered by him to form the first book. It is, however, more logical to distinguish here two *granthas*. Each of the books, further, is divided into *prakaraṇas* (chapters), and a *prakaraṇa* into paragraphs. I mean by a paragraph such a part of the text which is not interrupted by any comments.

## BOOK I. The six Categories.

## Chapter 1. Introduction &amp; enumeration of categories.

- 1) p. 1. *Maṅgala*: praise to the Lord and the muni KAṢĀDA.
- 2) „ 6. Enumeration of the six categories, connection between the knowledge of the categories and liberation (*nih-creyasa*).
- 3) „ 7. Connection between duty (*dharma*), prescribed by the Lord, and liberation.

## Chapter 2. The species of the categories enumerated.

- 1) p. 8. Statement of the topic now to be discussed. Enumeration of substances; 2) p. 10. enumeration of the qualities; 3) p. 11. enumeration of the actions; 4) p. 11. the two forms of generality; 5) p. 13. definition of ultimate difference; 6) p. 14. definition of inherence; 7) p. 15. conclusion.

## Chapter 3. The properties, common to all or some of the six categories.

- 1 & 2) p. 16. Properties, common to all six categories.
- 4 & 4) „ 16. Properties, common to five of the categories.
- 5—9) „ 17—19. Properties, common to three of the categories.

## BOOK II. Substance.

Chapter 1. The properties, common to all or some of the nine substances

1—15 p. 20-26. Similar treatment, as in the precedent chapter.

Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the nine substances..

1) p. 27. Topic mentioned.

2) .. 27. Earth, its qualities, two kinds of earth: atomical and developed. Division of developed earth into three kinds: body, sensory (organ of smell) and object. Subdivision and description of these three kinds.

3) .. 35. Water, similar order of treatment as in 2). The bodies, consisting of water, live in Varuṇa's world.

4) .. 38. Fire: its qualities and its kinds: atomical and developed. Developed fire divided into: bodies living in Āditya's world, the eye as organ of sight, objects. Four kinds of objects: fire on earth, heavenly fire (lightning &c.), heat of the animal body, mineral fire or gold &c.

5) .. 44. Wind, its qualities: its kinds: atomical and developed. Developed wind of *four* kinds: body (world of the Maruts), organ of touch, object and prāṇa (vital air).

6) .. 48. The creation and destruction of the world (specially of the four developed elements).

7) .. 58. Physical space, as the substance which possesses sound as a quality. Inference to prove its existence. The qualities of physical space (oneness, infinite greatness, &c.). Explanation of deafness.

8) .. 63. Time: inference to prove its existence; time as a cause of our temporal notions; time as a cause of origin, existence and perdition; its qualities: though really one, called many in consequence of its upādhis.

9) .. 66. Mathematical space, cause of the notion of the ten directions; its qualities: though really one, the ten names of the regions invented by the Ancient Wise for the use in profane and daily language: the mythological names of the regions.

10) .. 69. Soul. Proofs for its existence: 1. as the subject of sensorial knowledge, (p. 69 l. 6--16), 2. as the doer of the movements, executed by the body, 3. as the cause of the activity of the vital airs, 4. as the cause of the (unconscious) movements) of the eyelids,

5. as the cause of the states of our body (growth, health &c.), 6. as the agent, who directs the movement of the internal organ and thus causes the conjunction between an external organ and a desired object, 7. as the one perceiver of visual and gustatory impressions (saliva is formed in the mouth immediately after seeing a certain object), 8. as the substance in which pleasure, pain, wish, aversion and volition inhere. — Proofs for the proposition that pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are qualities of the soul (and not of the body). Complete enumeration of the qualities of the soul.

- 11) p. 89. The internal organ. Proofs for its existence: 1. necessity of the cooperation of attention in the arising of intellections, pleasures &c., 2. the arising of remembrances, whilst the external sense-organs are inactive, 3. the existence of other perceptibles (nam. pleasures &c.) which cannot be perceived by the external sense-organs. — The qualities of *manas* (*samkhyā*, *parimāṇa*, *prthakta*, *samyoga*, *vibhāga*, *paratva*, *aparatva*, *samskāra*). Other characteristics (*dravya-anārambhakatva*, *mūrtatva*, *ajñatva*, *parārthatva*, *āṇusamcāritū*).

### BOOK III. Quality.

#### Chapter 1. Characterisation of the qualities.

- 1—6) p. 94—95. Characterisation in respect to the substances in which they inhere.  
 7—8) „ 95—96. Distinction between common and special (typical) qualities.  
 9—12) „ 96—97. The qualities with reference to the organs of sense.  
 13—24) „ 98—100. The qualities, considered with reference to other qualities, as their causes or effects.  
 25) „ 101. Qualities which have movements as their effects.  
 26—29) „ 101—102. The qualities, considered with reference to causality in general.  
 30—31) „ 103. Qualities which „cover” a portion or the whole of the substance.  
 32—33) „ 103. Qualities, considered with reference to the duration of the substance.



## Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the twenty-four qualities.

- 1) p. 103. Introduction.
- 2) „ 104. Colour.
- 3) „ 105. taste.
- 4) „ 105. smell.
- 5) „ 106. touch.
- 6) „ 106. Qualities. produced by the influence of fire.
- 7) „ 111. Number.
- 8) „ 137. dimension.
- 9) „ 138. singleness.
- 10) „ 139. conjunction.
- 11) „ 151. separation.
- 12) „ 164. farness and nearness.
- 13—45) p. 171—258. Intellection.
- 13) p. 171. synonyms of the term *buddhi*.
- 14) „ 172. its manifold forms.
- 15) „ 172. division into trustworthy and untrustworthy intellections (knowledge & ignorance).
- 16) „ 174. *saṃcaya*.
- 17) „ 177. *ciparyaya*.
- 18) „ 182. *anadhyavasāya*.
- 19) „ 183. *svapna*.
- 20) „ 186. knowledge, divided into perception, inferential knowledge, remembrance and inspired knowledge.
- 21) „ 186. perception.
- 22) „ 200. definition of inferential knowledge (knowledge, reached by a mark, *liṅga*).
- 23) „ 200. definition of the mark, in two ślokas.
- 24) „ 201. explanation of the first śloka.
- 25) „ 204. explanation of the second śloka.
- 26) „ 205. division of *liṅgikam jñānam* into *dṛṣṭam* and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*.
- 27) „ 213. *śabda* really a form of inference.
- 28) „ 220. gesticulation, a form of inference.
- 29) „ 220. *upamāna* (comparison) a form of inference.
- 30) „ 223. *arthāpatti*, a form of inference.
- 31) „ 225. *sambhava*, a form of inference.
- 32) „ 225. *abhāva*, a form of inference.
- 33) „ 230. *aitihya*, a form of inference.
- 34) „ 231. inference, expressed for another.
- 35) „ 233. enunciation of the five members of such an inference; definition of the first member (*pratijñā*), its fallacies.

- 36) p. 237. the second member (*apadeṣa*).
- 37) „ 238. possible faults in this member.
- 38) „ 246. the third member (*nīdarṣana*).
- 39) „ 247. possible faults in this member.
- 40) „ 249. the fourth member (*anusandhāna*).
- 41) „ 250. the fifth member (*pratyāmnāya*). — Summary of  
§ 35—41. Necessity of the five *avayavas*.
- 42) „ 255. assurance.
- 43) „ 256. remembrance.
- 44) „ 258. inspired knowledge.
- 45) „ 258. *siddhudarṣana*.
- 46) „ 259. Pleasure.
- 47) „ 260. pain.
- 48) „ 261. desire.
- 49) „ 262. aversion.
- 50) „ 263. volition.
- 51) „ 263. weight.
- 52) „ 264. fluidity.
- 53) „ 266. adhesion.
- 54) „ 266. *saṃskāra* (physical inertia, latent preservation of psy-  
chical impressions, physical elasticity).
- 55) „ 272. merit.
- 56) „ 280. demerit.
- 57) „ 280. *saṃsāra*.
- 58) „ 281. liberation.
- 59) „ 287. sound.

## BOOK IV. Action.

- 1) p. 290. General characterisation of action.
- 2) „ 291. Definition of *utkṣepaṇa*.
- 3) „ 291. of *apakṣepaṇa*.
- 4) „ 291. of *ākūñcana*.
- 5) „ 292. of *prasāraṇa*.
- 6) „ 292. of *gamana*.
- 7) „ 292. Division of action into: *satpratīyayaṃ*, *asatpratīyayaṃ*,  
*apratīyayaṃ karma*. Discussion of the thesis that there  
are no more than five kinds of actions.
- 8) „ 296. Discussion of the difficulty (*saṃcaya*): is *gamana*  
equipollent or subordinate to *karman*.
- 9) „ 297. *Satpratīyayaṃ karma*: explanation of the movement  
of a pestle, held with the hand.
- 10) „ 300. *Asatpratīyayaṃ karma*. Explanation of the movement

- of the hand and of an object thrown with the hand.
- 11) p. 301. The same with reference to an object thrown with an instrument.
- 12) .. 303. *Apratyakṣaṇa karmāḥ*: *anāṇa*, one of the forms of *saṃyoga* which causes movement.
- 13) .. 304. *abhigṛhāta* & *saṃyukta-saṃyoga*, two other forms of *saṃyoga* which cause movement: the explanation of the falling of earth and water (*garutva* and *saṃskāra*).
- 14) .. 305. the flowing of water.
- 15) .. 307. revolving movement, caused by *saṃskāra*.
- 16) .. 308. the movement of the vital airs; the absence of movement in physical space, time, mathematical space and soul.
- 17) .. 308. the movement of the internal organ. Different movements, caused by *adrśta*.

BOOK V. Generality, p. 311.

BOOK VI. Difference, p. 321.

BOOK VII. Inherence, p. 324.

## SECTION 1.

Table A.

THE CONTENTS OF PRAÇASTAPADA'S BHĀṢYA.

Book 1, Chapter 3, in detail.

The properties of all or some of the six categories.

	Substance.	Quality.	Movement.	Generality.	Difference.	Inherence.
1) astitvam, abhidheyatvam, jñeyatvam . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..
2) ācṛitatvam . . . . .	.. <sup>1)</sup>	..	..	..	..	..
3) samavāyitvam, anekatvam .	..	..	..	..	..	..
4) nirguṇatvam, niṣkriyātvam	..	..	..	..	..	..
5) sattāsambandhaḥ . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..
sāmānyavattvam, viśeṣa-						
vattvam . . . . .						
svasamayārthaḥ abhidhe-						
yatvam . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..
dharmādharma-kartṛtvam . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..
6) kāryatvam, anityatvam . . .	.. <sup>1)</sup>	.. <sup>1)</sup>	..	..	..	..
7) kāraṇatvam . . . . .	.. <sup>1)</sup>	.. <sup>1)</sup>	..	..	..	..
8) dravyācṛitatvam . . . . .	.. <sup>1)</sup>	..	..	..	..	..
9) svātmasattvam, buddhila-	..	..	..	..	..	..
ṣaṇatvam . . . . .						
akāryatvam, akāraṇatvam .						
asāmānyatvam, aviśeṣatvam						
nityatvam, arthaḥ abhidh-	..	..	..	..	..	..
heyatvam . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..

Table B.

THE CONTENTS OF PRAÇASTAPĀDA'S BHĀṢYA,  
Book II, Chapter I, in detail.

The properties, common to all or some of the nine substances.

	prthivi	apas	tejas	vayu	akāṣa	kala	diś	atman	manas
1) dravyatvayogaḥ.....									
svātmanyārambhakatvam.....									
guṇavattvam.....	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
kāryakāraṇāvirodhitvam.....									
antyaṭyāyavattvam.....									
2) anaçritatvam, nityatvam.....	1.	1	1;	1;	"	"	"	"	1) anyatravayavi-
3) anekatvam, aparajātimattvam	"	"	"	"			"	"	dravyebhyaḥ.
4) kriyāvattvam, mūrtatvam....									
paratvāparatvavattvam.....	"	"	"	"				"	
vegavattvam.....									
5) sarvagatatvam.....									
paramamahattvam.....					"	"	"	"	
sarvasamyogisamānadeçatvam.									
6) bhūtatvam, indriyaprakṛtitvam									
bahyaikaikendriyagrahya-	"	"	"	"	"				
viçeṣaguṇavattvam.....									
7) dravyarambhakatvam.....									
spārçavattvam.....	"	"	"	"					
8) pratyakçatvam, rūpavattvam..	"	"	"						
dravatvam.....	"	"	"						
9) gurutvam, rasavattvam.....	"	"							
10) vaiçeṣikaguṇavattvam.....	"	"	"	"	"			"	
11) caturdaçaguṇavattvam.....	"	"						"	(Cf. here table D.)
12) kṣāṇika-ekadeçaviṭti-viçeṣa-									
guṇavattvam.....					"			"	
13) pañcaguṇavattvam.....									
sarvotpattimatam nimitta-						"	"		(Cf. table D).
kāraṇatvam.....									
14) naimittikadravatvayogaḥ.....	"	"							

Table C.

## CONTENTS OF THE BHAṢYA,

## Book III, Chapter I.

*Characterisation of the qualities.*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4
	rupa	rasa	gandha	sparśa	sapikhyā	parimāṇa	prthaktva	sāmyoga	vibhāga	paratva	aparatva	buddhi	sukha	duḥkha	icchā	dyeṣa	prayatna	gurutva	dravatva	sneha	samskāra	dharma	adharmā	śabda
<b>Characterisation in respect to the substances in which they inhere.</b>																								
1 guṇatvaḥhi-sambandhaḥ																								
dravyācṛitavm . . . . .	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
nirguṇatvam . . . . .																								
niṣkriyatvam . . . . .																								
2 mūrta-guṇāḥ . . . . .	"	"	"	"						"	"								"	"	"	"	"	"
3 amūrta-guṇāḥ . . . . .												"	"	"	"	"	"		"	"	"	"	"	"
4 ubhaya-guṇāḥ . . . . .					"	"	"	"	"															
5 anekācṛitāḥ . . . . .					"	"	"	"	"															
6 ekaikadravya-vṛttayāḥ . . . . .	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
<b>Distinction between common &amp; special (typical) qualities.</b>																								
7 vaiṣeṣika-guṇāḥ . . . . .	"	"	"	"								"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
8 sāmanyag-uṇāḥ . . . . .					"	"	"	"	"	"	"							"	"	"	"	"	"	"
<b>The qualities with reference to the organs of sense.</b>																								
9 bahyaikaiken-driyagrāhyāḥ . . . . .	"	"	"	"															"	"	"	"	"	"
10 dyumdriyagrahyāḥ . . . . .					"	"	"	"	"	"	"								"	"	"	"	"	"
11 antahkaraṇagrayāḥ . . . . .												"	"	"	"	"	"	"						
12 atindriyāḥ . . . . .																			"	"	"	"	"	"
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4

<sup>1</sup> vegāḥ.<sup>1</sup> bhavana.<sup>1</sup> dvitvadayaḥ.<sup>2</sup> dviprthaktva-dayaḥ.<sup>1</sup> ekatvam.<sup>2</sup> ekaprthaktvam.<sup>1</sup> samsiddhikadravatvam.<sup>2</sup> bhavanā.<sup>1</sup> naimittikadravatvam.<sup>2</sup> vegāḥ.<sup>1</sup> vegāḥ.<sup>1</sup> bhavanā.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	
	rūpa	rasa	gandha	sparśa	saṅkhyā	parimāṇa	prthaktva	samyoga	vibhaga	paratva	aparatva	buddhi	sukha	duḥkha	icchā	dveṣa	prayatna	gurutva	dravatva	śleṣa	samskāra	dharma	adharma	caḍa	
13 karuṇa-guṇa- pūrvakāḥ....																									1 apakajā. 2) ekatvam. 3) ekapṛthaktvam. 4) vegāḥ.
14 akarūpa-guṇa- pūrvakāḥ....																									1 bhavana.
15 saṃyogajal....	1		1	1																					1 pakajāḥ. 2) tūla-parimāṇāḥ. 3) uttara-samyogaḥ. 4) naimittika- dravatvam. 5) bhavana. 6) vegāḥ.
16 karmajāḥ.....																									1) uttaravibhagaḥ.
17 vibhagajau....																									1 dvitvadayaḥ. 2) dvipṛthaktva- dayaḥ.
18 buddhy-apekṣāḥ.																									1 anuṣṇasparśāḥ. 2) ekatvam. 3) ekapṛthaktvam.
19 samanajaty- arambhakāḥ..					1	2)																			1 anuṣṇasparśāḥ. 2) ekatvam. 3) ekapṛthaktvam.
20 asamanajaty- arambhakāḥ..																									1 anuṣṇasparśāḥ.
21 samanasamana- rambhakāḥ...																									1 bhavana.
22 svācāya-sama- vetarambhakāḥ.																									1 ekapṛthaktvam. 2) vegāḥ.
23 paratra- rambhakāḥ...																									1 vegāḥ.
24 ubhayatra- rambhakāḥ..																									1 ekapṛthaktvam. 2) vegāḥ.
25 kriyāhetavaḥ ..																									1 vegāḥ.

The qualities, con- sidered with re- ference to other qualities as their causes or effects.

Qualities which have movements as their effects.

The qualities, con- sidered with re- ference to causa- lity in general.

Qualities which  
have movements  
as their effects.

The qualities, con-  
sidered with re-  
ference to causa-  
lity in general.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	
	rupa	rasa	gandha	sparśa	śukhya	parimaṇa	prthaktva	saṃyoga	vibhaga	paratva	aparatva	baddha	sukha	duḥkha	veda	dveṣa	pratyatna	gurutva	dravatva	śukha	śauṣkara	dharma	adharma	śābda	
26 asamavāyī- kāraṇatvam...				1			2																	1	2
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Table E.

LIST OF PROPERTIES WHICH CHARACTERISE KARMAN :

Praçastapāda-bhāṣya, Book IV § 1 p. 290.

1. karmatva-sambandhaḥ
2. ekadravyavattvam
3. kṣaṇikatvam
- 4. mūrtadravyavṛttitvam
5. agumavattvam
6. gurutva-dravatva-prayatna-samyogajativam
7. sva-kārya-samyoga-virodhitvam
8. samyoga-vibhāga-nirapeksakāraṇatvam
9. asaṁavāyi-kāraṇatvam
10. sva-parācraṇa-saṁaveta-kāryārambhakatvam
11. saṁānājātiyānārambhakatvam
12. dravyānārambhakatvam
13. pratiniyata-jāti-yogitvam
14. dig-viçiṣṭa-kāryārambhakatvam

NOTE to this list: N°. 1 is an example of a tautological definition, no rare occurrence in Vaiçesika works. N°. 2, 4, 5 characterise movement with reference to inherence (movement inheres in one substance; in a solid substance only; it does not possess itself qualities); n°. 3 states the transient nature of movement. N°. 6—14 characterise movement with reference to causality, namely: n°. 6 sums up the qualities from which movement originates (this list is not complete: physical *saṁskāra* or *vega* and *adrṣṭa* are left out), n°. 7 expresses the incompatibility of movement and its result '*samyoga* &c.' (cf. V.S. I, 1, 14); n°. 8 sums up the qualities of which *karman* is the immediate cause (scil. *samyoga* & *vibhāga*; cf. V.S. I, 1, 17; to these, however, *vega* is added in V.S. I, 1, 20); n°. 9 determines the kind of causality which belongs to *karman* (cf. V.S. I, 1, 15—17, where this is only done for *dravya*); n°. 10 states that the result of movement (*samyoga* & *vibhāga*) inheres in the substance which was moving as well as in another substance; n°. 11 & 12 state the categories (*dravya* & *karman*) which cannot be result of movement; by n°. 13 the fact is expressed that the generality '*karman*' contains a limited number (*niyata*) of classes (*jāti*) [such as *utkṣepaṇa* &c.]; by n°. 14 the fact that the *samyoga* & *vibhāga*, originated by movement, are determined with reference to space.

Table F.

## CLASSIFICATION OF LOGICAL FALLACIES.

*according to Praçastapāda and Dignāga.*

NOTE. The following table is based on Praçastapāda-bhāṣya, book III chapter 2 § 35—39 and the account of DIGNĀGA'S Nyāya-praveça, given by VIDYĀBHÜṢAṢA in his *Medieval School* p. 89 &c.

## a. The fallacies of thesis.

According to PRAÇASTAPĀDA.	According to DIGNĀGA.
1. Thesis refuted by perception: fire is cold.	1. Thesis refuted by perception: sound is inaudible.
2. Thesis refuted by inference: physical space is solid.	2. Thesis refuted by inference: a pot is eternal
3. Thesis refuted by the Çruti:  a Brahman ought to drink <i>sarā</i> .	3. Thesis refuted by public opinion:  man's head is pure, because it is the limb of an animate being.
4. Thesis refuted by one's own school: the effect is existent [before its production].	4. Thesis refuted by one's own school: a Vaiçeṣika philosopher saying: „sound is eternal”.
5. Thesis refuted by one's own words: word does not give us infor- mation about anything.	5. Thesis refuted by one's own words: my mother is barren.
	6. Thesis with unfamiliar <i>pakṣa</i> .
	7. Thesis with unfamiliar <i>sādhya</i> .
	8. Thesis with both terms un- familiar
	9. Thesis universally accepted.

## 4. The fallacies of the probans.

I. The unproved (*asiddha*).

According to PRAÇASTAPĀDA.

1. Probans, unproved for both disputants:

word is transient,  
because it consists of parts.

2. Probans, unproved for one of the disputants:

word is transient,  
because it is an effect.

[The Mīmāṃsakas deny that word is an effect: it is only revealed by speaking].

3. Probans, unproved in its own nature:

there is fire here,  
because I get tears in my eyes. [The tears, however, arose by another cause than smoke].

4. The *anumeya* [i. e. *pakṣa*] does not exist [in the form in which it is supposed to exist in the argumentation]:

shade is an earthly substance,  
because it possesses a dark colour [the possession of a quality cannot be attributed to shade, which is no substance].

According to DIGNĀGA.

1. Probans, unproved for both disputants:

sound is not eternal,  
because it is visible.

2. Probans, unproved for one of the disputants:

sound is evolved,  
because it is a product.

3. The truth of the probans is questioned:

the hill is fiery,  
because there is vapour.

4. It is questioned whether the *pakṣa* can be predicated by the probans;

physical space is a substance,

because it has qualities  
[it is questioned whether physical space has qualities].

II. The uncertain (*sandigdha*).

According to PRAÇASTAPĀDA.

1. Probans too general (not excluded from the *vipakṣa*):

this is a cow,  
because it has horns.

According to DIGNĀGA:

1. Probans too general:

sound is eternal,  
because it is knowable.

- Cf. the fallacy, called *anadhyava-sāya* by PRAÇASTAPĀDA.
2. Probans not general enough:  
     sound is eternal,  
     because it is audible  
     [there is no *sapakṣa*, be-  
     sides the *pakṣa*].
  - 3 – 5. Special cases connected with  
     1 and 2 (see VIDYĀBHŪṢAṢA  
     p. 94).
  6. Non-erroneous contradiction:  
     i. e. when a thesis and its con-  
     tradictory are both supported  
     by what appear to be valid  
     reasons:  
     The Vaiçeśika speaking to  
     the Mīmāṃsaka:  
         sound is non-eternal,  
         because it is a product.  
     The Mīmāṃsaka speaking to  
     the Vaiçeśika:  
         sound is eternal,  
         because it is always  
         audible.

### III. The doubtful (*anadhyavasita*).

According to PRAÇASTAPĀDA.

According to DIGNĀGA.

1. Probans too narrow (no *sapakṣa* besides the *pakṣa*):  
     a product is existent [be-  
     fore its origination],  
     because it originates.
- (Cf. the fallacy n<sup>o</sup>. 2 of DIGNĀGA's *sandigdha*).

### IV. The contradictory (*viruddha*).

1. The supposed probans is absent in the *sapakṣa* and present in the *vipakṣa*:  
     this is a horse,  
     because it has horns.
  1. The supposed probans is absent in the *sapakṣa* and present in the *vipakṣa*:  
     sound is eternal,  
     because it is a product.
  2. Special case of *viruddha* 1)
  3. The probans is consistent with the *pakṣa*.
  4. Special case of *viruddha* 3).
- [NOTE. See VIDYĀBHŪṢAṢA p. 95].

c. The fallacies of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*).I. Positive examples (*sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*)

(i. e. examples used for showing that the *sādhyaśmānya* goes together with the *liṅgaśmānya*).

According to PRAÇASTAPĀDA.

According to DIGNĀGA.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>1. Fallacious with reference to the probans:<br/>             sound is eternal,<br/>             because it is incorporeal,<br/>             that which is incorporeal<br/>             is an eternal substance,<br/>             as an atom,<br/>             [the atom is corporeal].</p> <p>2. Fallacious with reference to the probandum:<br/>             sound is eternal,<br/>             because it is incorporeal,<br/>             that which &amp;c.<br/>             as a movement.</p> <p>3. Fallacious with reference to both:<br/>             sound is eternal,<br/>             because it is incorporeal,<br/>             that which is &amp;c.<br/>             as a pot.</p> <p>4. Example showing a lack of universal connection between probans and probandum:<br/>             sound is eternal,<br/>             like physical space<br/>             [in this argumentation<br/>             the connection between<br/>             probans and probandum<br/>             is not explicitly stated,<br/>             cf. Nyāya-kandālī p. 247<br/>             l. 24].</p> | <p>1. Fallacious with reference to the probans:<br/>             sound is eternal,<br/>             because it is incorporeal,<br/>             that which is incorporeal<br/>             is an eternal substance,<br/>             as an atom.</p> <p>2. Fallacious with reference to the probandum:<br/>             sound is &amp;c.<br/>             because &amp;c.<br/>             that which &amp;c.<br/>             as intelligence.</p> <p>3. Fallacious with reference to both:<br/>             sound is &amp;c.<br/>             because &amp;c.<br/>             that which is &amp;c.,<br/>             as a pot.</p> <p>4. Example showing a lack of universal connection between probans and probandum:<br/>             this person is passionate,<br/>             because he is a speaker,<br/>             whoever is a speaker is<br/>             passionate,<br/>             as a certain man in<br/>             Magadha.<br/>             [cf. VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA p.<br/>             97].</p> |
|--|---|

5. Example showing an inverse connection between probans and probandum  
 wind is a substance ,  
 that which is a substance,  
 is observed to possess movement  
 [the opposite of this argumentation holds true: whatever possesses movement, is a substance, cf. Nyāya-kandali p. 245].
5. Example showing an inverse connection between probans and probandum:  
 sound is non-eternal,  
 because it is a product of effort, <sup>48</sup>  
 whatever is non-eternal,  
 is a product of effort,  
 as a pot  
 [the connection between probans and probandum has been inverted i. e.: all products of effort are non-eternal: but all non-eternals are not products of effort].
6. Fallacious with reference to the abode:  
 sound is eternal,  
 because it is incorporeal,  
 that which incorporeal,  
 is an eternal substance,  
 as a shade  
 [shade is not an existing substance].

## II. Negative examples (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*).

In both sources the classification of the fallacious negative examples is completely parallel with the classification of the positive fallacious examples.

## SECTION 5.

## TABLE OF CONCORDANCE

*between Prayastapāda-bhāṣya and Vaiṣeṣika-Sūtra.*

The next table gives in a more concise form the Sūcīpattra which VINDHYEṢVARIPRASĀDA DVAIVĒDIN has composed for his edition of the Bhāṣya. Although his references are often rather forced and arbitrary, and must sometimes be rejected, yet on the whole his concordance has proved of the greatest help to my study.

*References to the Vaiṣ.-Sūtra in the Bhāṣya.*

The paragraphs of the Bhāṣya are indicated by italic types.

Division of Bhāṣya.	Title.	Division of V.S.	References.
I, 1	Enumeration of categories	I, 1	<i>1</i> cf. 1; 2—3 cf. 1—4.
I, 2	Species of categories	I, 1	<i>1</i> cf. 5; 2 cf. 6; 3 cf. 7.
		I, 2	<i>4</i> cf. 3—5; 5 cf. 6.
		VII, 2	<i>6</i> cf. 26.
I, 3	Characterisa- tion of categories	I, 1	<i>4</i> cf. 16, 17; 5 cf. 8.
		I, 2	<i>4</i> cf. 9; 5 cf. 7; 9 cf. 3, 10, 12, 14, 16.
		VII, 1	<i>4</i> cf. 15.
		VII, 2	<i>9</i> cf. 26.
		VIII, 2	<i>5</i> cf. 3.
II, 1	Characterisa- tion of substances	I, 1	<i>1</i> cf. 5, 9, 10, 12, 15, 18; 7 cf. 23; 15 cf. 13—14.
		II, 1	<i>7</i> cf. 1—4; 8 cf. 1—3, 6, 7; <i>9</i> cf. 1, 2; 11 cf. 1, 2, 6; <i>13</i> cf. 31; 14 cf. 6, 7.
		II, 2	<i>11</i> cf. 2, 5; 13 cf. 8, 9, 14.
		III, 2	<i>11</i> cf. 4, 20, 21.
		IV, 1	<i>11</i> cf. 11.



Division of Bhāṣya.	Title.	Division of V.S.	References.
		V, 1	4 cf. 17; 9 cf. 7, 18; 11 cf. 7, 17, 18.
		V, 2	4 cf. 1—7, 12—14; 9 cf. 3; 11 cf. 1, 3, 4—6, 8, 11.
		VI, 1	11 cf. 5.
		VII, 1	5 cf. 22, 24, 25; 11 cf. 22; 13 cf. 24, 25.
		VII, 2	1 cf. 21; 13 cf. 22.
		VIII, 2	6 cf. 5, 6
		IX, 2	11 cf. 6.
		X, 2	1 cf. 1—2.
II, 2	Detailed treatment of substances	II, 1	2 cf. 1, 6; 3 cf. 2; 4 cf. 3, 7; 5 cf. 1, 9—16; 6 cf. 18, 19; 7 cf. 24—31; 8 cf. 31; 9 cf. 31; 11 cf. 21.
		II, 2	2 cf. 1—2; 3 cf. 5; 4 cf. 4; 7 cf. 21, 31; 8 cf. 6—9; 9 cf. 10, 12—16.
		III, 1	10 cf. 2—5; 18—19.
		III, 2	10 cf. 4; 6—18; 20—21; 11 cf. 1—3.
		IV, 1	2 cf. 1—5, 11; 3 cf. 1—5, 11; 4 cf. 1—5, 11; 5 cf. 1—5, 7, 12.
		IV, 2	2 cf. 1, 5, 6—10; 3 cf. 1, 6—11; 4 cf. 1, 6—11; 5 cf. 1, 6—11.
		V, 1	2 cf. 7, 16—18; 3 cf. 17; 4 cf. 17; 5 cf. 14.
		V, 2	2 cf. 1; 3 cf. 3—6, 8, 11; 4 cf. 8, 13; 6 cf. 1, 12; 11 cf. 17.
		VI, 1	10 cf. 5.
		VII, 1	2 cf. 6, 10, 21; 3 cf. 20, 21; 4 cf. 20, 21; 5 cf. 20, 21; 7 cf. 22; 8 cf. 25; 9 cf. 21; 10 cf. 22; 11 cf. 23.

Division of Bhāṣya.	Title.	Division of V.S.	References.
		VII, 2	6 cf. 9—10; 7 cf. 22; 8 cf. 25; 9 cf. 24; 10 cf. 22; 11 cf. 23.
		VII, 2	6 cf. 9—10; 8 cf. 22; 9 cf. 22; 11 cf. 21.
		VIII, 2	2 cf. 5; 3 cf. 6; 4 cf. 6; 5 cf. 6.
		IX, 2	10 cf. 6.
		X, 2	6 cf. 2.
III, 1	Characterisation of qualities	I, 1	1 cf. 16; 5 cf. 15; 16 cf. 20; 19 cf. 28; 21 cf. 27, 29; 26 cf. 19; 27 cf. 19; 28 cf. 19; 29 cf. 19.
		II, 2	9 cf. 21; 15 cf. 31; 17 cf. 31; 19 cf. 31; 21 cf. 31; 22 cf. 31.
		III, 1	15 cf. 18.
		IV, 1	10 cf. 11; 12 cf. 10.
		V, 1	16 cf. 17; 25 cf. 1, 2, 5—7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18.
		V, 2	1 cf. 22; 15 cf. 15; 25 cf. 1—7, 13, 17; 26 cf. 24.
		VI, 2	22 cf. 10; 14.
		VII, 1	1 cf. 14—16; 13 cf. 6; 19 cf. 6; 23 cf. 6.
		VII, 2	1 cf. 3—5, 11, 12, 14—16, 23, 25; 15 cf. 9, 21; 16 cf. 9—10; 17 cf. 10; 18 cf. 21; 21 cf. 9, 10.
		VIII, 1	1 cf. 8.
		VIII, 2	9 cf. 5, 6.
		IX, 2	22 cf. 6.
		X, 2	26 cf. 4.
III, 2	Detailed treatment of qualities.	II, 1	2 cf. 1—3; 3 cf. 1—2; 4 cf. 1; 5 cf. 1—4.
§ 1—§ 6	First group	II, 2	4 cf. 2.
		IV, 1	2 cf. 6, 8; 3 cf. 9; 4 cf. 9; 5 cf. 9; 6 cf. 3.

Division of Bhāṣya.	Title.	Division of V.S.	References
		V, 2	6 cf. 1
		VII, 1	2 cf. 2—7; 3 cf. 2—7; 4 cf. 2—7; 5 cf. 2—7; 6 cf. 6—7.
		VII, 2	6 cf. 9—10
		VIII, 2	2 cf. 6; 3 cf. 6; 4 cf. 5; 5 cf. 6.
		IX, 1	6 cf. 2
§7—§12	Mathematical qualities	I, 1	10 cf. 27, 29
		II, 2	11 cf. 31
		III, 1	7 cf. 11.
		V, 1	10 cf. 1—6, 10, 14, 17.
		V, 2	10 cf. 1, 5, 6, 8, 15.
		VII, 1	8 cf. 9—13; 17—20, 22, 24, 25.
		VII, 2	7 cf. 1; 9 cf. 2; 10 cf. 9; 11 cf. 10; 12 cf. 21—22.
		VIII, 1	7 cf. 9.
		X, 2	10 cf. 2, 5, 6, 7.
§13—§20	General intellectual states	II, 2	15 cf. 17; 16 cf. 17—20.
		III, 1	20 cf. 18
		IX, 2	15 cf. 7, 10—12; 17 cf. 10; 19 cf. 7—9; 20 cf. 1, 6, 13.
§21—§45	Perception and infe- rence &c.	I, 1	27 cf. 3.
		II, 1	25 cf. 8.
		II, 2	21 cf. 21; 27 cf. 32.
		III, 1	21 cf. 18; 22—23 cf. 15; 25 cf. 15; 26 cf. 7—11; 34—35 cf. 15; 37 cf. 15—17; 39 cf. 15.
		IV, 1	21 cf. 6, 8, 9, 11, 13.
		VI, 1	27 cf. 1—3.
		VIII, 1	21 cf. 4—7.
		IX, 1	21 cf. 11—15.
		IX, 2	15 cf. 7, 10—12; 17 cf. 10; 19 cf. 7—9; 20 cf. 1, 6, 13; 22—23 cf. 1; 24 cf. 1; 26 cf. 1, 2; 27 cf. 3, 1; 28—33 cf. 5; 34—35 cf. 1, 2; 36 cf. 1, 38 cf. 1, 3; 40—41 cf. 1, 2; 42 cf. 12; 43 cf. 6; 44—45 cf. 13.

Division of Bhāṣya.	Title.	Division of V.S.	References.
§46—§59	Remaining qualities: psy- chical and physical	X. 1	42 cf. 3.
		X. 2	27 cf. 9.
		I, 1	15—50 cf. 6; 55 cf. 2.
		II, 1	52 cf. 2, 6, 7; 53 cf. 2; 59 cf. 27.
		II, 2	59 cf. 21; 25—32.
		V, 1	50 cf. 1; 51 cf. 7, 18; 54 cf. 17.
		V, 2	46—47 cf. 15; 50 cf. 14; 51 cf. 3; 52 cf. 4, 8; 58 cf. 16, 18.
		VI, 1	55 cf. 5; 56 cf. 5, 7, 8.
		VI, 2	46—49 cf. 10—14; 50 cf. 14; 55 cf. 1, 2, 5, 8, 9; 56 cf. 3, 4, 6, 7; 57 cf. 15; 58 cf. 16.
		IX, 2	54 cf. 6.
		X, 1	46—47 cf. 1—6.
		X, 2	55 cf. 8.
IV	Movement	I, 1	1 cf. 7, 11, 14, 17, 20—22, 24, 26, 29—31.
		I, 2	2—6 cf. 7.
		II, 1	1 cf. 21; 16 cf. 21.
		II, 2	1 cf. 25.
		V, 1	9 cf. 1—5; 10 cf. 1, 2, 9, 10, 17, 18; 11 cf. 1, 2, 16—18; 13 cf. 7, 18; 15 cf. 17.
		V, 2	12 cf. 1, 12; 13 cf. 1, 12, 3; 14 cf. 4; 16 cf. 12, 21; 17 cf. 2, 7, 12, 13, 14, 17.
		I, 2	1 cf. 3—5, 7—10, 17; 2 cf. 11—16.
V	<i>Sāmānya</i>	I, 2	1 cf. 3—5, 7—10, 17; 2 cf. 11—16.
VI	<i>Vijaya</i>	I, 2	cf. 6.
VII	<i>Samavāya</i>	V, 2	1 cf. 23.
		VII, 2	1 cf. 26—28.

## SECTION 6.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA.

The following table of contents of four books of the Nyāya-sūtra has been composed with the help of VIJAYANATHA'S *Vṛtti*, of which I have used the edition of 1828. Moreover, I have added in this table the following facts: in the first column the number of the section *prakaraṇa*, given to it in this edition; in the second the number of the *prakaraṇa* in the *ābhikā*; in the third the number of the sūtras according to the edition of 1828; in the fourth the number of the sūtras according to the edition of the Nyāya-bhāṣya (edition 1896). The fifth contains the title of the different *prakaraṇas*. For a short account of the system cf. MAX MÜLLER'S Six Darśanas.

	Ālm.	Ed. '28.	Ed. '96.	Title.
1	I, 1, 1	I, 1—2	I, 1, 1—2	The topic of the book and its interest.
2	„ „ 2	„ 3—8	„ „ 3—8	Definition of trustworthy source of knowledge ( <i>pramāṇa</i> ).
3	„ „ 3	„ 9—22	„ „ 9—22	Definition of <i>prameya</i> (object of knowledge).
4	„ „ 4	„ 23—25	„ „ 23—25	Definition of <i>sampraya</i> , <i>prajojana</i> and <i>disfānta</i> .
5	„ „ 5	„ 26—31	„ „ 25—31	Definition of <i>siddhanta</i> .
6	„ „ 6	„ 32—38	„ „ 32—38	Definition of the five <i>avayavas</i> .
7	„ „ 7	„ 39—40	„ „ 39—40	Definition of <i>tarka</i> and <i>nirṇaya</i> .
8	I, 2, 1	„ 41—43	I, 2, 1—3	Definitions of <i>rāḍa</i> , <i>jāḍa</i> and <i>citāḍa</i> .
9	„ „ 2	„ 44—49	„ „ 4—9	<i>Hetubhāsa</i> .
10	„ „ 3	„ 50—57	„ „ 10—17	<i>Chala</i> .
11	„ „ 4	„ 58—60	„ „ 18—20	Definitions of <i>jāti</i> and <i>anirāhasṭhana</i> .
12	II, 1, 1	II, 1—7	II, 1, 1—7	Examination of doubt
13	„ „ 2	„ 8—19	„ „ 8—19	Examination of trustworthy knowledge ( <i>pramāṇa</i> ) in general. <sup>1)</sup>
14	„ „ 3	„ 20—32	„ „ 20—32	Examination of perception ( <i>pratyakṣa</i> ).
15	„ „ 4	„ 33—36	„ „ 33—36	Examination of the aggregate ( <i>avayavin</i> ).

<sup>1)</sup> Section II, 1, 8 H. JACOBI J.A.O.S. XXXI p. 13 note 1.

	Ahn.	Ed. '28.	Ed. '96.	Title.
16	II, 1, 5	II, 37—38	II, 2, 37—38	Examination of inference ( <i>anumāna</i> ).
17	„ „ 6	„ 39—43	„ „ 39—43	Examination of present time.
	„ „ 7	„ 44—48	„ „ 44—48	Examination of the trustworthiness of comparison ( <i>upamāna</i> ).
18	„ „ 8	„ 49—56	„ „ 49—56	Examination of verbal authority ( <i>śabda</i> ) in general.
19	„ „ 9	„ 57—68	„ „ 57—68	Examination of verbal authority in detail.
20	II, 2, 1	„ 69—80	II, 2, 1—12	The fourfold set of trustworthy sources of knowledge.
21	„ „ 2	„ 81—105	„ „ 13—37	The transiency of word.
22	„ „ 3	„ 106—122	„ „ 38—54	The changes of word.
23	„ „ 4	„ 123—131	„ „ 55—56	The denotative power of word.
24	III, 1, 1	III, 1—3	III, 1, 1—3	The soul different from the sense-organs.
25	„ „ 2	„ 4—6	„ „ 4—6	The soul different from the body.
26	„ „ 3	„ 7—15	„ „ 7—15	The soul different from the body (no duality of visual perception).
27	„ „ 4	„ 16—18	„ „ 16—18	The soul is different from the internal organ.
28	„ „ 5	„ 19—27	„ „ 19—27	Soul without beginning or annihilation.
29	„ „ 6	„ 28—32	„ „ 28—29	Examination of the body. <sup>1)</sup>
30	„ „ 7	„ 33—51	„ „ 30—50	Examination of the sense-organs. Polemical passage against the Sāṅkhya.
31	„ „ 8	„ 52—60	„ „ 51—60	Manifoldness of the sense-organs. <sup>2)</sup>
32	„ „ 9	„ 61—71	„ „ 61—73	Examination of the object ( <i>artha</i> ).
33	III, 2, 1	III, 72—81	III, 2, 1—9	Transiency of intellection ( <i>buddhi</i> ). Polemics against Sāṅkhya and Buddhists.
34	„ „ 2	„ 82—89	„ „ 10—17	Discussion of the <i>kṣāṇabhāṅga</i> (a Buddhist dogma).
35	„ „ 3	„ 90—113	„ „ 18—43	Intellection a quality of soul.
36	„ „ 4	„ 114—117	„ „ 44—48	Origination and annihilation of intellection.

1) GARBE, *Sāṅkhya-Philosophie* p. 335 note 4.

2) Ibidem p. 322 note 1.

	Ahn.	Ed. '28.	Ed. '96.	Title.
37	III, 2, 5	III, 118—127	III, 2, 49—58	Intuition different from the qualities of the body.
38	" " 6	" 128—131	" " 59—62	Examination of the internal organ <i>manah</i> .
39	" " 7	" 132—144	" " 63—77	Influence of <i>adhyā</i> in the origination of the body.
40	IV, 1, 1	IV, 1—2	IV, 1, 1—2	The faults of activity <i>pravṛtti</i> in general.
41	" " 2	" 3—9	" " 3—9	Examination of faults ( <i>doṣa</i> ).
42	" " 3	" 10—13	" " 10—13	Examination of the condition after death ( <i>pretyabhāva</i> ).
43	" " 4	" 14—18	" " 14—18	Refutation of the dogma of <i>śūnātā</i> .
44	" " 5	" 19—21	" " 19—21	The dogma of the existence of a Lord ( <i>īśvara</i> ).
45	" " 6	" 22—24	" " 22—24	The theory of mere chance ( <i>āśamsitva</i> ).
46	" " 7	" 25—28	" " 25—28	Refutation of the transiency of everything.
47	" " 8	" 29—33	" " 29—33	Refutation of the eternality of everything.
48	" " 9	" 34—36	" " 34—36	Refutation of the separateness <i>pṛthaktva</i> of everything.
49	" " 10	" 37—40	" " 37—40	Refutation of the <i>śūnyatā</i> of everything.
50	" " 11	" 41—54	" " 41—54	Examination of fruit ( <i>phala</i> ). — This <i>prakaraṇa</i> contains a polemical egression against the <i>sāṃkhyaikāntarādhīna</i> , i. e. those who limit number to one: the advaitins.
NOTE. The <i>prakaraṇas</i> 1—11 contain principally polemics against the Buddhists; three of their dogmas: <i>sarva</i> , <i>śūnyam</i> , <i>sarvam anityam</i> , <i>sarvam pṛthak</i> <sup>1)</sup> are successively discussed.				
51	" " 12	" 55—58	" " 55—58	Examination of pain ( <i>duḥkha</i> ).
52	" " 13	" 59—67	" " 59—67	Examination of liberation ( <i>apavarga</i> ).

1) See here book I p. 85.

	Āhm.	Ed. '28.	Ed. '96.	Title.
53	IV, 2, 1	IV, 68—70	IV, 2, 1—3	The origination of the knowledge of truth.
54	„ „ 2	„ 71—82	„ „ 4—17	Component parts and aggregate.
55	„ „ 3	„ 83—90	„ „ 18—25	Things, devoid of parts.
56	„ „ 4	„ 91—102	„ „ 26—37	Refutation of the theory of constant annihilation of exterior things ( <i>bāhgyātrthaḥlāṇā</i> ). <sup>1)</sup>
				NOTE. The <i>prakaraṇas</i> 2—4 from one polemical egression against the Buddhists.
57	„ „ 5	„ 103—114	„ „ 38—49	The evolution of the knowledge of truth.
58	„ „ 6	„ 115—116	„ „ 50—51	The maintenance of the knowledge of truth.

1) Cf. however here book I chapter III appendix II p. 50.



## SECTION 7.

A. TWO POLEMICAL PASSAGES FROM ĆABARASVĀMIN'S  
BHĀṢYA ON MIMAMŚĀ-SŪTRA I, 1, 5.<sup>1</sup>

translated by H. JACOBI, J.A.O.S. XXXI (1911) p. 18.

*First passage.*

[An opponent objects]: All cognitions (*pratyakṣa*), are without foundation (in reality, just like a dream; for we recognise in a dream that it is the nature of cognition to be without foundation. A waking person also has cognitions, e. g. of a post or a wall; and therefore this cognition also is without foundation.

[We answer]: A waking man's notion (e. g.) 'this is a post' is a positively ascertained one; how is it possible that it should turn out wrong?

[Opponent]: The notion in a dream also was, just in the same way, a well ascertained one: previous to the awakening there was no difference between the two.

[Answer]: You are wrong: for we find that [what we saw] in a dream, turns out wrong; but we find that [what we see] in the other case [i. e. in the waking state], does not turn out wrong.

If you say: that on account of the class-characteristic [cognition as a genus] [the same predication] will hold good in the other case;

[we reply as follows]: If you mean that the cognition in a dream is wrong because it is a cognition, then of course the cognition of a waking man must be wrong too. But if cognition is [taken to be] the reason that something is so as it is cognised [and not different], then it is impossible to say that this cognition [viz. one in a dream] is different [i. e. wrong] because it is a cognition [Not from the nature of cognition by itself], but from something else we come to know that cognition in a dream is wrong on account of its being opposed to truth.

[Opponent]: How do you ascertain this?

[Answer]: In the following way: because a sleepy mind is weak, sleep is the reason for the wrongness [of cognition] in a

<sup>1</sup>) Cf. p. 558 sub II „Refutation of the Madhyamikas“; and book I p. 63 appendix II) and p. 74 appendix .

dream; in a dreamless sleep it [the mind] is absent altogether; for one without any consciousness whatever, is said to be in a dreamless sleep. Therefore the cognition of a waking man is not wrong.

[Opponent]: But the sensorium of a waking man also may be vitiated by some defect.

[Answer]: If so, the defect may be found out.

[Opponent]: While one dreams, a defect is not found out.

[Answer]: It is, for on awaking we find out that the mind had been vitiated by sleep.

*Translation of the second passage (p. 19).*

[The opponent says]: [The cognition itself] is a void. For we do not perceive a difference of form in the object and the idea of it; our idea is directly perceived, and therefore the so-called object which should be different from the idea, is a non-entity.

[Answer]: Well, this would be the case, if the idea had the form (or shape) of its object. But our idea is without form, and it is the external object which has the form; for the object is directly perceived as being in connexion with a locality outside of ourselves. An idea caused by perception is concerned with an object, and not with another idea: for every idea lasts but one moment, and does not continue to exist while another idea comes up.

[The opponent says]: While the second idea is originating, it becomes known to the first idea and at the same time, it makes known to it the object, just as a lamp [illuminates and makes thus known things].

[We reply]: This is not so. For before the object has become known, nobody is conscious of having the idea, but after the object has become known [to us], we become aware by inference that we have an idea concerning it; it is impossible that both these processes should be simultaneous.

[The opponent says]: We do not contend that we know the object before the idea has originated, but after it has originated; therefore the idea originates first, and afterwards the object becomes known.

[We reply]: Quite right. The idea originates first, but it is not the idea that first becomes known. For as will occur occasionally, we say of an object which we do know that we do not know it [i. e. we are not conscious of having an idea concerning it].

Moreover it is the very nature of every idea to be always and necessarily bound up with the name of [or a word

denoting its objects. Therefore an idea is 'intimately connected with a name', but that which is 'not intimately connected with a name' is termed directly perceived.

And furthermore, if [the object and the idea] had the same form, this would sublimate the idea and not the object which is directly perceived. But there is no such uniformity [between the object and its idea, as you assume]; for by inference we become cognisant of the intrinsically formless idea, but we directly perceive the object together with its form. Therefore cognition is based on the object.

And furthermore, the notion of [e. g.] a piece of cloth has an individual cause [in this sense that we have the idea of the cloth] only when threads form the material cause [of the object, viz. the cloth]. For if this were not the case, a man of sound senses might have the notion of a jar though threads had been used [in the production of the object in question], but that is not the case. [The meaning of this argument is that the object is not caused by the idea, but it has a cause which is independent of the idea, viz. the material from which the object or the thing is produced]. Therefore cognition is not without foundation [in external objects], and consequently direct perception does not convey erroneous knowledge.

B. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BĀDARĀYAṆA'S VEDĀNTA  
SŪTRA & ĆAṆKARA'S BHĀṢYA, II, 2, 18—27;  
TRANSLATIONS OF VEDĀNTA SŪTRA II, 2, 28—32.<sup>1)</sup>

I. Refutation of the Sarvāstivādin (Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas).

1°. Refutation of the *dhātu-skandha* theory.

Sūtra 18. a. ĆAṆKARA'S introduction, exposition of the *dhātu-skandha* theory: Elements of the world of two kinds: *bāhyaṃ caśṭa* & *āntaraṃ caśṭa*. Four kinds of *bāhyāṇi caśṭāṇi*: earth, water, fire and air; each element characterised by one quality: earth by touch, water by taste &c. Five kinds of *āntarāṇi caśṭāṇi*: *rūpa*, *viññāna* &c.

b. Ćaṅkara's explanation of the sūtra: refutation of this *dhātu-skandha* theory. 1. The *dhātus* cannot

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. here book I p. 71.

begin forming aggregates because they lack intelligence, and the *skandhas* can neither do so, because no material body yet exists. 2. Refutation of the notion of a spontaneous entering upon activity. 3. Refutation of the idea that the *ālayavijñāna-pravāha* (the train of self-cognition) is the cause of aggregation.

2°. Refutation of the *pratityasamutpāda*, as a basis for the *dhātva-skandha* theory.

Sūtra 19. *a.* Introduction: enumeration of the twelvefold chain. *b.* Refutation: 1. The argumentation of the Bauddha . . . merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. 2. No aggregate possible on the assumption of momentary atoms and a mere fluxus of psychical states. 3. No eternal series of aggregates to be accepted. 4. No aggregate on behalf of somebody's enjoyment, for according to the doctrine of general impermanency there is no permanent enjoyer.

3°. Refutation of the *kṣaṇabhāṅga-vāda*.

Sūtra 20. Contradiction between the *pratitya-samutpāda* and the *kṣaṇabhāṅga-vāda*. Different arguments brought forward, i. a. On the admission [of the momentary existence of everything] it is impossible to establish between two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or has ceased to be and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.

Sātra 21. Contradiction between the explanation of perception as caused by the four *pratyayas* and the *kṣaṇabhāṅga-vāda*.

[NOTE Cf. MADHYA's account of the Sautrāntika doctrine in DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's translation Muséon, N.S. II, p. 194].

Sūtras 22—24. Discussion on the triad: *pratisamkhyā-virodha*, *apratīsamkhyā-virodha*

and *ākāṣa*. [Cf. *Ṣlokavārttika*, translation-GAṆ-  
GANĀTHĀ JHĀ, p. 413, *kārikā* 22].

Sūtra 25. The *kṣaṇabhaṇḡga-vāda* refuted by the  
fact of remembrance.

Sūtras 26—27. The *kṣaṇabhaṇḡga-vāda* would lead  
to the absurd consequence that entity  
springs from non-entity.

II. Refutation of the Mādhyamikas (according to the  
translation, given by H. JACOBI with the help of the Vṛtti-pas-  
sage, quoted by ĆABARA-SVĀMIN in his comments to Mīm.  
Darṣana I. 1. 5). (See p. 554).

Sūtra 28. The objects of cognition are not non-entities [i. e.  
cognition is not without foundation in the external  
world], because we actually perceive external objects.

Sūtra 29. Nor is our cognition similar to dreams &c. because  
there is a real difference of cognition in the state  
of waking and that of dreaming.

Sūtra 30. [An idea] cannot be the real object [underlying  
cognition, as proved in sūtra 28 & 29], because  
[the idea] is not the object of direct perception.

Sūtra 31. And because cognition has but momentary existence  
[i. e. one idea cannot perceive another, for while  
the first exists, the second has not yet come into  
existence, and when the second has come into  
existence the first has ceased to be].

Sūtra 32. And because it is unreasonable in every way.

III. Refutation of the Vijñānavādins. (Interpretation of  
the sūtras 28—32 by ĆAṆKARA, as translated by G. THIBAUT).

Sūtra 28. The non-existence [of external things] cannot be  
maintained on account of [our] consciousness [of  
them].

Sūtra 29. And on account of their difference of nature, [the  
ideas of the waking state] are not like those of  
a dream.

Sūtra 30. The existence [of mental impressions] is not possible  
[on the Bauddha view] on account of the absence  
of perception [of external things].

Sūtra 31. And on account of the momentariness [of the *ālaya-  
vijñāna*] it cannot be the abode of mental impressions].

Sūtra 32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.

## C. LIST OF QUOTATIONS FROM GARBE'S BOOK

*Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie.*

In the following list I have collected from GARBE's book *Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie* all information which might be useful for the study of the relation between the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. I have divided this material under a few headings and put numbers before the separate paragraphs in order to make references easy.

	Ancient authorities.	Sāṃkhya- sūtra ± 1400.	Aniruddha ± 1500.	Vijñāna- bhikṣu ± 1575.
<i>a. Logical maxims which GARBE considers to be typical for the Sāṃkhya (Garbe p. 216):</i>				
1. Eine theoretische Erwägung <i>kalpanā</i> hebt nicht das durch die Erkenntnismittel festgestellte auf. ....		II, 25		
2. Die Theorie muss sich im Einklang mit der Empirie halten ( <i>dṛṣṭa</i> ). ....		V, 49	I, 45	I, 20 &c.
3. Wo die einfache, natürliche, nahe liegende Erklärung ( <i>la-ghava</i> ) ausreicht, ist die complicirtere Erklärung ( <i>gaurava</i> ) abzulehnen. ....			passim (see Garbe's index)	passim (see Garbe's index)
<i>b. Mistakes against logic, which, according to GARBE, the Sāṃkhya teaches to avoid, more than is done by any other system (p. 218);</i>				
4. Die Erklärung eines Dings durch das Ding selbst ( <i>ātmā-śraya</i> ). ....				
5. Der cirenlus vitiosus ( <i>anyo-nyāśraya</i> ). ....				
6. Der Mangel eines ausreichenden Grundes ( <i>niyamakābhāva</i> )				
			For 4—9 see Garbe's indices to Aniruddha & Vijñānabhikṣu.	

	Ancient authorities.	Sāṃkhya- sūtra ± 1100.	Anuruddha ± 1500.	Vijñāna- bhikṣu ± 1575.
7. Die Unmöglichkeit sich für eine der beiden Seiten einer Alternative zu entscheiden ( <i>śūnyasāśāṅghāra, śūnyā- mānāraśāṅghāra</i> ) . . . . .				
8. Der regressus in infinitum ( <i>anantasthā, anantasthāna</i> ) . . . . .				I, 122,
9. Die zu weit gehende Über- tragung, vermöge deren man eine Eigenschaft, die nur be- stimmten Dingen angehört, falschlich auch anderen zu- schreibt ( <i>atiprasakti, atipra- saṅgi, atirūpī</i> ) . . . . .				Einl. zu III, 46.
c. Propositions on general relations (p. 217).				
10. Die Nichtexistenz eines Din- ges ist nicht anderes als der Ort, an dem das Ding sich nicht befindet . . . . .				I, 113,
11. Kein Ding kann seines We- sens entkleidet werden; denn das Wesen dauert so lange, als das Ding selbst . . . . .				V, 56.
12. Die Individuen und die Gesamtheit sich identisch ( <i>vyastisamastgor ekatā</i> ) . . . . .				I, 7, 144.
13. Die Eigenschaft ist nicht etwas von ihrem Substrat verschiedenes ( <i>dharma-adhar- aḥ-abheda</i> ) . . . . .				II, 18
14. Dasselbe gilt von den Kraf- ten ( <i>śakti-śaktimad-abheda</i> ). . . . .				I, 61, 62
15. Einunddasselbe Ding kann nicht zugleich Subject und Object sein ( <i>karmakart- virodha</i> oder: <i>kartṛkarma- virodha</i> ) . . . . .				II, 13, 16
d. Polemical passages in Sāṃkhya-writings against		VI, 49		

	Ancient authorities.	Sāṅkhya- sūtra ± 1400.	Aniruddha ± 1500.	Vijñāna- bhikṣu ± 1575.
Nyāya- or Vaiṣeṣika theories: (GARBE p. 178):				
1°. <i>Doctrine of categories &amp; Ontology.</i>				
16. Gegen die Aufstellung der 6, resp. 16 Kategorien ..		I, 25		
17. Das Produkt vor der Ent- stehung und nach der Ver- nichtung ohne Realität?...		V 85, 86		
18. Gegen die Berechtigung des Begriffes der Inkärenz. ...	Tattvakaum. on Kār. 9.	I, 113, 114, 121. V 99.		
19. Combination mehrerer Kate- gorien ( <i>jātisāṃśkaryā</i> ) un- zulässig. ....				I 109, II 32.
2°. <i>Cosmology:</i>				
20. Gegen die Lehre dass es nur 9 Substanzen gebe. ....		VI, 38		
21. Gegen die Lehre, dass der innere Sinn, Zeit, Raum, Aether und die Atome von Erde, Wasser, Feuer und Luft ewig seien. ....		V 72.		
3°. <i>Physics:</i>				
22. Gegen die Atomistik ...		V 87, 88.		I 62.
23. Die Leitung der Körperbil- dung von Seite der Seele durch das <i>adṛṣṭa</i> vermittelt?				VI 62.
24. Gegen die Lehre der <i>antya viṣeṣāḥ</i> . ....	„Varṣaganya“ author quoted Yogabhasya III. 52 Garbe p. 74			
1°. <i>Theology:</i>				
25. Ist der Veda von Gott erfasst?		V 16, 17.		
26. Gegen die Annahme eines persönlichen Gottes (cf. Garbe p. 119 n. 122). ...	Gautapada on Kārīka 61.	I 92—94, V 2—12,		
2°. <i>Psychology:</i>	Vācaspatiṃ. on Kārīka 57.	46, 126, 127, VI 64.		
27. Gegen die Lehre dass der innere Sinn ein Atom sei — (denn dieser trete gleichzeitig				



	Ancient authorities.	Sāṃkhya- sūtra ± 1400.	Aniruddha ± 1500.	Vijñāna- bhikṣu ± 1575.
mit mehreren auseren Sin- nen in Verbindung).....		V 71.		II 32.
28. Besitzt die Seele als solche Qualitäten?... ..	Kārikā	I 15, 146,		
29. Erlosung als Aufhebung besonderer Eigenschaften der der Seele... ..	n. 19, 20	164; V 13 &c. V 75.		
60. <i>The doctrine of external perception.</i>				
30. Ny. & Vaiᢣ Lehre von dem Zustandekommen der Wahr- nehmung & Erkenntnis..				I 87, 91, 115—117.
31. Gegen die <i>anyathā-khyāti</i> . d. h. die Vorstellung dass ein Ding unter einer anderen als seiner eigenen Form erschei- nen könne... ..		V 55.		II 33.
32. Sind die Sinnen aus den Elementen gebildet? (Cf. GARBE p. 322 n. 3 & Nyāya sūtra III 60).....		V 81.		
c. Passages in Sāṃkhya-writ- ings, explaining Nyāya- or Vaiᢣeᢣika-theories (Garbe p. 205):				
33. The theory of <i>anumāna</i> ..	Tattva- kaumudī on Kārikā 5			I, 103.
34. The opinions on <i>vyapti</i> ..		VI 27—36.		
35. Epitome of the Nyāya- & Vaiᢣeᢣika-sūtras..			V 85, 86.	
36. „Eine Verbindung kann nur da eintreten, wo eine Ver- scheidenheit besteht“ (Garbe p. 216).				I, 112.

Other passages, in GARBE'S book of importance for the study of the Nyāya & Vaiṣeṣika:

- p. 308 n. 1 Sāṃkhya-psychology.
- p. 317 bottom „*prāṇa*”.
- p. 321 Explanation of external perception; the term „*vytti*”.
- p. 322 n. 1 Is there one external sense-organ, or are there more; reference to Nyāya Sūtra III 53—69.
- p. 322 n. 3—6 Do the organs of sense consist of the elements?
- p. 335 n. 4 The gross body consists only of earth; S.s. III 19; V 102, 112 & Vaiṣ. S. IV 2, 2, 3, Nyāya Sūtra III, 28—32.
- p. 347 n. 4 Space and time.
- p. 361 n. 2 The extension and number of souls.
- p. 374 n. 6 The term „*akhaṇḍopādhi*”.
- p. 386 n. 4 The nature of „*mokṣa*”.

#### D. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTER ON BUDDHISM IN THE SARVA-DARṢANA-SAMGRAHA.

*References to De la Vallée Poussin's translation.*

Introduction: *Anumānasya pramāṇatvam* p. 56—61.

The Mādhyamika-school p. 62—177.

1. *kṣaṇabhaṅga* p. 62—75.
  - a. discussion of the *kṣaṇabhaṅga* itself.
  - b. the refutation of *sāmānya* 71—73, the theory of *apoha* 73.
2. *duḥkha* p. 171.
3. *svalakṣaṇa* p. 172.
4. (*sarva*)-*śūnyatā* p. 172—177.
  - a. voidness of all objective and subjective forms of existence proved by the example of the dream and *adhyāsa*.
  - b. the fourfold formula „*sarvam anityam* &c.”
  - c. *prāsaṅgika* formula about the nature of things.
  - d. The standpoint of relative truth.

The Yogācāra-school.

- 1—3. *kṣaṇabhaṅga*, *duḥkha* & *svalakṣaṇa* p. 177.
- 4 *bāhya-śūnyatā* p. 177—185.
  - a. Reality of self-consciousness p. 177.
  - b. & c. Two *prasaṅga*-argumentations to show that external objects do not exist p. 178.
  - d. *avayavi-nirākaraṇa* p. 177—179.
  - e. *ekatvaṃ nīla-tadulhiyoh* p. 180—185.

The Sautrāntika-school p. 185—200.

- A. Causality between the external thing and its mental representation p. 185—190. The existence of external things proved p. 190—193. Explanation of *pratyakṣa* and its four *pratyayas* p. 193—194.
- B. Definition of the five *skandhas* *rūpa*, *vijñāna*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* & *sapśkāra*, p. 195—196.
- C. The threefold formula: *sarvaṃ duḥkham*, *duḥkhaṃ āyatanaṃ* & *duḥkhasaṃudhātum*. The four noble truths (*duḥkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* & *mārga*) p. 196.
- D. Egression: Explanation of the *pratyakṣa-samutpāda* as a corollary to *samudaya*, the origination of *duḥkha* p. 197—199. Continuation of C. Definition of *nirodha* and *mārga* p. 199. [In the explanation by JINADATTA, quoted p. 205 &c., *mārga* & *nirodha* are confounded and *āyatana* is introduced as the second member of the Four Noble Truths.]

The Vaibhāṣika-school p. 200—203.

- A. Explanation of *pratyakṣa* by the Vaibhāṣikas. *Sarikalpikam* & *nirvikalpakam pratyakṣam*.
- B. Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas agree in other matters.

## E. PARALLEL PASSAGES OF THE NYĀYA-KANDALĪ

and the chapter on Buddhism in the *Sarvadurṣanasaṅgraha*.

The references are taken from L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN and arranged in accordance with the subjects.

Subject.	Nyāya-kandalī.	Muséon II.	Division of the chapter, mentioned.
<i>sattā &amp; sāmānya</i>	p. 12 & p. 17 1 10	p. 63 n. 20  p. 71 n. 40 p. 72 n. 43	Mādhyamika School, <i>kṣaṇabhūga</i> .
	p. 317—320	p. 72 n. 43 p. 73 n. 47	
<i>kṣaṇikatva</i> . . . .	p. 73 & 74	p. 62 n. 19 p. 63 n. 21 p. 67 n. 31 p. 70 n. 36	
<i>avagacān &amp; paramaṇu</i> . . . .	p. 42 & 43	p. 178 n. 75	Yogācāra School,
<i>dvaita</i> . . . . .	p. 122—123	p. 178 n. 73 p. 189 n. 111 p. 190 n. 113	<i>bāhyaçūnyatā</i> . Sautrāntika School, A Causality between the exterior thing and our representation &c.
	p. 126 l. 9 & 17	p. 180 n. 80 p. 182 n. 85	Yogācāra School, <i>bāhyaçūnyatā</i> .
	p. 130	p. 183 n. 87	
<i>pratyakṣa</i> . . . .	p. 190 l. 18 & 19	p. 202 n. 153 p. 203 n. 156	Vaiśbhāṣika School, Explanation of <i>pra-</i> <i>tyakṣa</i> .
<i>anumāna</i> . . . . .	p. 206—207	p. 57 n. 3 p. 58 n. 7	Introduction: <i>anumānasya pramā-</i>
<i>pratijñā</i> . . . .	p. 234	p. 61 n. 13	<i>ṇatvam</i> .
<i>anumānasya pramāṇatvam</i>	p. 255 l. 5—22	p. 60 n. 11	
<i>prasaṅgānu- māna</i> . . . . .	p. 197 l. 12	p. 64 n. 25	Mādhyamika School.
<i>mahodaya</i> . . . .	p. 3 l. 24	p. 185 n. 24	Sautrāntika School.

## F. PASSAGE IN THE PURVA-MIMAMSA-SUTRA ON SOUND.

M.S. I, 1, 6—23.

6 <i>Karmaike tatra darṣanat.</i>	15 <i>Adityavād gaṅgapadyāt.</i>
7 <i>Asthānāt.</i>	16 <i>Varṇāntaram avikārah.</i>
8 <i>Karotiṣabhlāt.</i>	17 <i>Nādarṣddhiḥ parā. —</i>
9 <i>Sattvāntare gaṅgapadyāt.</i>	18 <i>Nityas tu syād darṣanasya</i> <i>parārthatvāt.</i>
10 <i>Prakṛticikṣṭpoṣa.</i>	
11 <i>Vṛthiḥca kartṛbhenuṁsya. —</i>	19 <i>Sarvatra gaṅgapadyāt.</i>
12 <i>Savām tu tatra darṣanāt.</i>	20 <i>Samkhyābhāvāt.</i>
13 <i>Sataḥ param adarṣanam</i> <i>viśayānāgamāt.</i>	21 <i>Anapeksatvāt.</i>
14 <i>Prayogasya param.</i>	22 <i>Prakhyābhāvācca yogyasya.</i>
	23 <i>Līṅgadarṣanācca.</i>

*Translation by Ballantyne.*

6. Some say that it [viz. sound] is a product, for in the case of it, we see [what constitutes it such].
7. Because of its transitoriness.
8. Because [we employ, when speaking of sound] the expression 'making'.
9. From its simultaneousness in another person.
10. And [the Naiyāyikas infer that sound is not eternal, from the observation] of the original and altered forms [of sound].
11. And, by a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it. —
12. But alike [according to both opinions: that of these objectors and of ourselves] is the perception thereof — [both agreeing that this is only for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to sound itself's being so].
13. Of this [sound] while it really exists, the non-perception at another time [than that when the sound is perceived] arises from the non-arrival [of the manifestor] at the object.
14. This [expression 'making'] means [merely] employing.
15. The simultaneousness is as in the case of the sun.
16. This [viz. the letter *y* — referred to in aph. 10 — when it comes in the room of the letter *i*] is another letter, not a modification [of that whose place it takes].
17. It is the increase of noise [not of sound] that is [in that case] augmented. —
18. But it must be eternal, because its exhibition is [available — which it else would not be —] for the sake of another.

19. [Sound is proved to be eternal] by there being everywhere simultaneousness [in the recognition of it by ever so many hearers].
20. [Sound is proved to be eternal] by its absence of number.
21. [Sound is proved to be eternal] by there being no ground for anticipation [of its destruction].
22. And [the case is not as the doubter, under aph. 21 comments, suggests], because [if it were so] there would be no perception [by the organ of hearing] of any object appropriate to it.
23. And [sound is proved to be eternal] by our seeing a proof [of this, in a text of the scripture<sup>1</sup>) which will be cited in the commentary here following].

*Translations and references by Gaṅgānātha Jhā.*

Some of these sūtras are translated, others referred to, by GAṆGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, in his translation of KUMĀRILA'S Ṣlokavārttika (Bibl. Ind.) To wit: sūtras 6—11 on p. 410 (adhikaraṇa 6) kārikā 8—18.

sūtra 12 on p. 413	kārikā 19	sūtra 18 on p. 448	kārikā 230
„ 13 „ „ 414	„ 33	„ 19 „ „ 470	„ 356
„ 14 „ „ 434	„ 158	„ 20 „ „ 472	„ 368
„ 15 „ „ 435	„ 163	„ 21 „ „ 484	„ 443
„ 16 „ „ 443	„ 201	„ 22 „ „ 484	„ 445
„ 17 „ „ 445	„ 211	„ 23 deest.	

G. SŪTRAS IN THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA, ON SOUND,

*as far as referred to, in book I.*

Ed. '28.	Ed. '96	
II, 81	II, 2, 13	<i>Ādimattēd aindriyakatvāt kṛtakavadūpacārācca.</i>
86	18	<i>Prāguccāraṇād anupalambhād, āvaraṇādy-anupalabdheḥ.</i>
89	22	<i>Asparṣatvāt.</i>
92	25	<i>Sampradānāt.</i>
94	27	<i>Adhyāpanād apratiṣedhaḥ.</i>
96	28	<i>Abhyāsāt.</i>
100	32	<i>Vināṣakāraṇānupalabdheḥ.</i>
106	38	<i>Vikārāpadeṣopadeṣāt samāyagḥ.</i>
122	54	<i>Gūṇāntarāpatty-upamāda-hrāsa-vṛddhi-leṣa-śleṣe-bhyas tu carṇavikāropapattir carṇavikārah.</i>

1) *Longa* in this meaning, often occurring in Mīmāṃsaka writings, cf. here p. 186.

*Translation by Ballantyne.*

81. From its having an origin, from its being cognisable by sense, and from its being spoken of as factitious, [sound is not eternal].
86. [Sound is not eternal], because it is not perceived antecedently to pronunciation, and because we do not perceive any veil, &c. [so that it might exist unperceived].
89. Because it is intangible.
92. By reason of traditionary teaching, [suggests some one, sound must be eternal].
94. You have not set aside [my argument — says the objector], because there is the lecture.
100. [Sound, says some one, must be eternal], because we discern no cause why it should perish.
106. From the injunction under the character of a change, there arises a doubt.
122. But there is [what may allowably be called] change of letters, because such change of letters does occur through the attainment of another quality, substitution, prolongation, contraction and augmentation.

## II. COLLECTION OF PASSAGES FROM BHIMĀCĀRYA'S NYĀYAKOṢA, BEARING ON SOUND.

First group of passages bearing on the substantiality of sound.

Nyāya-koṣa p. 791 l. 9: *Ābdo dravyam iti Bhaṭṭa-mīmāṃsaka āhuh.*

l. l. note 3. *Ātrānumānam pramāṇam:*

*Ābdo dravyam;*

*sākṣāndriya-sambandha-vedyatāt;*

*ghaṭavad, iti.*

*Ātrotram dravya-grāhakam;*

*āśrayavendriyatād;*

*manavad, iti.*

*Guṇavattēcca ābdo dravyam;*

*samkhyādayo 'pi hi ābaddharmā anu-*

*bhūyante.*

(References to VALLABHĀCĀRYA'S *Nyāya-līlāvatī*).

- l. 1. note 3. *Ābhidhikās tu ģabdam ubhaya-scarāpam icchanti;*  
 (continued) *tāratādago gaṇāh ģabdanisṭhāh,*  
*tadīṣṣayatevā chablasya dravyatvam;*  
*ākāṣarāpadravyaṣṣayatevā gūṇatvam ca, iti.*  
 (References to NĀGEṢABHATṬA'S *Laghu-*  
*mañjūṣā*).

Second group of passages, bearing on the eter-  
 nality of sound.

Nyāya-koṣa p. 791 l. 9: *Ābdo nityah, iti Prābhākara Bhaṭṭay cānuh.*

- l. 1. note 4. (in reference to the Prābhākaras): *Etsamute*  
*ģablasya nityatve pramāṇam anumānam; tac ca:*  
*Ābdo nityah,*  
*vyomamātraguṇatevā;*  
*vyoma-parimāṇatvad, iti.*

*Ābdo nityah;*  
*adravyadravyatvāt;*  
*pratyabhijñānācca.<sup>1)</sup>*

(References to JĀNAKĪNĀTHA'S *Nyāya-*  
*siddhāntamañjarī*, to ĆRĪKAṢṬHA'S *Tar-*  
*kaprakāṣa*; and VALLABHĀCĀRYA'S *Nyāya-*  
*tilkāṭi*).

- l. 1. note 4. *Ātrāyam āṣayah: so ṣyam gākārah, iti pra-*  
 (continued) *tyabhijñā-bālvā chablasya nityatvam. Gākāra*  
*atpānāh, cinaṣṭaṣṭra, iti pratyayas tu ģabda-*  
*vyañjaka-rāyatpatti-ciṣayaka eveti.*

(References to JĀNAKĪNĀTHA'S *Nyāya-*  
*siddhāntamañjarī*).

<sup>1)</sup> This argumentation presupposes the *abhidhika*-conception, mentioned by the gramma-  
 rian Nageṣa-bhaṭṭa (see above).



## SECTION S.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE NYĀYA-KANDALĪ.

The Nyāya-kandalī consists partly of paraphrases and short explanations of the Bhāṣya-text, and partly of longer egressions which as a rule show a polemical character. In most cases CRĪDHARA does not mention the authors or schools whom he attacks. But for us it is a matter of importance to make out who are meant by these different *kecit*, *anye* &c. Sometimes the verses, quoted in the text, afford us some help.

In the following table I have shortly indicated the contents of the most important egressions. For its composition I have made ample use of the alphabetical Sanskrit index, which DVIVEDIN has added to his edition.

The reader is referred to my table of contents of the Bhāṣya (here p. 527) for the division into books and chapters.

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book I. The six categories.
		Chapter I. Introduction & enumeration of categories.
1) Maṅgala	p. 1, l. 11	Importance of a <i>maṅgala</i> .
	p. 2, l. 13	Explanation of the name KAṆĀDA.
	p. 3, l. 6	PPAÇASTAPĀDA rightly mentions at the beginning of his book its <i>prayojana</i> (aim) and its relation ( <i>sambandha</i> ). This relation is twofold: <i>vācya-vācaka-bhāva</i> between the categories and the book, <i>sādhya-sāddhanabhāva</i> between the knowledge of the <i>padārthas</i> and liberation.
	p. 3, l. 21	This egression contains four discussions:
	p. 3, l. 21 —	A) Refutation of four definitions of <i>mokṣa</i> .
	p. 4, l. 11	NOTE. It will be seen by comparing a parallel passage in the Sarva-darṣana-saṃgraha <sup>1)</sup> that these definitions belong

<sup>1)</sup> COWELL'S translation p. 167. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN'S translation of the chapter on Buddhism p. 176 (n°. 65), p. 185 (n°. 94), p. 199 (n°. 145).

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book I. The six categories. Chapter 1. Introduction & enumeration of categories.
		<p>respectively to the Mādhyamikas, the Vijñānavādins, the Sāṃkhyins and Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña. The definition, given by ĆRĪDHARA himself, agrees with the Nyāya Sūtra.</p> <p>p. 4, l. 11— p. 5, l. 4 B) The Vedāntas (Upaniṣads) prove the existence of <i>mokṣa</i>. Authoritativeness belongs to sacred and wordly language. (This last thesis has been contradicted by the Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakas).</p> <p>p. 5, l. 4— p. 6, l. 3 C) Can words themselves express their separate meanings by the function denotation, or do they only express an action or something connected with an action? (This was an important subject of controversy between the Kumārila- and Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakas. Cf. GAṆGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, <i>The Prābhākara School</i>, p. 63. <sup>1)</sup>)</p> <p>p. 6, l. 3 D) How do we understand sentences in which a verb is lacking.</p>
2) The knowledge of the six <i>padārthas</i> and liberation.	p. 6, l. 18	Pleasure which arises from objects, even the pleasure of Heaven, is momentary (transient). Refutation of the opinion of MAṆḌANA's that the extirpation of a characteristic quality amounts to the extirpation of the <i>ātman</i> itself.
	p. 6, l. 25	<i>Mokṣa</i> is a desirable aim for mankind, for pleasure is always intermixed with pain and is like poisoned honey.
	p. 7, l. 7	Reason, why the <i>padārthas</i> are mentioned in the order substance, quality &c. — Why is <i>abhāva</i> , though a seventh category, not mentioned.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. Ny. kandaḥ p. 231 l. 24.

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book I. Chapter 2. The species of categories enumerated.
1) Enumera- tion of sub- stances.	p. 9, l. 1	Darkness is no substance. Neither can we say that darkness is merely the „non-existence of light“, nor that it is „our not-seeing of light“. Darkness is a kind of colour (blueness, blackness) which is thrown over ( <i>āropita</i> ) those places where light is lacking. <sup>1)</sup>
	p. 10, l. 8	Though the Lord possesses only six qualities <sup>2)</sup> and the individual soul, subject to <i>samsāra</i> , is characterised by fourteen qualities, yet the <i>Īvara</i> is to be considered as a kind of <i>ātman</i> . The number of nine <i>pañārtha</i> -, therefore, is not transgressed.
2) Enumera- tion of qua- lities	p. 10, l. 18	Psychical qualities as heroism &c. are subordinated to the general qualities ( <i>buddhi</i> &c.), mentioned in the Bhāṣya.
4) The two forms of ge- nerality.	p. 12, l. 4	Discussion of the notion „being“. This passage has been translated above p. 360.
	p. 12, l. 28	The notions <i>dravyatva</i> , <i>karmatva</i> and <i>guṇatva</i> must be accepted. The perception of an individual as well as the perception of the circumstances ( <i>samaya</i> ) are a cause of the [arising of this] notion <i>guṇatva</i> (p. 13 l. 3). F. i. when, on meeting a person, we say „this is a Brahman“, then this statement presupposes a previous knowledge of his parentage. But when once this knowledge has been obtained, then this perception „this is a brahman“ is a perception, nothing else. Finally the author discusses in connection with this perception of <i>guṇatva</i> the ques-

1) Cf. Ny. Kaṇḍik p. 179 l. 8-17

2) Cf. here p. 538.

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dividedin's edition.	Book I. Chapter 3. The properties, common to all or some of the categories.
6) Definition of inherence.	p. 14, l. 26	<p>tion: whether the chastity of women has ever been perceived. Undoubtedly, the author says, provided that strict guards have watched over them.</p> <p>Discussion about the technical term „<i>ayuta-siddhi</i>”.</p>
9) Properties, common to three of the categories.	p. 19, l. 7	<p>Book I, Chapter 3.</p> <p><i>The properties, common to all or some of the categories.</i></p> <p>Argument for the thesis, that no <i>sāmānya</i> is to be accepted in reference to <i>sāmānya</i> itself, <i>viśeṣa</i> and <i>samavāya</i> [in other words, though the notions <i>dravatva</i>, <i>guṇatva</i> &amp; <i>karmatva</i> are required by reason, the same thing cannot be said of a corresponding <i>sāmānyatva</i> &amp;c.]</p>
	p. 19, l. 20	<p>Argument for the thesis that we cannot say that generality, (ultimate) difference and inherence are produced (or effects).</p> <p>NOTE. A different view is held in reference to <i>samavāya</i> by the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas, see GAṆGANĀTHĀ JHĀ, <i>The Prābhākara-School</i> p. 89.</p>
4) Properties, common to the four elements and <i>manas</i> .	p. 21, l. 25	<p>Book II. Substance.</p> <p>Chapter 1. <i>The properties, common to all or some of the nine substances.</i></p> <p>Opponent: The ideas of farness and nearness are not to be accepted [namely as underived notions], in as far as they simply mean the greater or lesser number of conjunctions of things conjoined. — Refutation.</p>

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book II. Substance. Chapter I. The properties, common to all or some of the nine substances.
	p. 22, l. 6	<i>Vega</i> (speed, physical inertia) is something else than the series of actions [i. e. movements considered as existing during one moment]. For <i>vega</i> is not seen in things which move slowly.
6) Properties, common to the four elements and physical space.	p. 23, l. 4	Sensual perception is brought about by the organs of sense on reaching the object. NOTE. A translation of the passage is given here p. 361. The author has in view only the organ of sight. A similar theory in reference to sound was held by the Sāᅁkhya's, cf. <i>ᅒlokavārttika</i> , translation-GAᅒGANĀTHĀ JHĀ p. 430 n°. 127—128).
13) Properties, common to (mathematical) space and time.	p. 25, l. 14	(Mathematical) space and time should be called <i>nimitta-kāraᅇᅇni</i> (efficient or occasional causes) of produced things, in as far as every form of causation obeys the formula: in that time and place, where the causes are working, there the effects arise.
14) Properties, common to earth and fire.	p. 26, l. 1	Why does the Bhāᅒyakāra mention the accidental fluidity not only of earth, but also of light: are not then gold [and the other metals] of earthly nature? — No; because earth, by intense heat, turns into ashes [i. e. a portion of the earthly substance passes over from the solid or fluid state into a gaseous condition, whilst a remnant is left behind in the form of ashes]; but however intense the heat may be, still the metals remain fluids. The weight which is observed in metals, may be the result of their

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book II. Substances. Chapter I. The properties, common to all or some of the nine substances.
		<p>being mixed with earth. The objection that metals cannot be light, because they are not illuminous of themselves, is not convincing, in as far as the „colour”, peculiar to light, may be here in an undeveloped condition.</p> <p>NOTE. Both the explanation of ÇRĪDHARA's and the paragraph of the Bhāṣya refer to Vaiç. Sūtra II, 1, 6 &amp; 7, in which clarified butter, lac and wax are mentioned apart from tin, lead, iron, silver, gold. It is a priori clear that this distinction was due to the peculiar glance which is typical for metals and which is still accepted as such by modern European chemistry in its definition of this rubric of elements; on the other hand the explanation which ÇRĪDHARA gives, owes its origin probably to objections as the one, referred to at the end of his gloss.</p>
15) The three-fold method.	p. 26, l. 15	<p>The threefold method of the Vaiçeśika system: enunciation, definition and examination. [See translation, given here p. 363].</p>
2) Earth.	<p>p. 28, l. 21</p> <p>p. 30, l. 2</p>	<p>Book II. Chapter 2.</p> <p><i>Detailed treatment of the nine substances.</i></p> <p>The usefulness of definition. Refutation of the opinion that defining leads to an endless regress. [See translation, given here p. 364].</p> <p>The explanation of variegated colour. [See translation given here p. 365].</p>

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book II. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the nine substances.
	p. 31, l. 16	Atom-theory. Proof for the existence and eternality of atoms (or infinitesimal parts). Two atoms, united, form a double atom ( <i>dyānuka</i> ). Double atoms conjoin, three pairs together at least; thus one <i>tryaṇuka</i> is three <i>dyānukas</i> ; for the rest the number of <i>dyānukas</i> which can conjoin, is unlimited. [See translation here p. 367].
	p. 33, l. 5	The bodies of the gods and <i>ṛsis</i> are not originated from blood and seed. Even when a body is originated from blood and seed, this mixture is first dissolved into atoms.
	p. 35, l. 2	Proof for the existence of the olfactory sensory.
	p. 35, l. 5	Proof for the thesis that the olfactory sensory consists of earthly matter. The olfactory sensory, being of earth, possesses smell as its quality. But we do not perceive this smell. Similarly we do not perceive the flavour, the colour, the touch of the gustatory, visual and tactual organs. The case is different with the auditory organ; the sound, perceived, is really a quality of this organ itself.
3) Water.	p. 38, l. 5	Refutation of the theory that the body is built up of five elements. [See translation here p. 369].
	p. 38, l. 14	Proof for the thesis that the gustatory organ consists of water-atoms.
4) Fire.	p. 40, l. 6	Proof for the thesis that the visual organ consists of light.
	p. 41, l. 2	Proof for the thesis that the objective things are not yet included in their

Number of paragraph.	Page in Drivedin's edition.	Book II. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the nine substances.
		<p>qualities; in other words: the thing is not merely its qualities. Refutation of a Buddhistic theory according to which the outward reality only corresponds to such elementary sensations as blue &amp;c., but not to our conception of things. [See translation here p. 18).</p>
	p. 41, l. 12	<p>This refutation continued. Proof for the existence of aggregates. <i>A</i>) General part. <i>B</i>) Contradiction which exists (according to the Buddhist) between simultaneous movement of a part and the rest of an aggregate; is <i>yuta-siddhi</i> between part and aggregate to be admitted? <i>C</i>) We only perceive the side of a thing, that which is turned towards us; thus the contradiction arises (according to the Buddhist) that a thing is perceived and not perceived at the same time; <i>D</i>) Does an aggregate abide only partially or totally in each of its several parts? If no aggregates should exist, then (according to the Vaiṣeṣika) the notions, used in argumentations, such as <i>dharma</i> &amp;c, would become baseless. Validity of perception. [See translation here p. 371].</p>
	p. 43, l. 17	<p>Discussion between a Buddhist and a Vaiṣeṣika about the existence of the atoms. [See translation here p. 375].</p>
5) Wind.	p. 15, l. 16	<p>Proof for the thesis that the organ of touch consists of wind. Refutation of the opinion that the skin, which surrounds the whole body and its organs,</p>



Number of paragraph.	Page in Drivedin's edition.	Book II. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the nine substances.
	p. 46, l. 1	<p>is the seat of the common sensory for all sensorial impressions.</p> <p>The existence of wind is not known by perception, but by inference. For we perceive only the cold touch of wind, but not the wind itself as a thing.</p> <p>NOTE. In the term <i>nivṛtly-anumāna</i> in line 10, <i>nivṛtti</i> = <i>vyāvṛtti</i>.</p>
6) The creation and destruction of the world.	p. 54, l. 3	Explanation of the term <i>mānasa</i> . How the use of language is restored at the time of creation by the <i>Prajāpatīs</i> &c. [See translation here p. 376].
	p. 54, l. 10	Proof for the existence of the Lord. [See translation here p. 376].
	p. 56, l. 22	<p>The eternality of the divine cognition, wish and volition. [See translation here p. 381].</p> <p>Egressions: A) The individual souls cannot direct the atoms at the time of world-creation; B) Is there one Lord or more? C) The qualities of the Lord; D) Is the Lord a bound or a liberated soul? [See translation here p. 382].</p>
8) Time.	p. 65, l. 4	<p>How is it that we have a notion [i. e. a notion of a thing as] defined by time, although time itself is imperceptible? — By perception I realise the existence of the thing, by inference I realise the relation of the thing towards time, thus since I am the one and same person who ascertains both facts, this notion of the <i>viśiṣṭatva</i> of things by time can arise. Reference to the discussion on <i>śarabhaṃ candanam</i> (Nyāya-kandalī p. 117 l. 1)</p>

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book II. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the nine substances.
10) Soul.	<p>p. 73, l. 19— p. 82, l. 21</p> <p>p. 86, l. 23</p> <p>p. 89, l. 2</p>	<p>and to the Mīmāṃsaka example of <i>aghaṭaṃ bhūtaṃ</i>, used for the explanation of this difficulty of <i>kālena viṣiṣṭatvam</i>.</p> <p>Discussion of the <i>kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda</i>. [See translation, given here p. 384, and detailed analysis in next section].</p> <p>Discussion between a Vaiṣeṣika and an Advaita-Vedāntin, on the oneness or plurality of <i>ātman</i>.</p> <p>Discussion of the question: does not the belief in the eternality of <i>ātman</i> counteract the striving for liberation? In this passage we meet with the psychical concatenation: <i>sukhatṛṣṇā</i>, <i>rāga</i> &amp; <i>dveṣa</i>, <i>pravṛtti</i> &amp; <i>nivṛtti</i>, <i>dharmādharmau</i>, <i>saṃsāra</i> (cf. Vaiṣ. Sūtra VI, 2, 10—15).</p>
11) Manas.	<p>p. 90, l. 22</p> <p>p. 90, l. 27</p> <p>p. 91, l. 23</p>	<p>The difference between sentiment &amp;c. and cognition. [See translation here p. 403].</p> <p>Discussion on the question whether reflection is a necessary part or accidental addition of intellection (p. 403).</p> <p>Refutation of the <i>tripuṭipratyakṣatāvāda</i> and the theory that knowledge and soul are self-illuminated at every act of perceiving (p. 405).</p>
11) The internal organ.	p. 92, l. 7	<p><i>Manas</i> is one in number in every body, because every moment only one notion or one volitional act takes place in our soul-life. The simile of the <i>alātaka</i> is used for the explanation of those cases in which several notions seem to occur at the same moment. Although our soul contains only one</p>

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Quality. Chapter 1. Characterisation of the qualities.
11) The qualities, with reference to the organs of sense.		<p>notion at the time, still such a notion may have several objects for its contents.</p> <p>Book III. Quality.</p> <p>Chapter 1. <i>Characterisation of the qualities.</i></p> <p>Discussion of the question: is knowledge directly perceived by internal perception or must its existence be proved by inference? The Vaiṣeṣika defends the first alternative. In the course of the discussion the Mīmāṃsaka notions: <i>jñātātva</i>, <i>jñānasya svaprakāṣā</i>, <i>saṃvedana</i>, the innate spirituality of soul, are fully examined. Soul, according to the Vaiṣeṣikas, is the abode of intellections, but is not intellection itself. [See translation, given here p. 406].</p>
2) Colour.		<p>Book III. Chapter 2.</p> <p><i>Detailed treatment of the qualities.</i></p> <p>When a substance is destroyed, then its qualities: colour &amp;c. are also annihilated. The latter destruction follows the former so quickly that they seem to be simultaneous.</p> <p>Proof for the thesis that thing and quality are not identical [in other words that the notions of thing and quality must be both accepted next to each other]. [See translation, given here p. 409].</p>

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
6) Qualities, produced by the influence of fire.	p. 109, l. 6	The changes in earth, caused by fire, result from the conjunction between fire and the atoms of earth, and not from a conjunction between fire and an earthly aggregate. — The porosity of a pot &c. contradicted. — Explanation of how recognition is possible with reference to the unbaked and baked pot. — The stages in which the process of baking can be divided. [See translation, given here p. 410].
7) Number.	p. 113, l. 22	Discussion between a Vaiçeśika and a Vijñānavādin concerning the question: does number possess an objective reality? [See translation, given here p. 412]. [NOTE: It deserves our notice that here the reality of number is advocated by the Vaiçeśika, who himself elsewhere defends number as a mere result of <i>apekṣābuddhi</i> ].
	p. 116, l. 21	After having explained the <i>dvitva</i> -theory of the Bhāṣya with regard to the <i>indriyārthasaṃnikarṣa</i> , the <i>ekatva-sāmānyajñāna</i> and the <i>apekṣābuddhi</i> , the author of the Kandalī gives an argumentation for the thesis: objective twoness arises from the perceiver's intellection. This argumentation leads to the following egression:
	p. 116, l. 25	Discussion on the notions: <i>viçeṣaṇa</i> and <i>viçeṣya</i> . They are contained in two separate intellections. Explanation by means of the example of the intellection <i>surabhi candanam</i> . The difference between <i>viçeṣaṇa</i> and <i>upalakṣaṇa</i> . [See translation, given here p. 414].

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Bhapter II. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
p. 119, l. 4	4	How is it that the notion of number, e. g. of hundred, can arise with regard to destroyed substances? This seems to be contradictory to the theory, given by PRAṢASTAPĀDA. Some say (l. 7): this use of number is metaphorical ( <i>gauṇa</i> ). Others declare (l. 5 &c.) that the past can still be active as an inherential cause [i. e. a past object can be an abode for qualities, attributed to it by our soul at the present]. In the course of the argumentation the necessity of assuming the notion <i>saṃskāra</i> (latent impression) is upheld; — then the following example of the proposition to be proved is given: the first speech-sounds of a word are only remembered during the pronuntiation of the last sounds, and still they are together the occasional cause ( <i>nimittakāraṇa</i> ) of the concept ( <i>arthapratiti</i> ) expressed by the word; — finally we meet with a remark on the activity of the internal organ; this is fit for making a remembrance arise, and also a perceptive impression, but the latter in accordance with the organs of sense [in other words: we can direct our attention to things remembered as well as things perceived].
p. 122, l. 22	22	Discussion on duality between a Vijnānavādin and a Vaiṣeṣika. [See translation, given here p. 416, and detailed analysis in next section].

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
S) Dimension.	p. 132, l. 5	<p>How can we infer from the existence of certain words the existence of the corresponding objects? In the first place words are not identical with their corresponding objects; by the word 'fire' e. g. our mouth is not set on fire; neither are the words originated from the objects, for they are produced by our expired breath. Answer: words are not merely produced by breath, because they are capable of expressing — or concealing — the speaker's intentions.</p> <p>Further discussion, in which a quotation from the <i>Çlokavārttika</i> (p. 94 çl. 161) is met with, and which mainly turns on the question: how have we to explain the relation between words and objects in the case of a <i>bhrānta</i> (a confused person whose words, although without sense, may sometimes be understood by another in a certain way) and of a deceiver.</p> <p>Conclusion: words [which have been shown to be not merely products of breath] are moreover not simply expressions of intentions, but principally bear on objects, otherwise we could not say that in a dispute one speaker is the winner and the other the loser.</p>
	p. 133, l. 3	<p>The thesis that an object and its dimensions are identical cannot be upheld. Thus, for instance, we see the object itself from a distance, but its great size is then perceived as small by optical delusion (<i>bhrānti</i>).</p>

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
10) Conjunction.	p. 143, l. 2	Refutation of the proposition: „the aggregates do not originate from conjunction ( <i>samyoga</i> ) of constituent materials, but from non-existence; for instance the sprout arises in consequence of the annihilation (non-existence) of the seed &c.” On occasion of this proposition ŚRĪDHARA enters upon an:
	p. 143, l. 5	Exposition of the <i>satkāryavāda</i> , which is the main doctrine of the Sāṃkhya-system. Quotation and explanation of ĪCĀVARAKṚṢṢA's Sāṃkhyakārikā IX. In this explanation we meet again with another quotation (p. 143 l. 13).
	p. 143, l. 25	Refutation of the <i>satkāryavāda</i> . The order of these passages on the Sāṃkhya may be shown in the following table:
		<i>asadakāraṇāt</i> Comm. p. 143, 6; refutation p. 144, 9.
		<i>upādānagrahaṇāt</i> p. 143, 9; refutation p. 144, 19.
		<i>sarvasambhavābhāvāt</i> p. 143, 11; refutation p. 144, 16.
		(asambaddhatvaviçeṣe &c.); ( <i>asato</i> ‘ <i>sambaddhasya</i> ).
		<i>çaktusya çakyakaraṇāt</i> p. 143, 15; examination of <i>çakti</i> p. 144, 24.
		<i>kāraṇabhāvāt</i> p. 143, 20; refutation p. 145, 18: „the not performing, thus the non-existence, of the <i>nityāni karmāṇi</i> causes the existence of sin”, the discussion on <i>çakti</i> continued.
		REMARK. With the discussion of <i>çakti</i> p. 144, 24 &c. we may compare the exposition of the Mīmāṃsa-doctrine

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
		(GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĪ, <i>Prābhākara School</i> p. 90).
11) Disjunction.	p. 158, l. 6	Relative value of perception and inference. [See translation, given here p. 433].
	p. 159, l. 1	The annulment of an intellection. [See translation, given here p. 434].
13) Intellection.	p. 171, l. 18	Definition of <i>buddhi</i> , <i>jñāna</i> and <i>upalabdhi</i> according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy. Quotation from the Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra II, 20 and comments on these quotations; refutation of these doctrines. [See translation, given here p. 435].
15) Species of intellections.	p. 173, l. 1	The Bhāṣyakāra has enunciated four forms of <i>avidyā</i> : <i>saṃśaya</i> , <i>viparyaya</i> , <i>anadhyavasāya</i> and <i>svapna</i> . Must <i>tarka</i> (false supposition, made for the purport of refuting a wrong opinion and used as a basis for a reductio ad absurdum) not be considered as a fifth form of <i>avidyā</i> ? <i>Tarka</i> is an important means for reaching the truth [and should therefore be considered as a form of <i>vidyā</i> ]. Whosoever does not accept <i>tarka</i> [as <i>vidyā</i> ], should neither make use of <i>prasaṅga</i> [absurd consequence, used for the refutation of an adversary]. Translation, given here p. 436.
17) <i>Viparyaya</i> .	p. 180, l. 7	Discussion between a Vaiṣeṣika and a Pūrva-Mīmāṃsaka on the question: does <i>viparyaya</i> exist? [Translation, given here p. 438].
21) Perception.	p. 189, l. 13	Discussion between a Buddhist who does not accept <i>savikalpakam pratyakṣam</i> and a Vaiṣeṣika. [Translation here p. 442].



Number of paragraph.	Page in Drivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
p. 194, l. 13		Discussion between a Pūrva-Mīmāṃsaka and a Vaiṣeṣika on the question: do we perceive or infer movement? [Translation here p. 450].
p. 196, l. 4		The perception of the yogins. We may distinguish in this passage three parts:
p. 196, l. 4		A. We, ordinary men, perceive our soul under the aspect of <i>ego</i> or <i>meus</i> , i. e. as an agens or a possessor; but the yogins perceive the <i>ātman</i> in its pure nature, as it is taught in the Vedānta. During this perception the yogin's internal organ stands still in a certain spot of his <i>ātman</i> . With reference to other men's souls, to space &c., another process takes place: here the yogin's internal organ leaves his body for some time and enters into conjunction with other <i>ātman</i> s &c. Inference with respect to this subject: <i>ātmanākāṣṇādiṣv abhyāsapracayas  tattvajñānahetur,  vīṣiṣṭābhyāsatevāt,  vidyācīlpādy-abhyāsavat.</i>
p. 196, l. 18		B. Other inference with regard to the perception of yogins: <i>buddhes tārātamyam kva cin  niratiṣayam,  sātiṣayatvāt,-  parimāṇātārātamyavat.</i>
		Discussion on this inference; corrections, necessary to it.
p. 197, l. 9		C. Discussion on an inference, upheld by an opponent:

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
<p><i>yogino 'tindriyārthadras̥ṭāro na bhavanti,</i>  <i>prāṇitvāt,</i>  <i>asmadūḍicat.</i>  [Translation here p. 452].</p>		
24) The inferential probans.	p. 202, l. 14	Discussion of <i>prakaraṇasama</i> and <i>kālātyayāpadiṣṭa</i> .
	p. 202, l. 15	The exclusively positive probans.
	p. 203, l. 1	The exclusively negative probans.
	p. 204, l. 17	Conclusion to the two last-mentioned passages. [Translation of these four passages here p. 453].
26) <i>Dṛṣṭam</i> § <i>sāmānyato dṛṣṭam</i> .	p. 206, l. 17	Discussion of <i>avinābhāva</i> . According to the Buddhist regular concomitance is based on identity or causality. This is denied by ÇRĪDHARA. In the argumentation the <i>apohavāda</i> of Buddhism is often referred to. [Translation here p. 458].
27) <i>Ābda</i> as a form of inference.	p. 214, l. 6	Verbal authority a form of inference.
	p. 215, l. 19	Is there a <i>svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ</i> between word and object?
	p. 217, l. 23	<i>Scataḥprāmāṇya</i> of word specially and of knowledge in general. [Translation here respectively p. 465, 469, 470]. NOTE. These three passages are directed against the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.
29) <i>Upamāna</i> .	p. 220, l. 21	Polemics against the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, and especially against ÇABARASVĀMIN. [Translation here p. 475].
30) <i>Arthāpatti</i> .	p. 222, l. 9	Polemics against the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. According to the Vaiṣeṣika <i>arthāpatti</i> a form of inference. The distinction of <i>śrutārthāpatti</i> from <i>arthāpatti</i> in general not accepted. [Translation, here p. 478].

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
32) <i>Abhāva</i> .	p. 225, l. 16	<i>Abhāva</i> rejected as a separate source of knowledge. [Translation here p. 483].
	p. 225, l. 26	<i>Abhāva</i> as a separate category. [Translation p. 489].
	p. 230, l. 4	Division of this category „non-existence” into four kinds: <i>prāgabhāva</i> , <i>pradhvaṃsābhāva</i> , <i>ilaretarābhāva</i> , <i>atyantābhāva</i> .
34) <i>Parārthānumāna</i> .	p. 231, l. 24	Discussion of the <i>anvitābhīdhāna-vāda</i> and the <i>abhihitānvaya-vāda</i> [i. e. two psychological theories on language by KUMĀRILA and PRABHĀKARA]. Translation here p. 492.
	p. 233, l. 11	The <i>parārthatva</i> of <i>anumāna</i> , is contradicted by an opponent: if inference could be „for another”, then also an information about a perception should be called „ <i>parārtham pratyakṣam</i> ”. The defendant argues as follows: not the fact that in a <i>parārthānumāna</i> we use words directed against somebody else, but the fact that the fivefold verbal information causes the force of the argument to arise in somebody else, is a reason why the <i>parārthānumāna</i> should be considered as an <i>anumāna</i> .
35) The five <i>avayavas</i> .	p. 234, l. 15	Polemics against Buddhists who deny the necessity of <i>pratijñā</i> . [NOTE. Cf. <i>The Prābhākāra School</i> p. 49].
37) The fallacious probantia.	p. 242, l. 19	Explanation of Vaiṣeṣika Sūtra II, 2, 18—19.
40) <i>Anusandhāna</i> .	p. 249, l. 25	The order of the four first <i>avayavas</i> explained.

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41) <i>Praty- āmnāya.</i>	p.252, l.15— p. 253, l. 15 p.254, l.18— p. 255, l. 4 p. 255, l. 5	Necessity of the fifth <i>avayava</i> .  Two other explanations for this necessity.  The trustworthiness of inference. Pas- sage, taken from a Buddhistic source and refuting the opinion of those who only accept perception as a trust- worthy source of knowledge. [Trans- lation here p. 495].
46) <i>Sukha.</i>	p. 260, l. 16	Refutation of the opinion that pleasure is merely the negation of pain.
51) <i>Gurutva.</i>	p. 264, l. 3	Refutation of the opinion that weight is perceived by the organ of touch: if weight were perceived by touch, then also the weight of an object under our hand would be perceived. Really weight is inferred: thus an object, placed on our hand, will move our hand; and from this movement we infer the weight.
	p. 264, l. 9	Refutation of the opinion that weight does not reside in the aggregate, but only in the component parts.
54) <i>Sam- kāra.</i>	p. 272, l. 24	Discussion on <i>spṛṣṭa</i> . [Translation here p. 496 and detailed analysis book IV section IX table C].
55) <i>Dharma.</i>	p. 273, l. 21	This eggression may be divided into two parts: A) Discussion between a Vaiṣeṣika and an opponent [i. e. a Prābhākara Mī- māṃsaka]; according to the Vaiṣeṣika an act, i. e. a religious act, effectuates an unseen quality residing in the soul ( <i>adṛṣṭa</i> ); according to the opponent the act itself creates a power ( <i>apūrvā</i> );

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		<i>karmasāmānīrthyā; śakti</i> ) which is of an objective nature and does not reside in the soul, nor in the act.
		Division of the dialogue:
	p. 273, l. 21—24	the opponent: l. 24 -- p. 274, l. 1 answer.
	p. 274, l. 1—7	the opponent; l. 8—11 answer.
	p. 274, l. 11—12	the opponent; l. 12—16 answer.
	p. 274, l. 16—19	the opponent; l. 20 answer.
		[NOTE. Cf. <i>The Prābhākara School</i> , p. 160; ibidem p. 166 we find a description of KUMĀRILA BHATṬA's opinion which agrees with the theory defended by the Vaiṣeṣika. See moreover M. MÜLLER, <i>Six Darśanas</i> p. 276].
	p. 274, l. 21	B) Refutation of the opinion upheld by MAṆḌANA in his <i>Vidhi-cireka</i> ; the <i>apūrva</i> is an effect ( <i>kārya</i> ), but not a power ( <i>śakti</i> ) of the sacrifice. The <i>apūrva</i> , when helped by auxiliaries ( <i>sahakārin</i> ), such as favourable place, time and circumstance, brings about bliss. — Answer by the Vaiṣeṣika: when we find the expression <i>dharma</i> with reference to a sacrifice (cf. Nyāya-kandalī p. 273 l. 21), then this word is used metaphorically. Really <i>dharma</i> is a property of soul.
	p. 228, l. 21	The path to liberation: renunciation of <i>kāmyāni karmāṇi</i> (acts, sacrifices which aim at the fulfilment of a wish), application to <i>samādhi</i> ; gradual increase of <i>dharma</i> and <i>samādhi</i> , whilst

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
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alternating. An opponent asks: why is it not sufficient to study the nature of the *ātman* in the Ṛuti; why do we want application to *saṃādhi*? Because we must intuitively, directly realise the nature of the soul and must thoroughly feel that the soul is neither agent, nor possessor, but neutral (*na kartā, na bhoktā, kiṃtū dāśina eva*); the notions 'I' and 'mine' are caused by exterior factors (*upādhis*): body &c. From this wrong knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*) attachment and aversion arise; from this, activity and non-activity; from this, merit and demerit; from this, *saṃsāra*.

As the Buddhists have said: as long as we talk of self, we have the notion of other; from this distinction between self and other love and hatred arise.

Importance of immediate knowledge; insufficiency of knowledge, only based on study. Quotation of a Sāṃkhya-verse in which perfect knowledge is described.

[NOTE. The whole passage is interesting for the eclecticism, or rather syncreticism which we may already observe in the Nyāya-kandalī and which was still more developed in recent Indian thought].

58) *Apavarga*. p. 283, l. 12—  
p. 286, l. 19

He who is about to obtain *mokṣa*, must give up the *kāmyāni karmāṇi*, but is obliged to perform the *nitya-naimittika-karmāṇi* (daily and periodical sacrifices).

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
	p. 286, l. 20	Refutation of the opinion that the innate nature of the soul is bliss ( <i>ānanda</i> ).
	-	Division of the dialogue:
	p. 286, l. 21—24	Vaiṣeṣika; l. 24 opponent.
	l. 24—25	Vaiṣeṣika; l. 25—26 opponent.
	l. 26—p. 287 l. 1	Vaiṣeṣika; p. 287 l. 1—7 opponens.
	l. 7—10	Vaiṣeṣika; l. 10 opponent; l. 10—16 Vaiṣeṣika.
59) Sound.	p. 289, l. 19	Importance of the <i>kaṣṭhavyāḥ</i> (wind emitted from the centre of the lungs) for the space through which sound is transmitted.

## Book V.

*Generality.*

2) Additional notes on generality.	p. 315, l. 5 p. 317, l. 24	The eternity of generality. [Translated here p. 501]. The denial of generality by the Buddhist. [Translated here p. 503].
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## SECTION 9.

Table A.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE  
KṢANABHANGAVĀDA.

(Nyāya-kandalī p. 73 l. 20).

We may distinguish three main divisions:

- A. General refutation of the thesis of momentary destruction 73, 20.
- B. The theory of momentary destruction repugned by the fact of human recognition 80, 7.
- C. The notion „*samsāra*” is incompatible with the Buddhistic theory of universal momentariness 82, 2.

## A.

We may subdivide division A into four parts.

## Part I.

73, 20. Buddhist: *Arthakriyā* shows itself as succession or simultaneity. As to the first point, something that is — that is lasting — cannot perform actions at different times. As concerns the second point see 74, 21.

73, 24. Opponent: Something that is — that is lasting — can indeed perform actions at different times, in as far as it has recourse to different subsidiaries at different times.

Buddhist: The applied subsidiary must at any rate give a certain additament to the lasting thing, otherwise the applied subsidiary might just as well remain absent. This additament is either distinct from the lasting being (*a*) or it is identical with it (*b*).

In the first case (*a*) we can reason thus. It follows from agreement and contrariety that not the lasting thing, but the additament is cause of the action. For the second case see 74, 4.

74, 1. Opponent: The lasting thing performs its action, when it is accompanied by its additament, produced by the applied subsidiary.

Buddhist: Does not the additament in its turn begin a new additament or does it do so? In the first case there is no question of accompaniment between the lasting thing



and its additament. In the second case regressus ad infinitum takes place.

- 74, 1. The additament, produced by the applied subsidiary, cannot be identical *b'* with the old being, as the latter can not arise anew.
- 74, 6. Opponent: The old being, which does not possess the additament, disappears and a new being, identical with the additament arises.
- Buddhist: By this you have proved what I had to demonstrate.
- 74, 7. Egression: dialogue between the Buddhist and his opponent on the notion: „subsidiary (*sahakārin*)”.
- 74, 20. Conclusion. Buddhist: Something that is — that is lasting — cannot perform actions at different times; succession of events is only possible, when all existence is momentary.
- 74, 21. Short argumentation for the thesis: something that is permanent, cannot perform its actions at the same time (cf. this table sub 73, 20).
- 74, 24. The two conclusions summarised: neither succession, nor simultaneity is possible for the permanent.

## Part II.

- 74, 25. 1) *Anumāna* for the Buddhistic thesis of the universal momentariness.
- 75, 1. 2) Objections on the part of the opponent: there is no *vipakṣa*, and thus one cannot demonstrate the *vyācṛti* concerning the *vipakṣa*.
- 75, 2. 3) Several subterfuges of the Buddhist:
- a. *Īñjiviṣṇāṇa* as an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) for the *vipakṣa*.
- 75, 10. b. *Stambhaḥ piṣāco na bhavati* as an example how one can predicate something with regard to an imperceptible object.
- 75, 17. c. New definition for *akṣayika* by which the Buddhist makes it seem as if the *akṣayika*, the existence of which he denies, were perceptible.
- 76, 4. d. Further examination of the argumentations given. The argumentative force of a *bādha* discussed. Can the concept ‘to be’ serve as terminus medius between the twelve *āyatana*s and momentariness? DHARMOTTARA’S opinion put aside.

## Part III.

- 76, 21. 1) A further consideration of the two notions *arthakriyā* and momentariness.
- 77, 5, 5) Refutation of the theory that permanence should signify the not-perceiving of the difference between very similar *kṣāṇas* succeeding each other without interruption.
- 77, 8. 3) Refutation of the *kṣāṇa*-theory and maintenance of the idea *sahakārin*.

## Part IV.

- 78, 8. 1) A full Buddhistic explanation of the argumentation: because beginning things are perishable, they must also be momentary.
- 78, 22. 2) Discussion between a Buddhist and a Vaiṣeṣika with respect to that point.

## B.

We may subdivide division *B* into three parts.

## Part I.

- 80, 7. Can one state of consciousness, called „recognitive perception” (*pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa*), relate to a previous as well as a present time?

## Part II.

- 81, 8. Is this recognitive perception illusionary? Does there exist any sublative cognition (*bādhaka*) with reference to the trustworthiness of this recognitive perception?

## Part III.

- 81, 12. Do we know the momentariness of things by direct data of knowledge (*anubhava*)? Reference to the author's *Tattva-prabodha* & *Tattvasamvādinī*.

## C.

- 82, 2. The Buddhist defends here the theory that the first thought of a new-born babe arises from the last thought of another series of states of consciousness. The Vaiṣeṣika refutes this theory and upholds the substantiality and eternity of soul.

Table B.

## DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE DISCUSSION OF DUALITY.

- (Nyāya-kandali p. 122 l. 23.)
- 122, 23. I. The duality of object and representation doubted by the Vijnānavādin:
- 122, 26. a. By reason of the difference in time that exists between the influencing object and the representation.
- b. For the reason that sense-organ and object are the cause of the representation, so that these two should be perceived in the representation.
- 123, 11. II. The duality of object and representation maintained by the Vaiṣeṣika.
- a. *Grāhya-grāhaka-bhāvaḥ* follows from *viśaya-viśayi-bhāvaḥ*.
- 123, 13. b. We always perceive a particular object, [whereas abstract thought has to do with objects in general, thus with classes]. That we should see thus particular objects, is a matter of *śābhāva*.
- 123, 16. c. The form of the objects penetrates the mind, where it gives its own form to the representation; [from the form of the representation we infer the form of the object, and so the object itself]:
- 123, 25. III. The problem concerning the notion *ākāra* formulated and examined by the Vijnānavādin.
- a. Do we perceive the object and its form (image, constitution, *ākāra*) at the same time? No.
- 124, 1. b. Do we perceive the object by means of the *ākāra*-possessing representation?
- 125, 1. c. Do we perceive the form of the object by means of the *ākāra*-possessing representation? Explanation of the *nirālambanatva-vāda*.
- 125, 5. Only the representation exists; an object corresponding to it, does not. Neither the thing, nor its causal relation to our consciousness, are perceived.
- 125, 22. The regular going together of *vedya* and *vedaka* prove their identity; the identity of *sārvajña* and *asārvajña* quoted as a *dṛṣṭānta*.
- 126, 11. The notion „duality” is an illusion and indeed the result of a beginningless *vāsanā*.

- 126, 25. III. The manifoldness of the world of our experience no reason for accepting duality of cognition and thing. The ideas *citra* and *sthāla* compared to each other.
- 127, 10. External things correspond to the ideas of the waking man just as little as to those of the sleeping.
- 127, 15. Possibility for reasoning on accepting the *nirālam-banatvacāda*. Illustration of the proposition: *avidyāto vidyāprāptih*.
- 127, 21. IV. Defence of realism by the Vaiçeśika.

Table C.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE PASSAGE ABOUT *SPHOṬA*.*Preliminary note.*

The *sphoṭa*-theory, attributed by tradition to Pāṇini, teaches that the becoming conscious of the word as a whole takes place immediately after the separate perceptions of the speech-sounds of the word, by means of a mind-action, not allowing more accurate description. This theory can just as well be united with the doctrine of the eternity of the word as with the doctrine of the perishability of it. On the other hand the *sphoṭa*-theory is rejected both by the Mīmāṃsakas<sup>1)</sup>, who adopt eternity and the Vaiṣeṣikas, who teach perishability. ÇRĪDHARA seems to have made use of different sources for his argumentation, without having sufficiently watched against inconsistencies.

*Survey of the discussion in the Nyāya-kandāṭī.*

Defender of the *sphoṭa*-theory.  
p. 268, 27.

I. The speech-sounds, coming into existence one after the other and separately, can originate no word-meaning. On the other hand a whole consisting of speech-sounds, is not possible, because the speech-sounds are perishable.  
p. 269, 3.

II. Even accepting that the speech-sounds and the words are eternal, even then, since the perception takes place sound after sound, the difficulty remains that there is not a single comprehensive perception.  
p. 269, 6.

III. The original order of speech-sounds is preserved in the

Opponent.

I. Such a whole exists, because the speech-sounds are eternal.

II. The impressions of the speech-sounds, deposited in memory, are the causes of the apprehension.

III. The perception of the last speech-sound, characterised by the

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. the long polemics, occurring in KUMĀRILA'S *Ġhṛāṇvārttika*, transl. p. 261—281.

remembrance; thus here is there neither one single comprehension, taking place during one moment. p. 269, 11.

IV. Order in the objective sounds is not possible, because [according to the opponent] these are eternal. A comprehension of remembrance would signify sublation of order. It is thus necessary to adopt the *sphoṭa*. p. 269, 21.

V. The rushing in the air, belonging to every speech-sound, reveals gradually, but indistinctly the *sphoṭa*. The traces of former object-impressions help to originate it afterwards completely.

p. 270, 7.

VI. One cannot explain the origin of word-signification in the human soul without adopting the existence of *sphoṭa*.

p. 270, 2.

VII. Speech-sounds alone cannot be the cause of the signification of word, because otherwise word-meanings would originate notwithstanding change in the sound-order, interchange of speaker, and an interval.

impression left behind by the preceding sounds, is this comprehension.

IV. The successive speech-sounds are not able to cause such a simultaneous *sphoṭa*.

V. Should first the speech-sounds be perceived as unreal impressions and then the *sphoṭa* as a real impression, so must one, just as in the case of optical illusion (mother-of-pearl for silver) become conscious of it. This, however, is not the case.

VI. The *sphoṭa*, as has been said, is not perceived. Should a not-perceived *sphoṭa* effect the beginning of word-signification, then word-significations would at all times arise in the soul. A not-perceived *sphoṭa* is like a flower in the sky.

VII. One should learn the causality of the phenomena from experience; this teaches us that the speech-sounds effectuate word-significations only under special circumstances. Because speech-sounds are eternal and omnipresent, therefore they can possess order and from difference in order difference in signification will ensue.

p. 270, 20.

VIII. The speech-sounds do not possess order, how could their order then be an accessory factor?

p. 270, 26.

IX. From impressions which have for contents sounds, the understanding of a word-meaning cannot originate, only a comprehension of sound could be their effect. (Quotation from MAYADANA).

VIII. The temporary speech-sounds do possess order. Refutation of the argument, given by the defender sub I: „the loose speech-sounds are not able to effectuate a word-signification.” Repetition of that which has been said sub II.

IX. There is no difficulty in attributing such a causal ability to the *saṃskāras* of the speech-sounds (cf. the answer sub VII beginning). Moreover one is obliged to make a similar supposition in the *śrīloṭa*-theory, where one thus falls into the logical fault, called *lāṭṭāṇ-gaurava*.

## SECTION 10.

## IDENTIFIED QUOTATIONS IN THE NYĀYA-KANDALĪ.

*A. Quotations from Kumārila's Ġlokavārttika.*

(References to the edition of the Chowkhambī Series).

	Ny. kand.		Cl. vārt.	
	p.	l.	p.	cl.
anītyatvaṃ vinācākhyam &c. ....	18,	9	569,	13
jñāpakatvād dhi sambandhaḥ ....	216,	1	647,	32
tatra yat pūrvaviññānam. ....	257,	22	396,	158
na hi tat karaṇam loke. ....	173,	15	507,	37
paricchedāntaram yo 'yam. ....	129,	10	172,	1)
bhrāntasyānyavivakṣāyām ....	132,	16	94,	161
yatrāsūlbhāraṇo dharmanas. ....	242,	10	375,	88
yady api smṛtihatutvam. ....	271;	10	536,	102
yāvanto yādṛcā ye ca. ....	270,	17	527,	69
vyāpakatvagrhitas tu. ....	248,	9	348,	7
sāmānyavac ca sādṛcyaṃ. ....	221,	6	444,	35
siddhaḥ ca gaur apohyeta. ....	320,	7	587,	83

*B. Quotations from Kumārila's Tantra-vārttika.*

			T. Vārtt.	
pūrvaviññānaviṣayaṃ &c. ....	257,	19	69,	18
phalāya vihitam karma. ....	274,	6	360,	1
çaktiḥ kāryaṇumeyā hi. ....	274,	18	372,	11

*C. Quotations from the Nyāyabhāṣya.*

(References to the edition of the Vizianagram Series).

			Ny. Bh.	
asati hetau kasya sādhanabhāvaḥ pradarcyate..	250,	23	44,	17

*D. Quotations from Ġvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhyakārikā.*

			S. k. n <sup>o</sup> .	
asadakaraṇād &c. ....	143,	23		9
evaṃ tattvābhyāsād ....	279,	4		64
tena nivṛttaprasavām ....	279,	23		65
samyagjñānādhighamād ....	284,	20		67

1) In the Nyāyaparāśara.



*E. Quotations from Patañjali's Yogasūtra and the Yogasūtrabhāṣya.*

	Ny. k.		Ny. Bh.	
	p.	l.	p.	l.
aparīṇāminā hi bhoktṛeaktir &c. . . . .	177,	22	Bh. II,	20
abhyāsavairāgyābhyām. . . . .	279,	2	S. I,	12
ahiṃsāsatyāsteva <sup>c</sup> . . . . .	278,	8	S. II,	30
kṛcākarmavipākāḥayair. . . . .	58,	3	S. I,	24
ṣruddho 'pi puruṣaḥ. . . . .	172,	2	S. II,	20
ḥaucasantoṣa <sup>o</sup> . . . . .	278,	10	S. II,	32

*F. Passages, quoted in the Nyāya-kandali and the Sarvaśaraṇa-saṃgraha.*

(References to the Poona-edition).

		S. d. s.	
arthena ghaṭayaty enām. &c. . . . .	123,	22	15, 12
kāryakāraṇabhāvad vā <sup>1)</sup> . . . . .	207,	8	5, 25
ghaṭo 'stīti na vaktavyam . . . . .	319,	11	35, 8
pramāṇetara-sāmānya <sup>o</sup> . . . . .	255,	18	7, 5
bhedaḥ ca bhrāntivijñānair <sup>2)</sup> . . . . .	126,	17	13, 15
yat sat, tat kṣaṇikam. . . . .	74,	26	10, 5
vikalpo vastutirbhāṣād. . . . .	190,	18	18, 19

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. L. DE LA VALLÉE POISSIN. *Muséon* II, p. 57 n. 3.<sup>2)</sup> Cf. *ibidem* p. 182 n. 85 & SAHIC CANDRA VIDHYĀBHŪṢAṆA, *Medieval School*, p. 105 § 82.

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## CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS.

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### *The relative chronology of Vātsyāyana and Praçastapāda.*

P. 10 n. 1; p. 15 § 3; p. 28 sub 3; p. 174 l. 14 & 23.

Sūtra II, 2, 22 is quoted in the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya, although not in the paragraph on *saṃçaya* (III Ch. 2 § 16), still in connection with *hetu-ābhāsa* (III Ch. 2 § 37, p. 239 l. 11). This fact helps us to settle the relative chronology of VĀTSYĀYANA and PRAÇASTAPĀDA.

SUALI in his *Introduzione* (p. 31) considers it 'indubitabile' that Vātsyāyana precedes Praçastapāda, because the former is a faithful explainer and follower of GŌTAMA'S DARGAMA, whereas the latter is a reformer in his school.

BODAS (*Historical Survey of Indian Logic*, J.R.A.S., Bombay Br. XIX p. 332), on the other hand, is sure that Vātsyāyana quotes the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya. However Vātsyāyana's commentary on N.S. I, 1, 9 does not refer to Praç. Bh. I, 1 § 2, but to V.S., I, 1, 4. Bodas' error is based on his wrong admission that the last-mentioned aphorism did not yet exist in Praçastapāda's time; cf. here p. 107 § 3. A decisive argument for Sualì's opinion is the quotation of V.S. II, 2, 22 by Praçastapāda. For as I have shown (p. 174) this aphorism is an insertion, taken from the Nyāyabhāṣya; ergo Praçastapāda is posterior to Vātsyāyana.

### *The main dogmas of ancient Buddhism.*

P. 80 § 2.

The three first dogmas are all found in the *Mahāvagga*, respectively: M.V. I cap. I: M.V. I cap. VI § 19—28; M.V. I cap. VI § 36—46 (= *anatta-lakkhaṇa-sutta*).

### *The explanation of perception.*

P. 289 sub B.

Perception is discussed by KANĀDA in V.S. VIII, 1, 1—9, given here p. 285. In sūtra 5 there occurs an erratum, it should

be read: „In consequence of the non-existence of genus and species in genus and species, cognition [of them] is due to that alone.”

I here wish to give a new and I hope) clearer explanation of the sūtras 1—8. In the first place we must notice that NANDA LAL SINHA's translation of sūtra 5 is wrong; *tata eva* does not mean: 'due to that alone', i. e. due to substance only, but 'due to those alone', i. e. due to those genera and species only.

We can see that of the sūtras mentioned, sūtra 4 stands by itself and 5—8 form a group. In order to understand their meaning we must remember that the Vaiṣeṣikas, like the Buddhistic Sautrāntikas, explain perception as a causal process: and that causality is itself based either on conjunction, or inherence, or both relations combined (see here p. 141).

Thus sūtra 4 teaches: the substance which is conjoined with our sensory, causes an indirect connection (*samavikarṣa*) between its qualities or action and our sensory, and thus gives rise to knowledge concerning them.

Qualities and actions inhere in substances, but not in other qualities and actions (cf. here p. 533 sub 4); generality and difference inhere in *arthas* (i. e. substances, qualities and actions), but not in other generalities and differences. When we now perceive a substance (sūtra 7), then in the first place this substance is the agent in the causal process, and secondly it is distinguished from other substances by its qualities and actions (sūtra 7), by generalities and differences which inhere in it (sūtra 6). We distinguish qualities from each other, and similarly actions, not because other qualities and actions inhere in them (sūtra 5), but only in consequence of inherent generalities and differences (sūtra 6); we distinguish generalities and differences directly, without the help of other generalities and differences (sūtra 5).

So then this whole theory of perception is not based on experience, but is a deduction from the fundamental table of categories.

### *The axioms of logic.*

P. 335 § 5.

The axioms which European school-logic distinguishes, are not yet mentioned in Vaiṣeṣika Sūtra or Bhāṣya.

CRĪDHARA gives formulations of the *principia tertii exclusi & contradictionis*, although they are rather hidden in his argumentation. See Nyāya-kandālī p. 73 l. 22; p. 174 l. 7. p. 241 l. 20; p. 129 l. 25.

## ERRATA.

- P. 9 l. 7. *Read*: sporadically.
- P. 11 l. 6 from below. *Read*: grammar, as a science, as old as mathematics.
- P. 20 n. 1. See p. 289 sub *B*.
- P. 27 l. 5 from below. *Read*: to give this table in a more concise form so that it can easily be consulted in reversed order as well (see p. 545). He who uses this table, &c.
- P. 29 n. 1. *Read*: section IV. — Cf. p. 540 sub 4.
- P. 38 l. 4. " *çarāṣṛatubhāv ca*.
- P. 45 l. 3 from below. *Read*: implicitly *dharma*.
- P. 73 l. 3. " " *Add the note*. Cf. p. 375 sub 10.
- P. 86 l. 11. *Read*: cap. VI—XII.
- P. 86 l. 12. " *upādāna*.
- P. 90 l. 2 from below. *Read*: as the duality which.
- P. 93 l. 6. *Read*: a complex of thoughts.
- P. 97 l. 2 in § 2. *Read*: book II chapter V section 4, and see p. 314—323.
- P. 120 l. 15. *Delete*: mutatis mutandis; l. 27, *read*: *mad angad asat*.
- P. 129 l. 7. *Read*: chapter III section 1. p. 189.
- P. 134 l. 3 & 20. *Read*: component parts; l. 20, *read*: produced by.
- P. 136 l. 1. *Read*: book IV § 1; here p. 539.
- P. 147 l. 20. " VIII, 2, 1 & 2; — l. 28, *read*: Bh. III. 2 § 8, see here p. 219 & 220.
- P. 154 l. 24. *Read*: IV, 1, 1.
- P. 173 l. 6. " Bh. III, 2 § 16; — l. 18 *read*: *yathāḍeṣṭān* in sūtra 19.
- P. 177 l. 4 from below. *Read*: V.S. II, 2, 32.
- P. 181 l. 9. *Read*: V.S. VIII, 2, 5 & 6.
- P. 187 l. 3 from below. *Read*: In the sūtras 89, 92, 94, 95 and 100 five *pūrvapāṭya*-arguments... Each of the sūtras is &c.
- P. 203 l. 19. *Read*: the decline of the quality.
- P. 207 l. 3. " *jñātatā*.
- P. 209 l. 7 & 9. *Omit the brackets round* combination & combinative.
- P. 210 l. 2 from below. *Read*: II, I, 29.
- P. 219 l. 2. " " *andyaṁ pūrvāṇātā*.
- P. 225 l. 12. *Read*: V, 1, 16.
- P. 255 l. 8 from below. *The quotation ends with the word: pūrvapāṭyaḥ]*.
- P. 265 l. 17. *Read*: Bh. II chapter 1; — l. 2 from below V.S. VI. 2, 10.
- P. 288 l. 19 from below. *Read*: *sāmānasyatubhāvasya*.
- P. 307 l. 2 in § 1. *Read*: objects], because [conjunction].
- P. 458 under the title of fragment 39. *insert*: Ny.-kand. p. 204 l. 17.
- P. 489. " " " " " 49, " " " p. 228 l. 26.
- P. 568 after sūtra 94. *insert*: 96. [Sound must be permanent, says some one], because it is dwelt upon.



## Lines in remembrance of H. KERN and J. S. SPEYER.

I wish to express my gratitude towards Prof. SPEYER, who drew my attention to the Vaiçṣika System and encouraged my studies up to the last days of his life, and to Prof. KERN, who with Prof. W. CALAND recommended my work to the *Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam*, but to my regret by death was prevented from uttering his wishes concerning the final redaction.

B. FADDEGON.

*Doorn, October 8, 1918.*





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*"A book that is shut is but a block"*

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